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Publish Advisories
GHSA-4g8m-5mj5-c8xg GHSA-4vgf-2cm4-mp7c GHSA-9pcc-gvx5-r5wm
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‎advisories/github-reviewed/2025/05/GHSA-4g8m-5mj5-c8xg/GHSA-4g8m-5mj5-c8xg.json

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{
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"schema_version": "1.4.0",
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"id": "GHSA-4g8m-5mj5-c8xg",
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"modified": "2025-05-06T16:38:55Z",
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"published": "2025-05-06T16:38:55Z",
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"aliases": [
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"CVE-2025-46736"
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],
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"summary": "Umbraco Makes User Enumeration Feasible Based on Timing of Login Response",
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"details": "### Impact\nBased on an analysis of the timing of post login API responses, it's possible to determine whether an account exists.\n\n### Patches\nPatched in 10.8.10 and 13.8.1.\n\n### Workarounds\nNone available.",
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"severity": [
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{
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"type": "CVSS_V3",
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"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N"
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}
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],
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"affected": [
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "NuGet",
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"name": "Umbraco.Cms"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "11.0.0-rc1"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "13.8.1"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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},
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "NuGet",
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"name": "Umbraco.Cms"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "0"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "10.8.10"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"references": [
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/umbraco/Umbraco-CMS/security/advisories/GHSA-4g8m-5mj5-c8xg"
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},
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/umbraco/Umbraco-CMS/commit/14fbd20665b453cbf094ccf4575b79a9fba07e03"
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},
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/umbraco/Umbraco-CMS/commit/34709be6cce9752dfa767dffbf551305f48839bc"
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},
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{
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"type": "PACKAGE",
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"url": "https://github.com/umbraco/Umbraco-CMS"
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"cwe_ids": [
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"CWE-204"
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],
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"severity": "MODERATE",
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"github_reviewed": true,
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"github_reviewed_at": "2025-05-06T16:38:55Z",
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"nvd_published_at": null
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}
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}

‎advisories/github-reviewed/2025/05/GHSA-4vgf-2cm4-mp7c/GHSA-4vgf-2cm4-mp7c.json

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{
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"schema_version": "1.4.0",
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"id": "GHSA-4vgf-2cm4-mp7c",
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"modified": "2025-05-06T16:38:44Z",
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"published": "2025-05-06T16:38:44Z",
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"aliases": [
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"CVE-2025-46735"
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],
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"summary": "Terraform WinDNS Provider improperly sanitizes input variables in `windns_record`",
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"details": "## Impact:\nA security issue has been found in `terraform-provider-windns` before version `1.0.5`. The `windns_record` resource did not santize the input variables. This can lead to authenticated command injection in the underlyding powershell command prompt.\n\n## Patches:\n\n[`83ef736 (fix: better input validation)`](https://github.com/nrkno/terraform-provider-windns/commit/c76f69610c1b502f90aaed8c4f102194530b5bce)\n \n## Fixed versions:\n\n- `v1.0.5`",
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"severity": [
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{
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"type": "CVSS_V4",
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"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:U"
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}
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],
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"affected": [
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "Go",
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"name": "github.com/nrkno/terraform-provider-windns"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "0"
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},
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{
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"last_affected": "1.0.4"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"references": [
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/nrkno/terraform-provider-windns/security/advisories/GHSA-4vgf-2cm4-mp7c"
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},
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/nrkno/terraform-provider-windns/commit/c76f69610c1b502f90aaed8c4f102194530b5bce"
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},
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{
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"type": "PACKAGE",
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"url": "https://github.com/nrkno/terraform-provider-windns"
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"cwe_ids": [
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"CWE-77"
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],
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"severity": "LOW",
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"github_reviewed": true,
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"github_reviewed_at": "2025-05-06T16:38:44Z",
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"nvd_published_at": null
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}
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}

‎advisories/github-reviewed/2025/05/GHSA-9pcc-gvx5-r5wm/GHSA-9pcc-gvx5-r5wm.json

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{
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"schema_version": "1.4.0",
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"id": "GHSA-9pcc-gvx5-r5wm",
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"modified": "2025-05-06T16:38:35Z",
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"published": "2025-05-06T16:38:35Z",
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"aliases": [
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"CVE-2025-30165"
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],
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"summary": "Remote Code Execution Vulnerability in vLLM Multi-Node Cluster Configuration",
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"details": "### Affected Environments\n\nNote that this issue only affects the V0 engine, which has been off by default since v0.8.0. Further, the issue only applies to a deployment using tensor parallelism across multiple hosts, which we do not expect to be a common deployment pattern.\n\nSince V0 is has been off by default since v0.8.0 and the fix is fairly invasive, we have decided not to fix this issue. Instead we recommend that users ensure their environment is on a secure network in case this pattern is in use.\n\nThe V1 engine is not affected by this issue.\n\n### Impact\n\nIn a multi-node vLLM deployment using the V0 engine, vLLM uses ZeroMQ for some multi-node communication purposes. The secondary vLLM hosts open a `SUB` ZeroMQ socket and connect to an `XPUB` socket on the primary vLLM host.\n\nhttps://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/c21b99b91241409c2fdf9f3f8c542e8748b317be/vllm/distributed/device_communicators/shm_broadcast.py#L295-L301\n\nWhen data is received on this `SUB` socket, it is deserialized with `pickle`. This is unsafe, as it can be abused to execute code on a remote machine.\n\nhttps://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/c21b99b91241409c2fdf9f3f8c542e8748b317be/vllm/distributed/device_communicators/shm_broadcast.py#L468-L470\n\nSince the vulnerability exists in a client that connects to the primary vLLM host, this vulnerability serves as an escalation point. If the primary vLLM host is compromised, this vulnerability could be used to compromise the rest of the hosts in the vLLM deployment.\n\nAttackers could also use other means to exploit the vulnerability without requiring access to the primary vLLM host. One example would be the use of ARP cache poisoning to redirect traffic to a malicious endpoint used to deliver a payload with arbitrary code to execute on the target machine.",
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"severity": [
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{
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"type": "CVSS_V3",
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"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
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}
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],
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"affected": [
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "PyPI",
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"name": "vllm"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "0.5.2"
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},
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{
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"last_affected": "0.8.5.post1"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"references": [
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-9pcc-gvx5-r5wm"
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},
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{
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"type": "PACKAGE",
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"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm"
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},
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/c21b99b91241409c2fdf9f3f8c542e8748b317be/vllm/distributed/device_communicators/shm_broadcast.py#L295-L301"
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},
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/c21b99b91241409c2fdf9f3f8c542e8748b317be/vllm/distributed/device_communicators/shm_broadcast.py#L468-L470"
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"cwe_ids": [
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"CWE-502"
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],
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"severity": "HIGH",
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"github_reviewed": true,
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"github_reviewed_at": "2025-05-06T16:38:35Z",
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"nvd_published_at": null
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}
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}

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