

# JOINT PUB 3-05.5

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
## JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TARGETING AND MISSION PLANNING PROCEDURES




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Joint Pub 3-05.5  
10 AUGUST 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution List

Subject: Joint Pub 3-05.5, "Joint Special Operations  
Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures"

1. This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth procedures to guide the joint activities and employment of the Armed Forces of the United States in conducting joint special operations targeting and mission planning.

2. Recommendations for changes to this publication should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), Joint Staff, Washington, D.C. 20318-7000.

3. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal.

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7. The lead agent for this publication is the US Special Operations Command.

8. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is J-3.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

H. L. SHEFFIELD  
Captain, USN  
Secretary, Joint Staff

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Joint Special Operations Targeting and  
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K-1 thru K-14	O
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M-1 thru M-10	O
GL-1 thru GL-14	O

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JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS  
TARGETING AND MISSION PLANNING PROCEDURES

PREFACE

1. Purpose. This publication sets forth doctrine and selected tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) to govern the joint activities, and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by commanders of combatant commands and other joint force commanders, prescribes doctrine for joint force commanders, and provides military guidance for use by armed forces in preparing their respective detailed plans.

2. Application

a. Doctrine and TTP established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and the subordinate components of these commands. This doctrine and TTP also applies when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service, or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. In applying the principles and doctrine set forth in this publication, care must be taken to distinguish between distinct but related responsibilities in the two channels of authority to forces assigned to combatant commands. The Military Departments and Services recruit, organize, train, equip, and provide forces for assignment to combatant commands and administer and support these forces. Commanders of the unified and specified commands exercise Combatant Command (command authority) over these assigned forces. Service component commanders are responsible both to joint force commanders in the operational chain of command and to the Military Departments and Services in the chain of command for matters that the joint force commander has not been assigned authority.

c. This publication is authoritative but not directive. Commanders will exercise judgment in applying the procedures herein to accomplish their missions. These procedures should be followed, except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication takes precedence for the activities of joint forces

unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance.

3. Scope. This manual describes the special operations joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for the targeting and mission planning process. It identifies responsibilities and roles in directing, conducting, and supporting joint SO targeting and mission planning. It also provides guidance for the selection of targets and the development of associated targeting information required for the successful conduct of joint SO.

4. Basis. The development of Joint Pub 3-05.5 is based on the following primary sources:

a. Title 10, United States Code, and as specifically amended by:

(1) Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

(2) Cohen-Nunn Amendment to the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, as attached to the Defense Authorization Act, FY 1987.

b. DOD Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components."

c. MCM-64-92, 7 April 1992, "Unified Command Plan (UCP)."

d. JCSM-71-87, 29 May 1987, "Mission and Functions of the US Special Operations Command."

e. Joint Pub 0-2, 1 December 1986, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)--with Change 1, dated 21 April 1989."

f. Joint Pub 1-01, 30 July 1992, "Joint Publication System (Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Development Program)."

g. Joint Pub 1-02, 1 December 1989, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms."

h. Joint Test Pub 2-0, 3 June 1992, "Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations."

- i. Joint Test Pub 3-0, 10 January 1990, "Doctrine for Joint Operations."
- j. Joint Pub 5-03.1, draft, "Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPEs), Volume I (Planning Policy and Guidance)."
- k. Joint Test Pub 3-07, October 1990, "Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict."
- l. Joint Test Pub 5-0, 26 July 1991, "Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations."
- m. Joint Pub 3-05, 28 October 1992, "Doctrine for Joint Special Operations."
- n. Joint Pub 3-05.3, in revision, "Doctrine for Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures."
- o. Joint Pub 6-0, 3 June 1992, "Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Support to Joint Operations."

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## CHAPTER I

### SPECIAL OPERATIONS TARGETING AND MISSION PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES

#### 1. National Policy

a. The SO targeting and mission planning process supports national security policy and objectives at all echelons of command. SO are conducted in support of national and military objectives with the other aspects of military power.

b. SO targeting and mission planning objectives are based on various US Government policies that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff converts into general and specific tasks for the combatant commanders. The transformation of those tasks into operational plans requires military planners to:

(1) Be knowledgeable of national security strategy, national military strategy, and theater strategy.

(2) Ensure that the targeting and mission planning process remains fully supportive and integrated into various other cycles and processes; e.g., the intelligence and operations cycles, the resourcing process, and other Service planning cycles.

#### 2. References

a. Joint Pub 3-05 establishes the basic doctrine for the joint employment of SOF; contains the objectives and concepts for employment of SOF; describes the responsibilities of other Departments, agencies, and the Services as they relate to SO; provides planning guidance to the Services and combatant commands for the conduct and support of SO; and discusses the responsibilities of combatant commanders for the conduct and support of SO. Joint Pub 5-00.2 provides guidance on JTF planning as well as specific discussion of the purpose and functions of joint targeting coordination boards (JTCBs). The functions of this entity also exist in varying forms with varying responsibilities in support of each JFC.

b. Deployment planning, of which SOF will be a part, is discussed under the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) in Joint Pubs 5-03.1 (Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume I), 5-03.2 (Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II), and 5-03.21 (Volume II Classified Supplement). This publication focuses on the targeting and mission planning procedures of SOF already in place or slated for use in given areas of responsibilities (AORs). Accordingly, this document views SO targeting and mission planning requirements from the perspective of the SO mission executors--the mission planning agents (MPAs). This encompasses individual SO missions (e.g., direct action (DA), special reconnaissance (SR)) actually planned by MPAs for execution, whether the missions are conducted under JOPES or not.

c. JSCP, Annex A (Intelligence), Joint Pub 0-2, Chapter 3, Section V (Intelligence), Joint Pub 2-03 (Counterintelligence), and Joint Pub 3-05, Chapter V, paragraph 5c, provide more detailed responsibilities, policies, procedures, and principles for the timely provision of counterintelligence threat information and tailored intelligence to unified planning and operations.

### 3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

a. Approves SO targeting and mission planning doctrine and procedures as developed by USCINCSOC in accordance with Joint Pub 1-01.

b. Ensures combatant command, Service, and Intelligence Community support of the SO targeting and mission planning process.

### 4. Commander, US Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC)

a. Organizes, trains, equips, and provides forces for the conduct and support of special operations.

b. Develops SO targeting and mission planning doctrine and procedures in accordance with Joint Pub 1-01.

c. Develops intelligence requirements to support SO targeting and mission planning.

d. Coordinates with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to incorporate templated and/or generic SO collection, analysis, and production processes.



e. Develops concepts and determines program supporting requirements (e.g., personnel, communications, data handling systems, mobile facilities) to enhance the near-real-time flow of target intelligence and facilitate the effective peacetime exercise of the adaptive SO targeting and mission planning process (see Chapter IV).

f. Ensures that assigned forces respond in a timely manner to targeting and mission planning requirements established by supported JFSOCCs.

## 5. Theater Combatant Commanders

a. Develop targeting and mission planning concepts in accordance with this publication that integrate and deconflict SOF missions with missions of other components and agencies.

b. Develop and disseminate general campaign guidance and targeting objectives. (Guidance included in Section III of mission tasking package (MTP).)

c. Support SOF in the development of target intelligence resources.

d. Support SO requirements for intelligence and CI collection priorities and plans of execution.

e. Exercise SO targeting, time sensitive intelligence support mechanisms, and mission planning in crisis and combat scenarios as required to ensure responsiveness.

f. Ensure adequate all-source intelligence support to support SO targeting and mission planning.

## 6. Other Supporting Commanders

a. Incorporate support to SOF in planning mission requirements.

b. USTRANSCOM provides sea, air, and land transportation.

## 7. Defense Intelligence Agency

a. Integrates SO collection requirements into DIA collection plans.

b. Provides intelligence support for SO targeting and mission planning to the combatant commands and the Services.

c. Exploits intelligence supportive of SO missions.

d. Manages the provision of timely, all-source, tailored intelligence to support the deliberate and time-sensitive SO targeting and mission planning processes across the operational continuum.

8. Services. In cooperation with USSOCOM, ensure that SOF enhancement programs address operational shortfalls and limiting factors (e.g., personnel, weapons, equipment, training, logistics, communications) identified by Service MPAs as a result of mission planning.

9. Other Component Commanders

a. Nominate targets to the JFC for possible SOF employment.

b. As appropriate, ensure assigned and attached SOF respond to targeting and mission planning requirements established by the JFSOCC.

c. Develop supporting plans and procedures as required to support mission requests.

d. Direct Service component intelligence production agencies to respond to tasking by the combatant commander in support of Special Operations Mission Planning Folder SO targeting and mission planning.

e. Develop and disseminate specific targeting guidance and mission objectives for SO.

10. Joint Force Commanders. (when separate from the Theater Combatant Commander):

a. Establish and direct the SO target nomination process and exercise final approval of SO targets. The JFC may establish a JTCCB or similar body to perform the functions of a JTCCB.

b. Direct the development and maintenance of the SOMPFs. (See Appendix A.)

c. Develop targeting concepts that fully integrate SO.

d. Review and validate SO target nominations submitted by the JFSOCC.

e. Integrate and deconflict SO targeting and mission planning appropriately with attack options for other weapon delivery systems within the joint force areas of responsibility.

f. Coordinate and deconflict SOF missions with conventional force missions.

11. JFSOCC. The theater JFSOCC is normally the COMSOC and must maintain a long-term theater planning perspective. In a minor crisis or lesser regional contingency, the COMSOC may continue to function at the theater level. In these cases he normally establishes a JSOTF to serve as the JFSOCC for the current operation. In a major crisis or regional contingency, the COMSOC normally deploys as the JFSOCC.

a. Translate the JFC's operational plans and guidance into a supporting operation plan to provide a conceptual framework for SO targeting and mission planning.

b. Nominate SO targets to the JFC.

c. Develop SO target lists for validated targets in supporting operational plans.

d. Task MPAs to evaluate and develop a mission plan for assigned targets.

e. Task and coordinate SOMPF production and maintenance.

f. Provide SO theater intelligence and CI collection requirements to the JFC and assigned IPAs.

g. Develop and maintain statements of intelligence interest (SII) in accordance with DIA procedures; consolidate and forward component requests for information (RFIs).

h. Conduct periodic reviews of SOMPFs.

i. Prepare and provide the MTPs (Section II of the SOMPF) to SOC-designated MPAs. (See Appendix B.)

- j. Ensure coordination between SO elements and between SOF and supporting forces to develop FAs and POEs.
- k. Review and approve FAs and POEs for approval.
- l. Convene and chair a special operations target panel.
- m. Provide SO representation on the JFC's JTCB if established.
- n. Establish a SO target library that maintains all current and canceled (retained for reference) SOMPF and other targeting data.

12. USSOCOM Component Commands

- a. Monitor Service targeting and mission planning programs in support of the various combatant commanders as required to ensure program effectiveness.
- b. As appropriate, act as Service advocate on SO targeting and mission planning matters.
- c. As appropriate, ensure that assigned units respond to mission planning requirements assigned by theater JFSOCCs.

13. Special Operations Units

- a. Respond to SOC tasking for development of FAs and develop and maintain the POE.
- b. Nominate SO targets to the theater JFSOCC.
- c. Identify intelligence gaps to the JFSOCC regarding SO target materials development and maintenance. (These shortfalls should be covered in the TIP.)
- d. Maintain at least one copy of each approved SOMPF.
- e. Develop tasking from higher headquarters to the component commands.

## CHAPTER II

### CONCEPTS OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS TARGETING AND MISSION PLANNING

1. Assessment and Primary SO Missions. Appropriate SOF employment requires a careful assessment of SOF expertise and resources needed to conduct specific missions. SO mission plans are routinely dependent on more highly detailed intelligence and CI than conventional missions. The development of SO mission plans requires close coordination among staff elements at various levels, particularly intelligence, operations, logistics, communications, and plans and policy. SO targeting and mission planning support NCA direction and tasking, and JFCs. SOF may be used to influence enemy or friendly behavior. The suitability of a target for SOF is detailed in Joint Pub 3-05, "Doctrine for Joint Special Operations," Chapter IV. Primary SO missions are described below:

a. SOF direct action operations are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions, but can include multiunit operations to seize, destroy, or inflict damage on a specific target; or to destroy, capture, or recover designated personnel or materiel. They can involve unilateral DA or terminal guidance. In the conduct of these operations, SOF may employ raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics; place mines and other munitions; conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or waterborne platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions; and conduct independent sabotage.

b. Special reconnaissance is any mission of reconnaissance or surveillance actions conducted to obtain or verify, by visual observation or other collection methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy, or to secure information concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. SR operations include target acquisition, area assessment, and poststrike reconnaissance.

c. Unconventional warfare encompasses a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source.

d. Foreign internal defense is the participation by civilians and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. The SOF role in FID is to train, advise, and assist host nation military and paramilitary forces. FID can include tactical operations that focus on neutralizing and destroying insurgent threats. Planners should recognize that operational commanders do not command host nation forces.

e. Counterterrorism actions are offensive measures taken by civilian and military agencies of a government to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. SOF apply specialized capabilities to preempt and resolve terrorist incidents abroad.

2. Collateral Activities. Collateral activities are applications of SOF capabilities in other than primary mission areas. The collateral activities for which SOF are particularly well suited include security assistance, humanitarian assistance, antiterrorism and other security activities, counterdrug operations, personnel recovery, and special activities. (Joint Pub 3-05 contains further discussion of collateral activities.) The JFROBC assists the theater combatant commander in identifying collateral activities that capitalize on the inherent capabilities of SOF within the constraints of their availability. In any theater, the number of possible collateral activities is unlimited. The JFSOCC should discourage the use of SOF for collateral activities when conventional forces are available and capable of performing the mission to standard. When tasked, SOF analyze the situation, adapt to it, and apply their capabilities as appropriate. The responsibilities of the JFSOCC for SOF conducting collateral activities are the same as for SOF conducting primary missions.

3. Operational Mission Taskings. Theater-specific mission taskings may be beyond the scope of primary SO missions. Such taskings affect the training of forces apportioned to that theater but will not affect SOF worldwide (as would a change in doctrine). The JFSOCC must clearly communicate theater-specific requirements so that USCINCSOC can prepare forces to meet the needs of the theater combatant commander. An example of such an operational mission tasking was the SF coalition warfare mission during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. In this case, the Commander in Chief of US Central Command (USCINCCENT)

identified the requirement for providing liaison and training and advisory assistance to maintain cohesion among the coalition partners. As the JFSOCC, the commander of the Special Operations Command, Central (COMSOCCENT) advised USCINCCENT that SOF capabilities required to conduct FID and UW would be applicable to this requirement. As a result, SF were tasked and performed the operational mission under the OPCON of Third US Army. After the operation, the SF soldiers involved reported that the rapport-building skills developed during UW training exercises were critical during their initial contacts.

4. Targeting. Targeting is the function of evaluating the enemy's intent and capabilities with respect to the commander's mission and objectives, and identifying and nominating critical enemy activities, situations, capabilities or resources that are vulnerable to military operations (Joint Pub 2-0). Targeting combines intelligence and operations. It represents the integration of intelligence threat information, the target system, and target characteristics with operations data on friendly force posture, capabilities, weapon effects, objectives, rules of engagement, and doctrine. Targeting matches objectives and guidance with inputs from intelligence and operations to identify the forces necessary to achieve those objectives. This includes all lethal and nonlethal applications of force.

a. SO and psychological operations (PSYOP) targeting considerations include, but are not limited to, the political, military, economic, and psychological impacts on the capability and morale of the armed forces and civilians targeted. In FID or nation-building, medical, dental, and veterinary needs of an objective country are vital considerations. Civil affairs activities encompass political, social, economic, ideological, and security functions. From the integration of the above factors, targeting recommendations are made to use SOF for particular targets in support of a theater campaign plan's long- and short-term objectives.

b. SOF must be synchronized with other missions to achieve desired strategic and operational objectives. Examples of this synchronization include:

(1) Integration of SO infiltration, exfiltration, and target attacks.

(2) Integration of SR, DA, and UW operations against a specified target system, e.g., rail net.

(3) Integration of SO attacks and those of other components, e.g., SO attacks against a rail net are timed so that the stalled trains are subsequently destroyed by air interdiction.

(4) Integration of SO attacks and the overall campaign, e.g., the decision to use SO attacks against a rail net must be weighed against the need to use that node for subsequent transport of friendly troops and supplies.

c. The JFC may delegate targeting activities to a JTCCB.

(1) If the JFC designates, a JTCCB may be an integrating center for the targeting effort or a JFC level review mechanism. In either case, it needs to be a joint activity, comprised of representatives from the staff, all components, and if required, their subordinate units. The JTCCB reviews target information, develops target guidance and priorities, and may prepare and refine joint target lists (see Joint Pub 5-00.2.) The JTCCB should maintain a complete list for areas beyond the FSCL of restricted targets and areas where SOF are operating to avoid endangering current or future operations.

(2) To ensure appropriate support, deconfliction, and coordination is provided for SO missions, membership should include a senior J-2 target analyst, J-3 and J-5 operations planner, staff judge advocate members from the SOC and/or components, and when appropriate, representatives from PSYOP and CA.

(3) Final target approval and authority for SO missions rests with the JFC. In NCA-directed time-sensitive SO targeting situations (see Chapter IV), targeting functions are conducted at the national level and a JTCCB may not be involved.

5. Target Analysis. Target analysis is an examination of potential targets to determine military importance, priority of attack, scale of effort, and weapons required to obtain a desired level of damage or casualties.



a. Target system analysis is a systematic approach to determine enemy vulnerabilities and weaknesses to be exploited. It determines what effects will be achieved against target systems and their activities. A target analysis must review the systems and their interactions between components and elements of a target system to determine how the system works and, subsequently, how to attack that system so it becomes inoperable.

b. Critical system analysis focuses on total interaction and interrelationships among multiple target systems. The objective is to determine the most effective way to influence or affect the enemy systems in the most timely and efficient manner.

6. Targets Analysis Definitions. In intelligence usage, a target is a country, area, installation, agency, or person against which intelligence operations are directed. This definition covers most, but not all, of the military, economic, political, or psychological objectives that can be nominated and/or designated for the purposes of destruction, damage, degradation, disruption, neutralization, removal, exploitation, surveillance, or training by SO, PSYOP, or CA forces.

a. A single target may be significant because of its own characteristics. Most often, its importance lies in its relationship to other targets. A systematic examination and evaluation of potential targets requires a vocabulary diverse enough to accommodate a hierarchical system of definitions. The following is a hierarchical set of target definitions used in target analysis.

b. A target system is all the targets situated in a particular geographic area that are functionally related. It also can be a group of targets so related that their destruction will produce a particular effect desired by the attacker. A target system can also be viewed as all targets that encompass the entire system under consideration, which broadens the definition to include SOF missions like FID. It may be international in scope (e.g., international banking) and may include modifying behavior or influencing and altering attitudes vice destruction. Examples of target systems include:

- (1) Air transportation systems.
- (2) Port facilities.

- (3) Highways.
- (4) Railways.
- (5) Waterways.
- (6) Command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) complexes or networks.
- (7) Bulk electric power supplies.
- (8) Bulk water supplies.
- (9) Air defense networks.
- (10) Bulk petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) supplies.
- (11) Missile and satellite launch facilities.
- (12) Economic infrastructure.
- (13) Social welfare infrastructure.
- (14) National health infrastructure.
- (15) Attitudes of social groups.
- (16) Political infrastructure.

c. A target subsystem is a major element of a target system. Generation, transmission, and distribution are subsystems of a bulk electric power supply system.

d. A target complex is a geographically integrated series of target concentrations. A target complex may be a subset of a target subsystem. It consists of related facilities and activities that are located in the same general vicinity. Within a target complex, individual targets will be identified. Ports, airfields, and electric generating plants are examples of target complexes.

e. A target system or complex can be broken down into smaller units called target system components. Each of these may also be a target. A target system component belongs to one or more groups of industries or basic utilities required to produce individual components of an end product. For example, in the POL target system, the atmospheric distillation area of an oil refinery may be considered a target system component.

f. Target components (also known as target elements) are smaller, more intricate parts of the target that are necessary to the operation of the target as a whole. A target component is any machinery, structure, personnel, or other productive asset that contributes significantly to the operation or output of the target system, complex, or target. Catalytic cracking towers, radars, POL pump stations, and turbine-generator halls are examples of target components.

g. Target components can be further subdivided by criticality and vulnerability.

(1) A target critical damage point (also known as a critical node) is that part of the target component that is the most vital. Examples would include a transformer, generators, or control van or building at an early warning/ground-controlled intercept (EW/GCI) site.

(2) Given the detail of SO targeting, a target stress point (also known as the vulnerable node) may be identified as the weakest area on the critical damage point. Examples would include a key valve, control panel, or transformer insulators.

h. The definitions presented above can be illustrated with the example of an EW/GCI site. The target system is the national air defense network. The target subsystem is the air defense sector or zone in which the site is located. The target complex is the EW/GCI site itself. The target system component is the acquisition area of the EW/GCI site. The target component is a key communications van that relays enemy aircraft detection data to a major air defense command post located elsewhere. The target critical damage point is that particular part of the van which, if penetrated by a given weapon, would destroy the target stress point--a computer--vital to the operation of the entire site.

i. Objectives of UW and FID are broad in scope. Entire target systems may be allocated for UW attack and the specific targets chosen based on the ability of indigenous force capabilities. A target system for FID would be picked based on host-country needs for SOF assistance and training.

7. Target Analysis Methodologies. Target analysis must simplify a complex environment into relatively small measurable factors. Basic target analysis involves qualitative decision making. Fortunately, there are numerous quantitative techniques to assist those decisions. To perform target analysis, those who select SO targets must evaluate the impact on the enemy's political, military, and economic operations and on the psychological reactions. Joint Pub 3-05, Appendix D, "Joint Special Operations Planning Guidance," presents a series of factors that should be weighed when considering SOF employment. A common method used for SO target analysis is CARVER: criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability. This acronym captures the criteria which analyze a SOF target.

a. Criticality. Criticality, or target value, is the primary consideration in targeting. A target is critical when its destruction or damage would significantly impair an enemy's political, economic, or military operations. It may also be critical to observe a target in a SR mission (e.g., a key road junction for signs of major enemy movement). Individual targets within a target system must be considered in relation to other elements of that system. The value of a target may change as the situation develops, requiring the use of time-sensitive targeting methods (see Chapter IV).

b. Accessibility. In order to damage, destroy, or conduct surveillance of a target, SOF must be able to reach it, either physically or via indirect (i.e., standoff weapons or surveillance) means. During SR missions, SOF must not only be able to reach the target, but must often remain there for a time period. Finally, SOF must be able to exfiltrate out of the target area.

c. Recuperability. In the case of DA missions, it is important to estimate how long it will take the enemy to repair, replace, or bypass the damage inflicted on the target. Recuperability is a vital supporting element of criticality. A target may not be lucrative for SOF employment if it can be repaired, replaced, or bypassed in a short time with minimum resources.

d. Vulnerability. A target is vulnerable if SOF have the means and expertise to conduct the planned mission and achieve the desired level of damage or other objectives as assigned.

e. Effect. For targets of more purely military value (e.g., munitions depots; headquarters complexes; POL facilities; lines of communication (LOCs); and command, control, and communications (C3) complexes), the impact of both attacking (or surveilling) the target and achieving the desired results must be assessed. For targets that are critical in both the military and civilian regimes, the political, economic, legal, and psychological effects of the mission must be evaluated as well as the impact of target destruction on the health and welfare of the indigenous civilian population.

f. Recognizability. The target must be identifiable under various weather, light, and seasonal conditions and configurations (if applicable) without being confused with other targets or target components. Sufficient data must be available for SOF to differentiate the target from similar objects in the target area. The same requirement exists to distinguish the target's critical damage points and stress points from their parent structures and surroundings.

8. Other Targeting Considerations. Targets are classified as strategic, operational, and tactical. The terms "strategic, operational, and tactical targets" are not standardized within the Department of Defense and are applicable only in the context of this publication. The implications of collateral damage may have a large impact on SO targeting of specific military targets.

a. Strategic targets are vital to the enemy's overall political, military, and economic operations or psychological stability. The objective of a mission against such a target is to severely impede the enemy's capability to carry on with the theater or overall war effort (e.g., a key industrial facility or critical material or stockpiles). The use of SOF against strategic targets in large-scale conflict is part of the combatant commander's theater strategy. SOF employed in a DA, SR, or UW role contribute to the commander's strategic objectives (see Joint Pub 3-05).

b. Operational targets are deemed critical to the enemy's capability to conduct successful campaigns. Such targets include logistic and C3I actions required to support and direct tactical operations. For example, the employment of an SOF unit in a DA or SR role against an operational target can support a major operation and, ultimately, the overall campaign plan of the JFC.

c. Tactical targets affect the enemy's capability to conduct battles on a relatively localized basis. Tactical military ground targets usually extend no higher than divisional level. Typical SO tactical targets would include command posts, individual ships, police stations, local telephone exchanges, and individual aircraft. SOF employed in a UW or FID role may be tasked to attack or reconnoiter a tactical target using indigenous forces or to exploit a particular aspect of the enemy's economic, psychological, or operations base.

d. Considerations. Commanders and planners must consider how a successful mission will affect the enemy's ability to function effectively at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Generally, strategic targets will have the greatest value to the JFC and tactical the least, but strategic targets are rare and tactical ones plentiful. On the other hand, the missions of a JTF may focus more on operational or tactical targets. The category and type of target will influence the employment of SOF within the theater to meet the JFC's objectives.

9. Timing of Actions Against Targets. The timing of action taken against a target is an important consideration. Given the estimates of the enemy conduct of operations versus the JFC's plans and objectives, targets developed during both deliberate (long-term, usually peacetime operations) and time sensitive (short-term, hostilities other than war or war) mission planning can be evaluated and executed as either initial or follow-on targets. Those developed during time sensitive mission planning are usually follow-on targets. Time-sensitive target type include emerging and increasing value targets. The deliberate planning process is the focus of Chapter III. Time-sensitive planning, with particular emphasis on time-sensitive and emerging targets is specifically covered in Chapter IV.

a. Initial targets are targets that have been validated as part of an operational plan. They must be struck early in a conflict to affect adversely the enemy's activities and benefit friendly operations. Initial targets may be strategic, operational, or tactical. In peacetime, target planners must analyze target systems to identify the critical complexes and specific targets that could affect the outcome of the JFC's operational plans.

b. Follow-on targets are either in an operational plan or emerge as the campaign progresses and are addressed subsequent to the initial attack. This may be the result of resource availability, the concept of the operation, or the development of new targets.

c. Emerging Targets. New targets associated with a developing crisis or ongoing combat operations should be assessed using the JFC's objectives. These targets may be fixed or mobile. Examples include field headquarters, logistic support areas, a building being used to hold hostages, a downed pilot, or the first appearance of a new weapon system.

d. Increasing-Value Targets. Some previously identified, low-priority targets may increase in value during a crisis or combat and require allocation of resources. Examples of increasing-value targets are an air defense site that threatens to interfere with the execution of a mission, a bridge subsequently used to support enemy troop movements, or a naval combatant previously under repair that is later assessed as combat ready.

10. Mission Planning. There are three principles of SO mission planning for specific targets (Joint Pub 3-05).

a. Specific targets or mission assignments for SOF should always contribute substantially to the strategic or campaign plan being executed. Limited resources and the extensive planning required dictate that a commander selectively employ SOF for high priority operations. Further, the sensitivity of many SOF missions may force the NCA to place specific political, legal, time-of-day, geographic, or force size constraints upon the employing and supporting force.

b. SOF missions are complete packages--insertion, resupply, fire and maneuver support, extraction--to be thoroughly planned before committing the force. The nature of the target, enemy and friendly situation, and environmental characteristics of the operational area are key planning factors. They will dictate the size and capability of the assigned force, the nature of tactical operations, methods of insertion and extraction, length of force exposure, logistic requirements, and size and composition of the command and support structure. Although operational planning must focus on the objective, limiting intelligence and environmental information to the target area will not meet SOF requirements.

(1) SO targeting and mission planning must be conducted in coordination with all applicable theater and/or task force agencies through the appropriate JFC. During an ongoing crisis (hostilities other than war) or during sustained combat (war), conventional targeting and strike response time for ordnance delivery is extremely quick and may affect SOF infiltration routes, hide sites, or target areas. Conventional force planners must be involved during the early planning stages to facilitate coordination and deconfliction of all assets and to allocate conventional resources to support and augment SOF activities, and vice versa. SO mission planning must be supportive of, and supported by, all applicable aspects of the combatant commander's operational plans.

(2) Detailed targeting and mission planning is vital to successful mission execution and to the survival of deployed operational elements. Based on assigned strategic objectives and operational direction provided by the JFC, the SOC, or other component commanders, the JFSOCC gives mission guidance to the subordinate SOF commander, providing him with the basis for the development of a comprehensive mission plan that allows for the flexible execution required by SOF.

c. SO rarely can be repeated if they at first fail, since SO targets normally are perishable either from a military or political viewpoint. Therefore, thorough, detailed, and, whenever possible, repeated rehearsal is critical. These rehearsals should be conducted with the exact force to be committed and under the same time and distance constraints in an environment whose terrain and weather conditions closely approximate the operational area. A by-product of such rehearsal is that the operational element absorbs alternative courses of action and is better able to adapt to changed circumstances during the mission. Commanders should recognize and plan for such preparation time.

11. Intelligence Support. Timely, detailed, tailored, integrated, prioritized, rapidly updated, and focused intelligence is vital to the SO targeting and mission planning process. Existing national, theater, and command intelligence structures must be used to avoid confusion and duplication of efforts given limited production assets.



a. Timely. SOF must have ready access to the intelligence needed to plan and execute their assigned missions. Much of the general intelligence required for SO mission planning is already available within the US Intelligence Community. However, many "target specific" items require more collection, research, analysis, and textual elaboration than normally afforded to conventional mission planning.

b. Detailed and Tailored. In general, increasing the sophistication and complexity of a target, increases the level of detail and accuracy in intelligence. Most SO missions require more extensive and precise intelligence than conventional and nuclear missions planning. A key to effective SO intelligence support is thorough exploitation of the intelligence system to answer all essential elements of information (EEI) for the particular mission being planned. To do this, SO operators and their organic intelligence personnel must work with the intelligence agencies to sensitize the Intelligence Community to SO requirements. Intelligence requirements, EEIs, and requests for information (RFI) assist production agencies in understanding the detailed nature of intelligence needed in the target intelligence package (TIP). Target-specific intelligence not available may require analogies or estimates drawn from similar targets in the same region. Additionally, SO require more extensive graphic portrayal of information than other conventional operations. This reduces the time required by mission planners to assimilate information. Graphic presentation of the target also reduces rehearsal time and improves speed and precision during execution. Greater emphasis is placed on target area replicas or models, scale mock-ups, diagrams, and annotated imagery products.

c. Integrated (Fused). The JFSOCC J-2 is responsible for ensuring that SO intelligence and CI requirements are identified to, and understood by, the JFC J-2; the JFC J-2 is responsible for validating and satisfying these requirements. The comprehensive intelligence and CI that results from fusion of various disciplines (i.e., SIGINT, IMINT, and HUMINT) is essential to SO mission planning. HUMINT is especially valuable to provide details specified by EEIs. Counterintelligence can provide SO planners information for use by teams upon arrival in a hostile environment. SR capabilities, in those cases where their use would be both feasible and appropriate, can provide necessary

detailed intelligence and operational information. National agency liaison officers (e.g., those of DMA, NSA, DIA, CIA, CIO) resident in theater intelligence organizations are essential for ensuring that theater requirements will be addressed as efficiently as possible at the national level.

d. Prioritized. SO intelligence requirements will be prioritized in the context of overall theater production capabilities. This arrangement recognizes time constraints limiting an Intelligence Community response to a continuing best estimate on which targeting and mission decisions must be made. Therefore, MPAs should prioritize requirements and provide justification for particularly detailed requirements. The theater combatant commander and the JFSOCC are responsible for making intelligence support responsive during the deliberate targeting process and through follow-on efforts that demand time-sensitive targeting solutions.

e. Rapidly updated. Reliable, secure communications among the combatant commander's intelligence staff, components, and production agencies should be established and maintained throughout any crisis, conflict, or war. These secure communications should extend to the Service SOF components (ARSOC, NAVSOC, AFSOC) as well and provide for secure voice, data transfer, and imagery transfer between SOF components and the JFSOCC. Enhanced use of automated message processing and dissemination, imagery transmission, and intelligence analysis is essential.

f. Focused. Greater focus and in-depth analysis of social, political, economic, and demographic factors are required for SOF missions. An emphasis on the noncombatant dynamics within the society is important for FID and UW (see Appendixes F and K).

## CHAPTER III

### DELIBERATE SPECIAL OPERATIONS TARGETING AND MISSION PLANNING

1. General. Deliberate planning refers to planning for a hypothetical situation involving the deployment and employment of apportioned forces and resources projected to be available. Deliberate mission planning relies on assumptions regarding the political and military situation that will exist when the plan is implemented. Deliberate mission planning is applicable across the operational continuum. Normally, the JFSOCC develops supporting operational plans during the deliberate planning process (see Joint Pub 3-05.3). These plans initiate the targeting and mission planning cycle.

a. Deliberate targeting and mission planning are normally conducted in peacetime. National security policy is formulated by the NCA and conveyed through CJCS guidance to the combatant commanders, who build operational plans. In theater, most targets are nominated by the component commanders (and approved by the combatant commander) to support the operational plans. Assets (including SOF MPAs) are identified to plan and keep current individual missions until they are either executed or discarded.

b. Deliberate targeting and mission planning can be applicable in a protracted crisis situation, such as the lengthy process leading up to Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama. Finally, deliberate targeting and mission planning can apply in wartime as part of a theater campaign plan, exemplified by Operation OVERLORD against Normandy, which included lengthy mission planning and rehearsals by all concerned, including the Rangers, or unilaterally against strategic or operational targets such as the SO Executive DA and UW operations against the German Heavy Water Project in Norway.

2. The Targeting Cycle. The targeting cycle (Figure III-1) portrays an analytical, systematic approach focusing on the targeting process that supports operational planning to achieve the objectives of the JFC. There are six phases in the targeting cycle; tasking and execution have been added to Figure III-1 to show a complete mission. This cycle applies to deliberate and time-sensitive SO targeting and is used to select targets for all assets, including SOF, available to the JFC.




Figure III-1. Targeting Cycle

a. Phase 1: Objectives and Guidance. Objectives and guidance originate at the national level as broad concepts. The JFC refines those concepts applicable to the assigned AOR into additional objectives and guidance embodied in specific operational plans. Target development flows from objectives and guidance reflected in operational plans and statements of a commander's intent.

b. Phase 2: Target Development. The target development process entails the identification of targets by all levels of command to support the JFC's objectives and operational plans. Target development includes assessing enemy capabilities, determining enemy vulnerabilities, and recommending the most appropriate nodes of enemy target systems for attack, reconnaissance, or exploitation. Component commanders nominate targets to the JFC. Nominations are evaluated by a JTCB, if used, to ensure targets meet the commander's objectives and are deconflicted with targets assigned to other components. The target development process results in target nomination lists, which are approved by the theater combatant commander or JFC for approval. The JFSOCC (usually through the use of a JFSOCC target panel (Figure III-2)) reviews target nominations and assigns mission planning agents to conduct feasibility assessments.

c. Phase 3: Weaponneering. Weaponneering is analysis of weapons and weapon systems available and the scale of effort (number of each) required to obtain the desired level of damage. Lethal and nonlethal alternatives are considered during this phase. Weaponneering can occur at various levels of command.

(1) Before nominating targets to the JFC, the components assess damage required on a target using the Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual--Special Operations (JMEM-SO). In some cases, the JFC's JTCB or staff also conducts a preliminary evaluation of the lethal force requirements using JMEM-SO before presenting the target nominations list to the commander for approval.

(2) Similar to lethal analysis, nonlethal alternatives should be considered to conserve assets, protect clandestine actions, or reduce collateral damage. Evaluation of all available assets and capabilities should be conducted to



III-4

Figure III-2 annotations:

1. JFC provides objectives and guidance to subordinates.
2. Component commanders nominate targets from various levels of command to JTCB.
3. JTCB uses MTL to task JFSOCC to perform FAs.
4. JFSOCC target panel assigns and tasks MPA to perform FA(s). Concurrently JFC tasks appropriate IPA with providing MPA with any additional intelligence required to perform FA. JTBB and/or JFSOCC task supporting agencies to perform IA(s).
5. MPA reviews IA(s) and completes FA. FA is forwarded to JFSOCC target panel for review.
6. JFSOCC target panel reviews FA and communicates feasibility to JTCB for approval.
7. JTCB select(s) feasible target(s), develops SO target list and directs JFSOCC to develop SOMPF and IPAs to develop TIP.
8. IPA develops and forwards TIP to MPA and notifies JFC and JFSOCC target panel of TIP completion.
9. JFSOCC target panel directs MPA by MTP to complete POE, nominate required forces, and appropriate supporting agencies to develop the MSPs.
10. MPA reviews and concurs with MSPs submitted from supporting agencies and completes POE. POE planners refine MICON, develop a detailed list of specific requirements, and assign notional forces.
11. MPA reviews and concurs with TIP and combines them with MSPs, FA, MTP, TIP, and POE and forwards them as SOMPF to JFSOCC target panel.
12. JFSOCC target panel reviews, approves, and maintains SOMPF.

ensure that the JFC knows all appropriate options (for example, Air Force, Navy, and SOF assets may each be able to conduct EW).

(3) The JFSOCC conducts some weapons analysis (usually delegated to the SOC target panel) or passes targets to the MPA, who will go into more detail on weaponeering when assigned the target.

(4) The Joint Targeting Coordination Group-Munitions Effectiveness (JTCG-ME) sponsors the JMEM-SO. The SO Working Group is chaired by an officer from USSOCOM-J3. Targets and weapons or weapon systems needing vulnerability assessment are solicited from the SO community before making the yearly schedule for national and contracted laboratories.

d. Phase 4: Force Selection. This phase of the targeting cycle is accomplished at the theater and component levels. At the theater level, the JFC's staff or JTCB will deconflict targets, missions, timing, etc., and make recommendations to the JFC on the forces being tasked to plan and execute the missions. At the component level, operators, target analysts, and planners work together to mate target, weapon system, munitions, and possible nonlethal force options to optimize force required in light of operational realities. The JFC will task the theater Service or functional components with their respective assigned targets. SO assets normally are assigned to the JFSOCC; however, in some cases, air and naval SO assets are assigned to other component commands. In these cases, targeting, mission planning, and tasking is through the appropriate component.

e. Phase 5: Mission Planning. As Figure III-1 indicates, the completion of force selection and tasking sets in motion a distinctive sequence of SO mission planning phases. Mission planning is the phase where SO, conventional, and nuclear forces differ the most. SO mission planning requires very detailed operational and intelligence data. The following procedures apply specifically to SO mission planning. This process is described as four separate steps but operational necessity may require some steps to begin before the preceding one is completed.



(1) Target Validation. JFSOCC tasks MPA to validate whether a target is appropriate for execution by SOF. MPA will assess the target's feasibility (capability of SOF to conduct the mission), suitability (appropriateness of SOF to conduct the mission), relative priority and risk associated with the target. MPA sends a mission tasking letter (MTL) to the JFSOCC, indicating the validated targets. The JFSOCC target panel studies the MTL then tasks MPA to conduct the FA (in some instances the JFSOCC conducts the assessment itself in lieu of designating a MPA). MPA prepares a FA (Appendix C), while supporting agency conducts an IA (Appendix D) to confirm the infiltration and exfiltration feasibility of the mission. Intelligence support agencies (tasked by the JFC) support the FA and IA as required. The FA and IA are preliminary in nature, emphasizing "off the shelf" data. However, experience has shown that those kinds of data alone may not suffice to complete the FA and IA. In most cases, some intelligence collection and production will be required. The FA and IA process needs to be completed before detailed target analysis begins to avoid using scarce resources on a target that may not be validated for SOF employment. The JFSOCC should delegate to MPA sufficient coordinating authority with supporting organizations (balanced against OPSEC concerns) to facilitate the most thorough FA and IA possible. If a target is validated for SOF by the JFC, the target is added to the MTL and the JFC sends a MTP (Appendix B) to the JFSOCC tasking the development of a SOMPF (Appendix A).

(2) Intelligence Production. Once a target is determined to be feasible, the JFSOCC requests (through the JFC J-2) that joint intelligence assets (assisted as necessary by CINCSOC's J-2 and DIA) prepare a TIP (Appendixes E: DA and SR, and F: FID and UW) incorporating the EEIs (Appendixes J: DA and SR; Appendix K: FID and UW; and Appendix L: Insertion and Extraction) submitted by the MPA to plan the mission.

(3) Plan Development. The next step, POE production, cannot progress very far until the MPA receives the finished TIP. Development of the POE by the MPA and mission support plans (MSP) by

mission supporting agencies begins production of the SOMPF (Appendix G for the POE and Appendix H for the insertion and extraction MSP). The POE, written by an operational element of the MPA, is a highly detailed (e.g., which way a given door opens, when the sentries are relieved, etc.) combination of the best operational and intelligence information available on the target and surrounding area. The MSP is written by the supporting agency that will be tasked to conduct the insertion or exfiltration should the mission be tasked. The JFSOCC is the final authority for approval of POE and MSPs. Exhaustive POE rehearsals and demonstrations should be conducted in the field and shortfall assessments should be assessed continually. Upon completion of the POE and rehearsals, the SOMPF (i.e., MTL, FA, TIP, MSP, and POE) should be packaged by the MPA and sent to the JFSOCC. Once approved by the JFSOCC the SOMPF will be maintained and periodically updated by the JFSOCC as long as the target remains valid for SOF employment.

(4) Execution Planning. The fourth step is implemented when the mission is to be executed. Execution planning involves updating of required operational and intelligence EEIs (see Appendixes J, K and L.) For SOF this translates to MPA-team "isolation." Isolation activities include last-minute mission planning, coordination briefings with insertion and extraction assets, individual training, rehearsals, adjustments in mission plan, equipment preparation, and rest or sleep immediately preceding insertion into the target area. Intelligence and operational updates should continue until the target is prosecuted. Execution mission planning assumes the characteristics of time-sensitive planning as execution nears. Mission execution occurs upon receipt of an execute order.

f. Phase 6: Combat Assessment. In the final phase, the JFSOCC conducts a timely review of the executed mission to determine if the SOF element accomplished mission objectives. SO participates in combat assessment through debriefs of SOF after missions are completed. Mission success is gauged by whether the targeted enemy facilities, forces, actions, and/or capabilities were affected as desired. A review of battle damage assessment (for DA missions) is critical to the JFC who can change the course of action or order restrikes in response to the current tactical situation. In that case, the targeting cycle is reinitiated at the most appropriate phase.

## CHAPTER IV

### TIME-SENSITIVE SPECIAL OPERATIONS TARGETING AND MISSION PLANNING

1. General. Time-sensitive planning refers to planning for the deployment and employment of allocated forces and resources that occurs in response to an actual situation. Time-sensitive mission planning is applicable across the operational continuum. Time-sensitive SO targeting and mission planning demand flexibility in the targeting cycle. The ability to meet changing situations with the time, intelligence, and manpower available is critical. Contingency targeting and mission planning may be either deliberate or time-sensitive in nature, while crisis and combat mission planning are normally time-sensitive. Many small-scale operations, such as Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada or other NCA-directed operations, have emphasized time-sensitive mission planning. In other cases, such as Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama, sufficient time was available to conduct deliberate targeting and mission planning, subject to rapid, pre-mission execution updating. Figure IV-1 illustrates the time-sensitive planning process.

2. Time Sensitivity. Time-sensitivity can play an important part in categorizing a target and determining its appropriateness as a SO target. Time-sensitivity can be viewed from either a targeting or mission planning perspective or a combination of both, as in the case of personnel recovery missions.

a. A target is time-sensitive when it requires an immediate response because it poses (or will soon pose) a danger to friendly forces or is highly lucrative, fleeting target of opportunity. Time-sensitive targets are usually mobile, such as a mobile ICBM, or they may lose their value quickly, such as a bridge being used for an enemy advance or withdrawal.

b. A mission is time-sensitive when there is an operationally small time window during which the objective of the mission must be attained. In this case, the target may be available for SOF attack or reconnaissance over a long period, but the value is high only at a specific time. Examples of this include a radar site just before an airborne assault or an airstrike mission penetrating the area. If the site is attacked too soon, the radar may be repaired or replaced. If the attack is too late, the friendly air

mission may be detected. Another example is reconnaissance of chemical or nuclear storage facilities to assess indications of preparation for use.

c. Employment of SOF against time-sensitive targets can be difficult. However, SOF training and abilities are well suited to the need for precise execution of time-sensitive missions. No mission should be declared feasible or infeasible for SOF based solely on time-sensitivity. A careful evaluation should be made of time available versus SOF preparation time required to ensure both reasonable probability of mission success and force survivability.

3. Time-Sensitive SO Targeting and the Targeting Cycle. The targeting cycle is illustrated in Figure III-1. The SO time-sensitive targeting process will compress and/or truncate these phases. Normally, SOF require 96 hours in advance of a mission to conduct time-sensitive planning. If the situation does not permit the JFSOCC to perform normal execution planning, component commanders must determine minimum essential preparation tasks and modify normal procedures to complete these tasks in the time available. Component commanders inform the JFSOCC when inadequate mission preparation time has caused an unacceptable degree of risk of mission failure.

a. Phase 1: Objectives and Guidance. The MITASK initiates the time-sensitive SO planning process and should be sent a minimum of 96 hours before the EALT. The MITASK should be transmitted within 4 hours of mission receipt. Guidance usually is passed from the JFC to the JFSOCC by a MITASK. The MITASK may task new targets or preplanned targets requiring planning updates from an existing target list or SOMPF. The MITASK will grant DIRLAUTH between the MPA and IPA. Upon MITASK receipt the JFSOCC analyzes the mission for tasks and feasibility and then sends a MITASK to the MPA(s), supporting agencies, and IPA and authorizes DIRLAUTH between requisite organizations. IPAs update TIPS as required. The MITASK and subsequent planning may be kept within focal point channels for sensitive missions. The IPA provides the MPA and supporting agencies with all immediately available intelligence within 12 hours of MITASK receipt.

b. Phases 2 and 3: Target Development and Weaponneering. These two phases, comprising target analysis, will be conducted more briefly, with less detail and more fragmentary data under time-sensitive


targeting conditions. The MPA begins its estimate process and mission concept (MICON) development, and coordinates with the supporting agencies to examine insertion and extraction options. The IPA forwards new intelligence products as they become available. No later than 72 hours before the EALT, the MPA transmits the mission concept (MICON) to the JFSOCC, with information copies to the supporting agencies. The MPA simultaneously submits mission support requests (MSRs) to the supporting agencies, with an information copy to the JFSOCC. No later than 48 hours before the EALT, the supporting agencies send mission support confirmation (MSCs) to the MPA, with information copies to the JFSOCC.

c. Phase 4: Force Selection. The JFSOCC may approve, alter, or disapprove the MICON and MSRs and transmits Mission Concept Approval (MCA) to the MPA within 8 hours of MICON receipt, with information copies to the supporting agencies. Disapproval should include further guidance and a suspense for a new MICON. Generally the type of force (e.g., SFODA or SEAL platoon) has already been selected and specified in the MITASK issued by the JFSOCC.

d. Phase 5: Mission Planning. No later than 24 hours before the EALT, the JFSOCC should issue the EXORD. Changes to the mission after transmission of this confirmation may result in mission delay. Other elements continue detailed mission planning and preparation. The IPA continues to support the final phase of planning. The supporting agencies obtain the latest weather and intelligence update, prepare and stage platform(s) for the mission, and place crews in crew rest.

(1) Target Validation. Target information is reviewed and EEIs analyzed to determine if changes to the basic plan are required.

(2) Intelligence Production. Usually, this is very abbreviated if time is the constraint invoking the time-sensitive process. No formal TIP will be produced. As many TIP EEIs as possible will be answered in the time provided. Other constraints of manpower, secrecy, and intelligence gaps will influence the completeness of intelligence products. Also, shortfalls in map products may drive production of nonstandard products (new scale or graphic portrayal, substitute products, etc.).



**Figure IV-1. SO Targeting and Time Sensitive Mission Planning Process.**

Figure IV-1. SO Targeting and Time Sensitive Mission Planning Process.

Figure IV-1 annotations:

1. JFC component commanders or national-level intelligence assets identify potential targets. Targets are selected by the JFC's staff or JTCC (if used) and assigned to the JFSOCC by MITASK. IPAs update the TIP or assimilate required intelligence. MPA(s) forward intelligence requests through the JFSOCC, other component commanders, or JFSOCC to the theater intelligence agencies who then request national-level intelligence support if necessary. The required intelligence is then disseminated directly to the requesting organization, depending on the time factor and operational security situation.
2. The JFSOCC, JFSOCC staff, or JFSOCC target panel perform an abbreviated FA and send a MITASK to the MPA. If a SOMPF was prepared in the deliberate planning cycle, the JFSOCC will pass it to the MPA with the MITASK. If the MPA (or SA via the MPA) does not validate the target SOF execution, then the MPA must inform the JFSOCC and await further guidance.
3. If the target is validated, the MPA develops the MICON and coordinates MSRs with supporting agencies,
4. The MPA sends the MICON to JFSOCC and MSRs to supporting agencies, with information copies to the JFSOCC.
5. The supporting agencies confirm MSRs by MSC.
6. The JFSOCC reviews and approves the MICON by MCA.
7. MPA coordinates execution planning with the executing SO unit and supporting agencies.
8. The JFSOCC recommends to the JFC that the mission be approved, disapproved, modified, or canceled.
9. The JFC makes a decision on the mission by EXORD. The EXORD is passed through the JFSOCC to the MPA.

(3) Plan Development. When time is short and no SOMPF exists for the assigned target, the commander must determine the minimum essential preparation tasks. Then the SOMPF format is modified to include only those tasks required. Shortfalls in intelligence production (listed above) can also affect mission planning completeness, which increases the degree of mission risk. Mission rehearsal and demonstrations are conducted whenever possible (e.g., when time permits). Even if secrecy is paramount, these activities can be accomplished given enough time to complete necessary tasks.

(4) Execution Planning. This step can be eliminated completely if not much time has passed between final mission preparation and execution. The MPA completes final planning and final rehearsals, then moves the tactical elements to the insertion staging area. Unless directed otherwise, the MPA internally approves the detailed planning that supports the MICON approval. Normally, however, EEI needed during the isolation phase must still be answered. Mission execution normally will be conducted as soon as possible after the mission planning phase is complete.

e. Phase 6: Combat Assessment. Rapid review of the executed missions and OPSUMs (Joint Pub 3-05.3, Appendix E) to determine if mission objectives were accomplished is time-sensitive by nature. Mission debriefs become more important if collection and reconnaissance are slow or backed up. Special reconnaissance missions can play a significant role in accurate combat assessment.



## APPENDIX A

### SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSION PLANNING FOLDER FORMAT

- I. MISSION TASKING PACKAGE
- II. FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENT (with supporting IA)
- III. TARGET INTELLIGENCE PACKAGE
- IV. PLAN OF EXECUTION
- V. MISSION SUPPORT PLANS

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## APPENDIX B

### SOF MISSION TASKING PACKAGE

#### SECTION I--Tasking and Transmittal Documents

- A. Tasking to JFSOCC.
- B. Subordinate tasking from JFSOCC.
- C. Coordinating instructions or Direct Liaison Authorized (DIRLAUTH).

#### SECTION II--Target Identification Data

- A. Name.
- B. BE number.
- C. Mission number (if applicable).
- D. Mission tasks.
- E. Functional classification code.
- F. Country.
- G. JSOA coordinates (GEOREF and UTM).
- H. Geographic coordinates (GEOREF and UTM).
- I. General description and target significance.

#### SECTION III--JFC Mission Guidance (JFC's Mission Statement, Objectives, and Intent)

- A. Mission statement.
- B. Specific targeting objectives.
- C. Commander's intent.
- D. Command and control.
- E. Rules of Engagement

#### SECTION IV--Record of Changes

#### SECTION V--Record of Distribution

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## APPENDIX C

### SOF FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENT

#### SECTION I--Mission Description

A. Target identification data (BE number, category code, geographic coordinates, UTM coordinates, map sheets, etc.).

B. Mission Statement and Commander's Guidance

#### SECTION II--Commander's Assessment

A. Feasibility as a target.

B. Feasibility of getting to/from the target area. (Attach supporting IA)

C. Probability of mission success.

D. Recommendation.

#### SECTION III--Assumptions

#### SECTION IV--Factors Affecting Courses of Action (COAs)

A. Characteristics of the joint special operations area.

1. Weather.

2. Terrain.

3. Other pertinent factors.

B. Friendly situation.

C. Enemy situation.

1. Composition.

2. Disposition.

3. Strength.

a. Committed forces.

b. Location of reinforcements and estimated reaction times.

c. Nuclear, biological, and chemical capabilities.

4. Significant enemy activity, intelligence, and counterintelligence capabilities.
5. Peculiarities and weaknesses.
6. Vulnerability to deception.
7. Enemy capabilities.
  - a. Defensive.
  - b. Offensive.
  - c. Intelligence and counterintelligence.
8. Reaction and Reinforcement.
9. Security on target.
10. Ability to get to/from the target.

#### SECTION V--Courses of Action

- A. Identify COAs.
- B. Analyze COAs.
- C. Compare COAs.
  1. Advantages.
  2. Disadvantages.
  3. Risks.
- D. Recommended COA.

#### SECTION VI--Intelligence Requirements

#### SECTION VII--Special Requirements

- A. Personnel.
- B. Logistics (including combat service support).
- C. Resupply.

D. SERER.

E. ROE.

F. Fire Support.

G. Medical.

H. Special Equipment.

I. Communications and electronics procedures and equipment needs  
(publish joint CEOI).

J. Non-SOF major assets.

K. OPDEC.

L. PSYOP and CA.

SECTION VIII--Indigenous Support

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## APPENDIX D

### INITIAL ASSESSMENT

(Includes fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft,  
surface ships, and submarines)

SECTION I--Mission Description (BE number, category code, geographic coordinates, UTM coordinates, map sheets, etc.)

SECTION II--Assumptions

SECTION III--Mission Data

- A. Launch base(s), intermediate staging base(s), and recovery base(s).
- B. Landing zone(s) (LZs), drop zone(s) (DZs), seaward launch point(s) (SLPs), beach landing site(s) (BLSS), recovery zone(s) (RZs), and seaward recovery point(s) (SRPs).
- C. Abort and emergency divert base(s).
- D. Air refueling track(s) and forward arming and refueling point(s) (FARPs).
- E. Flight and seaward approach routes
  - 1. Ingress.
  - 2. Egress.
  - 3. Orbiting and holding.
- F. Range factors.
- G. Time factors.
- H. Route factors.
- I. Refueling factors.
- J. Crew factors.
- K. Weather.

SECTION IV--Mission assessment

- A. Threat.

1. Air defenses.
2. Deception of air defenses.
3. Surface and/or subsurface water defenses.
4. Ground defenses.

- B. Probability of team insertion.
- C. Probability of team resupply.
- D. Probability of team extraction.
- E. Overall probability of mission success.
- F. Other factors.

#### SECTION V--Limiting Factors

- A. Intelligence.
- B. Weather.
- C. Terrain and hydrography.
- D. Equipment.
- E. Munitions.
- F. Tactics.
- G. Logistics (including combat service support).
- H. Personnel.
- I. Training.
- J. Supporting forces.
- K. Rules of engagement (ROEs) and legal issues.

#### SECTION VI--Supporting Data

- A. Photography and imagery requested.
- B. Intelligence information requested.

## SECTION VII--Initial Assessment Board

A. Composition.

B. Recommendation.

NOTE: Some of the information may not be readily available. Information-on-hand will normally suffice to conduct the IA. However, all efforts should be made to obtain the above information and incorporate it into the IA.

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## APPENDIX E

### SOF TARGET INTELLIGENCE PACKAGE

#### DIRECT ACTION AND SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS

##### SECTION I--Target Identification and Description

- A. Target identification data.
- B. Description and significance.
- C. Detailed target description.
- D. Target vulnerability assessment.

##### SECTION II--Natural Environment

- A. Geographic data (including terrain and hazards to movement).
- B. Meteorological data (climatological overview and tables and illumination data).
- C. Hydrographic data (coastal, waterways, lakes, luminescence, etc.).

##### SECTION III--Threat

- A. Ground forces (including border guards).
- B. Paramilitary and indigenous forces (including intelligence and security and police services).
- C. Naval forces (including Coast Guard and maritime border guard).
- D. Air forces.
- E. Air defense forces (including radars, passive detectors, C3).
- F. Electronic order of battle.
- G. Space-based assets.
- H. Counterintelligence environment (efforts of indigenous forces to collect against SOF elements).

I. Other

SECTION IV--Demographics and Cultural Features

- A. Area population characteristics.
- B. Languages, dialects, and ethnic composition.
- C. Social conditions.
- D. Religious factors.
- E. Political characteristics.
- F. Economic conditions.
- G. Miscellaneous (e.g., currency, holidays, dress, customs).

SECTION V--Lines of Communication and Information Systems

- A. Airfields.
- B. Railways.
- C. Roadways.
- D. Waterways.
- E. Ports.
- F. POL.
- G. Power grid.
- H. Public information media and telecommunications (print, radio, television, telephone, etc.).

SECTION VI--Infiltration And Exfiltration (potential LZs, DZs, BLSSs, HLZs)

- A. Potential zones.
- B. Chokepoints between insertion point(s) and objective.

SECTION VII--SERER and Survival data

- A. SERER and SAFE areas.

B. Survival data.

SECTION VIII--Unique Intelligence (mission-specific requirements not covered above)

SECTION IX--Intelligence Shortfalls

APPENDIX A: BIBLIOGRAPHY

APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY

APPENDIX C: IMAGERY

APPENDIX D: MAPS AND CHARTS

APPENDIX E: SCI (if applicable)

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## APPENDIX F

### TARGET INTELLIGENCE PACKAGE

#### FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE MISSIONS

##### SECTION I--Objective Area (OA) Identification and Description

- A. OA identification data.
- B. Description and significance.

##### SECTION II--Natural Environment

- A. Geographic data (including terrain, hazards to movement).
- B. Meteorological data (climatological overview, tables, and illumination data).
- C. Hydrographic data (coastal, waterways, lakes, etc.).
- D. Water sources (color-coded overlay).
- E. Flora and fauna (plants and animals of tactical importance).

##### SECTION III--Threat

- A. Objective country (enemy order of battle).
- B. Opposition and resistance forces.
- C. Counterintelligence environment (efforts of indigenous forces to collect against SOF elements).

##### SECTION IV--Demographics, Cultural, Political, Social Features (EEI must be answered for both the objective country and opposition and resistance forces)

- A. Area population Characteristics (include resistance potential).
- B. Languages, dialects, and ethnic composition.
- C. Social conditions.
- D. Religious factors.

- E. Political characteristics.
- F. Available labor force.
- G. Customs (social, weapons, religion, cultural, mores, etc.).
- H. Medical capabilities.
- I. Health and sanitation conditions.
- J. Economic conditions.
- K. Currency, holidays, and dress.

SECTION V--Lines of Communication, Information Systems, and Logistics

- A. Airfields.
- B. Railways.
- C. Roadways.
- D. Waterways.
- E. Ports.
- F. POL.
- G. Power grid.
- H. Public information media and telecommunications systems (print, radio, television, telephone, etc.).
- I. Exploitable civilian transportation.
- J. Primary mode(s) of transportation.
- K. US-provided materials, and services.
- L. Stockpiles.
- M. War-sustaining industries.
- N. War-sustaining resupply.
- O. Movement control centers.

SECTION VI--Infiltration and Exfiltration (potential LZs, DZs, BLSSs, HLZs)

- A. List potential LZs, DZs, BLSSs, and HLZs.
- B. Chokepoints between insertion point(s) and objective.

SECTION VII--FID and Military Assistance (EEI must be answered for both the objective country and opposition and resistance forces)

- A. Military assistance provided.
- B. Foreign personnel (noncombatants).
- C. Foreign military material.
- D. Deployments of foreign personnel and equipment.
- E. Foreign contractors services and construction.
- F. US support.

SECTION VIII--SERER and Survival Data

- A. SERER and SAFE areas.
- B. Survival data.

SECTION IX--Unique Intelligence (mission-specific requirements not covered above)

SECTION X--Intelligence Shortfalls

APPENDIX A: BIBLIOGRAPHY

APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY

APPENDIX C: IMAGERY

APPENDIX D: MAPS AND CHARTS

APPENDIX E: SCI (If applicable)

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## APPENDIX G

### SOF PLAN OF EXECUTION

Issuing Headquarters  
Place  
Hour, Day, Month, Year

#### Commander's Estimate of the Situation

##### References:

- a. Maps and charts
- b. Other pertinent documents

SECTION I--Mission Description (BE number, category code, geographic coordinates, UTM coordinates, map sheets, etc.)

#### SECTION II--The Situation and Courses of Action (COAs)

##### A. Considerations affecting the possible COAs

1. Characteristics of the joint special operations area
  - a. Military geography
    - (1) Topography.
    - (2) Hydrography, luminescence data, etc.
    - (3) Climate, weather, illumination data, etc.
  - b. Transportation.
  - c. Telecommunications.
  - d. Politics.
  - e. Economics.
  - f. Sociology.
  - g. Science and technology.
2. Relative combat power
  - a. Enemy
    - (1) Strength.

- (2) Composition.
- (3) Location and disposition.
- (4) Reinforcements.
- (5) Logistics.
- (6) Time and space factors.
- (7) Combat efficiency.

b. Friendly

- (1) Strength.
- (2) Composition.
- (3) Location and disposition.
- (4) Reinforcements.
- (5) Friendly force assistance.
- (6) Logistics (including combat service support).
- (7) Time and space factors.
- (8) Combat efficiency.

3. Assumptions.

B. Analysis of enemy capabilities.

C. Comparison of friendly COAs

- 1. Statement of COAs.
- 2. Probability of success assessment.
- 3. Comparison of COAs.

D. Decision (recommended COA)--mission profile

- 1. Method and location of insertion.
- 2. Movement to target area.

3. Actions at the objective.

4. Movement to and method of extraction.

#### SECTION III--Supporting plans

##### A. Overall schedule

1. Preparation / Rehearsal.

2. Insertion / Infiltration.

3. Actions at Objective.

4. Exfiltration / Extraction.

5. Debrief.

B. Logistics (including combat service support).

C. Resupply.

D. Communications and electronics procedures and equipment needs (publish joint CEOI).

E. SERER

F. Indigenous force support.

G. Time and distance charts.

H. Deployment.

I. Weaponneering.

J. Target recuperability.

K. Command relationships.

L. OPDEC

M. PSYOP and CA.

#### SECTION IV--Limiting Factors

A. Intelligence.

B. Weather.

C. Equipment.

- D. Tactics.
- E. Logistics (including combat service support).
- F. Personnel.
- G. Training.
- H. Supporting forces.
- I. C3.
- J. Law of war and rules of engagement and US law and legal issues.
- K. Counterintelligence environment.
- L. Other factors.

SECTION V--Unsatisfied Requirements

- A. Operational
- B. Intelligence
- C. Support

(Signed)  
Commander

ANNEXES: (As required: by letter and title)

DISTRIBUTION: (According to policies and procedures of the issuing headquarters)



## APPENDIX H

### MISSION SUPPORT PLANS

(Includes fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft,  
surface ships, and submarines)

#### SECTION I--Mission

- A. Target identification data.
- B. Mission statement.

#### SECTION II--Mission Summary

- A. Mission tasking.
- B. Objective area.
- C. General concept.
- D. Summary of limiting factors.
- E. Probability of mission success.

#### SECTION III--Assumptions

#### SECTION IV--Threat Assessment

#### SECTION V--Navigation and Overall Mission Portrayal

NOTE: This represents the entire infil and exfil route from launch to recovery on a suitable scale chart annotating all information deemed necessary by the planning cell for portrayal of the mission. This should include, but is not limited to, the following:

- A. Launch base(s).
- B. Intermediate staging base(s).
- C. Landing zone(s), drop zones, recovery zone(s), seaward launch point(s), beach landing sites(s), and seaward recovery point(s).
- D. Recovery base(s).
- E. Abort and/or emergency divert base(s).

F. Air refueling track(s) and forward arming and refueling points (FARPs).

G. Routes

1. Ingress.
2. Egress.
3. Orbiting and holding.
4. Safe passage procedures.
5. Strip charts, navigation logs, global positioning satellite receivers, and other aids (as required).

#### SECTION VI--Supporting Plans

A. Overall schedule of events.

B. Prelaunch requirements

1. Updates to orders of battle.
2. Essential elements of information.
3. Problem areas and key factors.

C. Insert and extract platform(s) factors and logistic considerations.

D. Command, control, and communications.

1. Security preparations.
2. Departure procedures (overt or deception procedures).
3. Communications equipment requirements.
  - a. Insertion and extraction platform(s).
  - b. SOC.
4. Specialized operational procedures and techniques.
5. Radio silence areas.
6. Go/no-go point.

7. Publish joint communications-electronics operating instructions for air mission.

8. Deception.

E. Emergency procedures

1. Engine-out capability.

2. Weather.

3. Faulty intelligence.

4. Insertion and extraction platform(s) abort procedures

a. Late departure procedures.

b. Maintenance problems.

c. Battle damage.

d. Platform destruction.

e. Bump plan.

5. Drop or other fuel-related malfunctions.

6. Lost communications procedures.

7. Mission abort procedures.

F. Evasion plan of action

1. Crew/embarked personnel responsibilities.

2. Immediate actions upon sinking, ditching, or bailout.

3. Evasion movement.

4. SAFE area intelligence descriptions (SAID).

5. Selected area for evasion (SAFE).

6. Evasion team communications.

7. SAR contact procedures.

## SECTION VII--Limiting Factors

- A. Intelligence.
- B. Weather.
- C. Equipment.
- D. Munitions.
- E. Tactics.
- F. Logistics (including combat service support and hazardous material).
- G. Personnel.
- H. Training.
- I. Supporting forces.
- J. Rules of engagement (ROEs) and legal issues.
- K. Counterintelligence environment.

## SECTION VIII--Special Operations Aviation, Surface Ship, and Submarine Requirements from AFSOC, ARSOF, or NAVSOF to Conduct Initial Assessment(s)

- A. Target coordinates.
- B. Maximum and minimum distances the LZs, DZs, SLPs, BLSSs, RZs, and SRPs can be from the target.
- C. Timeframe in OPLAN or CONPLAN scenario, (e.g., D-day, D-XX, or D+XX).
- D. Desired launch and recovery base(s).
- E. Type of delivery or recovery required (e.g., airdrop, airland, fast rope, SEAL delivery vehicle (SDV), combat rubber raiding craft (CRRC)), and platform preferred.
- F. Number of personnel to be transferred and approximate weight per person.
- G. Approximate size and weight of additional equipment.
- H. Type and quantity of hazardous material (e.g., gasoline, lithium batteries, etc.)

I. Assumptions made during supported unit's FA and POE.

J. Desired time over target.

K. Resupply and/or extraction requirements.

NOTE:       Some of the information may not be readily available.  
              Information in hand will normally suffice to conduct the POE.  
              However, all efforts should be made to obtain the above  
              information and incorporate it into the POE.

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## APPENDIX J

### SOF ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

#### DIRECT ACTION AND SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS

##### SECTION I--Target Identification and Description

FA	TIP	ISO	
			A. Target identification data
B1	-	-	1. Target name.
B1	-	-	2. Mission number.
B1	-	-	3. BE number.
B1	-	-	4. Target coordinates: give geographic, source, datum, UTM's, graphic reference(s).
B1	-	-	5. SOA coordinates.
B1	-	-	6. Category code.
B1	-	-	7. Safe area number.
B1	-	-	8. Country.
			B. Description and significance
B1	-	-	Reference MTP SECTION II:I.

##### NOTES:

1. EEI coding for FA, TIP and ISOLATION planning steps.  
Alpha code: "D"=DA MISSIONS; "S"=SR MISSIONS; "B"=BOTH.  
Numeric coding: Priority "1"=ESSENTIAL; "2"=MISSION ENHANCING
2. Enter "NA" for not applicable EEI.
3. Recommend TIP production time (90 days) not be exceeded for intelligence collection--annotate TIP with collection request date, number, and agency.
4. Update TIP with collected data upon receipt or annually.

FA	TIP	ISO	
			C. Detailed target description
-	B1	-	1. Physical layout or functional organization
-	B1	-	a. Description.
-	B1	-	b. Layout of structures and areas. Annotated photo or line drawing.
-	B1	-	c. Key component list (see Section C5 that follows for details)
			(1) First component.
			(a) Critical damage point
			1. Stress point.
			2. Stress point.
			(b) Critical damage point
			(2) Second component, etc.
-	S1	-	2. Line-of-sight study (if required by the mission type or specified by the MTP or FA).
-	B1	-	3. Primary and alternate power sources
-	B1	-	a. Number.
-	B1	-	b. Type.
-	B1	-	c. Location.
-	B1	-	d. Conduits
-	B1	-	(1) Location (power lines, comms cables, relationships, etc.).
-	B1	-	(2) Type (color, construction, diameter, thickness).



FA	TIP	ISO	
-	B1	-	e. Associated facilities (transformers, switches, yards, relays, spares).
-	B1	-	f. Fuel supply
-	B1	-	(1) Location (above, partially below, or below ground; containers types).
-	B1	-	(2) Type fuel(s).
-	B1	-	4. Communications associated with the target
-	B1	-	a. Type (telephone, radios (FM/AM/HF/UHF), SATCOM voice/Morse code, data fax, etc.)
-	B1	-	(1) Methods and procedures for securing comms (scrambling, frequency jumping, one-time pads, brevity codes).
-	B1	-	(2) Visual signals (smoke, panels, flags).
-	B1	-	(3) Noise (rifle shots, klaxons, sirens).
-	B1	-	(4) Country of origin, year manufactured, model.
-	B1	-	(5) Number and type of antennas.
-	B1	-	b. Number (by type).
-	B1	-	c. Location.
-	B1	-	d. Associated facilities (link sites, switch centers, repair centers, etc.)
-	B1	-	(1) Power supply.
-	B1	-	(2) Switchboards and rerouting centers.

FA	TIP	ISO
----	-----	-----

-	B1	-	(3) Antenna array.
---	----	---	--------------------

-	B1	-	(4) Cables and number and location of personnel.
---	----	---	--

-	D1	-	5. Components, critical damage points and stress points. Support to CARVER. The piece of equipment, portion of bridge, building, section of power line, staff member that, if destroyed, killed, or captured, will result in the inability of the target to function.
---	----	---	---

First component: 1. Name (list each component separately with all items in subparagraph a and b below)

Second component: 2. Name (list each component separately with all items in paragraph a and b below) (continue listing components as needed)

-	B1	-	a. Physical structure (equipment, machinery, room. Annotated photograph, sketch, floor plan, diagram, etc.)
---	----	---	---

-	D1	-	(1) Dimensions (length, width, height, separation).
---	----	---	---

-	D1	-	(2) Construction materials (masonry wood, etc.).
---	----	---	--

-	D1	-	b. Critical damage points--one (list each critical damage point separately with each item below)
---	----	---	--

-	D1	-	(1) Type (provide damage point and parent structure).
---	----	---	---

-	D1	-	(2) Location (be as specific as possible).
---	----	---	--

-	D1	-	(3) Dimensions.
---	----	---	-----------------

FA	TIP	ISO	
-	D1	-	(4) Construction material (type, thickness, etc.).
-	D1	-	(5) First stress point (second stress point is (5b), etc. List each stress point separately with 6, 7, and 8 below).
-	D1	-	(6) Criticality (destruction or damage will have significant influence on target function).
-	D1	-	(7) Accessibility (ability to reach point either physically or by indirect fire weapons).
-	D1	-	(8) Recuperability (time to replace, repair, or bypass and return to normal operations).
-	D1	-	(9) Effect (possible political, economic, or sociological impact of damage or destruction on the target or the populace).
-	D1	-	(10) Recognizability (target recognizability under varying weather, light, and seasonal conditions).
6. On-site security			
-	B1	-	a. Location (guard posts, bunkers, trenches, security force barracks, motor pools). Annotated photo, sketch.
-	B2	B1	b. Security procedures
-	B2	B1	(1) Patrols
-	B2	B1	(a) Type (air, ground--on foot or in vehicle, surface, subsurface).

FA	TIP	ISO	
-	B2	B1	(b) Frequency and pattern (route, timing).
-	B2	B1	(c) Size.
-	B2	B1	(d) Armament.
-	B2	B1	(2) Lighting (power source and location).
-	D2	D1	(3) Detection systems (perimeter barriers, fences, buildings, extent and integration of defenses)
-	D2	D1	(a) Overhead cameras.
-	D2	D1	(b) Ground (seismic, infrared, motion, and metallic).
-	D2	D1	(c) Water alarms.
-	D2	D1	(d) Electromagnetic (frequency spectrum).
-	D2	D1	(4) Barrier and obstacles (height, width, depth, special features--electrification, booby traps, detection devices. Include intentional barbed wire and incidental telephone poles).
-	D2	D1	(5) Entry, internal procedures (keys, cipher locks using cards or numbers, personnel, vehicle badges, decals, and colors).
-	B2	B1	c. Ground-associated military or internal security facilities and forces
-	B2	B1	(1) Location (coordinates of units that could interfere with operations).

FA	TIP	ISO	
-	B2	B1	(2) Types of forces (garrison, artillery, SAM, AAA, paramilitary, bandit, etc.).
-	B2	B1	(3) Strength (TO&E strength).
-	B2	B1	(4) Weapons (type, number, location).
-	B2	B1	(5) Ammunition (type, number, location).
-	B2	B2	(6) Communications (type, number, frequency)
-	B2	B2	(a) Connectivity with target.
-	B2	B2	(b) Location of links and conduits (telephone switch points, microwave towers, radio relay sites, etc.).
-	B2	B2	(7) Alternate means of communication
-	B2	B2	(a) Number, type, location.
-	B2	B2	(b) Interruption alarms.
-	B2	B2	(8) Organic and available transport
-	B2	B2	(a) Type (vehicles, helos, civilian and military, maintenance).
-	B2	B2	(b) Number.
-	B2	B2	(9) Fuel supply
-	B2	B2	(a) Type (diesel, gasoline, water-driven turbine).

FA	TIP	ISO	
-	B2	B2	(b) Location (source, tankers, etc.).
-	B2	B2	(c) Access (hydrant, hose, hand pump, etc.).
-	B2	B2	(d) Storage (tanks, barrels, aboveground, underground (depth), etc.).
-	B2	B2	(e) Firefighting equipment.
-	B2	B1	7. Target area activity
-	B2	B1	a. On target--operational routine (daily, weekly, monthly, seasonally).
-	B2	B1	b. Target vicinity--operational routine (daily, weekly, monthly, seasonally, in civilian neighborhood, industrial complex, business).
-	D2	D1	8. Target site alert procedures
-	D2	D1	a. Security procedures.
-	D2	D1	b. Changes in procedures and posture (more guards at gates, entrances, in towers, emplacements, entrenching, barbed wire, obstacles, etc.).
-	D2	D1	9. Enemy reaction capability
-	D2	D1	a. Dedicated (strength, equipment, training, weapons, reaction time, etc.).
-	D2	D1	b. Incidental (strength, equipment, training, weapons, reaction time, etc.).

FA	TIP	ISO	
-	-	B1	10. Latest target and target area intelligence (examples: updated order of battle, target status, SERER and SAFE areas).
			D. Target vulnerability assessment (use Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual--Special Operations, etc.).

## SECTION II--Natural Environment

FA	TIP	ISO	
			A. Geographic data (including terrain, hazards to movement)
-	B1	-	1. Geographic terrain features
-	B1	-	a. Natural obstacles.
-	B1	-	b. Manmade obstacles.
-	B2	B1	2. Avenues of approach (including road, rail, waterway, air, etc. Trace approaches to the target using an overlay or graphic)
-	B2	B1	a. Most likely approach to be used by the enemy.
-	B2	B1	b. Exploitable approaches to impede reinforcement.
-	B2	B1	c. Potential obstacles, terrain features, or chokepoints.
-	B2	B1	d. Special conditions (seasonal variations, etc.).
-	B2	B1	e. Fording sites (depth, width, type bottom).
-	B2	B1	f. Trafficability (estimated rates of advance, transit time to target).
-	B2	B1	g. Exploitable civilian transport

FA	TIP	ISO	
			B. Meteorological data (climatological overview, illumination data)
-	B1	-	1. Current data.
-	B1	-	2. Historical data (including unusual conditions: sandstorms, blizzards, etc.).
-	B1	-	C. Hydrographic data (coastal and otherwise)
-	B1	-	1. Tidal activity.
-	B1	-	2. Currents.
-	B1	-	3. Temperatures.
-	B1	-	4. Special conditions (seasonal variations, etc.).
-	B1	-	5. Beaches (natural and manmade obstacles).
-	B1	-	6. Marine life.

#### SECTION III--Threat

FA	TIP	ISO	
-	B1	-	A. Ground forces (including border guards--type, number, NBC capability, night operations)
-	B1	-	B. Paramilitary and indigenous forces (type, number, NBC capability, night operations).
-	B1	-	C. Naval forces (including coast guard and maritime border guards--type, number, NBC capability, night operations).
-	B1	-	D. Air forces (type, number, NBC capability, night operations).
-	B1	-	E. Air defense forces (including aircraft, radars, passive detectors--type, numbers).



FA	TIP	ISO	
-	B2	B1	F. Electronic order of battle.
-	B2	B2	G. Space-based assets.
-	-	B1	H. Other (including indicators of enemy course of action within a 24-hour period including reinforce, defend, delay, NBC operations).

#### SECTION IV--Demographics and Cultural Features

FA	TIP	ISO	
-	B1	-	A. Area population characteristics.
-	B1	-	B. Languages, dialects, and ethnic composition (national and in target area).
-	B1	-	C. Social conditions.
-	B1	-	D. Religious factors.
-	B1	-	E. Political characteristics.
-	B1	-	F. Economic conditions.
-	B1	-	G. Miscellaneous (including currency, holidays, dress, customs, foreign influences, and personnel).

#### SECTION V--Lines of Communication and Information Systems

FA	TIP	ISO	
-	B1	-	A. Airfields
-	B1	-	1. Description of each (graph, overlay, chart--type, location, capacity, POL, parking areas, aircraft, etc.).
-	B1	-	2. Factors limiting use.
-	B1	-	B. Railways
-	B1	-	1. Description of network (graph, overlay, chart).

FA	TIP	ISO	
-	B1	-	2. Factors limiting use.
-	B1	-	C. Roadways
-	B1	-	1. Description of network (graph, overlay, chart).
-	B1	-	2. Factors limiting use.
-	B1	-	3. Bypass routes.
-	B1	-	D. Waterways
-	B1	-	1. Description (graph, overlay, chart).
-	B1	-	2. Beaches suitable for amphibious landing
-	B1	-	a. Beach length and configuration.
-	B1	-	b. Usable beach length.
-	B1	-	c. Beach interruptions and obstacles.
-	B1	-	d. Type of coastline.
-	B1	-	e. Backshore description
-	B1	-	(1) Width.
-	B1	-	(2) Gradient.
-	B1	-	(3) Composition.
-	B1	-	(4) Vegetation.
-	B1	-	(5) Exits.
-	B1	-	f. Foreshore description
-	B1	-	(1) Width.
-	B1	-	(2) Gradient.
-	B1	-	(3) Composition.

FA	TIP	ISO	
-	B1	-	g. Nearshore
-	B1	-	(1) Width.
-	B1	-	(2) Gradient.
-	B1	-	(3) Composition.
-	B1	-	E. Ports
-	B1	-	1. Depth.
-	B1	-	2. Tides.
-	B1	-	3. Currents.
-	B1	-	F. POL.
-	B1	-	G. Power grid.
-	B1	-	H. Public information media and telecommunications (print, radio, television, telephone, etc.).

#### SECTION VI--Insertion and Extraction

FA	TIP	ISO	
-	B1	-	A. Potential LZs, DZs, BLSSs, HLZs.
-	U1	U1	B. Chokepoints between insertion point(s) and objective.

#### SECTION VII--SERER and Survival Data

FA	TIP	ISO	
			A. SERER and SAFE areas
-	B2	B1	1. Population.
-	B2	B1	2. Characteristics and culture.
-	B2	B1	3. Location.
-	B2	B1	4. Approaches.
-	B2	B1	5. Contact, recovery points, and procedures.

FA	TIP	ISO	
-	B2	B1	6. Security hazards.
-	B2	B1	7. Cover and concealment.
			B. Survival data
-	B2	B1	1. Food.
-	B1	-	2. Water (identify all known water sources).
-	B1	-	a. Type.
-	B1	-	b. Source.
-	B1	-	c. Capacity.
-	B2	B1	3. Shelter.
-	B2	B1	4. Medical, health, and sanitation.
-	B2	B1	a. General health and sanitation conditions.
-	B2	B1	b. Diseases.
-	B2	B1	c. Plants and animals of medical importance.

SECTION VIII--Unique Intelligence (mission-specific requirements, to include counterintelligence environment, not covered above)

#### SECTION IX--Intelligence Shortfalls

APPENDIX A: BIBLIOGRAPHY

APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY

APPENDIX C: IMAGERY

FA	TIP	ISO	
			A. Imagery
-	B1	-	1. Area (20-25 nm radius from target center).

FA	TIP	ISO	
-	B2	B2	2. Intermediate (5-6 nm or 10 km).
-	B1	-	3. Target (entire target).
-	B1	-	4. Broad-area-coverage (to identify, select, plan, and execute overland infil and exfil routes).
B. Photography			
-	D1	-	1. Picture(s) or facsimile(s) of key components and critical damage points of target (such as building room, van, missile, warhead, etc.).
-	D1	-	2. Picture(s) or facsimile(s) of stress points of critical damage point(s) (the bulls eye: such as a junction box, bridge girder, valve, etc.).

#### APPENDIX D: MAPS AND CHARTS

FA	TIP	ISO	
-	B1	-	A. A copy of all maps and charts used to create the TIP.
-	B1	-	B. Map of the target area (1:50,000).
-	B2	-	C. Digitally manipulated imagery (i.e. line-of-sight studies, ground-based views on specific azimuths).

#### APPENDIX E: SCI (if applicable)

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## APPENDIX K

### SOF ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

#### FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

##### SECTION I--Objective Area (OA) Identification and Description

FA	TIP	ISO
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###### A. OA identification data

B1	-	-	1. Country(s).
B1	-	-	2. Geographic limits of OA (geographic or UTM).
B1	-	-	3. Plan or operations (number and name).

###### B. Description and significance

B1	-	-	Reference Appendix A, SECTION II:I.
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##### SECTION II--Natural Environment

FA	TIP	ISO
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###### A. Geographic data (including terrain, hazards to movement)

-	B1	-	1. Geographic terrain features
-	B1	-	a. General description of OA.
-	B1	-	b. Key natural and manmade features.

##### Notes:

1. EEI coding for FA, TIP AND ISOLATION planning steps.
  - a. Alpha coding: "U"=Unconventional Warfare; "F"=Foreign Internal Defense; "B"=Both.
  - b. Numeric coding: Priority "1"-ESSENTIAL; "2"-MISSION ENHANCING.
2. Enter "NA" for not applicable EEI.
3. Update TIP with collected data upon receipt or annually.

FA	TIP	ISO	
-	B1	-	2. Avenues of approach into OA (road, rail, waterway, air, etc. Trace approaches using an overlay or graphic)
-	B1	-	a. Most likely approach of reinforcement.
-	B1	-	b. Potential obstacles, terrain features, and choke points.
-	B1	-	c. Special conditions (seasonal variations, etc.).
-	B1	-	d. Fording sites (depth, width, type bottom).
-	B1	-	e. Exploitable points and segments to impede reinforcements.
			B. Meteorological data (climatological overview, illumination data)
U1	F1	-	1. Current data.
U1	F1	-	2. Historical data (including unusual conditions: sandstorms, blizzards, etc.).
			C. Hydrographic data (coastal, waterways, lakes, etc.)
-	U1	-	1. Tidal activity.
-	U1	-	2. Currents.
-	U1	-	3. Temperatures.
-	U1	-	4. Special conditions (seasonal variations, etc.).
-	U1	-	5. Depths, underwater obstacles.
			D. Water sources (color-coded overlay)
U1	F1	-	1. Type.
U1	F1	-	2. Source.



FA	TIP	ISO
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U1	F1	-	3. Capacity.
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B2	B1	-	E. Flora and fauna (plants and animals. Include information of tactical value, i.e., plants and animals that would impede or assist movement routes or rates, massing, dispersal, acquisition, and weapon capabilities, security --including location, numbers, size, type).
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# SECTION III--Threat

FA	TIP	ISO
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## A. Objective country

- Summary (strategy, force disposition, threat to US personnel)

F1	F1/U1	-	a. Objective country's military strategy.
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B1	B1	-	b. Disposition of combat units.
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-	F1	-	c. Principal military targets.
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-	B1	-	d. Threat to US personnel and advisors.
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B1	-	-	2. Ground forces (TO&E strength, including border guards and reserves, etc. Give type, number, capability of equipment, weapons, night vision capability, field defense positions located in UTMs to nearest 100 meters).
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B1	-	-	3. Paramilitary and/or indigenous forces, internal security forces or police (TO&E strength. Type, number, capability, equipment, weapons, night operations).
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B1	-	-	4. Naval forces (including coast guard and maritime border guard--type, number, capability, equipment, weapons).
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B1	-	-	5. Air forces (type, numbers, capability, ordnance, reaction time,
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FA      TIP      ISO

loiter times, sortie rate, performance characteristics, operating schedules, alert factors).

- |    |       |    |   |
|----|-------|----|---|
| -  | B1    | -  | 6. Air defense forces (including aircraft, radars, antiaircraft weapon systems type and deployment, passive detectors--type, numbers, capability. For GCI include proficiency, operating schedules, flexibility, and responsiveness). |
| -  | B1    | -  | 7. Electronic order of battle.  |
| -  | B2    | B2 | 8. Forces' communications (C3: hierarchy and protocols, capabilities, TO&E operating characteristics, COMSEC equipment, and material type).   |
| U1 | U1/F2 | -  | 9. Electronic warfare (types, capabilities, operational characteristics, frequencies, power output, locations of units, equipment, and ECM).  |
| -  | B2    | B2 | 10. Command, control, and communications countermeasures (C3CM) (list communications of military significance and susceptible to C3CM actions.  |
| -  | B1    | -  | 11. Weapon systems (both US and foreign. Type, availability, maintenance and logistic capabilities, suppliers, training, etc.).   |
| -  | B1    | -  | 12. Intelligence collection capability (include agency and means, effectiveness of each, and predisposition or bias toward or against)  |
| -  | B1    | -  | a. HUMINT and counterintelligence.  |
| -  | B1    | -  | b. SIGINT environment.  |
| -  | B1    | -  | c. IMINT.   |
| -  | B1    | -  | d. Reconnaissance patrols.  |

FA	TIP	ISO	
-	B1	-	13. Uniform and equipment markings.
B2	B1	-	14. NBC capability (types, sources, and storage locations. For NBC-capable units--type, specify launcher or weapon system location, availability, ranges, employment or alert times, comms, and units' ammunition load; e.g., 50 percent nuclear, 25 percent conventional HE, 25 percent chemical).
-	B2	-	15. NBC protection and decontamination (locations and types).
B1	B1	-	16. Special operations and PSYOP (plans, programs, capabilities to conduct. Vulnerability to PSYOP).
B1	F1/U2	-	17. Civil disturbance and riot control training (units and their capabilities).
B2	B1	-	18. Government resistance potential (internal and external threats. List indigenous peoples and vulnerabilities).
-	B2	B2	19. Support of regional insurgencies (groups, movements, type of support).
			20. Support of terrorist and guerrillas
B1	B1	-	a. Groups supported (name, type, affiliation, operational techniques, capabilities, equipment).
-	U1/F2	-	b. Training and staging areas, infil or escape routes (location, techniques, equipment, etc.).
-	B2	-	c. Safe houses (disposition, size, location).
U2	U1/F2	-	d. Reaction to introduction of US forces.
			B. Opposition and resistance forces
B1	B1	-	1. Groups and forces (names, organization, leaders, political affiliation, size, population support).

FA	TIP	ISO	
-	B1	-	2. Military capabilities (organization, equipment training, ability to conduct sabotage, subversion, and deception).
-	U1/F2	-	3. Groups and force communications (types, vulnerability to covert or overt attack).
F2	F1	-	4. US use of groups and forces (methods of contact and probability of cooperation).
B1	B1	-	5. Threat to US personnel and advisers.
-	-	B1	6. Indicators and warning (indicators of preparation by the objective country or opposition forces for action within a 24-hour period for the following: attack, withdraw without engaging, reinforce, defend, delay, conduct special or NBC operations).

SECTION IV--Demographics, Cultural, Political, Social Features (EEI must be answered for both objective country and opposition or resistance forces)

FA	TIP	ISO	
			A. Area population characteristics
-	B2	B2	1. Centers and density.
-	B1	-	2. Refugee movement(s).
-	B1	-	3. Attitude of civilians and civilian groups to US involvement (friendly, unfriendly, or neutral)
-	B1	-	a. Groups.
-	B1	-	b. Key civilians.
-	B1	-	c. Biographic data.
-	F2	F2	4. Attitude of neutral population toward host country (HC), threat policies, and actions.

FA	TIP	ISO	
-	F2	F2	5. Local sources that could help our position through liaison or other means (used by allied, friendly, or US HUMINT organizations)
-	F2	F2	a. Human rights history (friendly and threat).
-	F2	F2	b. US policy toward HC's human rights actions.
-	F2	F2	6. Friendly contacts (embassies, businesses, missionaries, teachers, students, etc.)
-	F2	F2	a. Human rights history (friendly and threat).
-	F2	F2	b. US policy toward HC's human rights activities.
-	B1	-	B. Languages, dialects, and ethnic composition.
-	F1	-	C. Social conditions.
-	F1	-	D. Religious factors.
			E. Political characteristics
-	B1	-	1. Internal groups (identify groups, indigenous elements who are members, level of popular support).
-	B1	-	2. Key military leaders (biographic data-- backgrounds, talents, connections, political affiliation, and orientation).
-	F1	-	3. Attitude toward planned US operations (support, oppose, or tolerate action).
-	B1	-	4. Opposition to existing US forces, facilities, or interests (general population and significant groups and forces).

FA	TIP	ISO	
-	B1	-	a. Who (biographic data).
-	B1	-	b. When.
-	B1	-	c. Where.
-	B1	-	d. Nature and form of opposition.
-	F1	-	5. Assistance available to US forces (extent and capabilities).
B1	B1	-	6. Vulnerabilities of objective country government to insurgent attack (prioritize).
-	B2	B2	7. Tensions (regional and national; causes, intensity, degree, and exploitability by the US or opposition).
-	F2	F2	8. Information service, apparatus, or organization (key personnel, attitude toward the US Government, usable by US forces).
-	B2	B2	9. Propaganda apparatus (organization(s), key personnel, attitude toward the US Government, usable by US forces).
B2	B2	-	10. Employment of propaganda and disinformation (currently, future capabilities).
F1	U1	-	11. Foreign influences (identify sources, leaders, themes, influence on government, unions, students, insurgent forces and general public).
-	B2	B2	F. Available labor force (location, numbers, equipment, etc.).
-	B1	-	G. Customs (social, weapons, religious, cultural, mores, etc.).
F2	F1	-	H. Medical capabilities (use by US forces, limitations).

FA	TIP	ISO	
F2	B1	-	I. Health and sanitation conditions (facilities, agencies, capabilities).
-	F1	-	J. Economic conditions.
-	F1/U2		K. Currency, holidays, dress, etc.

#### SECTION V--Lines of Communication, Information Systems, and Logistics

FA	TIP	ISO	
			A. Airfields
-	F1/U2	-	1. Description of each (graph, overlay, chart--type, location, capacity, POL, parking areas, aircraft, etc.).
-	F1/U2	-	2. Limiting factors for use.
-	F1/U2	-	3. Available for US use (include any limitations).
			B. Railways
U2	B1	-	1. Description of network (graph, overlay, chart).
U2	B1	-	2. Limiting factors for use.
			C. Roadways
-	B2	B2	1. Description of network (graph, overlay, chart).
-	B2	B2	2. Limiting factors for use.
-	B2	B2	3. Bypass routes.
			D. Waterways
-	B1	-	1. Description (graph, overlay, chart).
-	B1	-	2. Identify beaches suitable for amphibious landing.

FA	TIP	ISO	
-	B2	-	E. Ports (include availability to US forces and limitations on US operations).
			F. POL (refining, storage, and distribution)
-	U1	-	1. Vulnerabilities.
-	U1	-	2. Exploitability by US forces.
			G. Power grid (generating and distribution networks)
-	U1	-	1. Vulnerabilities.
-	U1	-	2. Exploitability by US forces.
			H. Public information media and telecommunications
-	B2	B2	1. Signal allocation controlling authority (agency and procedures).
-	B2	B2	2. Radio and TV broadcast (controlling agency, key personnel, station locations, channels and frequencies, output transmitters, operating hours, political affiliations).
-	B2	B2	3. Newspapers (controlling agency, key personnel, printing locations, political affiliations, distribution).
-	B2	B2	4. Communications network or system
-	B2	B2	(a) Equipment type and switching system.
-	B2	B2	(b) Cable vaults and layouts.
-	B2	B2	(c) Transmission media for trunk groups (e.g., open wires, microwave).
-	B2	B2	(d) Relay towers (location).
-	B2	B2	(e) System manning (civilian, military).



FA	TIP	ISO	
-	B2	B2	(f) For multiple systems, indicate interconnections.
-	U1/F2	-	I. Exploitable civilian transportation (trucks, buses, river craft).
-	F2/F2	-	J. Primary modes of transportation (public and commercial).
B1	B1	-	K. US-provided materials, services urgently needed or required (by cooperating indigenous military, paramilitary, resistance forces, or local nationals. List and prioritize).
-	F1/U2	-	L. Stockpiles (equipment, supplies, etc. Give location, type, volume).
B2	F1/U2	-	M. War-sustaining industries (ability to produce warfighting supplies).
-	F1/U2	-	N. War-sustaining resupply (outside suppliers of end items and war material, country, agent, company, storage location).
-	U1	-	O. Movement control centers.

SECTION VI--Infiltration and Exfiltration (potential LZs, DZs, BLSSs, HLZs. Include availability to US forces and limitations on US operations)

FA	TIP	ISO	
U2	B1	-	A. List potential zones.
U2	U1	-	B. Chokepoints between insertion point(s) and objective.

SECTION VII--Military Assistance (EEIs must be answered for objective country and opposition or resistance forces)

FA	TIP	ISO	
			A. Military assistance provided (countries committed to or providing assistance)

FA	TIP	ISO	
—	F2	F2	1. External military assistance (legal or de facto).
B2	B1	-	2. Foreign military advisers (country represented, adviser location, type of assistance).
F1	F1/U2	-	3. Foreign combatants, paramilitary (strengths and locations).
B2	B1	-	B. Foreign personnel (noncombatants, medical, engineers, etc. Numbers and locations).
-	F1/U2	-	C. Foreign military material (trucks, heavy equipment, etc.).
—	B1	-	D. Deployments of foreign personnel and equipment (types, frequency, number, represented country, purpose, and projections).
—	B2	B2	E. Foreign contractors services and construction (type of work, equipment, location, represented country or company, etc.).
F1	F1/U2	-	F. US support (current and projected).

#### SECTION VIII--SERER and Survival Data

FA	TIP	ISO	
			A. SERER and SAFE areas
-	F2	F1	1. Population.
-	F2	F1	2. Characteristics and culture.
-	F2	F1	3. Location.
-	F2	F1	4. Approaches.
-	F2	F1	5. Contact and recovery points and procedures.
-	F2	F1	6. Security hazards.

FA	TIP	ISO	
-	F2	F1	7. Cover and concealment.
			B. Survival data
-	B2	B1	1. Food.
-	B1	-	2. Water (identify all known water sources)
-	B1	-	a. Type.
-	B1	-	b. Source.
-	B1	-	c. Capacity.
-	F2	F1	3. Shelter.
-	B2	B1	4. Medical, health, and sanitation
-	B2	B1	a. General health and sanitation conditions.
-	B2	B1	b. Diseases.
-	B2	B1	c. Plants and animals of medical importance.

SECTION IX--Unique Intelligence (mission-specific requirements not covered above)

SECTION X--Intelligence Shortfalls

APPENDIX A: BIBLIOGRAPHY

APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY

APPENDIX C: IMAGERY

FA	TIP	ISO	
			A. Imagery for FID
-	U2	U2	1. Imagery of infil and exfil routes.
-	U2	U2	2. Imagery of DZ, if specified.

FA	TIP	ISO	
-	U1	-	3. Requester-specified requirements may include: chokepoints, critical bridges, water and road junctions, terrain features that could hamper movement or tactically endanger friendly or enemy forces (no more than 10 requirements, no request for scale larger than 1:12,000, and no imagery requested larger than 5 kilometers radius center of mass of target).
-	F1	-	B. Imagery for UW. Requester-specified requirements may include: imagery of LOCs, major cities, and chokepoints. List items, scales, and radius.

#### APPENDIX D: MAPS AND CHARTS

FA	TIP	ISO	
			A. Maps and charts for FID
U1	U1	-	(Maps or charts of the entire OA (overall area chart and 1:50,000s)).
			B. Maps and charts for UW
1	F1	-	(Maps or charts of the country (1:1,000,000)).
F2	F2	-	C. Digitally manipulated imagery (i.e., line-of-sight studies, ground-based views on specific azimuths).

#### APPENDIX E: SCI (if applicable)

## APPENDIX L

### SOF ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

#### INSERTION AND EXTRACTION

(Includes Fixed and Rotary Wing Aircraft)

#### SECTION I--Air Defense

FA	TIP	ISO	
			A. Enemy command and control structure
2	1	-	1. Type of center.
2	1	-	2. Location of centers.
2	1	-	3. Type of communication assets (land line, radio/freqs, microwave, SATCOM).
-	1	-	4. Doctrine and employment methods,
2	2	1	5. Ability to direct intercepts and SAM engagements.
			6. Launch authority
-	1	-	a. Who?
-	1	-	b. How long?
-	1	-	7. Critical nodes in C3.
-	2	2	8. Reaction to one C-130 in their area.
2	2	1	9. Defensive capability (AAA, SAM, CAP).
2	1	-	10. Air defense zone boundaries.

#### NOTES:

- EEI Coding for FA, TIP and ISOLATION Planning sets
  - Priority "1" = ESSENTIAL "2" = MISSION ENHANCING
- Enter "NA" for not applicable EEI
- Recommend TIP production time (90 days) not be exceeded for intelligence collection--annotate TIP with collection request date, number and agency.
- Update TIP with collected data upon receipt or annually

FA	TIP	ISO	
			B. Listening/visual reporting posts
1	-	-	1. Locations.
-	2	2	2. Hours of operation/shift change times.
-	2	2	3. Status (alert, overall readiness).
2	1	-	4. Communications ability.
-	2	1	5. Night vision capabilities.
2	1	-	6. Defensive capabilities.
			C. Passive detection devices
1	-	-	1. Type.
1	-	-	2. Location.
			3. Capabilities
2	1	-	a. Equipment reliability.
2	1	-	b. Operators/limitations.
-	2	1	4. Hours of operation/shift change times.
2	1	-	5. Reporting network, procedures (links with direct threats).
-	1	-	6. Defensive capabilities (SAMs, AAA, small arms).
			D. Early warning radars
1	-	-	1. Type.
1	-	-	2. Location
1	-	-	a. Site elevation.
1	-	-	b. Antenna height.
-	2	1	3. Operating frequencies.
			4. Operations
2	1	-	a. Status.

FA	TIP	ISO	
2	1	-	b. Mobile?
-	2	2	c. Hours/shift change.
-	2	2	d. MX down times.
			5. Capabilities
-	1	-	a. ECCM capability.
-	1	-	b. EMCON.
-	2	2	c. Operator proficiency.
-	2	1	6. System limitations.
-	1	-	7. Communication capabilities.
-	1	-	8. Defenses around radar sites.
			E. Air interceptors/helos
1	-	-	1. Airfield locations.
			2. Aircraft
1	-	-	a. Type.
1	-	-	b. Number.
1	-	-	c. Armament.
-	2	1	d. Tactics and employment doctrine (low level GCI?).
-	2	1	e. GCI dependence pilot proficiency at attacking a large aircraft.
1	-	-	f. Radar.
-	1	-	g. Capabilities.
			3. Operation
-	2	2	a. Readiness.
-	2	2	b. Alert status.

FA	TIP	ISO	
-	2	1	c. Response times.
-	1	-	4. Airborne early warning tracks.
-	1	-	5. CAP locations.
-	1	-	6. Training areas.
2	1	-	7. Night capable?
2	1	-	8. IFF capability.
			F. Missile information (SAMS)
1	-	-	1. Type include model/quantity.
1	-	-	2. Location
-	1	-	a. Site elevation.
-	1	-	b. Antenna height.
			3. Operations
-	2	1	a. Status.
-	1	-	b. Mobile?
-	2	2	c. Alert/status.
-	2	2	d. Hours/shifts.
-	2	2	e. MX down times.
-	2	1	f. Actual freqs of radars.
-	1	-	4. Tactics/doctrine.
			5. Capabilities
-	2	1	a. Non-standard capabilities.
-	2	1	b. ECCM.
-	1	-	c. Night.
-	2	1	d. EMCON.
-	2	1	e. Operator proficiency.



FA TIP ISO

-	2	1	6. Weapons status (free, hold)/reaction time.
-	2	1	7. Limitations.
1	-	-	8. Number of systems per army unit.
G. Anti-aircraft (AAA) information			
1	-	-	1. Type (both gun & radar).
1	-	-	2. Locations
-	1	-	a. Site elevation.
-	1	-	b. Antenna height.
3. Operation			
-	2	1	a. Actual freqs.
-	2	1	b. Status.
-	2	2	c. Alert/status.
-	2	2	d. Hours/shifts.
-	2	2	e. MX down times.
-	1	-	4. Fire control system.
-	1	-	5. Tactics and doctrine.
6. Capabilities			
-	2	2	a. Non-standard.
-	2	1	b. ECCM.
-	2	1	c. Night.
-	2	1	d. EMCON.
-	2	2	e. Operator proficiency.
-	1	-	7. Weapons free/reaction time.
-	2	1	8. Limitations.

FA	TIP	ISO
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1	-	-	9. Numbers of systems per battalion/brigade/division.
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## SECTION II--Ground order of battle

FA	TIP	ISO
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1	-	-	1. Units, to include C3 link.
1	-	-	2. Location.
1	-	-	3. Patrol area.
1	-	-	4. Composition.
2	1	-	5. Associated air defense equipment w/location.
-	2	1	6. Readiness posture.
			7. Capabilities
-	2	2	a. Special.
-	2	2	b. Chemical warfare.
2	1	-	8. Assessment of future movement/location.

## SECTION III--Naval order of battle

FA	TIP	ISO
----	-----	-----

1	-	-	1. Type.
1	-	-	2. Location.
1	-	-	3. Patrol areas.
1	-	-	4. EW radar types/capabilities/limitations/freqs.
-	1	-	5. SAM types/capabilities/limitations/freqs.
-	1	-	6. AAA types/capabilities/limitations/freqs.
-	2	2	7. Crew proficiency.

#### SECTION IV--Paramilitary/internal security forces

FA	TIP	ISO	
-	1	-	1. Type and size.
-	1	-	2. Location.
-	1	-	3. Patrol areas.
-	2	1	4. Organization/command structure.
-	1	-	5. Air defense capabilities/locations and links.
-	2	2	6. Readiness/proficiency.
-	2	2	7. Operating schedule.
-	2	1	8. Uniforms/markings.
			9. Capabilities
-	2	1	a. Special.
-	2	1	b. Chemical.

#### SECTION V--Planning materials

FA	TIP	ISO	
			1. Charts
1	-	-	a. TPCs.
2	1	-	b. JOGs.
-	1	-	c. AMS, and larger scale maps.
-	2	1	d. Specials.
			2. Imagery
2	1	-	a. Objective area.
-	2	1	b. Critical enroute points (no more than 10 ).
-	2	1	c. Critical air defense points.

FA	TIP	ISO	
-	2	2	d. Survival, escape and evasion.
			3. APPs data
-	1	-	a. Objective area.
-	2	1	b. Radar update points.
-	2	1	c. Critical turn points.
			4. JEWIC overlays
2	1	-	a. TPC (detection).
			b. JOG
2	2	-	(1) Detection.
2	1	-	(2) Kill.
			5. Surveys
2	1	-	a. DZs, LZs, HLZs, RZs.

#### SECTION VI--Physical characteristics

FA	TIP	ISO	
			1. Weather data
1	-	-	a. Climatology.
1	-	-	b. Solar data.
1	-	-	c. Lunar data (Army NVG lunar data).
-	2	1	d. Tactical decision aid (TDA).
-	2	1	e. IREP data, best and worst cases.
-	-	1	f. Unusual weather phenomenon.
-	2	2	2. Prominent terrain features.
-	1	-	3. Location of population, industrial concentrations.

FA	TIP	ISO	
-	2	-	4. Location of strategic/choke points.
1	-	-	5. Location of usable airfields (3000-4000 feet)
-	1	-	a. Water.
			b. POL.
-	1	-	6. Location of prominent lines of communications (roads, rail, water, airways, telecommunications).
-	1	-	7. Power lines (for EWO).

#### SECTION VII--survival, evasion and escape information

FA	TIP	ISO	
-	2	1	1. Suitable areas for evasion [SAFE] (wells, food, pickup locations, hazards).
-	2	1	2. Population distribution and probable reaction of US personnel.
-	2	1	3. Location of dissident groups.
-	1	-	4. Travel restrictions, locals and foreign nationals.
-	1	-	5. Ways to blend with the local population.
-	2	-	6. Phone codes to use to contact friendly forces.
-	1	-	7. Evasion charts.
-	2	1	8. Evasion kits.
-	2	1	9. Contents of suggested personal survival kit.
-	2	-	10. Food, water, and shelter.
-	2	-	11. Medical (diseases, plants/animals of medical importance).

SECTION VIII--Intelligence gaps (Information still on request)

SECTION IX--Friendly forces

FA	TIP	ISO	
			1. Strike package
-	2	1	a. Ingress routes (times, altitudes).
-	2	1	b. Egress routes (times, altitudes).
-	2	1	c. Location of control points.
-	2	1	d. Climb and descent.
-	2	1	2. Defense suppression support available/ requested (jamming, destruction, monitor).
-	2	1	3. CAP location and capability.
-	2	1	4. SIGINT/ELINT support available/requested.
-	2	1	5. Tanker support available/requested.
-	2	1	6. Location of ground forces and air defense assets.
-	2	1	7. CSAR support available, contact procedures.

APPENDIX M

USERS EVALUATION REPORT  
ON JOINT PUB 3-05.5

1. Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this pub. Please fill out the following: Users' POC, unit address, and phone (DSN) number.

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2. Content

a. Does the pub provide a conceptual framework for the topic? \_\_\_\_\_

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b. Is the information provided accurate? What needs to be updated?

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c. Is the information provided useful? If not, how can it be improved? \_\_\_\_\_

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d. Is this pub consistent with other joint pubs? \_\_\_\_\_

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e. Can this pub be better organized for the best understanding of the doctrine and/or JTTP? How? \_\_\_\_\_

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3. Writing and Appearance

a. Where does the pub need some revision to make the writing clear and concise? What words would you use? \_\_\_\_\_

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4. Recommended urgent change(s) (if any). \_\_\_\_\_

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5. Other \_\_\_\_\_

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6. Please fold and mail comments to the Joint Doctrine Center (additional pages may be attached if desired) or FAX to DSN 564-3990 or COMM (804) 444-3990.

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JOINT DOCTRINE CENTER  
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## GLOSSARY

### PART I--ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAA	antiaircraft artillery
AFSOC	Air Force special operations component
AFSOF	Air Force special operations forces
AOR	area of responsibility
ARSOC	Army special operations component
ARSOF	Army special operations forces
BE Number	basic encyclopedia number
BLS	beach landing site
C3	command, control and communications
C3CM	command, control, and communications countermeasures
C3I	command, control, communications, and intelligence
CA	civil affairs
CAP	crisis action planning
CARVER	criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, recognizability
CD	counterdrug
CEOI	communications electronics operating instructions
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINC	commander in chief
CJTF	commander joint task force
COA	course of action
COCOM	Combatant Command (command authority)
COMSEC	communications security
CRRC	combat rubber raiding craft
CT	counterterrorism
DA	direct action
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIRLAUTH	direct liaison authorized
DMA	Defense Mapping Agency
DZ	drop zone
EALT	earliest anticipated launch time
ECM	electronic countermeasures
EEl	essential elements of information
EXORD	execute order
EW	electronic warfare
EW/GCI	early warning/ground-controlled intercept

FA	feasibility assessment
FARP	forward arming and refueling point
FID	foreign internal defense
GEOREF	geographic reference
GW	guerrilla warfare
HC	host country
HF	high frequency
HLZ	helicopter landing zone
HUMINT	human intelligence
IA	initial assessment
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile
IMINT	imagery intelligence
IPA	intelligence production agency
ISO	isolation
JAG	judge advocate general
JFC	joint force commander
JFSOCC	joint force special operations component commander
JMEM-SO	Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual--Special Operations
JOPES	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JOPS	Joint Operation Planning System
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSOA	joint special operations area
JSOTF	joint special operations task force
JTCB	joint targeting coordination board
JTCG-ME	Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Munitions Effectiveness
JTF	joint task force
JTTP	joint tactics, techniques, and procedures
LOC	lines of communications
LZ	landing zone
MC&G	mapping, charting, and geodesy
MICON	mission concept
MITASK	mission tasking
MPA	mission planning agent
MSC	mission support confirmation
MSP	mission support plan
MSR	mission support request
MTL	mission tasking letter
MTP	mission tasking package

NAVSOC	naval special warfare operations component
NAVSO	Naval special warfare forces
NAVSPECWARCOM	Naval Special Warfare Command
NBC	nuclear, biological, chemical
NCA	National Command Authorities
nm	nautical miles
NSA	National Security Agency
OA	objective area
OPSEC	operations security
POE	plan of execution
POL	petroleum, oils, and lubricants
PSYOP	psychological operations
RFI	request for information
ROE	rules of engagement
RZ	recovery zone
SAFE	selected areas for evasion
SAID	SAFE area intelligence description
SAM	surface-to-air missile
SAR	search and rescue
SCI	sensitive, compartmented information
SDV	SEAL Delivery Vehicle
SERER	survival, evasion, resistance, escape, recovery
SIGINT	signals intelligence
SLP	seaward launch point
SO	special operations
SOA	special operations aviation
SOC	special operations command
SOE	Special Operations Executive
SOF	special operations forces
SOMPF	special operations mission planning folder
SOW	special operations wing (USAF)
SR	special reconnaissance
SRP	seaward recovery point
TIP	target intelligence package
TO&E	table of organization and equipment
USSOCOM	US Special Operations Command
USA	United States Army
USAF	United States Air Force
USASOC	United States Army Special Operations Command
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
UTM	universal transverse mercator
UW	unconventional warfare

## PART II--TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Air Force special operations component. The Air Force component of a joint force special operations component. Also called AFSOC. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

Air Force Special operations forces. Those active and reserve component Air Force forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called AFSOF. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Army special operations component. The Army special operations component of a unified or subordinate unified command or joint special operations task force. Also called ARSOC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Army special operations forces. Those active and reserve component Army forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called ARSOF. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

beach landing site. A geographic location selected for across-the-beach infiltration, exfiltration, resupply operations. Also called BLS. (Joint Pub 1-02)

CARVER. A special operations forces acronym used throughout the targeting and mission planning cycle to assess mission validity and requirements. The acronym stands for criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

Combatant Command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by title 10, United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands. Combatant Command (command authority) is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant Command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations; normally this authority is exercised through the Service component

commander. Combatant Command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the CINC considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Also called COCOM. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatant commander. A commander in chief of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterdrug. Those active measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. Also called CD. (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterterrorism. Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

direct action. Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by special operations forces to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel. In the conduct of these operations, special operations forces may employ raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics; emplace mines and other munitions; conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions; and conduct independent sabotage. Also called DA. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02) (This term and definition will replace the term and definition of "direct action mission" in Joint Pub 1-02.)

drop zone. A specific area upon which airborne troops, equipment, or supplies are airdropped. (Joint Pub 1-02)

earliest anticipated launch time. The earliest time expected for a special operations tactical element and its supporting platform to depart the staging or marshalling area together en route to the operations area. Also called EALT. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

essential elements of information. The critical items of information regarding the enemy and the environment needed by the commander by a particular time to relate with other available information and intelligence in order to assist in reaching a logical decision. (Joint Pub 1-02)

evasion and escape. The procedures and operations whereby military personnel and other selected individuals are enabled to emerge from an enemy-held or hostile area to areas under friendly control. (Joint Pub 1-02)

feasibility assessment. A basic target analysis that provides an initial determination of the viability of a proposed target for special operations forces employment. Also called FA. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. (Joint Pub 1-02)

guerrilla warfare. Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. (Joint Pub 1-02).

helicopter landing zone. A specified ground area for landing assault helicopters to embark or disembark troops and/or cargo. A landing zone may contain one or more landing sites. (Joint Pub 1-02)

initial assessment. An assessment that provides a basic determination of the viability of the infiltration and exfiltration portion of a proposed special operations forces mission. Also called IA. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

intelligence production agency.\* In special operations usage, the agency of the Intelligence Community that produces target intelligence data in support of special operations mission planning. Also called IPA.

joint force commander. A general term applied to a commander authorized to exercise Combatant Command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force special operations component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of special operations forces and assets, planning and coordinating special operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force special operations component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The joint force special operations component commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of special operations forces and the requisite command and control capabilities. Also called JFSOCC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual--Special Operations. A publication providing a single, comprehensive source of information covering weapon effectiveness, selection, and requirements for special operations munitions. In addition, the closely related fields of weapon characteristics and effects, target characteristics, and target vulnerability are treated in limited detail required by the mission planner. Although emphasis is placed on weapons that are currently in the inventory, information is also included for some weapons not immediately available but projected for the near future. Also called JMEM-SO. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

joint special operations task force. A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The joint special operations task force may have conventional nonspecial operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. Also called JSOTF. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. The actions and methods which implement joint doctrine and describe how forces will be employed in joint operations. They will be promulgated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in consultation with other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called JTTP. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint targeting coordination board. A group formed by the joint force commander to accomplish broad targeting oversight functions that may include but are not limited to coordinating targeting information, providing targeting guidance and priorities, and preparing and/or refining joint target lists. The board is normally comprised of representatives from the joint force staff, all components, and if required, component subordinate units. Also called JTCB. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

joint task force. A force composed of assigned or attached elements of the Army, the Navy or the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, or two or more of these Services, which is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense or by the commander of a unified command, a specified command, or an existing joint task force. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Munitions Effectiveness. A Joint Staff level organization tasked to produce generic target vulnerability and weaponeering studies. The Special Operations working group (JTSG-SO) is a subordinate organization specializing in studies for special operations. Also called JTSG-ME. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

landing zone. Any specified zone used for the landing of aircraft. (Joint Pub 1-02)

mission planning agent.\* The subordinate special operations force commander designated by the joint force special operations component commander to validate, plan, and execute a particular special operations mission. Also called MPA.

mission tasking.\* A directive that assigns a mission to a subordinate commander, provides essential planning guidance, and directs the initiation of mission planning. A mission tasking may be issued as a warning order, planning order, alert order, or execute order. Also called MITASK.

mission tasking letter.\* The means by which the joint force commander tasks the theater special operations command to validate and mission-plan assigned targets. Also called MTL.

mission tasking package.\* The documentation and guidance provided by the theater special operations command to the mission planning agent to provide basic guidance for target planning. It contains the tasking and administrative framework within which a given special operations forces target is planned. Also called MTP.

naval special warfare forces. Those active and reserve component Navy forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called NSW forces or NAVSOF. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

naval special warfare group. A permanent Navy organization to which most naval special warfare forces are assigned for some operational and all administrative purposes. The



group consists of a group headquarters with command and control, communications, and support staff, sea-air-land teams, special boat squadrons and subordinate special boat units, and sea-air-land delivery vehicle teams. The group is the source of all deployed naval special warfare forces and administratively supports the naval special warfare units assigned to the theater combatant commanders. The group staff provides general operational direction and coordinates the activities of its subordinate units. A naval special warfare group is capable of task-organizing to meet a wide variety of requirements. Also called NSWG. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

naval special warfare special operations component. The Navy special operations component of a unified or subordinate unified command or joint special operations task force. Also called NAVSOC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

objective area. A defined geographical area within which is located an objective to be captured or reached by military forces. This area is defined by competent authority for purposes of command and control. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operation plan. A plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. It is usually based on stated assumptions and is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders. The designation "plan" is usually used instead of "order" in preparing for operations well in advance. An operation plan may be put into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal, and then becomes the operation order. (Joint Pub 1-02)

plan of execution.\* A detailed plan of precisely how the assigned special operations forces will carry out the validated mission assigned to them. This plan, in conjunction with mission rehearsals, is the end result of the targeting and mission planning process. The term also describes the supporting infiltration and exfiltration plan developed by the supporting organization. Also called POE.

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called PSYOP. (Joint Pub 1-02)

recovery zone. A designated geographic area from which special operations forces can be extracted by air, boat, or other means. Also called RZ. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

seaward launch point. A designated point off the coast from which special operations forces will launch to proceed to the beach to conduct operations. Also called SLP. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

seaward recovery point. A designated point off the coast to which special operations forces will proceed for recovery by submarine, surface ship, or other means of recovery. Also called SRP. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

special operations. Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted during peacetime competition, conflict, and war, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, nonspecial-operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called SO. (Joint Pub 1-02)

special operations command. A functional command established by a theater combatant commander to plan, coordinate, conduct, and support joint special operations. Most special operations commands are subordinate unified commands of the theater combatant commands. Also called SOC. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

special operations forces. Military units that are designated by the Secretary of Defense and organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct special operations. Also called SOF. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

special operations mission planning folder. The package that contains the materials required to execute a given special operations mission. It will include the mission tasking letter, mission tasking package, original feasibility assessment (as desired), initial assessment (as desired), target intelligence package, plan of execution, infiltration and exfiltration plan of execution, and other documentation as required or desired. Also called SOMPF. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

special operations wing. An Air Force special operations wing. Also called SOW. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

special reconnaissance. Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by special operations forces to obtain or verify, by visual observation or other collection methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. It includes target acquisition, area assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

supporting agency.\* In special operations, a military unit or nonmilitary organization tasked to provide operational support for a particular special operations mission as requested by the mission planning agent. There may be more than one supporting agency for a single special operations mission. Also called SA.

target. 1. A geographical area, complex, or installation planned for capture or destruction by military forces. 2. In intelligence usage, a country, area, installation, agency, or person against which intelligence operations are directed. (Joint Pub 1-02)

target analysis. An examination of potential targets to determine military importance, priority of attack, and weapons required to obtain a desired level of damage or casualties. (Joint Pub 1-02)

target complex. A geographically integrated series of target concentrations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

target component. A major element of a target complex or target. It is any machinery, structure, personnel, or other productive asset that contributes to the operation or output of the target complex or target. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

target concentration. A grouping of geographically proximate targets. (Joint Pub 1-02)

target critical damage point. The part of a target component that is most vital. Also called critical node. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

targeting. The process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

target intelligence package.\* A product tasked and compiled to provide the intelligence support to those personnel who will plan and execute a given special operations forces mission. Also called TIP.

target list. The listing of targets maintained and promulgated by the senior echelon of command; it contains those targets that are to be engaged by supporting arms, as distinguished from a "list of targets" that may be maintained by any echelon as confirmed, suspected, or possible targets for informational and planning purposes. (Joint Pub 1-02)

target stress point. The weakest point (most vulnerable to damage) on the critical damage point. Also called vulnerable node. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

target system. 1. All the targets situated in a particular geographic area and functionally related. 2. A group of targets which are so related that their destruction will produce some particular effect desired by the attacker. (Joint Pub 1-02)

target system component. A set of targets belonging to one or more groups of industries and basic utilities required to produce component parts of an end-product such as periscopes, or one type of a series of interrelated commodities, such as aviation gasoline. (Joint Pub 1-02)

time-sensitive special operations planning. The planning for the deployment and employment of assigned, attached, and allocated forces and resources that occurs in response to an actual situation. Time-sensitive planners base their plan on the actual circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. Also see deliberate planning. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

unconventional warfare. A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. Also called UW. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

weaponneering. Analysis of weapons effectiveness against specific targets with specific weapons delivery parameters to provide probability of damage. The analysis highlights appropriate weapons for employment and the scale of effort (numbers of weapons required) to obtain the desired level of damage. Weaponneering connotes lethal or damage assessment of a target. Nonlethal alternatives are also considered during the weaponneering phase of the target cycle. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

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\* This term and definition are applicable only in the context of this publication and cannot be referenced outside of this publication.

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