

# **CSE 410/565: Computer Security**


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# **Symmetric Encryption II**

# Design Principles of Block Ciphers

- Confusion-diffusion paradigm
  - split a block into small chunks
  - define a substitution on each chunk separately (confusion)
  - mix outputs from different chunks by rearranging bits (diffusion)
  - repeat to strengthen the result

# Design Principles of Block Ciphers



- For this type of algorithm to be reversible, each operation needs to be invertible


# Design Principles of Block Ciphers

- Let's denote one iteration or round by function  $g$ 
  - The initial state  $s_0$  is the message  $m$  itself
  - In round  $i$ :
    - $g$ 's input is round key  $k_i$  and state  $s_{i-1}$
    - $g$ 's output is state  $s_i$
  - The ciphertext  $c$  is the final state  $s_{Nr}$  where  $Nr$  is the number of rounds
  - Decryption algorithm applies  $g^{-1}$  iteratively
    - the order of round keys is reversed
    - set  $s_{Nr} = c$ , compute  $s_{i-1} = g^{-1}(k_i, s_i)$

# Design Principles of Block Ciphers

- Another way to realize confusion-diffusion paradigm is through **Feistel** network
  - in Feistel network each state is divided into halves of the same length:  $L_i$  and  $R_i$
  - in one round:
    - $L_i = R_{i-1}$
    - $R_i = L_{i-1} \oplus f(k_i, R_{i-1})$

# Design Principles of Block Ciphers



- Are there any advantages over the previous design?
  - operations no longer need to be reversible, as the inverse of the algorithm is not used!
  - reverse one round's computation as  $R_{i-1} = L_i$  and  $L_{i-1} = R_i \oplus f(k_i, R_{i-1})$

# Design Principles of Block Ciphers

- In both types of networks, the substitution and permutation algorithms must be carefully designed
  - choosing random substitution/permutation strategies leads to significantly weaker ciphers
  - each bit difference in S-box input creates at least 2-bit difference in its output
  - mixing permutation ensures that difference in one S-box propagates to at least 2 S-boxes in next round



# Block Ciphers


- Larger key size means greater security
  - for  $n$ -bit keys, brute force search takes  $2^n/2$  time on average
  - More rounds often provide better protection
    - the number of rounds must be large enough for proper mixing
  - Larger block size offers increased security
    - security of a cipher also depends on the block length

# Data Encryption Standard (DES)


- In 1973 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published a solicitation for cryptosystems
- DES was developed by IBM and adopted as a standard in 1977
- It was expected to be used as a standard for 10–15 years
- Was replaced only in 2001 with AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)
- DES characteristics:
  - key size is 56 bits
  - block size is 64 bits
  - number of rounds is 16

# Data Encryption Standard (DES)

- DES uses Feistel network
  - Feistel network is used in many block ciphers such as DES, RC5, etc.
  - not used in AES
  - in DES, each  $L_i$  and  $R_i$  is 32 bits long;  $k_i$  is 48 bits long




# Data Encryption Standard (DES)



- DES has a fixed initial permutation  $IP$  prior to 16 rounds of encryption
  - The inverse permutation  $IP^{-1}$  is applied at the end

# DES f function



- The f function  $f(k_i, R_{i-1})$ 
  - first expands  $R_{i-1}$  from 32 to 48 bits ( $k_i$  is 48 bits long)
  - XORs expanded  $R_{i-1}$  with  $k_i$
  - applies substitution to the result using S-boxes
  - and finally permutes the value

# DES

- There are 8 S-boxes
  - S-boxes are the only non-linear elements in DES design
  - they are crucial for the security of the cipher
- Example S1

14	4	13	1	2	15	11	8	3	10	6	12	5	9	0	7
0	15	7	4	14	2	13	1	10	6	12	11	9	5	3	8
4	1	14	8	13	6	2	11	15	12	9	7	3	10	5	0
15	12	8	2	4	9	1	7	5	11	3	14	10	0	6	13

input to each S-box is 6 bits  $b_1b_2b_3b_4b_5b_6$

- row =  $b_1b_6$ , column =  $b_2b_3b_4b_5$
- output is 4 bits


# DES

## More about S-boxes..

- a modified version of IBM's proposal was accepted as the standard
- some of the design choices of S-boxes weren't public, which triggered criticism
- in late 1980s – early 1990s differential cryptanalysis techniques were discovered
- it was then revealed that DES S-boxes were designed to prevent such attacks
- such cryptanalysis techniques were known almost 20 years before they were discovered by others

# DES Key Schedule

- Key computation consists of:
  - circular shift
  - permutation
  - contraction





# DES Weak Keys

- The master key  $k$  is used to generate 16 round keys
- Some keys result in the same round key to be generated in more than one round
  - this reduces complexity of the cipher
- Solution: check for weak keys at key generation
- DES has 4 weak keys:
  - 00000000 00000000
  - 00000000 FFFFFFFF
  - FFFFFFFF 00000000
  - FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF

# Attacks on DES

- Brute force attack: try all possible 256 keys
  - time-consuming, but no storage requirements
- Differential cryptanalysis: traces the difference of two messages through each round of the algorithm
  - was discovered in early 90s
  - not effective against DES
- Linear cryptanalysis: tries to find linear approximations to describe DES transformations
  - was discovered in 1993
  - has no practical implication

# Brute Force Search Attacks on DES

- It was conjectured in 1970s that a cracker machine could be built for \$20 million
- In 1990s RSA Laboratories called several DES challenges
  - Challenge II-2 was solved in 1998 by Electronic Frontier Foundation
    - a DES Cracker machine was built for less than \$250,000 and found the key was in 56 hours
  - Challenge III was solved in 1999 by the DES Cracker in cooperation with a worldwide network of 100,000 computers
    - the key was found in 22 hours 15 minutes
    - <http://www.distributed.net/des>

# Increasing Security of DES

- DES uses a 56-bit key and this raised concerns
- One proposed solution is double DES
  - apply DES twice by using two different keys  $k_1$  and  $k_2$
  - encryption  $c = E_{k_2}(E_{k_1}(m))$
  - decryption  $m = D_{k_1}(D_{k_2}(c))$
- The resulting key is  $2 \cdot 56 = 112$  bits, so it should be more secure, right?
  - an attack called meet-in-the-middle discovers keys  $k_1$  and  $k_2$  with 256 computation and storage
  - better, but not substantially than regular DES

# Triple DES

- Triple DES with two keys  $k_1$  and  $k_2$ :
  - encryption  $c = E_{k_1}(D_{k_2}(E_{k_1}(m)))$
  - decryption  $m = D_{k_1}(E_{k_2}(D_{k_1}(c)))$
  - key space is  $2 \cdot 56 = 112$  bits
- Triple DES with three keys  $k_1$ ,  $k_2$ , and  $k_3$ :
  - encryption  $c = E_{k_3}(D_{k_2}(E_{k_1}(m)))$
  - decryption  $m = D_{k_1}(E_{k_2}(D_{k_3}(c)))$
  - key space is  $3 \cdot 56 = 168$  bits
- There is no known practical attack against either version
- Can be made backward compatible by setting  $k_1 = k_2$  or  $k_3 = k_2$

# Summary of Attacks on DES

- DES – best attack: brute force search
  - 255 work on average
  - no other requirements
- Double DES
  - best attack: meet-in-the-middle
  - requires 2 plaintext-ciphertext pairs
  - requires 256 space and about 256 work
- Triple DES
  - best practical attack: brute force search

# Symmetric Encryption

- So far we've covered:
  - what secure symmetric encryption is
  - high-level design of block ciphers
  - DES
- Next, we'll talk about:
  - AES
  - block cipher encryption modes


# Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

- In 1997 NIST made a formal call for an **unclassified publicly disclosed encryption algorithm available worldwide and royalty-free**
  - the goal was to replace DES with a new standard called AES
  - the algorithm must be a symmetric block cipher
  - the algorithm must support (at a minimum) 128-bit blocks and key sizes of 128, 192, and 256 bits
- The **evaluation criteria** were:
  - security
  - speed and memory requirements
  - algorithm and implementation characteristics




# AES

- During encryption:
  - the block is copied into the state matrix
  - the state is modified at each round of encryption and decryption
  - the final state is copied to the ciphertext



# AES

- The key schedule in AES:
  - the key is treated as a 4 × 4 matrix as well
  - the key is then expanded into an array of words
  - each word is 4 bytes and there are 44 words (for 128-bit key)
  - four distinct words serve as a round key for each round



# AES

- Rijndael doesn't have a Feistel structure
  - 2 out of 5 AES candidates (including Rijndael) don't use Feistel structure
  - they process the entire block in parallel during each round
- The operations are (3 substitution and 1 permutation operations):
  - SUBBYTES: byte-by-byte substitution using an S-box
  - SHIFTRROWS: a simple permutation
  - MIXCOLUMNS: a substitution using *mod 28* arithmetics
  - ADDROUNDKEY: a simple XOR of the current state with a portion of the expanded key

# AES

- At a high-level, **encryption** proceeds as follows:
  - set initial state  $s_0 = m$
  - perform operation ADDROUNDKEY (XORs  $k_i$  and  $s_i$ )
  - for each of the first  $Nr - 1$  rounds:
    - perform a substitution operation SUBBYTES on  $s_i$  and an S-box
    - perform a permutation SHIFTRows on  $s_i$
    - perform an operation MIXCOLUMNS on  $s_i$
    - perform ADDROUNDKEY
  - the last round is the same except no MIXCOLUMNS is used
  - set the ciphertext  $c = s_{Nr}$

# AES


- More about Rijndael design. . .
  - ADDROUNDKEY is the only operation that uses key
    - that's why it is applied at the beginning and at the end
- all operations are reversible
- the decryption algorithm uses the expanded key in the reverse order
- the decryption algorithm, however, is not identical to the encryption algorithm

# AES

- The SUBBYTES operation
  - maps a state byte  $s_{i,j}$  to a new byte  $s'_{i,j}$  using S-box
  - the S-box is a  $16 \times 16$  matrix with a byte in each position
    - the S-box contains a permutation of all possible 256 8-bit values
    - the values are computed using a formula
    - it was designed to resist known cryptanalytic attacks (i.e., to have low correlation between input bits and output bits)

# AES


- The **SUBBYTES** operation
  - to compute the new  $s'_{i,j}$ :
    - set  $x$  to the 4 leftmost bits of  $s_{i,j}$  and  $y$  to its 4 rightmost bits
    - use  $x$  as the row and  $y$  as the column to locate a cell in the S-box
    - use that cell value as  $s'_{i,j}$



- the same procedure is performed on each byte of the state

# AES

- The **SHIFTROWS** operation
  - performs circular left shift on state rows
    - 2nd row is shifted by 1 byte
    - 3rd row is shifted by 2 bytes
    - 4th row is shifted by 3 bytes



- important because other operations operate on a single cell



# AES

- The **MIXCOLUMNS** operation
  - multiplies the state by a fixed matrix

$$\begin{bmatrix} 02 & 03 & 01 & 01 \\ 01 & 02 & 03 & 01 \\ 01 & 01 & 02 & 03 \\ 03 & 01 & 01 & 02 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} s_{0,0} & s_{0,1} & s_{0,2} & s_{0,3} \\ s_{1,0} & s_{1,1} & s_{1,2} & s_{1,3} \\ s_{2,0} & s_{2,1} & s_{2,2} & s_{2,3} \\ s_{3,0} & s_{3,1} & s_{3,2} & s_{3,3} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} s'_{0,0} & s'_{0,1} & s'_{0,2} & s'_{0,3} \\ s'_{1,0} & s'_{1,1} & s'_{1,2} & s'_{1,3} \\ s'_{2,0} & s'_{2,1} & s'_{2,2} & s'_{2,3} \\ s'_{3,0} & s'_{3,1} & s'_{3,2} & s'_{3,3} \end{bmatrix}$$

- was designed to ensure good mixing among the bytes of each column
- the coefficients 01, 02, and 03 are for implementation purposes  
(multiplication involves at most a shift and an XOR)

# AES

- **Decryption:**
  - inverse S-box is used in SUBBYTES
  - inverse shifts are performed in SHIFTROWS
  - inverse multiplication matrix is used in MIXCOLUMNS
- **Key expansion:**
  - was designed to resist known attacks and be efficient
  - knowledge of a part of the key or round key doesn't enable calculation of other key bits
  - round-dependent values are used in key expansion

# AES

- Summary of Rijndael design
  - simple design but resistant to known attacks
  - very efficient on a variety of platforms including 8-bit and 64-bit platforms
  - highly parallelizable
  - had the highest throughput in hardware among all AES candidates
  - well suited for restricted-space environments (very low RAM and ROM requirements)
  - optimized for encryption (decryption is slower)

# AES Hardware Implementation

- It's been long known that hardware implementations of AES are extremely fast
  - the speed of encryption is compared with the speed of disk read
- Hardware implementations however remained inaccessible to the average user
- Recently Intel introduced new AES instruction set (AES-NI) in its commodity processors
  - other processor manufacturers support it now as well
  - hardware acceleration can be easily used on many platforms

# Secure Encryption


- For symmetric encryption to be secure, the key must be chosen completely at random
  - cryptography failures are often due to incorrect implementations
- Using a strong block cipher is not enough for secure encryption!
  - if you need to send more than 1 block (i.e., 16 bytes) over the key lifetime, applying plain block cipher to the message as will fail even weak definitions of secure encryption

$\text{Enck}(b1), \text{Enck}(b2), \dots$

- no deterministic encryption can be secure if multiple blocks are sent


# Block Cipher Limitation

- Block length is fixed (n-bit)
- Need to Partition into n-bit blocks to encrypt large messages



# Block Cipher Limitation

- Does not hide data patterns, unsuitable for long messages



- Susceptible to replay attacks
  - Example: a wired transfer transaction can be replayed by resending the original message)


# Encryption Modes

- Encryption modes indicate how messages longer than one block are encrypted and decrypted
- 4 modes of operation were standardized in 1980 for Digital Encryption Standard (DES)
  - can be used with any block cipher
  - electronic codebook mode (ECB), cipher feedback mode (CFB), cipher block chaining mode (CBC), and output feedback mode (OFB)
- 5 modes were specified with the current standard Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in 2001
  - the 4 above and counter mode



# Encryption Modes

- **Electronic Codebook (ECB)** mode
  - divide the message  $m$  into blocks  $m_1, m_2, \dots, m_\ell$  of size  $n$  each
  - encipher each block separately: for  $i = 1, \dots, \ell$ ,  $c_i = E_k(m_i)$ , where  $E$  denotes block cipher encryption
  - the resulting ciphertext is  $c = c_1 c_2 \dots c_\ell$




# Encryption Modes

- Properties of ECB mode:
  - identical plaintext blocks result in identical ciphertexts (under the same key)
  - each block can be encrypted and decrypted independently
  - this mode doesn't result in secure encryption
- ECB mode is a plain invocation of the block cipher
  - it allows the block cipher to be used in other, more complex cryptographic constructions

# Encryption Modes

- Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode

- set  $c_0 = IV \xleftarrow{R} \{0, 1\}^n$  (initialization vector)
- encryption: for  $i = 1, \dots, \ell$ ,  $c_i = E_k(m_i \oplus c_{i-1})$
- decryption: for  $i = 1, \dots, \ell$ ,  $m_i = c_{i-1} \oplus D_k(c_i)$ , where D is block cipher decryption




# Encryption Modes

- Properties of CBC mode:
  - this mode is CPA-secure (has a formal proof) if the block cipher can be assumed to produce pseudo random output
  - a ciphertext block depends on all preceding plaintext blocks
  - sequential encryption, cannot use parallel hardware
  - *IV* must be random and communicated intact
    - if the IV is not random, security quickly degrades
    - if someone can fool the receiver into using a different IV, security issues arise

# Encryption Modes

- Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode
  - the message is XORed with the encryption of the feedback from the previous block
  - generate random  $IV$  and set initial input  $I_1 = IV$
  - encryption:  $c_i = E_k(I_i) \oplus m_i; I_{i+1} = c_i$
  - decryption:  $m_i = c_i \oplus E_k(I_i)$


# Encryption Modes



- This mode allows the block cipher to be used as a **stream cipher**
  - if our application requires that plaintext units shorter than the block are transmitted without delay, we can use this mode
  - the message is transmitted in  $r$ -bit units ( $r$  is often 8 or 1)

# Encryption Modes

- **Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode:**
  - input: key  $k$ ,  $r$ -bit plaintext blocks  $m_1, \dots$
  - output:  $n$ -bit  $IV$ ,  $r$ -bit ciphertext blocks  $c_1, \dots$




# Encryption Modes

- Properties of CFB mode:
  - the mode is CPA-secure (under the same assumption that the block cipher is strong)
  - similar to CBC, a ciphertext block depends on all previous plaintext blocks
  - throughput is decreased when the mode is used on small units
  - one encryption operation is applied per  $r$  bits, not per  $n$  bits



# Encryption Modes

- **Output Feedback (OFB) mode:**
  - similar to CFB, but the feedback is from encryption output and is independent of the message




# Encryption Modes

- **Output Feedback (OFB) mode:**
  - $n$ -bit feedback is recommended
  - using fewer bits for the feedback reduces the size of the cycle
- **Properties of OFB:**
  - the mode is CPA-secure
  - the key stream is plaintext-independent
  - similar to CFB, throughput is decreased for  $r < n$ , but the key stream can be precomputed

# Encryption Modes

- Counter (CRT) mode:
  - a counter is encrypted and XORed with a plaintext block
  - no feedback into the encryption function
  - initially set  $ctr = IV \xleftarrow{R} \{0, 1\}^n$



# Encryption Modes

- Counter (CRT) mode:

- encryption: for  $i = 1, \dots, \ell$ ,  $c_i = E_k(ctr + i) \oplus m_i$
- decryption: for  $i = 1, \dots, \ell$ ,  $m_i = E_k(ctr + i) \oplus c_i$

- Properties:

- there is no need to pad the last block to full block size
- if the last plaintext block is incomplete, we just truncate the last cipher block and transmit it

# Encryption Modes

- Advantages of counter mode
  - Hardware and software efficiency: multiple blocks can be encrypted or decrypted in parallel
  - Preprocessing: encryption can be done in advance; the rest is only XOR
  - Random access:  $i$ th block of plaintext or ciphertext can be processed independently of others
  - Security: at least as secure as other modes (i.e., CPA-secure)
  - Simplicity: doesn't require decryption or decryption key scheduling
- But what happens if the counter is reused?

# Summary

- **AES** is the current block cipher standard
  - it offers strong security and fast performance
- Five **encryption modes** are specified as part of the standard
  - ECB mode is not for secure encryption
  - any other encryption mode achieves sufficient security
    - use one of these modes for encryption even if the message is a single block
- **Strong randomness** is required for cryptographic purposes
  - key generation, IV generation, etc.