The SHA-256 Project

This project was originally assigned in NYU Tandon's CS-GY 6903 Applied Cryptography course, Fall 2021. Here's the original course repo with all the other problem sets.

In this project we're going to implement SHA-256 ourselves, and then we'll use our implementation to demonstrate a "length extension attack". To get a sense of scale, take a look at the SHA-256 pseudocode on Wikipedia. That pseudocode will be one of our references, and there will be several direct quotes from it below. The animations in this video might also help you get a big-picture sense of what the algorithm is doing.

Implementing that pseudocode takes less than a hundred lines of Python, which might not seem like a lot. But there are lots of little details in those lines, and the nature of the "avalanche effect" is such that a tiny mistake will totally mess up your output, usually without giving you any useful feedback about what you did wrong. So we'll move slowly, piece by piece, making sure to test each piece before we move on to the next. Read and reread each problem carefully, two or three times through, and then follow the instructions exactly as you write your code. If the instructions are unclear, ask for help and avoid the temptation to guess. Mistakes will be difficult to debug, which makes this project challenging.

So...what's the point of such a challenging project? If we almost never implement hash functions ourselves in the real world, why are we going to spend our precious time on it now? Two reasons:

Concretely, as long as SHA-2 remains widely used, length extension attacks will remain a common pitfall. You need to know about them to use SHA-2 safely, and to help others use it safely. As with most attacks, the best way to understand the length extension attack is to do it yourself, which means we need to get our hands on the inner workings of SHA-2.

More broadly, there are just so many black boxes in cryptography that we almost never look inside, especially our block ciphers, stream ciphers, and hash functions. No one has enough time to learn the details of all of them, not even professional cryptographers. But these algorithms are not magic, and this class would be doing you a disservice if we never opened up any black boxes. Our goal isn't to memorize all the details, but to build up the sort of practical intuition that can only come from having seen the details before. And I want you to come away from this class with the confidence that you can handle this level of detail for any algorithm, if and when you need to.

So this is it. This is where we're going to open one of the black boxes and get all the way to the bottom of it. This is SHA-256.

Contents

Workflow
Example input
Example output
Building blocks
- Problem 1: addition modulo 2³²
- Problem 2: bitwise right rotation
The Message Schedule
The Round Function
The Compression Function
- Problem 11: the compression function
Padding
- Problem 12: padding
The Hash Function
- Problem 13: the hash function
The Length Extension Attack
Conclusion

Workflow

This project was originally assigned in NYU Tandon's CS-GY 6903 Applied Cryptography course. It's intended to be JSON-in-JSON-out and autograded. A grading script is provided in this repo, but if you prefer you can also just visually compare the output of your solution to the example output provided.

The arguments to the grade.py script are the command to run your solution. Internally, the grading script generates test input with generate_input.py and uses the Python solution provided in solution_py/ to generate expected answers. So for example, to test the provided Rust solution against the provided Python solution, you would run this command:

./grade.py cargo run --manifest-path solution_rs/Cargo.toml

Or similarly, to test the Python solution against itself, you could run:

./grade.py solution_py/solution.py

Example input

{
  "problem1": [
    [1, 2],
    [4294967295, 1],
    [3050487260, 3710144918]
  ],
  "problem2": [
    [2, 1],
    [1, 1],
    [2919882184, 31]
  ],
  "problem3": 1114723206,
  "problem4": 1232674167,
  "problem5": "iguana wombat dog kangaroo llama turkey yak unicorn sheep xenoce",
  "problem6": 3536071395,
  "problem7": 651015076,
  "problem8": [2749825547, 776049372, 1213590135],
  "problem9": [3758166654, 2821345890, 1850678816],
  "problem10": {
    "state": [
        2739944672, 3126690193, 4191866847, 1163785745,
        3714074692, 1172792371, 283469062, 826169706
    ],
    "round_constant": 961987163,
    "schedule_word": 3221900128
  },
  "problem11": {
    "state": [
      2918946378, 1679978889, 1678006433, 650957219,
      379281712, 2112907926, 1775216060, 2152648190
    ],
    "block": "manatee fox unicorn octopus dog fox fox llama vulture jaguar xen"
  },
  "problem12": [0, 1, 55, 56, 64, 492022654431536432],
  "problem13": [
    "",
    "hello world",
    "aardvark zebra yak pig jaguar aardvark rhinoceros butte",
    "narwhal dog llama llama giraffe narwhal octopus dog xeno",
    "John Jacob Jingleheimer Schmidt! His name is my name too. Whenever we go out the people always shout there goes John Jacob Jingleheimer Schmidt! Nanananananana..."
  ],
  "problem14": {
    "original_input": "fox elephant dog",
    "chosen_suffix": "pig jaguar iguana"
  },
  "problem15": "bacb15aef84802baa0f530845013a98ee1eede664b914f8ebc2a520e69049a09",
  "problem16": {
    "original_hash": "27b82abe296f3ecd5174b6e6168ea683cd8ef94306d9abd9f81807f2fa587d2a",
    "original_len": 41,
    "chosen_suffix": "manatee jaguar zebra zebra dog"
  }
}

Example output

{
  "problem1": [3, 0, 2465664882],
  "problem2": [1, 2147483648, 1544797073],
  "problem3": 1345017931,
  "problem4": 2902922196,
  "problem5": [
    1768387937, 1851859063, 1869439585, 1948279919, 1730177889, 1852268914, 1869553772, 1818324321,
    544503154, 1801812256, 2036427552, 1970170211, 1869770272, 1936221541, 1881176165, 1852793701,
    3002878561, 3711121932, 1520676164, 3002441970, 2935068969, 1610329529, 1904580351, 3219988740,
    2337695268, 263015313, 2120931855, 131203777, 3818546915, 19163115, 3479924161, 2154860703,
    1790169326, 516580487, 2414737634, 909025701, 2241053595, 1237268359, 3797503938, 1773623028,
    2840671725, 2299292186, 1933596460, 2279513616, 514132674, 3245155609, 1753922983, 2241450350,
    2449659630, 262239956, 773552098, 3253131632, 3863807927, 879696536, 3143654396, 3973063648,
    509015903, 270850193, 1893431553, 719566283, 2310657204, 365781698, 3761063438, 1007484868
  ],
  "problem6": 3003388882,
  "problem7": 2194029931,
  "problem8": 1783753340,
  "problem9": 3893039714,
  "problem10": [
    1724514418, 2739944672, 3126690193, 4191866847,
    1638715774, 3714074692, 1172792371, 283469062
  ],
  "problem11": [
    1251501988, 1663226031, 2877128394, 4050467288,
    2375501075, 1434687977, 2625842981, 650253644
  ],
  "problem12": [
    "80000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
    "800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008",
    "8000000000000001b8",
    "8000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001c0",
    "80000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000200",
    "800000000000000036a01ffa96b12980"
  ],
  "problem13": [
    "e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855",
    "b94d27b9934d3e08a52e52d7da7dabfac484efe37a5380ee9088f7ace2efcde9",
    "4b45e1bec21185865d1628a8a502eed789193a3c253a529983e4bc17fa65f32b",
    "99069f1eba4c874aba649c17136a253e1dd504cda936ab77cf189c2cf9eb88ff",
    "68b74d91364475247c10bfee2621eaa13bcabb033ed1dee58b74c05e7944489a"
  ],
  "problem14": "666f7820656c657068616e7420646f67800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000080706967206a616775617220696775616e61",
  "problem15": [
    3133871534, 4165468858, 2700423300, 1343465870,
    3790528102, 1267814286, 3156890126, 1761909257
  ],
  "problem16": "50417b93404facb1b481990a7bf6ac963b1e1ee0ccced8b2a5938caa28b52b41"
}

Building blocks

We'll start with the smallest details at the very bottom of the box. As a first step, we need to build a couple of math operations that Python doesn't give us directly: modular addition and bitwise right-rotation.

Problem 1: addition modulo 2³²

If you've learned a language like C or Java before, you might know that modular addition is what many languages do with integers by default. In these languages, integers have some fixed size, like 32 bits, and any math operation that would normally give a result ≥2³² instead "overflows" and starts counting up from 0 again. These fixed-size integer operations are very efficient in hardware, so they're common in CPU instruction sets and in algorithms like SHA-256. However, integers in Python have no fixed size, and math operations in Python never overflow. If you want to see this in action, ask Python for the value of 2^1,000,000. This property is lovely for our intuition as programmers, because it means Python integers work like the regular math we're used to. But alas, it's not how addition is done in SHA-256, so we'll need to give ourselves a helper function for this.

Define a function like add32(x, y). (I'll suggest names for your functions throughout this project, but you can name them whatever you like.) It should add its two arguments and then take the result modulo 2³², i.e. the remainder when the result is divided by 2³². Remember that % is the "modulo" or "remainder" operator in Python, and ** is the exponentiation operator.

Input: a list of (x, y) pairs

Output: a list of results from calling add32 on each pair

Problem 2: bitwise right rotation

The other building block we need is bitwise rotation. Most programming languages including Python provide a very similar operation called bit shifting, usually written << (left shift) or >> (right shift). A bit rotation is like bit shift, but instead of "falling off the end" of the number, the bits rotate around to the other end. This is nice for cryptographic functions that need to do a lot of mixing, because it moves bits around without losing any information. For example, consider this 32-bit number:

00000000000000000000000000001111

If we right-shift that number by two places, we get:

00000000000000000000000000000011

But if we right-rotate that number by two places, we get:

11000000000000000000000000000011

Python doesn't have a built-in bit rotation operator, but we can accomplish the same thing by combining the results of two shifts. If you enjoy bit twiddling puzzles, figure out how to do this before reading further. If not, it's ok to just copy the following function, but make sure you take a few moments to walk through the example above and see how it does the right thing.

def rightrotate32(x, n):
    assert x < 2 ** 32, "x is too large. Did you use + instead of add32 somewhere?"
    right_part = x >> n
    left_part = x << (32 - n)
    return add32(left_part, right_part)

Input: a list of (x, n) pairs

Output: a list of results from calling rightrotate32 on each pair

Using these helper functions and Python's other built-in operations, we're going to do a lot of math using 32-bit integers. As a shorthand, we'll refer to these integers as "words". A "word" is just another way of saying "an integer of the size that we prefer to / are able to work with". The size of a word depends on context, but in the context of SHA-256, a "word" means a 32-bit unsigned integer.

The Message Schedule

With those two building blocks in place, we're ready to implement the first major moving part of our hash function, the "message schedule". Here the "message" means the hash function's input. In each round of its compression function, SHA-256 mixes in one word from the message. (Make sure you read the definition of a "word" above.) The "message schedule" defines exactly what those words are and the order in which they're used.

A SHA-256 message block is 64 bytes long, and a word is 4 bytes long, so one block contains exactly 16 words. SHA-256 has 64 rounds, and the first 16 of those rounds use those 16 message words directly. The subsequent 48 rounds mix different message words together using a formula. We're about to implement that formula. First we need a couple more small helpers, which we'll call little_sigma0 and little_sigma1.

Problem 3: `little_sigma0()`

Given a word x, we define little_sigma0(x) to be the value:

rightrotate32(x, 7) ^ rightrotate32(x, 18) ^ (x >> 3)

Implement this function in Python. You can copy the line above if you like.

Inputs: an integer x

Outputs: the value little_sigma0(x)

Based on this paper, I'm pretty sure the name "sigma" (Greek lowercase σ and uppercase Σ) refers to the "S-boxes" or "substitution boxes" that we're familiar with from block ciphers. See p. 57 of Serious Cryptography.

Problem 4: `little_sigma1()`

Similarly, given a word x, we define little_sigma1(x) to be the value:

rightrotate32(x, 17) ^ rightrotate32(x, 19) ^ (x >> 10)

Implement this function in Python too. Again, you can copy the line above if you like.

Inputs: an integer x

Outputs: the value little_sigma1(x)

Problem 5: the message schedule

Now we're ready to compute the full 64-word message schedule array, which is usually called W (for "words"). As we said above, the block size of SHA-256 is 64 bytes, so for this process you start off with a 64-byte block of input. Convert these 64 bytes into 16 words, by converting each 4-byte group into an integer using a big-endian conversion. (Using the wrong endianness here will be a common mistake.) This gives you the first 16 elements of W. For each of the remaining 48 elements — that is, for each index from 16 to 63 — use the following formula:

W[i] := W[i-16] + little_sigma0(W[i-15]) + W[i-7] + little_sigma1(W[i-2])

Note that in this case the formula is pseudocode, not Python. The := symbol means "is defined to be", similar to = in Python. Importantly, the + symbol in SHA-256 pseudocode does not mean Python's +, but rather the add32() function that we defined back in Problem 1. (Implementing pseudocode using regular Python addition rather than add32 will be a common mistake throughout this project.) Depending on how you structure your Python code, you might also want to use the .append() method on lists.

Define a function like message_schedule(block) which takes a 64-byte block and returns a 64-word list, according to the formula described above. Your input for this problem is an ASCII string of length 64. Convert it to bytes, and use your message_schedule() function to construct message schedule for that block. Your output should be the resulting list.

Input: an ASCII string of length 64, which represents a block of input for the compression function

Output: the resulting message schedule, a list of 64 words (integers)

As you work on this part of the algorithm, it might be helpful or interesting to compare notes with how different sources describe it. Here's how Serious Cryptography describes it, on p. 119:

And here's how the pseudocode on Wikipedia describes it:

create a 64-entry message schedule array w[0..63] of 32-bit words
(The initial values in w[0..63] don't matter, so many implementations zero them here)
copy chunk into first 16 words w[0..15] of the message schedule array

Extend the first 16 words into the remaining 48 words w[16..63] of the message schedule array:
for i from 16 to 63
    s0 := (w[i-15] rightrotate  7) xor (w[i-15] rightrotate 18) xor (w[i-15] rightshift  3)
    s1 := (w[i- 2] rightrotate 17) xor (w[i- 2] rightrotate 19) xor (w[i- 2] rightshift 10)
    w[i] := w[i-16] + s0 + w[i-7] + s1

And finally, here's how it's described in the official standard that defines SHA-256, p. 22 of FIPS 180-4:

These are all different ways of describing the same message schedule.

Once you've got the message schedule implemented correctly, you've reached the first major milestone of the project. Well done! We'll need to set it aside for a moment to focus on another big moving part, but don't worry: we'll come back and make use of it before long.

The Round Function

As we said above, the SHA-256 compression function does 64 rounds of mixing. We're about to implement the operation that's done for each round. To get started, we're going to need four more small helper functions:

Problem 6: `big_sigma0()`

Given a word x, we define big_sigma0(x) to be the value:

rightrotate32(x, 2) ^ rightrotate32(x, 13) ^ rightrotate32(x, 22)

Implement this function in Python. You can copy the line above if you like.

Inputs: an integer x

Outputs: the value big_sigma0(x)

Problem 7: `big_sigma1()`

Given a word x, we define big_sigma1(x) to be the value:

rightrotate32(x, 6) ^ rightrotate32(x, 11) ^ rightrotate32(x, 25)

Implement this function in Python too. Again, you can copy the line above if you like.

Inputs: an integer x

Outputs: the value big_sigma1(x)

Problem 8: `choice()`

Given three words, x, y, and z, we define choice(x, y, z) to be the value:

(x & y) ^ (~x & z)

Implement this function in Python too. Again, you can copy the line above if you like.

Note that the ~ symbol in Python means "bitwise-not", i.e. turn all the 0-bits into 1's and all the 1-bits into 0's. This isn't an operation we need very often, but it's nice that it's built-in. The fact that Python integers are both signed and also variably-sized means that the behavior of ~ is subtler than it might seem at first glance. Because of the rules of "two's complement" signed arithmetic, it tends to give us negative numbers. Luckily, all the little details work out in the end, and we can use ~ here without worrying about it. You can just trust me on that and copy the line of code above, or you can explore how ~ works in Python as an exercise.

Inputs: a list of three integers, [x, y, z]

Outputs: the value choice(x, y, z)

Before you move on from this function, take a moment to stare at it. Can you tell why it's called "choice"?

Problem 9: `majority()`

The last helper for the round function. Given three words, x, y, and z, we define majority(x, y, z) to be the value:

(x & y) ^ (x & z) ^ (y & z)

Implement this function in Python too. Again, you can copy the line above if you like.

Inputs: a list of three integers, [x, y, z]

Outputs: the value majority(x, y, z)

Same follow-up question as above: Can you tell why this function is called "majority"? This one's a little trickier. Three bits put together have 2³ = 8 possible values, and the easiest way to see this one is to just make a table and calculate what happens in each case.

Problem 10: the round function

Alright, we're ready to implement the next big moving part of SHA-256, the round function. The round function takes three arguments. The most important of these is the state, a list of 8 words. Recall the diagram of the Merkle–Damgård construction from p. 112 of Serious Cryptography:

The values H₀, H₁, and H₂ represent this 8-word state as it's transformed by each call to the compression function. At this point we're working on the round function, which is inside the compression function (i.e. inside the trapezoids in that diagram), but it's the same state that we're talking about.

The other two inputs to the round function are the round constant and the schedule word, each of which is one word (an integer). As you might guess, the schedule word is ultimately going to come from the message schedule, which we implemented in Problem 5, but for now we'll just take it as an argument.

Define a function like round(state, round_constant, schedule_word). This function starts by computing several values, using the helper functions defined above:

ch    := choice(state[4], state[5], state[6])
temp1 := state[7] + big_sigma1(state[4]) + ch + round_constant + schedule_word
maj   := majority(state[0], state[1], state[2])
temp2 := big_sigma0(state[0]) + maj

As in Problem 5, these formulas are pseudocode, and the + symbol means add32(). Finally, the round function assembles a new state:

new_state := [
    temp1 + temp2,
    state[0],
    state[1],
    state[2],
    state[3] + temp1,
    state[4],
    state[5],
    state[6],
]

This new_state is the return value of round().

Your input for this problem is an object with three fields, "state" containing a list of 8 integers, "round_constant" containing one integer, and "schedule_word" containing one integer. Call your round() function with these three arguments. Your output should be the resulting new state.

Input: an object with three fields, "state", "round_constant", and "schedule_word"

Output: a list of 8 words (integers), the new state returned by round()

As we did in Problem 5, we can compare how different sources describe the same part of the algorithm. Serious Cryptography doesn't include the SHA-256 round function in detail, describing it only as "more complex than that of SHA-1" on p. 119.

The pseudocode on Wikipedia uses the variables a, b, c, d, e, f, g, and h to refer to the 8 elements of the state array. Here's how it describes the round function:

S1 := (e rightrotate 6) xor (e rightrotate 11) xor (e rightrotate 25)
ch := (e and f) xor ((not e) and g)
temp1 := h + S1 + ch + k[i] + w[i]
S0 := (a rightrotate 2) xor (a rightrotate 13) xor (a rightrotate 22)
maj := (a and b) xor (a and c) xor (b and c)
temp2 := S0 + maj

h := g
g := f
f := e
e := d + temp1
d := c
c := b
b := a
a := temp1 + temp2

P. 23 of the FIPS 180-4 standard describes the round function using uses the same 8 variables:

Once you've got the round function working, you've reached the second major milestone of the project. Very well done! Most of the little details are behind us now, and the pieces we've built are about to start fitting together.

The Compression Function

Problem 11: the compression function

Finally, we've arrived at a piece big enough that we've actually heard of it before. The compression function is the trapezoid from the Merkle–Damgård diagram above. This is where we're going to write the "round loop" that executes the round function 64 times, once for each of the 64 rounds of SHA-256.

We saw the round_constant argument above. We need to start by copying the array of values that we'll use for this argument. Paste the following into your Python code as a global variable:

ROUND_CONSTANTS = [
    0x428a2f98, 0x71374491, 0xb5c0fbcf, 0xe9b5dba5, 0x3956c25b, 0x59f111f1, 0x923f82a4, 0xab1c5ed5,
    0xd807aa98, 0x12835b01, 0x243185be, 0x550c7dc3, 0x72be5d74, 0x80deb1fe, 0x9bdc06a7, 0xc19bf174,
    0xe49b69c1, 0xefbe4786, 0x0fc19dc6, 0x240ca1cc, 0x2de92c6f, 0x4a7484aa, 0x5cb0a9dc, 0x76f988da,
    0x983e5152, 0xa831c66d, 0xb00327c8, 0xbf597fc7, 0xc6e00bf3, 0xd5a79147, 0x06ca6351, 0x14292967,
    0x27b70a85, 0x2e1b2138, 0x4d2c6dfc, 0x53380d13, 0x650a7354, 0x766a0abb, 0x81c2c92e, 0x92722c85,
    0xa2bfe8a1, 0xa81a664b, 0xc24b8b70, 0xc76c51a3, 0xd192e819, 0xd6990624, 0xf40e3585, 0x106aa070,
    0x19a4c116, 0x1e376c08, 0x2748774c, 0x34b0bcb5, 0x391c0cb3, 0x4ed8aa4a, 0x5b9cca4f, 0x682e6ff3,
    0x748f82ee, 0x78a5636f, 0x84c87814, 0x8cc70208, 0x90befffa, 0xa4506ceb, 0xbef9a3f7, 0xc67178f2,
]

You'll see the same array near the top of the Wikipedia pseudocode. In effect, these are just some hardcoded, random-looking numbers that we add to the mix. In fact, they do actually come from a formula, something to do with the cube roots of the first 64 prime numbers. But the details of the formula don't matter to us. These are just "nothing-up-my-sleeve numbers".

Now, define a function like compress(input_state, block), where input_state is an 8-word list, and block is a 64-byte block of the hash function's input. This function combines the message schedule from Problem 5 with the round function from Problem 10, like this:

W := message_schedule(block)

state := input_state
for i in 0, 1, ..., 63
    state = round(state, ROUND_CONSTANTS[i], W[i])

state = [
    input_state[0] + state[0],
    input_state[1] + state[1],
    input_state[2] + state[2],
    input_state[3] + state[3],
    input_state[4] + state[4],
    input_state[5] + state[5],
    input_state[6] + state[6],
    input_state[7] + state[7],
]

As in Problem 5, these formulas are pseudocode, and the + symbol means add32(). The final value of state is the return value of compress(). Note that the value of input_state gets used again at the end, so input_state and state do need to be two different variables.

Your input for this problem is an object with two fields, "state" containing a list of 8 integers and "block" containing an ASCII string of length 64. Convert the block to bytes and then call your compress() function with those arguments. Your output should be the resulting new state.

Input: an object with two fields, "state" and "block"

Output: a list of 8 words (integers), the new state returned by compress()

Before you move on, think about the loop you just wrote. It's probably just two or three lines of code. But 64 rounds is actually quite a lot of work for the computer. This little loop, plus all the code inside of round(), is where the magic happens. This is the mixing loop. When cryptographers study SHA-256 and try to develop attacks, this little loop is what they're attacking. That makes the number 64 a very careful tradeoff between speed and security. Is 64 rounds enough mixing to guarantee collision resistance and all the other security properties? It seems to be enough today, but what about ten or twenty years from now? Will SHA-256 be able to withstand another generation of clever attacks and faster computers? Maybe some of you will have a hand in that research...

In any case, for now we have our secure compression function. With this working, we've turned onto the home stretch. The full hash function is in sight.

Padding

Problem 12: padding

SHA-256 takes a "message" of any length as input, but the compression function works with 64-byte blocks at a time, so we need to pad the message to be an exact multiple of the block size. This is very similar to what we did with block ciphers in Chapter 4 and Problem Set 3. As with block ciphers, a naive padding scheme like "just fill the remainder of the last block with zeros" isn't going to work. This time it's because of collision resistance: If two different messages looked the same after padding, then their hashes would be the same too, which is never supposed to happen. That means we need a proper, unambiguous padding scheme.

It would be nice if we could reuse our PCKS#7 code from Problem Set 3, but alas SHA-256 does something different. On the bright side, because this is hashing and not encryption, at least we don't need to write any code for unpadding.

The SHA-256 padding scheme is originally defined in terms of bits, not bytes. I think it's a little clearer in those terms, so let's start there. Remember that there are 8 bits in a byte, so a block size of 64 bytes is the same as 512 bits. Here's the padding scheme as it's originally defined:

Start the padding bitstring with a single 1-bit.
Then append some 0-bits after that. We'll define how many in step 4 below.
Finally, append the bit-length of the message, encoded as a 64-bit unsigned big-endian number.
Choose the number of 0-bits for step 2 to be the smallest number such that the total bit-length of the message plus the padding is an exact multiple of 512.

A side note: You might notice that step 3 there isn't actually necessary for making the padding unambiguous. Steps 1 and 2 are sufficient for that. The goal of step 3 is to make it harder to find collisions, by including the message length in the mix.

Defining the padding scheme in terms of bits like this is pretty straightforward, but in practice our programming languages and our computer hardware don't usually talk about individual bits directly. We need to translate that definition into bytes. So here's the exact same padding scheme, redescribed in terms of bytes, the way we'll actually implement it:

Start the padding bytestring with a single 0x80 byte (decimal 128, binary 0b10000000). As you can see in the binary representation, this is a single 1-bit followed by seven 0-bits.
Then append some 0x00 bytes after that. We'll define how many in step 4 below.
Finally, append 8 times the byte-length of the message, encoded as an 8-byte unsigned big-endian number. (Forgetting to multiply the len() by 8 here is a common mistake.)
Choose the number of 0x00 bytes for step 2 to be the smallest number such that the total byte-length of the message plus the padding is an exact multiple of 64.

That translation made things a little less elegant. The first byte is less obvious, and the multiply-by-8 step is easy to forget. But we'll manage.

How do we determine the number of 0x00 bytes in step 4? If you like little arithmetic puzzles, this is another good one to think about on your own before reading further. Otherwise, feel free to copy the following three lines of Python:

remainder_bytes = (message_length + 8) % 64  # number of bytes in the final block, including the appended length
filler_bytes = 64 - remainder_bytes          # number of bytes we need to add, including the initial 0x80 byte
zero_bytes = filler_bytes - 1                # number of 0x00 bytes we need to add

Take a minute or two to review that logic and convince yourself it's correct. Then write a function like padding(message_length), which takes the original byte-length of a message and returns the padding bytestring for that message. Your input for this problem is a list of message byte-lengths. For each of these, call your padding() function with that length as an argument and hex-encode the resulting padding bytes. (There are no message bytes to concatenate in this problem, just the padding bytes themselves.) Your output for this problem should be the resulting list of hex-encoded padding strings.

I recommend that you have your padding() function return raw bytes, and that you call it like padding(...).hex() for this problem. If you prefer to have your padding() function do hex-encoding internally, that's ok too, but then you'll need to remember to hex-decode its output in the following problems.

Input: a list of message lengths, counted in bytes

Output: a list of SHA-256 padding bytestrings, each hex-encoded

This padding function was our last big moving part. All we have to do now is put the padding function and the compression function together.

The Hash Function

Problem 13: the hash function

Now we're ready to assemble the complete hash function. The genuine article. Once you finish this problem, you can test your code against Python's hashlib or against any other SHA-256 implementation in the world, and your output will be exactly the same. Knock on wood.

As we did with block ciphers, we're going to pad the message and split it up into blocks. Let's look at that Merkle–Damgård diagram again:

M₁, M₂, and so on represent 64-byte blocks of the padded message. There are as many M blocks as needed, depending on the padded message length. The output state ("chaining value") returned by each call to the compression function (H₁, H₂, and so on) becomes the input state for the following call. And the final chaining value returned by the last call to the compression function is the SHA-256 hash of the message.

You might've noticed one last missing detail: Where do we get H₀, the input state for the first call to the compression function? We'll use a constant for this. As in CBC mode, we'll call this constant the "initialization vector", or IV for short. Unlike CBC mode, where the IV needs to be uniformly random every time, the SHA-256 IV never changes. It's baked into the standard. This is the other set of constants at the top of the Wikipedia pseudocode. Paste the following into your Python code as another global variable:

IV = [
    0x6a09e667, 0xbb67ae85, 0x3c6ef372, 0xa54ff53a,
    0x510e527f, 0x9b05688c, 0x1f83d9ab, 0x5be0cd19,
]

Now, write a function like sha256(message). Inside it, use your padding() function to generate padding bytes, and then append them to the message bytes. Note that nothing should be hex-encoded at this point. (Using hex-encoded padding here is a common mistake.) Create a state variable, whose starting value is IV. Then split the padded message up into 64-byte blocks and loop over the blocks, calling your compress() function on each one. For each call to compress(), use the current state value as input and assign the return value back to state. Double check that your argument types for compress() are the same as they were in Problem 11. (Calling compress() with block bytes here but block words there is another common mistake.) Once the block loop is finished, convert the final value of state into 32 bytes by encoding each of the 8 state words as a 4-byte big endian integer and concatenating them. Those 32 bytes are the return value of sha256().

Debugging tips: Even if you've passed tests for all the previous problems, and your sha256() function looks good, sometimes you can still get the wrong answer here. Look carefully for the common mistakes described above. Also look for accidental global variables in your functions, which might refer to input from a previous problem. If you get stuck, put print statements everywhere, and compare what you see to these known-good debug printouts for sha256(b"").

Your input for this problem is a list of ASCII strings. Convert each string to bytes and hash it with your sha256() function. Your output should be a list of the resulting SHA-256 hashes, each encoded as hex.

Input: a list of ASCII strings

Output: a list of the hex-encoded SHA-256 hashes of those strings

The Length Extension Attack

If we were to stop here, all our blood, sweat, and tears would not have been wasted. Implementing SHA-256 is an accomplishment in itself, and the intuition you've gained along the way will hopefully be useful to you whenever you see a hash function from now on. But besides that broad intuition, you've also learned some very specific tricks: Now you know how to invoke the SHA-256 compression and padding functions directly, which isn't something that most library implementations will let you do. It turns out that you can use these tricks to pull off an important attack, and the best time to learn this attack is while the tricks are still fresh in your mind. Strike while the iron is hot, as they say.

SHA-256 has a flaw. Although its collision resistance and other security properties remain unbroken so far, it does not behave like a true "random oracle". Some SHA-256 outputs are related to each other, in a way that you can detect or exploit even when you don't know the input. This exploit is called a "length extension attack".

Remember how the "chaining values" worked in Problem 13. The output from each call to the compression function became the input for the next call. But the final output, well, it just became the hash. We didn't do anything special to it; we just returned it. That means that if you look at a SHA-256 hash, you're looking at the same state that would have been used to call the compression function again if there had been more input.

This was a design mistake. (The designers actually knew about this issue at the time but didn't consider it important.) Here's the problem: Suppose you're an attacker, and you're looking at a hash that I've published. Let's say you don't know what input I used, maybe because I included a secret key or something like that. Because of this mistake, even though you don't know my input, you can construct a new hash, which matches a different input, one which starts with the same bytes as mine but then has some extra bytes of your choosing added to the end. If SHA-256 hashes were truly independent of each other, this wouldn't be possible, but they aren't, and it is possible.

There's one thing standing between you and this attack: the padding. I didn't do anything special to the last chaining value, but I did pad my input. Those padding bytes went into the state that you're looking at, and there's no way for you to unmix them. But you can live with that, by making a clever compromise:

Pretend that my padding bytes are part of your chosen suffix.

That is to say, you can't extend my input with a totally arbitrary suffix, but you can choose any suffix that starts with my padding bytes. That's an important limitation, but it still allows for quite a lot of mischief.

If you're reading through this project before we've covered Chapter 7 of Serious Cryptography, it might not yet be clear why this attack is important. The short answer is, this attack is why we need an algorithm called HMAC for keyed hashing, and programmers who don't know about HMAC often misuse hash functions in ways that are vulnerable to this attack. We'll get to HMAC in class shortly, if we haven't already. For now, let's see the length extension attack in action.

Problem 14: modeling the extended input

Let's say my original input is 55 bytes long. I've chosen that length because it's the most that still fits in one 64-byte block after padding is added. What's the padding in this case? Let's use our padding() function to see it:

>>> padding(55)
b'\x80\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\xb8'
>>> padding(55).hex()
'8000000000000001b8'

We can recognize the pieces there. One 0x80 byte at the front, no extra 0x00 bytes in this case, and an 8-byte big-endian integer encoding the value 0x01b8 = 440 = 8 * 55, which is my input length in bits. My original 55 bytes and these 9 bytes of padding are 64 bytes put together, exactly one block. Clear so far?

Now put your attacker hat back on. You're going to pretend that those padding bytes are actually the start of your chosen suffix. Then you're going to add any number of additional suffix bytes of your choosing. The resulting "synthetic" input, which you're ultimately going to compute the hash of, will be equivalent to my original, plus my padding, plus the rest of your chosen suffix. Let's say my original input was fifty-five 0xaa bytes, and you chose three 0xff bytes for your suffix. In that case the synthetic message, represented here as a hex-encoded string that I've split over a few lines, would be:

aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa    <-- the first 32-byte half of the first block
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa8000000000000001b8    <-- the second 32-byte half of the first block
ffffff                                                              <-- the second block, 3 bytes *before* padding

To be clear, we won't construct this complete synthetic string ourselves when we perform the length extension attack. In fact, we can't. All those 0xaa bytes in my original input are hidden from the attacker. But this synthetic string is what our final length-extended hash will represent, and we want to model it in this problem.

Your input for this problem is an object with two fields, "original_input" containing an ASCII string that we want to extend, and "chosen_suffix" containing the ASCII string that we want to extend it with. Convert these strings to bytes, and construct the synthetic message with padding in the middle that a length extension attack would compute the hash of. Your output should be this synthetic string, encoded as hex.

Input: an object with two fields, "original_input" and "chosen_suffix"

Output: the synthetic message, encoded as hex

Problem 15: recovering the state

The length extension attack will reuse a hash as a chaining value, feeding it into additional calls to the compression function. However, you might remember that there was a conversion step we did when we returned the hash. We converted it from 8 words to 32 bytes. We need to undo that and recover the words.

Your input for this problem is a 32-byte hash, encoded as hex. Hex-decode it into bytes. Then convert it back into a list of 8 words, by breaking it into groups of 4 bytes and parsing each 4-byte group as a big-endian integer. Your output should be that list.

Input: a 32-byte hash, encoded as hex

Output: the list of 8 state words recovered from the hash

Problem 16: the length extension attack

We're ready to perform the attack. Your input for this problem will be an object with three fields, "original_hash", "original_len", and "chosen_suffix". Hex-decode the original hash and convert the chosen suffix to ASCII bytes. Recover the list of 8 state words from the original hash, as you did in Problem 15 above.

Now, to begin the attack, re-pad the chosen suffix, like you padded the regular message in Problem 13. However, instead of calling your padding() function with the length of the suffix itself, call it with the total length of the synthetic message. That is, the original input length, plus the length of the original input's padding, plus the length of the suffix. (This makes your padding bytes different, but it doesn't change how many padding bytes you get. Can you see why?)

Next, hash the padded suffix by looping over its blocks and calling compress() on each of them, again as you did in Problem 13. However, instead of using IV for your initial state, use the state words that you recovered from the original hash.

Once you've compressed all the resulting blocks, the attack is finished. Convert your list of 8 state words back into 32 bytes, using the same method as in Problem 13. Your output for this problem should be the resulting hash, encoded as hex.

The input for the "original_hash" given in example_input.json was elephant jaguar vulture octopus butterfly. You don't need to know that to extend it, but if you like, you can check that the output is indeed a valid extension of that original string as an exercise.

Input: an object with three fields, "original_hash", "original_len", and "chosen_suffix"

Output: the length-extended hash, encoded as hex

Conclusion

The project is finished, and there are no more questions. If you've made it this far, then you know more about the insides of a hash function than many cryptographers do. That's something to be proud of, and I hope you'll find that it was worth the trouble.

If you're tired of hashing and ready for a break, no need to read any further. But if you found all this very interesting and you're eager to learn more, there are many different avenues to explore. Here are a few:

In Problem 13, we implemented "all-at-once" hashing. That is, the entire input string was provided as an argument. In practice however, most hash functions are designed to work incrementally, piece-by-piece. When the input is very large, they read smaller chunks of it in a loop, so that the application doesn't need to allocate lots of memory for a large string. Python's hashlib module provides the .update() method for this. You can try refactoring your own SHA-256 code to support some sort of "update" function, which can be called multiple times. You'll need to think about how to "buffer" input when what you're given isn't an exact multiple of 64 bytes.
More recent designs like SHA-3, BLAKE2, and BLAKE3 prevent length extension attacks by making sure that their chaining values and their published hashes are different from each other in some way. This prevents an attacker from looking at a hash and recovering the chaining value that would have been used to compress more input, like we did in Problems 15 and 16. Think about ways you might modify SHA-256 to prevent this. What if the compression function was implemented in hardware, and you weren't allowed to change it?
The Merkle–Damgård contruction is very common, but there are other ways to organize things. SHA-3 uses a "sponge construction" (p. 115), and BLAKE3 uses a "Merkle tree" (named after the same Ralph Merkle). These different structures can have a variety of different benefits. You might compare and contrast your SHA-256 code with this Python implementation of SHA-3, especially the part where they use permute() instead of compress().
Some use cases, particularly hash tables (dictionaries in Python), can tolerate collisions. For these cases, it's common to use a faster hash function with a smaller state and a shorter output. See for example SipHash, also designed by J.P. Aumasson, the author of our textbook. SipHash is used by default in the Rust HashMap, for example. But note that even though hash tables/maps don't need collision resistance per se, they often do need some related security properties, because they can be vulnerable to DOS attacks if an attacker is able to produce too many collisions.
Some applications need a hash function with more exotic properties. For example, you might be familiar with the rsync command for copying files over a network. Rsync uses a "rolling hash" to efficiently detect blocks that are the same between two different versions of a file. Rolling hashes look quite different from cryptographic hash functions, and they usually don't make strong security guarantees. If you have access to a remote server, you can play with making a tiny change to a large file, and see how long it takes Rsync to pick up the change.

Happy hashing.

richard1122/sha256_project

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