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Zincati allows unprivileged access to rpm-ostree D-Bus `Deploy()` and `FinalizeDeployment()` methods

Low severity GitHub Reviewed Published Mar 17, 2025 in coreos/zincati • Updated Mar 19, 2025

Package

cargo zincati (Rust)

Affected versions

>= 0.0.24, <= 0.0.29

Patched versions

0.0.30

Description

Impact

Zincati ships a polkit rule which allows the zincati system user to use the following actions:

  • org.projectatomic.rpmostree1.deploy: used to deploy updates to the system
  • org.projectatomic.rpmostree1.finalize-deployment: used to reboot the system into the deployed update

Since Zincati v0.0.24, this polkit rule contains a logic error which broadens access of those polkit actions to any unprivileged user rather than just the zincati system user.

In practice, this means that any unprivileged user with access to the system D-Bus socket is able to deploy older Fedora CoreOS versions (which may have other known vulnerabilities). Note that rpm-ostree enforces that the selected version must be from the same branch the system is currently on so this cannot directly be used to deploy an attacker-controlled update payload.

This primarily impacts users running untrusted workloads with access to the system D-Bus socket. Note that in general, untrusted workloads should not be given this access, whether containerized or not. By default, containers do not have access to the system D-Bus socket.

Patches

The logic error is fixed in Zincati v0.0.30. The fix is included in the following FCOS releases:

  • On the stable stream: 41.20250302.3.2
  • On the testing stream: 41.20250315.2.0
  • On the next stream: 42.20250316.1.0

Workarounds

A workaround is to add the following polkit rule:

polkit.addRule(function(action, subject) {
    if (action.id == "org.projectatomic.rpmostree1.deploy" ||
        action.id == "org.projectatomic.rpmostree1.finalize-deployment" ||
        action.id == "org.projectatomic.rpmostree1.cleanup") {
        if (subject.user != "zincati") {
                return polkit.Result.NO;
        }
    }
});

to e.g. /etc/polkit-1/rules.d/00-zincati-fix.rules (it must sort earlier than zincati.rules lexicographically).

Note that this rule will deny all non-root users other than zincati from using those actions. If you've added polkit rules to allow e.g. the core user or other users, you will need to adjust the policy (or make sure the ordering is appropriate).

References

This issue was introduced by this commit, and is fixed in v0.0.30.

References

@jlebon jlebon published to coreos/zincati Mar 17, 2025
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Mar 17, 2025
Reviewed Mar 17, 2025
Published by the National Vulnerability Database Mar 17, 2025
Last updated Mar 19, 2025

Severity

Low

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector Local
Attack Complexity Low
Attack Requirements Present
Privileges Required None
User interaction None
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity High
Availability None
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity None
Availability None

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(1st percentile)

Weaknesses

CVE ID

CVE-2025-27512

GHSA ID

GHSA-w6fv-6gcc-x825

Source code

Credits

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