cryptlib.asn

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-/ This specification makes one slight deviation from standard ASN.1 syntax
   to overcome an annoyance in ASN.1 which requires a separate -- at the
   start of each and every line of comment.  Instead, this specification uses
   -//- comment delimiters (which work like C's /**/) in place of standard
   ASN.1 delimiters /-

cryptlib DEFINITIONS ::=
BEGIN

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--																			--
--								PKCS #7 Data Formats						--
--																			--
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-/ There are several variants of the PKCS #7/S/MIME/CMS format which gradually
   get more flexible (but not necessarily better) over time.  The initial
   format was PKCS #7 1.5 and earlier, 1.6 was a quick update which changed a
   number of SETs to SEQUENCEs (which don't require sorting of the encoded
   components), this doesn't appear to have been used by anything.  S/MIME 3/
   CMS was an extended form of S/MIME 2 which fiddled with some of the inner
   fields but was mostly the same as PKCS #7 1.5.  1.5 is a significant
   improvement on most of its successors /-

ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
	contentType			OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
	content			[0]	EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY contentType OPTIONAL
	}

-/ Raw data /-

Data ::= OCTET STRING						-- PKCS #7 1

-/ Authenticated data: Digested, signed, MAC'd data /-

DigestedData ::= SEQUENCE {					-- PKCS #7 5
	version				INTEGER (0),		-- PKCS #7 v1.5
	digestAlgorithm		AlgorithmIdentifier,-- v=2 for non id-Data
	encapContentInfo	SEQUENCE {
		contentType		OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-Data/Sig/Encr/Env,
		content		[0]	EXPLICIT OCTET STRING
		},
	digest				OCTET STRING
	}

SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {					-- PKCS #7 2
	version				INTEGER (1),		-- PKCS #7 v1.5
	digestAlgorithms	SET OF AlgorithmIdentifier,
	encapContentInfo	SEQUENCE {
		contentType		OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-Data/Sig/Encr/Env,
		content		[0]	EXPLICIT OCTET STRING
		}
	certificates	[0]	SET OF Certificate,
	signerInfos			SET OF SignerInfo
	}

AuthenticatedData ::= SEQUENCE {			-- PKCS #9 16 1 2
	version				INTEGER (0),		-- S/MIME v3
	recipientInfos		SET OF RecipientInfo,
	macAlgorithm		AlgorithmIdentifier,
	encapContentInfo	SEQUENCE {
		contentType		OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-Data/Sig/Encr/Env,
		content		[0]	EXPLICIT OCTET STRING
		}
	authAttrs		[1]	SET OF Attribute OPTIONAL,
	mac					OCTET STRING
	unauthAttrs		[2]	SET OF Attribute OPTIONAL
	}

-/ Encrypted data: Raw encrypted, enveloped /-

EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE {				-- PKCS #7 6
	version				INTEGER (0),		-- PKCS #7 v1.5
	encrContentInfo		SEQUENCE {
		contentType		OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-Data/Sig/Encr/Env,
		contentEncrAlgo	AlgorithmIdentifier,
		content		[0]	OCTET STRING
		}
	}

EnvelopedData ::= SEQUENCE {				-- PKCS #7 3
	version				INTEGER (0),		-- PKCS #7 v1.5, v=2 for origInfo
	recipientInfos		SET OF RecipientInfo,
	encrContentInfo		SEQUENCE {
		contentType		OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-Data/Sig/Encr/Env,
		contentEncrAlgo	AlgorithmIdentifier,
		content		[0]	OCTET STRING
		},
	unauthAttrs		[1]	SET OF Attribute OPTIONAL
	}

-/ Combined encrypted + authenticated data /-

 AuthEnvelopedData ::= SEQUENCE {			-- PKCS #9 16 1 23
	version				INTEGER (0),		-- CMS
	recipientInfos		SET OF RecipientInfo,
	encrContentInfo		SEQUENCE {
		contentType		OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-Data/Sig/Encr/Env,
		contentEncrAlgo	AlgorithmIdentifier,
		content		[0]	OCTET STRING
		},
	authAttrs		[1]	SET OF Attribute OPTIONAL,
	mac					OCTET STRING
	unauthAttrs		[2]	SET OF Attribute OPTIONAL
	}

-/ Attributes.  Contrast these with certificate attributes, identified as
   Extensions, which use hole encodings rather than proper ASN.1
   structures /-

Attribute ::= SEQUENCE {
	type			OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
	value			SET OF ANY
	}

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--																			--
--								Key Management								--
--																			--
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-/ The parameters used to derive the conventional encryption key from the
   user key.  Usually we use the key directly, but sometimes it may have
   been derived from a longer user key, which is encoded in this record /-

PBKDF2 ::= SEQUENCE {						-- PKCS #5v2 key setup parameters
	algorithm		AlgorithmIdentifier (pkcs-5 12),
	params			SEQUENCE {
		salt		OCTET STRING,			-- Key setup salt
		iterationCount						-- Key setup iterations
					INTEGER (1..MAX),
		}
	}

-/ CMS key transport information /-

KeyTransRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE {		-- CMS - S/MIME
	version			INTEGER (0),			-- CMS
	issuerAndSerial	IssuerAndSerialNumber,	-- Encrypting certificate
	algorithm		AlgorithmIdentifier,	-- Encryption algorithm
	encryptedKey	OCTET STRING			-- Encryped key
	}
KeyTransRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE {		-- CMS - cryptlib
	version			INTEGER (2),			-- CMS
	keyID		[0]	SubjectKeyIdentifier,	-- Key ID of encrypting key
	algorithm		AlgorithmIdentifier,	-- Encryption algorithm
	encryptedKey	OCTET STRING			-- Encrypted key
	}

-/ CMS key agreement information, which is officially called
   KeyAgreeRecipientInfo but in order for it to make sense it really needs
   to be named FortezzaRecipientInfo /-

FortezzaRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE {		-- CMS - S/MIME
	version			INTEGER (3),			-- CMS
	originator	[0]	EXPLICIT [ 0 ] SubjectKeyIdentifier,-- Originator pub.key
	ukm			[1]	EXPLICIT OCTET STRING,	-- Nonce, Ra
	algorithm		AlgorithmIdentifier,	-- Fortezza key wrap OID
	recipientKeys	SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
		rKeyId	[0]	SEQUENCE { SubjectKeyIdentifier }, -- Recip.pubk
		encryptedKey OCTET STRING			-- Encr.key info, TEK( MEK )
		}
	}

-/ CMS conventional key transport information.  This structure is somewhat
   misnamed since it's really just a kludge to work with pre-distributed
   shared RC2 or 3DES keys for S/MIME-based mailing lists and not a general-
   purpose KEK object, however by using the PWRI AlgorithmIdentifier for
   KEKRI we can turn it into a general-purpose key transport mechanism /-

KEKRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
	version			INTEGER (4),			-- CMS
	kekid			SEQUENCE {
		keyIdent	OCTET STRING			-- Magic ID for KEK
		},
	keyEncAlgo		AlgorithmIdentifier,	-- Key wrap algorithm
	encryptedKey	OCTET STRING			-- Encrypted key
	}

-/ CMS password-based key transport information.  This is also misnamed since
   it's actually general-purpose and does what KEKRecipientInfo should do /-

PasswordRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
	version			INTEGER (0),			-- CMS
	keyDerivationAlgorithm					-- KEK derivation algorithm,
				[0]	AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,	-- PBKDF2 if present
	keyEncryptionAlgorithm					-- KEK algorithm
					AlgorithmIdentifier,	-- PWRI-KEK
	encryptedKey	OCTET STRING
	}

-/ CMS key management /-

RecipientInfo ::= CHOICE {
	ktri			KeyTransRecipientInfo,	-- Public-key encrypted key
	kari		[1] FortezzaRecipientInfo,	-- Fortezza key-agreement info
	kekri		[2] KEKRecipientInfo,		-- Conventionally encrypted key
	pwri		[3]	PasswordRecipientInfo	-- Password-encrypted key
	}

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--																			--
--									Signatures								--
--																			--
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-/ CMS signature information /-

SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE {					-- CMS - S/MIME
	version			INTEGER (1),			-- CMS
	issuerAndSerial	IssuerAndSerialNumber,	-- Signing certificate
	hashAlgorithm	AlgorithmIdentifier,	-- Hash algorithm type
	signedAttributes						-- Authenticated attributes
				[0]	SET OF Attribute OPTIONAL,
	signatureAlgorithm						-- Signature algorithm type
					AlgorithmIdentifier,
	signature		OCTET STRING			-- The signature itself
	unsignedAttrs							-- Countersignature
				[1]	SET OF Attribute OPTIONAL
	}
SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE {					-- CMS - cryptlib
	version			INTEGER (3),			-- CMS
	keyID		[0]	SubjectKeyIdentifier,	-- Key ID of signing key
	hashAlgorithm	AlgorithmIdentifier,	-- Hash algorithm type
	signatureAlgorithm						-- Signature algorithm type
					AlgorithmIdentifier,
	signature		OCTET STRING			-- The signature itself
	}

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--																			--
--								Public/Private Keys							--
--																			--
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-/ PKCS #15 uses a very object-oriented design that follows PKCS #11 and
   uses a lot of the expressive power of ASN.1 in the specification of its
   PDUs.  The basic PKCS #15 object is defined as follows:

	PKCS15Object( ClassAttributes, SubclassAttributes, TypeAttributes ) ->
		SEQUENCE {
			commonAttr		CommonObjectAttributes,
			classAttr		ClassAttributes,
			subclassAttr[0]	SubclassAttributes OPTIONAL,
			typeAttr	[1]	TypeAttributes
			}

   with the attributes being filled in on a per-object basis.  Every object
   contains common object attributes, and every key or certificate object
   contains common key or cert class attributes.  In addition the public and
   private key subclasses contain subclass-specific attributes, but they
   don't contain anything which isn't present elsewhere so they're omitted.
   Note the explicit use of EXPLICIT tagging, this is required because dummy
   parameters like TypeAttributes are always explict-tagged to ensure tag
   uniqueness (it's like the CHOICE explicit-tag rule):

					Key									Cert
	SEQUENCE {
		SEQUENCE {											-- CommonObjectAttr
			label		UTF8String,
			...
			},
		SEQUENCE {							SEQUENCE {		-- ClassAttr
			iD			OCTET STRING,			iD			OCTET STRING,
			usage		BIT STRING,				authority	BOOLEAN DEF FALSE,
			accessFlags	BIT STRING OPTIONAL,	trusted	[1] SEQUENCE { usage BIT STR },
			...									keyID	[2] SEQUENCE OF KeyID,
			},									impTrust[3]	BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
												...
												},
		[0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {								-- SubclassAttr
			...			SEQUENCE OPTIONAL,
			keyID	[0]	SEQUENCE OF KeyID,
			...
			} OPTIONAL,
		[1] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {								-- TypeAttr
			<data>
			}
		}
				cryptlib config/user data
	SEQUENCE {
		SEQUENCE {											-- CommonObjectAttr
			label		UTF8String,
			...
			},
		SEQUENCE {											-- ClassAttr
			...
			appOID		OBJECT IDENTIFIER (cryptlib),
			...
			},
		[1] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {
			<data>
			}
		}

   PKCS #15 hasn't been significantly updated since the PKCS #15 / ISO
   7816-15 split, a few new items (validFrom/validTo attributes and
   pgp/openPGP identifiers) were added for v1.2 which was apparently only
   ever published in draft form by RSA Labs in March 2010, and other items
   like AuthEnvelopedData instead of EnvelopedData, protected private-key
   attributes bound to the otherwise unprotected public-key ones, and URI
   (=email) identifiers, were never standardised due to the spec becoming
   moribund.  Any of the post-1.2 additions are given an 'Ext' in the name
   to indicate that they're extensions to the spec /-

PKCS15CommonObjectAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
	label			UTF8String OPTIONAL,	-- Object label
	...
	}

-/ Class attributes.  Note that the certificate keyID/impTrust/validFrom/
   validTo attributes were added for PKCS #11 support in the PKCS #15 v1.2
   draft /-

PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
	iD				OCTET STRING,			-- Cross-reference to cert
	usage			BIT STRING,				-- PKCS #11 usage flags
	accessFlags		BIT STRING b'01101' OPT,-- PKCS #11 access flags
	startDate		GeneralisedTime OPTIONAL,
	endDate		[0]	GeneralisedTime OPTIONAL,
	...
	}

PKCS15CommonCertificateAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
	iD				OCTET STRING,			-- Cross-reference to key
	authority		BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,	-- CA flag
	dummy			SEQUENCE {} OPTIONAL,	-- Not used
	dummy		[0]	SEQUENCE {} OPTIONAL,	-- Not used
	trusted		[1]	SEQUENCE {
		keyUsage	BIT STRING,				-- Key usage cert is trusted for
		...
		} OPTIONAL,
	keyID		[2]	SEQUENCE OF KeyID OPTIONAL,	-- Added in v1.1
	impTrust	[3]	BOOLEAN OPTIONAL,		-- Added in v1.1
	validFrom		GeneralisedTime OPTIONAL,
	validTo		[4] GeneralisedTime OPTIONAL,
	...
	}

PKCS15CommonSecretKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
	...
	}

PKCS15CommonDataObjectAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
	applicationName	UTF8String OPTIONAL,	-- One or both must be present
	applicationOID	OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
	iD				OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
	...
	}

-/ Subclass attributes.  These are required for public/private keys, for
   which the ID information isn't present in the class attributes as it is
   for certificates.  Unfortunately the ID information also isn't present
   in the public-key subclass attributes, which means that looking up a
   raw public key by ID is impossible /-

PKCS15CommonPrivateKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
	keyID		[0]	SEQUENCE OF KeyID OPTIONAL,
	...
	}

-/ Key identifiers.  Note that the pgp/openPGP IDs were added for PKCS #11
   support in the PKCS #15 v1.2 draft.  The uri ID is a custom addition
   required to support fetching by email address for encryption keys /-

PKCS15KeyIdentifier ::= TYPED CHOICE {
	iAndS			SEQUENCE {				-- Not written, conv.to iAndSHash on rd
		id			INTEGER (1),
		value		IssuerAndSerialNumber
		},
	subjectKeyID	SEQUENCE {				-- Only used if different from iD
		id			INTEGER (2),
		value		OCTET STRING
		},
	iAndSHash		SEQUENCE {				-- Written and read
		id			INTEGER (3),
		value		OCTET STRING SIZE(20)
		},
	iHash			SEQUENCE {				-- Written and read
		id			INTEGER (6),
		value		OCTET STRING SIZE(20)
		},
	sHash			SEQUENCE {				-- Written and read
		id			INTEGER (7),
		value		OCTET STRING SIZE(20)
		},
	pgp				SEQUENCE {				-- Written and read
		id			INTEGER (8),
		value		OCTET STRING SIZE(8)
		},
	openPGP			SEQUENCE {				-- Written and read
		id			INTEGER (9),
		value		OCTET STRING SIZE(8)
		},
	uriExt			SEQUENCE {				-- Written and read
		id			INTEGER (10),
		value		UTF8String
		},
	...
	}

-/ Private key information (DLP = DSA/DH/KEA/etc, ECC = ECDSA/ECDH/etc).
   PKCS #15 actually has a separate type for DH keys but since they're
   DLP keys like DSA we use that for both DH and DSA.  Note that the
   AuthEnvelopedData form is a custom addition that postdates the v1.2
   draft, and the Ext form is similar and cryptographically binds the
   public-key components to the stored private key ones /-

PKCS15PrivateRSAKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
	value			[2]	EnvelopedData {		-- Before 3.4.0
	value			[4]	AuthEnvelopedData {	-- 3.4.0 and up
						SEQUENCE {
		modulus		[0]	INTEGER OPTIONAL,	-- n, not written
		publicExp	[1]	INTEGER OPTIONAL,	-- e, not written
		privateExp	[2]	INTEGER OPTIONAL,	-- d, not written
		prime1		[3]	INTEGER OPTIONAL,	-- p
		prime2		[4]	INTEGER OPTIONAL,	-- q
		exponent1	[5]	INTEGER OPTIONAL,	-- d mod p-1
		exponent2	[6]	INTEGER OPTIONAL,	-- d mod q-1
		coefficient	[7]	INTEGER OPTIONAL	-- q^-1 mod p
						}
		},
	modulusLength		INTEGER,
	...
	}

PKCS15PrivateECCKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
	value			[2]	EnvelopedData {		-- Before 3.4.0
	value			[4]	AuthEnvelopedData {	-- 3.4.0 and up
						INTEGER				-- ECC d value
						},
	...
	}

PKCS15PrivateDLPKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
	value			[2]	EnvelopedData {		-- Before 3.4.0
	value			[4]	AuthEnvelopedData {	-- 3.4.0 and up
						INTEGER				-- DLP x value
						},
	...
	}

ESSCertIDv2 ::=  SEQUENCE {
--	hashAlgorithm		AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT SHA2,
	certHash			OCTET STRING
	}

PKCS15PrivateRSAKeyAttributesExt ::= SEQUENCE {
	value			[4]	AuthEnvelopedData {
						SEQUENCE {
		spkiHash		ESSCertIDv2,
						SEQUENCE {
		prime1		[3]	INTEGER,			-- p
		prime2		[4]	INTEGER,			-- q
		exponent1	[5]	INTEGER,			-- d mod p-1
		exponent2	[6]	INTEGER,			-- d mod q-1
		coefficient	[7]	INTEGER				-- q^-1 mod p
						}
					}
		},
	modulusLength		INTEGER,
	...
	}

PKCS15PrivateECCKeyAttributesExt ::= SEQUENCE {
	value			[4]	AuthEnvelopedData {
						SEQUENCE {
		spkiHash		ESSCertIDv2,
		value			INTEGER				-- ECC d value
						}
					},
	...
	}

PKCS15PrivateDLPKeyAttributesExt ::= SEQUENCE {
	value			[4]	AuthEnvelopedData {
						SEQUENCE {
		spkiHash		ESSCertIDv2,
		value			INTEGER				-- DLP x value
						}
					},
	...
	}

PKCS15PrivateKey ::= CHOICE {
	privateRSAKey		PKCS15Object{ PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes,		-- ClassAttr
									  PKCS15CommonPrivateKeyAttributes,	-- SubclassAttr
									  PKCS15PrivateRSAKeyAttributes },	-- TypeAttr
	privateECCKey	[0]	PKCS15Object{ PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes,
									  PKCS15CommonPrivateKeyAttributes,
									  PKCS15PrivateECCKeyAttributes }
--	privateDHKey	[1]	PKCS15Object{ ... }
	privateDSAKey	[2]	PKCS15Object{ PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes,
									  PKCS15CommonPrivateKeyAttributes,
									  PKCS15PrivateDLPKeyAttributes }
--	privateKEAKey	[3]	PKCS15Object{ ... }
	privateRSAKeyExt[4]	PKCS15Object{ PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes,
									  PKCS15CommonPrivateKeyAttributes,
									  PKCS15PrivateRSAKeyAttributesExt },
	privateECCKeyExt[5]	PKCS15Object{ PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes,
									  PKCS15CommonPrivateKeyAttributes,
									  PKCS15PrivateECCKeyAttributesExt }
	privateDSAKeyExt[6]	PKCS15Object{ PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes,
									  PKCS15CommonPrivateKeyAttributes,
									  PKCS15PrivateDLPKeyAttributesExt }

	}

-/ This expands out to:

	SEQUENCE {
		keyAttr			PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes,
		privKeyAttr		PKCS15CommonPrivateKeyAttributes,
		keyData		[1]	{ SEQUENCE { [2] IMPLICIT { Enveloped key data } } }
		}

   Note that when the PKCS #15 keyset is being used as structured storage
   for a crypto hardware device then the direct-protected option
   '[2] EnvelopedData' is replaced by an indirect 'Path' reference, where:

	Path ::= SEQUENCE {
		path			OCTET STRING
		}

   So the above would become:

	SEQUENCE {
		keyAttr			PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes,
		privKeyAttr		PKCS15CommonPrivateKeyAttributes,
		keyData		[1]	{ SEQUENCE { SEQUENCE { OCTET STRING } } }
		}

   with the key components stored in the crypto hardware, referenced by the
   value in the OCTET STRING /-

-/ Public key information (DLP = DSA/DH/KEA/etc, ECC = ECDSA/ECDH/etc).
   PKCS #15 actually has a separate type for DH keys but since they're
   DLP keys like DSA we use that for both DH and DSA /-

PKCS15PublicRSAKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
	value			[0]	EXPLICIT {
					[1]	SubjectPublicKeyInfo
						},
	modulusLength		INTEGER,
	...
	}

PKCS15PublicECCKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
	value			[0]	EXPLICIT SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
	...
	}

PKCS15PublicDLPKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
	value			[0]	EXPLICIT SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
	...
	}

PKCS15PublicKey ::= CHOICE {
	publicRSAKey		PKCS15Object{ PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes,		-- ClassAttr
									  PKCS15CommonPublicKeyAttributes,	-- SubclassAttr
									  PKCS15PublicRSAKeyAttributes },	-- TypeAttr
	publicECCKey	[0]	PKCS15Object{ PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes,
									  PKCS15CommonPublicKeyAttributes,
									  PKCS15PublicECCKeyAttributes }
	publicDSAKey	[2]	PKCS15Object{ PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes,
									  PKCS15CommonPublicKeyAttributes,
									  PKCS15PublicDSAKeyAttributes }
	}

-/ This expands out to:

	SEQUENCE {
		keyAttr			PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes,
		privKeyAttr		PKCS15CommonPublicKeyAttributes,
		keyData		[1]	{ SEQUENCE { [0] { Public-key data } } }
		} /-

-/ Certificate information /-

PKCS15X509CertificateAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
	value			[0]	Certificate,
	...
	}

PKCS15Certificate ::= CHOICE {
	x509Certificate		PKCS15Object{ PKCS15CommonCertificateAttributes	-- ClassAttr
									  NULL,								-- SubclassAttr
									  PKCS15X509CertificateAttributes }	-- TypeAttr
	}

-/ This expands out to:

	SEQUENCE {
		certAttr		PKCS15CommonCertificateAttributes,
		classAttr		NULL,
		certData	[1]	{ SEQUENCE { [0] IMPLICIT Certificate } }
		} /-

-/ Secret key information /-

PKCS15GenericSecretKeyAttributes ::= {
	value			[2] EnvelopedData {
						OCTET STRING		-- Raw secret key
						}
	}

PKCS15SecretKey ::= CHOICE {
	des3Key			[4] PKCS15Object{ PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes,		-- ClassAttr
									  PKCS15CommonSecretKeyAttributes,	-- SubclassAttr
									  PKCS15GenericSecretKeyAttributes },-- TypeAttr
	}

-/ This expands out to:

	SEQUENCE {
		keyAttr			PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes,
		secKeyAttr		PKCS15CommonSecretKeyAttributes,
		keyData		[1]	{ [2] { Enveloped key data } }
		} /-

-/ Data information /-

ConfigOption ::= SEQUENCE {
	type				INTEGER,			-- CRYPT_PROPERTY_xxx
	value				ANY DEFINED BY type	-- BOOLEAN, INTEGER, UTF8String
	}

ConfigOptions ::= SEQUENCE OF ConfigOption

UserIndexEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
	iD					OCTET STRING SIZE(16),	-- User ID
	creatorID			OCTET STRING SIZE(16),	-- Creating SO's ID
	name				UTF8String,				-- User name
	fileReference		INTEGER					-- Reference to user file
	}

UserIndex ::= SEQUENCE OF UserIndexEntry

UserInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
	role				ENUMERATED,				-- SO/user/CA
	iD					OCTET STRING SIZE(16),	-- User ID
	creatorID			OCTET STRING SIZE(16),	-- Creating SO's ID
	name				UTF8String,				-- User name
	}

// Other user data, has to be stored elsewhere
//	state				ENUMERATED,				-- SO inited/user inited/locked
//	encSecKey			EncryptedData OPTIONAL	-- (Used for CAs)

PKCS15OidDO ::= SEQUENCE {
	type				OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
	value				ANY DEFINED BY type	-- ConfigOptions/UserIndex/UserInfo
	}

PKCS15Data ::= CHOICE {
	oidDO			[1]	PKCS15Object { PKCS15CommonDataObjectAttributes,
									   NULL,
									   PKCS15OidDO }
	}

-/ Overall object wrappers. The tagging is [n] PKCS15Objects.foo
   [0] PKCS15ObjectValue.objects /-

PrivateKeys ::= [0][0] SEQUENCE OF PKCS15PrivateKey
PublicKeys ::= [1][0] SEQUENCE OF PKCS15PublicKey
SecretKeys ::= [3][0] SEQUENCE OF PKCS15SecretKey
Certificates ::= [4][0] SEQUENCE OF PKCS15Certificate
DataObjects ::= [7][0] SEQUENCE OF PKCS15Data

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--																			--
--								User/Config Info							--
--																			--
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-/ User information /-

-/ PKI user information needed for CMP.  The attributes always include an
   sKID (to uniquely identify the user info) and optionally additional
   template attributes that are applied to certificate(s) created for this
   user.  The dual use of the attributes is somewhat ugly, in theory we
   could split the two into attributes required for PKI user management and
   attributes to apply to the issued certificate, but because the only one
   that's used for user management is the sKID it's easier to special-case
   it in the cert handling code /-

userData ::= SEQUENCE {
	name				Name,					-- Name for CMP
	encAlgo				AlgorithmIdentifier,	-- Algo to encrypt passwords
	encPW				OCTET STRING,			-- Encrypted passwords
	attributes			Attributes
	}

userPW ::= SEQUENCE {
	issuePW				OCTET STRING SIZE(11),	-- Password for ir
	revPW				OCTET STRING SIZE(11)	-- Password for rr
	}

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--																			--
--										Misc								--
--																			--
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-/ OCSP /-

OCSPRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
						SEQUENCE {			-- tbsRequest
		version		[0]	EXPLICIT INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
											-- Must be 1 if !certID used
		reqName		[1]	EXPLICIT ... OPTIONAL
											-- Ignored
						SEQUENCE {			-- requestList
						SEQUENCE {			-- request
			certID		CertID,
			singleReqExt
					[0] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL
				}
			},
		reqExts		[2] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL
		},
	signature		[0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {
		sigAlgo			AlgorithmIdentifier,
		sig				BIT STRING,
		certs		[0]	EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL
		} OPTIONAL
	}

OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {					-- As read
	respStatus			ENUMERATED,			-- 0 = OK
	respBytes		[0]	EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {
		respType		OBJECT IDENTIFIER,	-- id-pkix-ocsp-basic
		resp			OCTET STRING {
						SEQUENCE {			-- basicOCSPResponse
						SEQUENCE {			-- tbsRespData
			version [0] EXPLICIT ... OPTIONAL,-- Ignored
			respID		...,				-- Ignored
			producedAt	...,				-- Ignored
			responses	SEQUENCE {
						SEQUENCE {			-- singleResponse
				certID	...,				-- Ignored
				certStatus [0] EXPLICIT = OK, else !OK
						...					-- Ignored
						}
					},
			respExts[0]	EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL
				}
		sigAlgo			AlgorithmIdentifier,
		signature		BIT STRING
		certs		[0]	EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL
				}
			}
		}
	}

OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {					-- As written
	respStatus			ENUMERATED,			-- 0 = OK
	respBytes		[0]	EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {
		respType		OBJECT IDENTIFIER,	-- id-pkix-ocsp-basic
		resp			OCTET STRING {
						SEQUENCE {			-- basicOCSPResponse
						SEQUENCE {			-- tbsRespData
			responderID [2] OCTET STRING,	-- Responder sKID
			producedAt	GeneralizedTime,
			responses	SEQUENCE {
						SEQUENCE {			-- singleResponse
				certID	CertID,				-- SEQUENCE choice
				certStatus [0] EXPLICIT NULL = OK, else !OK
				thisUpdate	GeneralizedTime,
				nextUpdate [0] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL
						}
					},
			respExts[0]	EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL
				}
		sigAlgo			AlgorithmIdentifier,
		signature		BIT STRING
		certs		[0]	EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL
				}
			}
		}
	}

CertID ::= CHOICE {
	certID				SEQUENCE {
		hashAlgo		AlgorithmIdentifier,
		iNameHash		OCTET STRING,		-- Hash of issuerName
		iKeyHash		OCTET STRING,		-- Hash of issuer SPKI w/o tag+len
		serialNo		INTEGER
						},
	issuerAndSerial	[0]	IssuerAndSerialNumber,	-- OCSPv2 only
	certificate		[1]	Certificate,		-- OCSPv2 only
	certHash		[2] OCTET STRING		-- OCSPv2 only
	}

-/ RTCS /-

RTCSRequests ::= SEQUENCE {
	responseType		RTCSResponseType DEFAULT rtcsBasic,
						SEQUENCE OF {		-- requests
						SEQUENCE {			-- requestInfo
		certHash		OCTET STRING SIZE(20),
			}
		}
	attributes	Attributes OPTIONAL,
	}

RTCSResponsesBasic ::= SEQUENCE {
						SEQUENCE {			-- responseBasic
	certHash			OCTET STRING SIZE(20),
	status				BOOLEAN
		}
	}

RTCSResponsesExtended ::= SEQUENCE {
						SEQUENCE {			-- responseBasic/Extended
	certHash			OCTET STRING SIZE(20),
	status				ENUMERATED,
	statusInfo			ANY DEFINED BY status,
	attributes		[0]	Attributes OPTIONAL	-- For ext.response
		}
	}

-/ Timestamping / TSP /-

TSARequest ::= SEQUENCE {
	version				INTEGER (1),
	msgImprint			SEQUENCE {
		algorithm		AlgorithmIdentifier,
		hash			OCTET STRING
		},
	policy				OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
											-- Ignored
	nonce				INTEGER OPTIONAL,	-- Copy to output if present
	includeSigCerts		BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
											-- Include signer certs if set
	extensions		[0]	Extensions OPTIONAL	-- Reject if present
	}

TSAResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
	status				SEQUENCE {
		status			INTEGER,			-- 0 = OK
						... OPTIONAL
		},
	timeStamp			ContentInfo
	}

TSTInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
	version				INTEGER (1),
	policy				OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
	msgImprint			SEQUENCE { ... }	-- From request
	serialNo			INTEGER,			-- Unique value
	genTime				GeneralizedTime,	-- Current time
	nonce				INTEGER OPTIONAL	-- From input if present
	}

-/ PKCS #12.  Note that what's deployed (and documented here) bears very
   little resemblance to what's given in the specification /-

PFX ::= SEQUENCE {
	version				INTEGER (3),
	authSafe			SEQUENCE {			-- ContentInfo
		contentType		OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-Data,
		content		[0]	EXPLICIT OCTET STRING {
			safeConts	SEQUENCE OF {
						CHOICE {			-- Effectively a CHOICE
				p12Data	PKCS12Data,			-- Data for encrypted keys
				p12Encr	PKCS12Encr			-- EncrData for public keys
						}
					}
				}
			}
		}
	macData				SEQUENCE {
		mac				SEQUENCE {
			algorithm	AlgorithmIdentifier,
			mac			OCTET STRING
			}
		macSalt			OCTET STRING,
		iterations		INTEGER DEFAULT 1	-- Usually set to 2,000
		}
	}

PKCS12Data ::= SEQUENCE {					-- For encrypted private keys
	contentType			OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-Data,
	content			[0]	EXPLICIT OCTET STRING {
		safeContents	SEQUENCE OF PKCS12Bag -- SIZE(1)
		}
	}

PKCS12Bag ::= SEQUENCE {
	bagId				OBJECT IDENTIFIER pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag,
	bagValue		[0]	EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {
		encryptionAlgo	SEQUENCE {
			algo		OBJECT IDENTIFIER pbeWithSHAAnd2-KeyTripleDES-CBC,
			pbeParams	SEQUENCE {
				salt	OCTET STRING,
				iters	INTEGER
				}
			}
		encryptedData	OCTET STRING		-- Encrypted PKCS #8
		}
	bagAttributes		SET OF Attribute
	}

PKCS12BagAlt ::= SEQUENCE {
	bagId				OBJECT IDENTIFIER pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag,
	bagValue		[0]	EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {
		encryptionAlgo	SEQUENCE {
			algo		OBJECT IDENTIFIER pkcs5PBES2,
			params		SEQUENCE {
				kdfInfo	SEQUENCE {
					algo	OBJECT IDENTIFIER pkcs5PBKDF2,
					params	SEQUENCE {
						salt	OCTET STRING,
						iters	INTEGER,
						keyLen	INTEGER OPTIONAL,
						prf		AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT hmacSHA1
						}
					}
				encInfo		SEQUENCE {
					algo	OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
					iv		OCTET STRING
					}
				}
			}
		encryptedData	OCTET STRING		-- Encrypted PKCS #8
		}
	bagAttributes		SET OF Attribute
	}

PKCS8 ::= SEQUENCE {						-- Within PKCS12Bag above
	version				INTEGER (0),
	algorithm			AlgorithmIdentifier,
	key					SEQUENCE {
		version			INTEGER (0),
		keyValues		...
						}
	attributes		[0]	SET OF Attribute OPTIONAL
	}

PKCS12Encr ::= SEQUENCE {					-- For public certificates
	contentType			OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-EncryptedData,
	content			[0]	EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {
		version			INTEGER (0),
		encContentInfo	SEQUENCE {
			contentType	OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-Data,
			contentEncAlgo SEQUENCE {
				algo	OBJECT IDENTIFIER pbeWithSHAAnd40BitRC2-CBC,
				pbeParams SEQUENCE {
					salt OCTET STRING,
					iters INTEGER
					}
				}
			encryptedData OCTET STRING		-- Encrypted PKCS12CertBag
			}
		}
	}

PKCS12CertBag ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {	-- Within PKCS12Enc above
	bagId				OBJECT IDENTIFIER pkcs12CertBag,
	bagValue		[0]	EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {
		certId			OBJECT IDENTIFIER x509Certificate,
		certValue	[0]	EXPLICIT OCTET STRING {
			cert		Certificate
			}
		}
	bagAttributes		SET OF Attribute
	}

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--																			--
--					Certificate Mismanagement Protocol / CMP				--
--																			--
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-/ "If an undergraduate student handed this in as an assignment I'd fail them
	on the grounds that it shows a complete lack of understanding of the
	principles of workable protocol design" /-

xxxRequest ::= SEQUENCE {					-- ir/cr/kur, 3.3.1/3.3.3/3.3.5
	header				SEQUENCE {			--	Profile = B8
		version			INTEGER (2),
		sender		[4]	EXPLICIT DirectoryName,	-- DN of subject
		recipient	[4]	EXPLICIT DirectoryName,	-- DN of CA
		protAlgo	[1]	EXPLICIT AlgorithmIdentifier (PBMac),
		protKeyID	[2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING,
		transID		[4] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16),	-- Random
		nonce		[5] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16),	-- Random
		},
	body			[0]	EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {	-- [2] in cr, [7] in kur
		certReqMsg		SEQUENCE {			-- RFC 2510
						SEQUENCE {
			cReqID		INTEGER (0),
			cTemplate	SEQUENCE {
				validity[1] TIME OPTIONAL,
				subject	[5] EXPLICIT Name,
				pubKey	[6] SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
				exts	[9] Extensions OPTIONAL
						},
			cControls	SEQUENCE OF Attribute OPTIONAL		-- Ignored
					},
		pop			[1] EXPLICIT Signature	-- From X.509, for sig.key
or		pop			[2] EXPLICIT [1] INTEGER (0)
											-- For encr-only key
				}
			}
		},
	protection		[0]	EXPLICIT BIT STRING	-- ir = MAC, cr/kur = SIG
	}

xxxResponse ::= SEQUENCE {					-- ip/cp/kup, 3.3.2/3.3.4/3.3.6
	header				SEQUENCE {			--	Profile = B8
		version			INTEGER (2),
		sender			SEQUENCE {...},		-- Ignored
		recipient		SEQUENCE {...},		-- Ignored
		messageTime	[0]	... OPTIONAL,		-- Ignored
		protAlgo	[1]	EXPLICIT AlgorithmIdentifier (PBMac),
		protKeyID	[2]	EXPLICIT OCTET STRING,			-- Must match previous
		transID		[4] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16),-- Must match previous
		nonceX		[5] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16),-- Needed in CertConf
		...
		},
	body			[1] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {			-- [3] in cp, [8] in kup
		caPubs		[1] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {...} OPTIONAL,-- Ignored
		response		SEQUENCE {
						SEQUENCE {
			certReqID	INTEGER (0),
			status		SEQUENCE {			-- PKIStatusInfo, 3.2.3
				status	INTEGER,
				statusStr SEQUENCE OF UTF8String OPTIONAL,
				failInfo BIT STRING OPTIONAL
				},
			certKeyPair	SEQUENCE {			-- If status == 0 or 1
				cert[0]	EXPLICIT Certificate,
or				encCert						-- For encr-only key
					[1] EXPLICIT EncryptedCert,
						...					-- Ignored
					}
				}
			}
		},
	protection		[0]	EXPLICIT BIT STRING	-- ip = MAC, cp/kup = SIG
	}

CertConf ::= SEQUENCE {						-- 3.3.18, profile = B8
	header				SEQUENCE {
		version			INTEGER (2),
		sender			SEQUENCE {...},		-- Ignored
		recipient		SEQUENCE {...},		-- Ignored
		messageTime	[0]	... OPTIONAL,		-- Ignored
		protAlgo	[1]	EXPLICIT AlgorithmIdentifier (PBMac),
		protKeyID	[2]	EXPLICIT OCTET STRING,			-- Must match previous
		transID		[4] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16),-- Must match previous
		nonce		[5] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16),-- Random
		nonceX		[6] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16),-- Copied from InitResp
						...					-- Ignored
		},
	body		   [24]	EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {
						SEQUENCE {
		certHash		OCTET STRING
		certReqID		INTEGER (0),
			}
		},
	protection		[0]	EXPLICIT BIT STRING	-- ix = MAC, cx/kux = SIG
	}

Conf ::= SEQUENCE {							-- 3.3.17, profile = B8
	header				SEQUENCE {
		version			INTEGER (2),
		sender			SEQUENCE {...},		-- Ignored
		recipient		SEQUENCE {...},		-- Ignored
		messageTime	[0]	... OPTIONAL,		-- Ignored
		protAlgo	[1]	EXPLICIT AlgorithmIdentifier (PBMac),
		protKeyID	[2]	EXPLICIT OCTET STRING,			-- Must match previous
		transID		[4] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16),-- Must match previous
						...					-- Ignored
		},
	body		   [19]	EXPLICIT NULL,
	protection		[0]	EXPLICIT BIT STRING	-- ix = MAC, cx/kux = SIG
	}

RevRequest ::= SEQUENCE {					-- rr, 3.3.9
	header				SEQUENCE {
		version			INTEGER (2),
		sender		[4]	EXPLICIT DirectoryName,	-- DN of subject
		recipient	[4]	EXPLICIT DirectoryName,	-- DN of CA
		protAlgo	[1]	EXPLICIT AlgorithmIdentifier (PBMac),
		protKeyID	[2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING,
		transID		[4] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16),	-- Random
		nonce		[5] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16),	-- Random
		},
	body		   [11]	EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {
		revDetails		SEQUENCE {
			cTemplate	SEQUENCE {			-- RFC 2510
				serial	[1] INTEGER,
				issuer	[3] EXPLICIT NAME
						},
			crlEntries	Extensions OPTIONAL
					}
				},
	protection		[0]	EXPLICIT BIT STRING	-- MAC or SIG
	}

RevResponse ::= SEQUENCE {					-- rp, 3.3.10
	header				SEQUENCE {
		version			INTEGER (2),
		sender			SEQUENCE {...},		-- Ignored
		recipient		SEQUENCE {...},		-- Ignored
		messageTime	[0]	... OPTIONAL,		-- Ignored
		protAlgo	[1]	EXPLICIT AlgorithmIdentifier (PBMac),
		protKeyID	[2]	EXPLICIT OCTET STRING,			-- Must match previous
		transID		[4] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16),-- Must match previous
						...					-- Ignored
		},
	body		   [12]	EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {
		status			SEQUENCE {
						SEQUENCE {			-- PKIStatusInfo, 3.2.3
			status		INTEGER,
			statusStr	SEQUENCE OF UTF8String OPTIONAL,
			failInfo	BIT STRING OPTIONAL
						},
						...					-- Ignored
					}
						...					-- Ignored
			},
	protection		[0]	EXPLICIT BIT STRING	-- MAC or SIG
	}

GenMsg ::= SEQUENCE {						-- 3.3.19/3.3.20
	header				SEQUENCE {
		version			INTEGER (2),
		sender			SEQUENCE {...},		-- Ignored
		recipient		SEQUENCE {...},		-- Ignored
		messageTime	[0]	... OPTIONAL,		-- Ignored
		protAlgo	[1]	EXPLICIT AlgorithmIdentifier (sigAlgo),
		protKeyID	[2]	EXPLICIT OCTET STRING,			-- Must match previous
		transID		[4] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16),-- Must match previous
						...					-- Ignored
		},
	body		   [21]	EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF {
						SEQUENCE {
		infoType		OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
		intoValue		ANY DEFINED BY infoType OPTIONAL
						}
					},
	protection		[0]	EXPLICIT BIT STRING	-- MAC or SIG
	}

Error ::= SEQUENCE {						-- 3.3.21
	header				SEQUENCE {
		version			INTEGER (2),
		sender			SEQUENCE {...},		-- Ignored
		recipient		SEQUENCE {...},		-- Ignored
		messageTime	[0]	... OPTIONAL,		-- Ignored
		protAlgo	[1]	EXPLICIT AlgorithmIdentifier (sigAlgo),
		protKeyID	[2]	EXPLICIT OCTET STRING,			-- Must match previous
		transID		[4] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16),-- Must match previous
						...					-- Ignored
		},
	body		   [23]	EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {
						SEQUENCE {
		status			INTEGER,
						SEQUENCE {
			statusMsg	UTF8String,
						...					-- Ignored
						} OPTIONAL,
		failInfo		BIT STRING OPTIONAL
						},
		errorCode		INTEGER OPTIONAL,
						SEQUENCE {
			errorMsg	UTF8String,
						...					-- Ignored
						} OPTIONAL
					},
	protection		[0]	EXPLICIT BIT STRING	-- SIG
	}

-/ The MAC information used when the protection is a MAC /-

MacInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
	algoID				OBJECT IDENTIFIER (entrustMAC),
	algoParams			SEQUENCE {
		salt			OCTET STRING,
		pwHashAlgo		AlgorithmIdentifier (SHA-1),
		iterations		INTEGER,
		macAlgo			AlgorithmIdentifier (HMAC-SHA1)
		}
	}

-/ The encrypted data when the cert is returned encrypted /-

EncryptedCert ::= SEQUENCE {
	dummy			[0]	... OPTIONAL,		-- Ignored
	cekAlg			[1]	AlgorithmIdentifier,-- CEK algorithm
	encCEK			[2]	BIT STRING,			-- Encrypted CEK
	dummy			[3]	... OPTIONAL,		-- Ignored
	dummy			[4] ... OPTIONAL,		-- Ignored
	encData			BIT STRING
	}

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--																			--
--					Certificate Messages over CMS /  CMC					--
--																			--
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-/ CMC request and response messages.  Certificates are returned as signing
   certs attached to the CMS signed data /-

PKIData ::= SEQUENCE {
	attributes		SEQUENCE OF TaggedAttribute, -- Control attrs.
	requests		SEQUENCE OF TaggedReq,	-- Cert.requests
	cms				SEQUENCE OF TaggedCMS,	-- CMS messages
	other			SEQUENCE OF OtherMsg	-- Type-and-value pairs
	}

PKIResp ::= SEQUENCE {
	attributes		SEQUENCE OF TaggedAttribute, -- Control attrs.
	cms				SEQUENCE OF TaggedCMS,	-- CMS messages
	other			SEQUENCE OF OtherMsg	-- Type-and-value pairs
	}

-/ TaggedXYZ types.  OtherMsg is identical to TaggedAttribute except that
   the value field is ANY DEFINED BY /-

TaggedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
	iD				INTEGER,				-- Unique 32-bit ID for this attr.
	type			OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
	values			SEQUENCE OF Attribute
	}

TaggedCMS ::= SEQUENCE {
	iD				INTEGER,				-- Unique 32-bit ID for this attr.
	value			CMS
	}

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--																			--
--			Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol / SCVP				--
--																			--
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-/ Another CMP-grade mess full of mandatory fields that are optional,
   optional fields that are mandatory, ambiguous and even undefined fields,
   and infinite SEQUENCE OF { SEQUENCE OF { SEQUENCE OF { CHOICE { CHOICE {
   OPTIONAL, OPTIONAL, OPTIONAL, OPTIONAL, OPTIONAL } } } } } /-

CVRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
	cvRequestVersion		INTEGER DEFAULT 1, -- Possibly encoded even if default
	query					SEQUENCE {
		queriedCerts		CertReferences,
		checks				SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
		wantBack		[1]	SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL, -- Actually mandatory
		validationPolicy	ValidationPolicy,
		responseFlags		... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
		serverContextInfo [2] ... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
		validationTime	[3]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
		intermediateCerts [4] ... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
		revInfos		[5]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
		producedAt		[6]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
		queryExtensions	[7]	... OPTIONAL 	-- Ignored
		},
	requestorRef		[0]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	requestNonce		[1]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	requestorName		[2]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	responderName		[3]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	requestExtensions	[4]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	signatureAlg		[5]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	hashAlg				[6]	OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
	requestorText		[7]	... OPTIONAL 	-- Ignored
	}

CVResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
	cvResponseVersion		INTEGER = 1,
	serverConfigurationID	INTEGER = 1,
	producedAt				GeneralizedTime,
	responseStatus			SEQUENCE {
		statusCode			CVStatusCode DEFAULT okay,
		errorMessage		UTF8String OPTIONAL	-- Ignored
		},
	respValidationPolicy [0] ... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	requestRef			[1]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	requestorRef		[2]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	requestorName		[3]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	replyObjects		[4]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	respNonce			[5]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	serverContextInfo	[6]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	cvResponseExtensions [7] ... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	requestorText		[8]	... OPTIONAL	-- Ignored
	}

ValPolRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
	vpRequestVersion		INTEGER DEFAULT 1, -- Possibly encoded even if default
	requestNonce			OCTET STRING
	}

ValPolResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
	vpResponseVersion               INTEGER = 1,
	maxCVRequestVersion             INTEGER = 1,
	maxVPRequestVersion             INTEGER = 1,
	serverConfigurationID           INTEGER = 1,
	thisUpdate                      GeneralizedTime,
	nextUpdate                      GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, -- Ignored
	supportedChecks                 SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
	supportedWantBacks              SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
	validationPolicies              SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
	validationAlgs                  SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
	authPolicies                    SEQUENCE OF AuthPolicy,
	responseTypes                   ENUMERATED { ... },
	defaultPolicyValues             ValidationPolicy,
	revocationInfoTypes             BIT STRING { ... },
	signatureGeneration             SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier,
	signatureVerification           SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier,
	hashAlgorithms                  SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
	serverPublicKeys                SEQUENCE OF ... OPTIONAL, -- Ignored
	clockSkew                       INTEGER DEFAULT 10, -- Ignored
	requestNonce                    OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
	}

ValidationPolicy ::= SEQUENCE {
	validationPolRef				SEQUENCE {
		valPolId					OBJECT IDENTIFIER scvpDefaultValPolicy,
		valPolParams				ANY DEFINED BY valPolId OPTIONAL
		},
	validationAlg				[0]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	userPolicySet				[1]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	inhibitPolicyMapping		[2]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	requireExplicitPolicy		[3]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	inhibitAnyPolicy			[4]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	trustAnchors				[5]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	keyUsages					[6]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	extendedKeyUsages			[7]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	specifiedKeyUsages			[8]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	}

CertReferences ::= CHOICE {
     pkcRefs					[0]	SEQUENCE OF CHOICE {
		cert					[0]	Certificate,
		pkcRef					[1]	SEQUENCE {
			certHash				OCTET STRING,
			issuerSerial			SEQUENCE {
				issuer				SEQUENCE OF GeneralName,	-- Must be cert DN
				serialNumber		INTEGER,
			hashAlgorithm			AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT sha-1
			}
		}
	}

END
=======
-/ This specification makes one slight deviation from standard ASN.1 syntax
   to overcome an annoyance in ASN.1 which requires a separate -- at the
   start of each and every line of comment.  Instead, this specification uses
   -//- comment delimiters (which work like C's /**/) in place of standard
   ASN.1 delimiters /-

cryptlib DEFINITIONS ::=
BEGIN

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--																			--
--								PKCS #7 Data Formats						--
--																			--
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-/ There are several variants of the PKCS #7/S/MIME/CMS format which gradually
   get more flexible (but not necessarily better) over time.  The initial
   format was PKCS #7 1.5 and earlier, 1.6 was a quick update which changed a
   number of SETs to SEQUENCEs (which don't require sorting of the encoded
   components), this doesn't appear to have been used by anything.  S/MIME 3/
   CMS was an extended form of S/MIME 2 which fiddled with some of the inner
   fields but was mostly the same as PKCS #7 1.5.  1.5 is a significant
   improvement on most of its successors /-

ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
	contentType			OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
	content			[0]	EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY contentType OPTIONAL
	}

-/ Raw data /-

Data ::= OCTET STRING						-- PKCS #7 1

-/ Authenticated data: Digested, signed, MAC'd data /-

DigestedData ::= SEQUENCE {					-- PKCS #7 5
	version				INTEGER (0),		-- PKCS #7 v1.5
	digestAlgorithm		AlgorithmIdentifier,-- v=2 for non id-Data
	encapContentInfo	SEQUENCE {
		contentType		OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-Data/Sig/Encr/Env,
		content		[0]	EXPLICIT OCTET STRING
		},
	digest				OCTET STRING
	}

SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {					-- PKCS #7 2
	version				INTEGER (1),		-- PKCS #7 v1.5
	digestAlgorithms	SET OF AlgorithmIdentifier,
	encapContentInfo	SEQUENCE {
		contentType		OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-Data/Sig/Encr/Env,
		content		[0]	EXPLICIT OCTET STRING
		}
	certificates	[0]	SET OF Certificate,
	signerInfos			SET OF SignerInfo
	}

AuthenticatedData ::= SEQUENCE {			-- PKCS #9 16 1 2
	version				INTEGER (0),		-- S/MIME v3
	recipientInfos		SET OF RecipientInfo,
	macAlgorithm		AlgorithmIdentifier,
	encapContentInfo	SEQUENCE {
		contentType		OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-Data/Sig/Encr/Env,
		content		[0]	EXPLICIT OCTET STRING
		}
	authAttrs		[1]	SET OF Attribute OPTIONAL,
	mac					OCTET STRING
	unauthAttrs		[2]	SET OF Attribute OPTIONAL
	}

-/ Encrypted data: Raw encrypted, enveloped /-

EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE {				-- PKCS #7 6
	version				INTEGER (0),		-- PKCS #7 v1.5
	encrContentInfo		SEQUENCE {
		contentType		OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-Data/Sig/Encr/Env,
		contentEncrAlgo	AlgorithmIdentifier,
		content		[0]	OCTET STRING
		}
	}

EnvelopedData ::= SEQUENCE {				-- PKCS #7 3
	version				INTEGER (0),		-- PKCS #7 v1.5, v=2 for origInfo
	recipientInfos		SET OF RecipientInfo,
	encrContentInfo		SEQUENCE {
		contentType		OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-Data/Sig/Encr/Env,
		contentEncrAlgo	AlgorithmIdentifier,
		content		[0]	OCTET STRING
		},
	unauthAttrs		[1]	SET OF Attribute OPTIONAL
	}

-/ Combined encrypted + authenticated data /-

 AuthEnvelopedData ::= SEQUENCE {			-- PKCS #9 16 1 23
	version				INTEGER (0),		-- CMS
	recipientInfos		SET OF RecipientInfo,
	encrContentInfo		SEQUENCE {
		contentType		OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-Data/Sig/Encr/Env,
		contentEncrAlgo	AlgorithmIdentifier,
		content		[0]	OCTET STRING
		},
	authAttrs		[1]	SET OF Attribute OPTIONAL,
	mac					OCTET STRING
	unauthAttrs		[2]	SET OF Attribute OPTIONAL
	}

-/ Attributes.  Contrast these with certificate attributes, identified as
   Extensions, which use hole encodings rather than proper ASN.1
   structures /-

Attribute ::= SEQUENCE {
	type			OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
	value			SET OF ANY
	}

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--																			--
--								Key Management								--
--																			--
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-/ The parameters used to derive the conventional encryption key from the
   user key.  Usually we use the key directly, but sometimes it may have
   been derived from a longer user key, which is encoded in this record /-

PBKDF2 ::= SEQUENCE {						-- PKCS #5v2 key setup parameters
	algorithm		AlgorithmIdentifier (pkcs-5 12),
	params			SEQUENCE {
		salt		OCTET STRING,			-- Key setup salt
		iterationCount						-- Key setup iterations
					INTEGER (1..MAX),
		}
	}

-/ CMS key transport information /-

KeyTransRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE {		-- CMS - S/MIME
	version			INTEGER (0),			-- CMS
	issuerAndSerial	IssuerAndSerialNumber,	-- Encrypting certificate
	algorithm		AlgorithmIdentifier,	-- Encryption algorithm
	encryptedKey	OCTET STRING			-- Encryped key
	}
KeyTransRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE {		-- CMS - cryptlib
	version			INTEGER (2),			-- CMS
	keyID		[0]	SubjectKeyIdentifier,	-- Key ID of encrypting key
	algorithm		AlgorithmIdentifier,	-- Encryption algorithm
	encryptedKey	OCTET STRING			-- Encrypted key
	}

-/ CMS key agreement information, which is officially called
   KeyAgreeRecipientInfo but in order for it to make sense it really needs
   to be named FortezzaRecipientInfo /-

FortezzaRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE {		-- CMS - S/MIME
	version			INTEGER (3),			-- CMS
	originator	[0]	EXPLICIT [ 0 ] SubjectKeyIdentifier,-- Originator pub.key
	ukm			[1]	EXPLICIT OCTET STRING,	-- Nonce, Ra
	algorithm		AlgorithmIdentifier,	-- Fortezza key wrap OID
	recipientKeys	SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
		rKeyId	[0]	SEQUENCE { SubjectKeyIdentifier }, -- Recip.pubk
		encryptedKey OCTET STRING			-- Encr.key info, TEK( MEK )
		}
	}

-/ CMS conventional key transport information.  This structure is somewhat
   misnamed since it's really just a kludge to work with pre-distributed
   shared RC2 or 3DES keys for S/MIME-based mailing lists and not a general-
   purpose KEK object, however by using the PWRI AlgorithmIdentifier for
   KEKRI we can turn it into a general-purpose key transport mechanism /-

KEKRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
	version			INTEGER (4),			-- CMS
	kekid			SEQUENCE {
		keyIdent	OCTET STRING			-- Magic ID for KEK
		},
	keyEncAlgo		AlgorithmIdentifier,	-- Key wrap algorithm
	encryptedKey	OCTET STRING			-- Encrypted key
	}

-/ CMS password-based key transport information.  This is also misnamed since
   it's actually general-purpose and does what KEKRecipientInfo should do /-

PasswordRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
	version			INTEGER (0),			-- CMS
	keyDerivationAlgorithm					-- KEK derivation algorithm,
				[0]	AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,	-- PBKDF2 if present
	keyEncryptionAlgorithm					-- KEK algorithm
					AlgorithmIdentifier,	-- PWRI-KEK
	encryptedKey	OCTET STRING
	}

-/ CMS key management /-

RecipientInfo ::= CHOICE {
	ktri			KeyTransRecipientInfo,	-- Public-key encrypted key
	kari		[1] FortezzaRecipientInfo,	-- Fortezza key-agreement info
	kekri		[2] KEKRecipientInfo,		-- Conventionally encrypted key
	pwri		[3]	PasswordRecipientInfo	-- Password-encrypted key
	}

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--																			--
--									Signatures								--
--																			--
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-/ CMS signature information /-

SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE {					-- CMS - S/MIME
	version			INTEGER (1),			-- CMS
	issuerAndSerial	IssuerAndSerialNumber,	-- Signing certificate
	hashAlgorithm	AlgorithmIdentifier,	-- Hash algorithm type
	signedAttributes						-- Authenticated attributes
				[0]	SET OF Attribute OPTIONAL,
	signatureAlgorithm						-- Signature algorithm type
					AlgorithmIdentifier,
	signature		OCTET STRING			-- The signature itself
	unsignedAttrs							-- Countersignature
				[1]	SET OF Attribute OPTIONAL
	}
SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE {					-- CMS - cryptlib
	version			INTEGER (3),			-- CMS
	keyID		[0]	SubjectKeyIdentifier,	-- Key ID of signing key
	hashAlgorithm	AlgorithmIdentifier,	-- Hash algorithm type
	signatureAlgorithm						-- Signature algorithm type
					AlgorithmIdentifier,
	signature		OCTET STRING			-- The signature itself
	}

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--																			--
--								Public/Private Keys							--
--																			--
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-/ PKCS #15 uses a very object-oriented design that follows PKCS #11 and
   uses a lot of the expressive power of ASN.1 in the specification of its
   PDUs.  The basic PKCS #15 object is defined as follows:

	PKCS15Object( ClassAttributes, SubclassAttributes, TypeAttributes ) ->
		SEQUENCE {
			commonAttr		CommonObjectAttributes,
			classAttr		ClassAttributes,
			subclassAttr[0]	SubclassAttributes OPTIONAL,
			typeAttr	[1]	TypeAttributes
			}

   with the attributes being filled in on a per-object basis.  Every object
   contains common object attributes, and every key or certificate object
   contains common key or cert class attributes.  In addition the public and
   private key subclasses contain subclass-specific attributes, but they
   don't contain anything which isn't present elsewhere so they're omitted.
   Note the explicit use of EXPLICIT tagging, this is required because dummy
   parameters like TypeAttributes are always explict-tagged to ensure tag
   uniqueness (it's like the CHOICE explicit-tag rule):

					Key									Cert
	SEQUENCE {
		SEQUENCE {											-- CommonObjectAttr
			label		UTF8String,
			...
			},
		SEQUENCE {							SEQUENCE {		-- ClassAttr
			iD			OCTET STRING,			iD			OCTET STRING,
			usage		BIT STRING,				authority	BOOLEAN DEF FALSE,
			accessFlags	BIT STRING OPTIONAL,	trusted	[1] SEQUENCE { usage BIT STR },
			...									keyID	[2] SEQUENCE OF KeyID,
			},									impTrust[3]	BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
												...
												},
		[0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {								-- SubclassAttr
			...			SEQUENCE OPTIONAL,
			keyID	[0]	SEQUENCE OF KeyID,
			...
			} OPTIONAL,
		[1] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {								-- TypeAttr
			<data>
			}
		}
				cryptlib config/user data
	SEQUENCE {
		SEQUENCE {											-- CommonObjectAttr
			label		UTF8String,
			...
			},
		SEQUENCE {											-- ClassAttr
			...
			appOID		OBJECT IDENTIFIER (cryptlib),
			...
			},
		[1] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {
			<data>
			}
		}

   PKCS #15 hasn't been significantly updated since the PKCS #15 / ISO
   7816-15 split, a few new items (validFrom/validTo attributes and
   pgp/openPGP identifiers) were added for v1.2 which was apparently only
   ever published in draft form by RSA Labs in March 2010, and other items
   like AuthEnvelopedData instead of EnvelopedData, protected private-key
   attributes bound to the otherwise unprotected public-key ones, and URI
   (=email) identifiers, were never standardised due to the spec becoming
   moribund.  Any of the post-1.2 additions are given an 'Ext' in the name
   to indicate that they're extensions to the spec /-

PKCS15CommonObjectAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
	label			UTF8String OPTIONAL,	-- Object label
	...
	}

-/ Class attributes.  Note that the certificate keyID/impTrust/validFrom/
   validTo attributes were added for PKCS #11 support in the PKCS #15 v1.2
   draft /-

PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
	iD				OCTET STRING,			-- Cross-reference to cert
	usage			BIT STRING,				-- PKCS #11 usage flags
	accessFlags		BIT STRING b'01101' OPT,-- PKCS #11 access flags
	startDate		GeneralisedTime OPTIONAL,
	endDate		[0]	GeneralisedTime OPTIONAL,
	...
	}

PKCS15CommonCertificateAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
	iD				OCTET STRING,			-- Cross-reference to key
	authority		BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,	-- CA flag
	dummy			SEQUENCE {} OPTIONAL,	-- Not used
	dummy		[0]	SEQUENCE {} OPTIONAL,	-- Not used
	trusted		[1]	SEQUENCE {
		keyUsage	BIT STRING,				-- Key usage cert is trusted for
		...
		} OPTIONAL,
	keyID		[2]	SEQUENCE OF KeyID OPTIONAL,	-- Added in v1.1
	impTrust	[3]	BOOLEAN OPTIONAL,		-- Added in v1.1
	validFrom		GeneralisedTime OPTIONAL,
	validTo		[4] GeneralisedTime OPTIONAL,
	...
	}

PKCS15CommonSecretKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
	...
	}

PKCS15CommonDataObjectAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
	applicationName	UTF8String OPTIONAL,	-- One or both must be present
	applicationOID	OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
	iD				OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
	...
	}

-/ Subclass attributes.  These are required for public/private keys, for
   which the ID information isn't present in the class attributes as it is
   for certificates.  Unfortunately the ID information also isn't present
   in the public-key subclass attributes, which means that looking up a
   raw public key by ID is impossible /-

PKCS15CommonPrivateKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
	keyID		[0]	SEQUENCE OF KeyID OPTIONAL,
	...
	}

-/ Key identifiers.  Note that the pgp/openPGP IDs were added for PKCS #11
   support in the PKCS #15 v1.2 draft.  The uri ID is a custom addition
   required to support fetching by email address for encryption keys /-

PKCS15KeyIdentifier ::= TYPED CHOICE {
	iAndS			SEQUENCE {				-- Not written, conv.to iAndSHash on rd
		id			INTEGER (1),
		value		IssuerAndSerialNumber
		},
	subjectKeyID	SEQUENCE {				-- Only used if different from iD
		id			INTEGER (2),
		value		OCTET STRING
		},
	iAndSHash		SEQUENCE {				-- Written and read
		id			INTEGER (3),
		value		OCTET STRING SIZE(20)
		},
	iHash			SEQUENCE {				-- Written and read
		id			INTEGER (6),
		value		OCTET STRING SIZE(20)
		},
	sHash			SEQUENCE {				-- Written and read
		id			INTEGER (7),
		value		OCTET STRING SIZE(20)
		},
	pgp				SEQUENCE {				-- Written and read
		id			INTEGER (8),
		value		OCTET STRING SIZE(8)
		},
	openPGP			SEQUENCE {				-- Written and read
		id			INTEGER (9),
		value		OCTET STRING SIZE(8)
		},
	uriExt			SEQUENCE {				-- Written and read
		id			INTEGER (10),
		value		UTF8String
		},
	...
	}

-/ Private key information (DLP = DSA/DH/KEA/etc, ECC = ECDSA/ECDH/etc).
   PKCS #15 actually has a separate type for DH keys but since they're
   DLP keys like DSA we use that for both DH and DSA.  Note that the
   AuthEnvelopedData form is a custom addition that postdates the v1.2
   draft, and the Ext form is similar and cryptographically binds the
   public-key components to the stored private key ones /-

PKCS15PrivateRSAKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
	value			[2]	EnvelopedData {		-- Before 3.4.0
	value			[4]	AuthEnvelopedData {	-- 3.4.0 and up
						SEQUENCE {
		modulus		[0]	INTEGER OPTIONAL,	-- n, not written
		publicExp	[1]	INTEGER OPTIONAL,	-- e, not written
		privateExp	[2]	INTEGER OPTIONAL,	-- d, not written
		prime1		[3]	INTEGER OPTIONAL,	-- p
		prime2		[4]	INTEGER OPTIONAL,	-- q
		exponent1	[5]	INTEGER OPTIONAL,	-- d mod p-1
		exponent2	[6]	INTEGER OPTIONAL,	-- d mod q-1
		coefficient	[7]	INTEGER OPTIONAL	-- q^-1 mod p
						}
		},
	modulusLength		INTEGER,
	...
	}

PKCS15PrivateECCKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
	value			[2]	EnvelopedData {		-- Before 3.4.0
	value			[4]	AuthEnvelopedData {	-- 3.4.0 and up
						INTEGER				-- ECC d value
						},
	...
	}

PKCS15PrivateDLPKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
	value			[2]	EnvelopedData {		-- Before 3.4.0
	value			[4]	AuthEnvelopedData {	-- 3.4.0 and up
						INTEGER				-- DLP x value
						},
	...
	}

ESSCertIDv2 ::=  SEQUENCE {
--	hashAlgorithm		AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT SHA2,
	certHash			OCTET STRING
	}

PKCS15PrivateRSAKeyAttributesExt ::= SEQUENCE {
	value			[4]	AuthEnvelopedData {
						SEQUENCE {
		spkiHash		ESSCertIDv2,
						SEQUENCE {
		prime1		[3]	INTEGER,			-- p
		prime2		[4]	INTEGER,			-- q
		exponent1	[5]	INTEGER,			-- d mod p-1
		exponent2	[6]	INTEGER,			-- d mod q-1
		coefficient	[7]	INTEGER				-- q^-1 mod p
						}
					}
		},
	modulusLength		INTEGER,
	...
	}

PKCS15PrivateECCKeyAttributesExt ::= SEQUENCE {
	value			[4]	AuthEnvelopedData {
						SEQUENCE {
		spkiHash		ESSCertIDv2,
		value			INTEGER				-- ECC d value
						}
					},
	...
	}

PKCS15PrivateDLPKeyAttributesExt ::= SEQUENCE {
	value			[4]	AuthEnvelopedData {
						SEQUENCE {
		spkiHash		ESSCertIDv2,
		value			INTEGER				-- DLP x value
						}
					},
	...
	}

PKCS15PrivateKey ::= CHOICE {
	privateRSAKey		PKCS15Object{ PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes,		-- ClassAttr
									  PKCS15CommonPrivateKeyAttributes,	-- SubclassAttr
									  PKCS15PrivateRSAKeyAttributes },	-- TypeAttr
	privateECCKey	[0]	PKCS15Object{ PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes,
									  PKCS15CommonPrivateKeyAttributes,
									  PKCS15PrivateECCKeyAttributes }
--	privateDHKey	[1]	PKCS15Object{ ... }
	privateDSAKey	[2]	PKCS15Object{ PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes,
									  PKCS15CommonPrivateKeyAttributes,
									  PKCS15PrivateDLPKeyAttributes }
--	privateKEAKey	[3]	PKCS15Object{ ... }
	privateRSAKeyExt[4]	PKCS15Object{ PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes,
									  PKCS15CommonPrivateKeyAttributes,
									  PKCS15PrivateRSAKeyAttributesExt },
	privateECCKeyExt[5]	PKCS15Object{ PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes,
									  PKCS15CommonPrivateKeyAttributes,
									  PKCS15PrivateECCKeyAttributesExt }
	privateDSAKeyExt[6]	PKCS15Object{ PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes,
									  PKCS15CommonPrivateKeyAttributes,
									  PKCS15PrivateDLPKeyAttributesExt }

	}

-/ This expands out to:

	SEQUENCE {
		keyAttr			PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes,
		privKeyAttr		PKCS15CommonPrivateKeyAttributes,
		keyData		[1]	{ SEQUENCE { [2] IMPLICIT { Enveloped key data } } }
		}

   Note that when the PKCS #15 keyset is being used as structured storage
   for a crypto hardware device then the direct-protected option
   '[2] EnvelopedData' is replaced by an indirect 'Path' reference, where:

	Path ::= SEQUENCE {
		path			OCTET STRING
		}

   So the above would become:

	SEQUENCE {
		keyAttr			PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes,
		privKeyAttr		PKCS15CommonPrivateKeyAttributes,
		keyData		[1]	{ SEQUENCE { SEQUENCE { OCTET STRING } } }
		}

   with the key components stored in the crypto hardware, referenced by the
   value in the OCTET STRING /-

-/ Public key information (DLP = DSA/DH/KEA/etc, ECC = ECDSA/ECDH/etc).
   PKCS #15 actually has a separate type for DH keys but since they're
   DLP keys like DSA we use that for both DH and DSA /-

PKCS15PublicRSAKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
	value			[0]	EXPLICIT {
					[1]	SubjectPublicKeyInfo
						},
	modulusLength		INTEGER,
	...
	}

PKCS15PublicECCKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
	value			[0]	EXPLICIT SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
	...
	}

PKCS15PublicDLPKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
	value			[0]	EXPLICIT SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
	...
	}

PKCS15PublicKey ::= CHOICE {
	publicRSAKey		PKCS15Object{ PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes,		-- ClassAttr
									  PKCS15CommonPublicKeyAttributes,	-- SubclassAttr
									  PKCS15PublicRSAKeyAttributes },	-- TypeAttr
	publicECCKey	[0]	PKCS15Object{ PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes,
									  PKCS15CommonPublicKeyAttributes,
									  PKCS15PublicECCKeyAttributes }
	publicDSAKey	[2]	PKCS15Object{ PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes,
									  PKCS15CommonPublicKeyAttributes,
									  PKCS15PublicDSAKeyAttributes }
	}

-/ This expands out to:

	SEQUENCE {
		keyAttr			PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes,
		privKeyAttr		PKCS15CommonPublicKeyAttributes,
		keyData		[1]	{ SEQUENCE { [0] { Public-key data } } }
		} /-

-/ Certificate information /-

PKCS15X509CertificateAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
	value			[0]	Certificate,
	...
	}

PKCS15Certificate ::= CHOICE {
	x509Certificate		PKCS15Object{ PKCS15CommonCertificateAttributes	-- ClassAttr
									  NULL,								-- SubclassAttr
									  PKCS15X509CertificateAttributes }	-- TypeAttr
	}

-/ This expands out to:

	SEQUENCE {
		certAttr		PKCS15CommonCertificateAttributes,
		classAttr		NULL,
		certData	[1]	{ SEQUENCE { [0] IMPLICIT Certificate } }
		} /-

-/ Secret key information /-

PKCS15GenericSecretKeyAttributes ::= {
	value			[2] EnvelopedData {
						OCTET STRING		-- Raw secret key
						}
	}

PKCS15SecretKey ::= CHOICE {
	des3Key			[4] PKCS15Object{ PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes,		-- ClassAttr
									  PKCS15CommonSecretKeyAttributes,	-- SubclassAttr
									  PKCS15GenericSecretKeyAttributes },-- TypeAttr
	}

-/ This expands out to:

	SEQUENCE {
		keyAttr			PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes,
		secKeyAttr		PKCS15CommonSecretKeyAttributes,
		keyData		[1]	{ [2] { Enveloped key data } }
		} /-

-/ Data information /-

ConfigOption ::= SEQUENCE {
	type				INTEGER,			-- CRYPT_PROPERTY_xxx
	value				ANY DEFINED BY type	-- BOOLEAN, INTEGER, UTF8String
	}

ConfigOptions ::= SEQUENCE OF ConfigOption

UserIndexEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
	iD					OCTET STRING SIZE(16),	-- User ID
	creatorID			OCTET STRING SIZE(16),	-- Creating SO's ID
	name				UTF8String,				-- User name
	fileReference		INTEGER					-- Reference to user file
	}

UserIndex ::= SEQUENCE OF UserIndexEntry

UserInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
	role				ENUMERATED,				-- SO/user/CA
	iD					OCTET STRING SIZE(16),	-- User ID
	creatorID			OCTET STRING SIZE(16),	-- Creating SO's ID
	name				UTF8String,				-- User name
	}

// Other user data, has to be stored elsewhere
//	state				ENUMERATED,				-- SO inited/user inited/locked
//	encSecKey			EncryptedData OPTIONAL	-- (Used for CAs)

PKCS15OidDO ::= SEQUENCE {
	type				OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
	value				ANY DEFINED BY type	-- ConfigOptions/UserIndex/UserInfo
	}

PKCS15Data ::= CHOICE {
	oidDO			[1]	PKCS15Object { PKCS15CommonDataObjectAttributes,
									   NULL,
									   PKCS15OidDO }
	}

-/ Overall object wrappers. The tagging is [n] PKCS15Objects.foo
   [0] PKCS15ObjectValue.objects /-

PrivateKeys ::= [0][0] SEQUENCE OF PKCS15PrivateKey
PublicKeys ::= [1][0] SEQUENCE OF PKCS15PublicKey
SecretKeys ::= [3][0] SEQUENCE OF PKCS15SecretKey
Certificates ::= [4][0] SEQUENCE OF PKCS15Certificate
DataObjects ::= [7][0] SEQUENCE OF PKCS15Data

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--																			--
--								User/Config Info							--
--																			--
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-/ User information /-

-/ PKI user information needed for CMP.  The attributes always include an
   sKID (to uniquely identify the user info) and optionally additional
   template attributes that are applied to certificate(s) created for this
   user.  The dual use of the attributes is somewhat ugly, in theory we
   could split the two into attributes required for PKI user management and
   attributes to apply to the issued certificate, but because the only one
   that's used for user management is the sKID it's easier to special-case
   it in the cert handling code /-

userData ::= SEQUENCE {
	name				Name,					-- Name for CMP
	encAlgo				AlgorithmIdentifier,	-- Algo to encrypt passwords
	encPW				OCTET STRING,			-- Encrypted passwords
	attributes			Attributes
	}

userPW ::= SEQUENCE {
	issuePW				OCTET STRING SIZE(11),	-- Password for ir
	revPW				OCTET STRING SIZE(11)	-- Password for rr
	}

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--																			--
--										Misc								--
--																			--
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-/ OCSP /-

OCSPRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
						SEQUENCE {			-- tbsRequest
		version		[0]	EXPLICIT INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
											-- Must be 1 if !certID used
		reqName		[1]	EXPLICIT ... OPTIONAL
											-- Ignored
						SEQUENCE {			-- requestList
						SEQUENCE {			-- request
			certID		CertID,
			singleReqExt
					[0] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL
				}
			},
		reqExts		[2] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL
		},
	signature		[0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {
		sigAlgo			AlgorithmIdentifier,
		sig				BIT STRING,
		certs		[0]	EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL
		} OPTIONAL
	}

OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {					-- As read
	respStatus			ENUMERATED,			-- 0 = OK
	respBytes		[0]	EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {
		respType		OBJECT IDENTIFIER,	-- id-pkix-ocsp-basic
		resp			OCTET STRING {
						SEQUENCE {			-- basicOCSPResponse
						SEQUENCE {			-- tbsRespData
			version [0] EXPLICIT ... OPTIONAL,-- Ignored
			respID		...,				-- Ignored
			producedAt	...,				-- Ignored
			responses	SEQUENCE {
						SEQUENCE {			-- singleResponse
				certID	...,				-- Ignored
				certStatus [0] EXPLICIT = OK, else !OK
						...					-- Ignored
						}
					},
			respExts[0]	EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL
				}
		sigAlgo			AlgorithmIdentifier,
		signature		BIT STRING
		certs		[0]	EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL
				}
			}
		}
	}

OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {					-- As written
	respStatus			ENUMERATED,			-- 0 = OK
	respBytes		[0]	EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {
		respType		OBJECT IDENTIFIER,	-- id-pkix-ocsp-basic
		resp			OCTET STRING {
						SEQUENCE {			-- basicOCSPResponse
						SEQUENCE {			-- tbsRespData
			responderID [2] OCTET STRING,	-- Responder sKID
			producedAt	GeneralizedTime,
			responses	SEQUENCE {
						SEQUENCE {			-- singleResponse
				certID	CertID,				-- SEQUENCE choice
				certStatus [0] EXPLICIT NULL = OK, else !OK
				thisUpdate	GeneralizedTime,
				nextUpdate [0] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL
						}
					},
			respExts[0]	EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL
				}
		sigAlgo			AlgorithmIdentifier,
		signature		BIT STRING
		certs		[0]	EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL
				}
			}
		}
	}

CertID ::= CHOICE {
	certID				SEQUENCE {
		hashAlgo		AlgorithmIdentifier,
		iNameHash		OCTET STRING,		-- Hash of issuerName
		iKeyHash		OCTET STRING,		-- Hash of issuer SPKI w/o tag+len
		serialNo		INTEGER
						},
	issuerAndSerial	[0]	IssuerAndSerialNumber,	-- OCSPv2 only
	certificate		[1]	Certificate,		-- OCSPv2 only
	certHash		[2] OCTET STRING		-- OCSPv2 only
	}

-/ RTCS /-

RTCSRequests ::= SEQUENCE {
	responseType		RTCSResponseType DEFAULT rtcsBasic,
						SEQUENCE OF {		-- requests
						SEQUENCE {			-- requestInfo
		certHash		OCTET STRING SIZE(20),
			}
		}
	attributes	Attributes OPTIONAL,
	}

RTCSResponsesBasic ::= SEQUENCE {
						SEQUENCE {			-- responseBasic
	certHash			OCTET STRING SIZE(20),
	status				BOOLEAN
		}
	}

RTCSResponsesExtended ::= SEQUENCE {
						SEQUENCE {			-- responseBasic/Extended
	certHash			OCTET STRING SIZE(20),
	status				ENUMERATED,
	statusInfo			ANY DEFINED BY status,
	attributes		[0]	Attributes OPTIONAL	-- For ext.response
		}
	}

-/ Timestamping / TSP /-

TSARequest ::= SEQUENCE {
	version				INTEGER (1),
	msgImprint			SEQUENCE {
		algorithm		AlgorithmIdentifier,
		hash			OCTET STRING
		},
	policy				OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
											-- Ignored
	nonce				INTEGER OPTIONAL,	-- Copy to output if present
	includeSigCerts		BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
											-- Include signer certs if set
	extensions		[0]	Extensions OPTIONAL	-- Reject if present
	}

TSAResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
	status				SEQUENCE {
		status			INTEGER,			-- 0 = OK
						... OPTIONAL
		},
	timeStamp			ContentInfo
	}

TSTInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
	version				INTEGER (1),
	policy				OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
	msgImprint			SEQUENCE { ... }	-- From request
	serialNo			INTEGER,			-- Unique value
	genTime				GeneralizedTime,	-- Current time
	nonce				INTEGER OPTIONAL	-- From input if present
	}

-/ PKCS #12.  Note that what's deployed (and documented here) bears very
   little resemblance to what's given in the specification /-

PFX ::= SEQUENCE {
	version				INTEGER (3),
	authSafe			SEQUENCE {			-- ContentInfo
		contentType		OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-Data,
		content		[0]	EXPLICIT OCTET STRING {
			safeConts	SEQUENCE OF {
						CHOICE {			-- Effectively a CHOICE
				p12Data	PKCS12Data,			-- Data for encrypted keys
				p12Encr	PKCS12Encr			-- EncrData for public keys
						}
					}
				}
			}
		}
	macData				SEQUENCE {
		mac				SEQUENCE {
			algorithm	AlgorithmIdentifier,
			mac			OCTET STRING
			}
		macSalt			OCTET STRING,
		iterations		INTEGER DEFAULT 1	-- Usually set to 2,000
		}
	}

PKCS12Data ::= SEQUENCE {					-- For encrypted private keys
	contentType			OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-Data,
	content			[0]	EXPLICIT OCTET STRING {
		safeContents	SEQUENCE OF PKCS12Bag -- SIZE(1)
		}
	}

PKCS12Bag ::= SEQUENCE {
	bagId				OBJECT IDENTIFIER pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag,
	bagValue		[0]	EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {
		encryptionAlgo	SEQUENCE {
			algo		OBJECT IDENTIFIER pbeWithSHAAnd2-KeyTripleDES-CBC,
			pbeParams	SEQUENCE {
				salt	OCTET STRING,
				iters	INTEGER
				}
			}
		encryptedData	OCTET STRING		-- Encrypted PKCS #8
		}
	bagAttributes		SET OF Attribute
	}

PKCS12BagAlt ::= SEQUENCE {
	bagId				OBJECT IDENTIFIER pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag,
	bagValue		[0]	EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {
		encryptionAlgo	SEQUENCE {
			algo		OBJECT IDENTIFIER pkcs5PBES2,
			params		SEQUENCE {
				kdfInfo	SEQUENCE {
					algo	OBJECT IDENTIFIER pkcs5PBKDF2,
					params	SEQUENCE {
						salt	OCTET STRING,
						iters	INTEGER,
						keyLen	INTEGER OPTIONAL,
						prf		AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT hmacSHA1
						}
					}
				encInfo		SEQUENCE {
					algo	OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
					iv		OCTET STRING
					}
				}
			}
		encryptedData	OCTET STRING		-- Encrypted PKCS #8
		}
	bagAttributes		SET OF Attribute
	}

PKCS8 ::= SEQUENCE {						-- Within PKCS12Bag above
	version				INTEGER (0),
	algorithm			AlgorithmIdentifier,
	key					SEQUENCE {
		version			INTEGER (0),
		keyValues		...
						}
	attributes		[0]	SET OF Attribute OPTIONAL
	}

PKCS12Encr ::= SEQUENCE {					-- For public certificates
	contentType			OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-EncryptedData,
	content			[0]	EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {
		version			INTEGER (0),
		encContentInfo	SEQUENCE {
			contentType	OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-Data,
			contentEncAlgo SEQUENCE {
				algo	OBJECT IDENTIFIER pbeWithSHAAnd40BitRC2-CBC,
				pbeParams SEQUENCE {
					salt OCTET STRING,
					iters INTEGER
					}
				}
			encryptedData OCTET STRING		-- Encrypted PKCS12CertBag
			}
		}
	}

PKCS12CertBag ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {	-- Within PKCS12Enc above
	bagId				OBJECT IDENTIFIER pkcs12CertBag,
	bagValue		[0]	EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {
		certId			OBJECT IDENTIFIER x509Certificate,
		certValue	[0]	EXPLICIT OCTET STRING {
			cert		Certificate
			}
		}
	bagAttributes		SET OF Attribute
	}

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--																			--
--					Certificate Mismanagement Protocol / CMP				--
--																			--
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-/ "If an undergraduate student handed this in as an assignment I'd fail them
	on the grounds that it shows a complete lack of understanding of the
	principles of workable protocol design" /-

xxxRequest ::= SEQUENCE {					-- ir/cr/kur, 3.3.1/3.3.3/3.3.5
	header				SEQUENCE {			--	Profile = B8
		version			INTEGER (2),
		sender		[4]	EXPLICIT DirectoryName,	-- DN of subject
		recipient	[4]	EXPLICIT DirectoryName,	-- DN of CA
		protAlgo	[1]	EXPLICIT AlgorithmIdentifier (PBMac),
		protKeyID	[2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING,
		transID		[4] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16),	-- Random
		nonce		[5] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16),	-- Random
		},
	body			[0]	EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {	-- [2] in cr, [7] in kur
		certReqMsg		SEQUENCE {			-- RFC 2510
						SEQUENCE {
			cReqID		INTEGER (0),
			cTemplate	SEQUENCE {
				validity[1] TIME OPTIONAL,
				subject	[5] EXPLICIT Name,
				pubKey	[6] SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
				exts	[9] Extensions OPTIONAL
						},
			cControls	SEQUENCE OF Attribute OPTIONAL		-- Ignored
					},
		pop			[1] EXPLICIT Signature	-- From X.509, for sig.key
or		pop			[2] EXPLICIT [1] INTEGER (0)
											-- For encr-only key
				}
			}
		},
	protection		[0]	EXPLICIT BIT STRING	-- ir = MAC, cr/kur = SIG
	}

xxxResponse ::= SEQUENCE {					-- ip/cp/kup, 3.3.2/3.3.4/3.3.6
	header				SEQUENCE {			--	Profile = B8
		version			INTEGER (2),
		sender			SEQUENCE {...},		-- Ignored
		recipient		SEQUENCE {...},		-- Ignored
		messageTime	[0]	... OPTIONAL,		-- Ignored
		protAlgo	[1]	EXPLICIT AlgorithmIdentifier (PBMac),
		protKeyID	[2]	EXPLICIT OCTET STRING,			-- Must match previous
		transID		[4] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16),-- Must match previous
		nonceX		[5] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16),-- Needed in CertConf
		...
		},
	body			[1] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {			-- [3] in cp, [8] in kup
		caPubs		[1] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {...} OPTIONAL,-- Ignored
		response		SEQUENCE {
						SEQUENCE {
			certReqID	INTEGER (0),
			status		SEQUENCE {			-- PKIStatusInfo, 3.2.3
				status	INTEGER,
				statusStr SEQUENCE OF UTF8String OPTIONAL,
				failInfo BIT STRING OPTIONAL
				},
			certKeyPair	SEQUENCE {			-- If status == 0 or 1
				cert[0]	EXPLICIT Certificate,
or				encCert						-- For encr-only key
					[1] EXPLICIT EncryptedCert,
						...					-- Ignored
					}
				}
			}
		},
	protection		[0]	EXPLICIT BIT STRING	-- ip = MAC, cp/kup = SIG
	}

CertConf ::= SEQUENCE {						-- 3.3.18, profile = B8
	header				SEQUENCE {
		version			INTEGER (2),
		sender			SEQUENCE {...},		-- Ignored
		recipient		SEQUENCE {...},		-- Ignored
		messageTime	[0]	... OPTIONAL,		-- Ignored
		protAlgo	[1]	EXPLICIT AlgorithmIdentifier (PBMac),
		protKeyID	[2]	EXPLICIT OCTET STRING,			-- Must match previous
		transID		[4] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16),-- Must match previous
		nonce		[5] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16),-- Random
		nonceX		[6] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16),-- Copied from InitResp
						...					-- Ignored
		},
	body		   [24]	EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {
						SEQUENCE {
		certHash		OCTET STRING
		certReqID		INTEGER (0),
			}
		},
	protection		[0]	EXPLICIT BIT STRING	-- ix = MAC, cx/kux = SIG
	}

Conf ::= SEQUENCE {							-- 3.3.17, profile = B8
	header				SEQUENCE {
		version			INTEGER (2),
		sender			SEQUENCE {...},		-- Ignored
		recipient		SEQUENCE {...},		-- Ignored
		messageTime	[0]	... OPTIONAL,		-- Ignored
		protAlgo	[1]	EXPLICIT AlgorithmIdentifier (PBMac),
		protKeyID	[2]	EXPLICIT OCTET STRING,			-- Must match previous
		transID		[4] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16),-- Must match previous
						...					-- Ignored
		},
	body		   [19]	EXPLICIT NULL,
	protection		[0]	EXPLICIT BIT STRING	-- ix = MAC, cx/kux = SIG
	}

RevRequest ::= SEQUENCE {					-- rr, 3.3.9
	header				SEQUENCE {
		version			INTEGER (2),
		sender		[4]	EXPLICIT DirectoryName,	-- DN of subject
		recipient	[4]	EXPLICIT DirectoryName,	-- DN of CA
		protAlgo	[1]	EXPLICIT AlgorithmIdentifier (PBMac),
		protKeyID	[2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING,
		transID		[4] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16),	-- Random
		nonce		[5] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16),	-- Random
		},
	body		   [11]	EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {
		revDetails		SEQUENCE {
			cTemplate	SEQUENCE {			-- RFC 2510
				serial	[1] INTEGER,
				issuer	[3] EXPLICIT NAME
						},
			crlEntries	Extensions OPTIONAL
					}
				},
	protection		[0]	EXPLICIT BIT STRING	-- MAC or SIG
	}

RevResponse ::= SEQUENCE {					-- rp, 3.3.10
	header				SEQUENCE {
		version			INTEGER (2),
		sender			SEQUENCE {...},		-- Ignored
		recipient		SEQUENCE {...},		-- Ignored
		messageTime	[0]	... OPTIONAL,		-- Ignored
		protAlgo	[1]	EXPLICIT AlgorithmIdentifier (PBMac),
		protKeyID	[2]	EXPLICIT OCTET STRING,			-- Must match previous
		transID		[4] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16),-- Must match previous
						...					-- Ignored
		},
	body		   [12]	EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {
		status			SEQUENCE {
						SEQUENCE {			-- PKIStatusInfo, 3.2.3
			status		INTEGER,
			statusStr	SEQUENCE OF UTF8String OPTIONAL,
			failInfo	BIT STRING OPTIONAL
						},
						...					-- Ignored
					}
						...					-- Ignored
			},
	protection		[0]	EXPLICIT BIT STRING	-- MAC or SIG
	}

GenMsg ::= SEQUENCE {						-- 3.3.19/3.3.20
	header				SEQUENCE {
		version			INTEGER (2),
		sender			SEQUENCE {...},		-- Ignored
		recipient		SEQUENCE {...},		-- Ignored
		messageTime	[0]	... OPTIONAL,		-- Ignored
		protAlgo	[1]	EXPLICIT AlgorithmIdentifier (sigAlgo),
		protKeyID	[2]	EXPLICIT OCTET STRING,			-- Must match previous
		transID		[4] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16),-- Must match previous
						...					-- Ignored
		},
	body		   [21]	EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF {
						SEQUENCE {
		infoType		OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
		intoValue		ANY DEFINED BY infoType OPTIONAL
						}
					},
	protection		[0]	EXPLICIT BIT STRING	-- MAC or SIG
	}

Error ::= SEQUENCE {						-- 3.3.21
	header				SEQUENCE {
		version			INTEGER (2),
		sender			SEQUENCE {...},		-- Ignored
		recipient		SEQUENCE {...},		-- Ignored
		messageTime	[0]	... OPTIONAL,		-- Ignored
		protAlgo	[1]	EXPLICIT AlgorithmIdentifier (sigAlgo),
		protKeyID	[2]	EXPLICIT OCTET STRING,			-- Must match previous
		transID		[4] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16),-- Must match previous
						...					-- Ignored
		},
	body		   [23]	EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {
						SEQUENCE {
		status			INTEGER,
						SEQUENCE {
			statusMsg	UTF8String,
						...					-- Ignored
						} OPTIONAL,
		failInfo		BIT STRING OPTIONAL
						},
		errorCode		INTEGER OPTIONAL,
						SEQUENCE {
			errorMsg	UTF8String,
						...					-- Ignored
						} OPTIONAL
					},
	protection		[0]	EXPLICIT BIT STRING	-- SIG
	}

-/ The MAC information used when the protection is a MAC /-

MacInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
	algoID				OBJECT IDENTIFIER (entrustMAC),
	algoParams			SEQUENCE {
		salt			OCTET STRING,
		pwHashAlgo		AlgorithmIdentifier (SHA-1),
		iterations		INTEGER,
		macAlgo			AlgorithmIdentifier (HMAC-SHA1)
		}
	}

-/ The encrypted data when the cert is returned encrypted /-

EncryptedCert ::= SEQUENCE {
	dummy			[0]	... OPTIONAL,		-- Ignored
	cekAlg			[1]	AlgorithmIdentifier,-- CEK algorithm
	encCEK			[2]	BIT STRING,			-- Encrypted CEK
	dummy			[3]	... OPTIONAL,		-- Ignored
	dummy			[4] ... OPTIONAL,		-- Ignored
	encData			BIT STRING
	}

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--																			--
--					Certificate Messages over CMS /  CMC					--
--																			--
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-/ CMC request and response messages.  Certificates are returned as signing
   certs attached to the CMS signed data /-

PKIData ::= SEQUENCE {
	attributes		SEQUENCE OF TaggedAttribute, -- Control attrs.
	requests		SEQUENCE OF TaggedReq,	-- Cert.requests
	cms				SEQUENCE OF TaggedCMS,	-- CMS messages
	other			SEQUENCE OF OtherMsg	-- Type-and-value pairs
	}

PKIResp ::= SEQUENCE {
	attributes		SEQUENCE OF TaggedAttribute, -- Control attrs.
	cms				SEQUENCE OF TaggedCMS,	-- CMS messages
	other			SEQUENCE OF OtherMsg	-- Type-and-value pairs
	}

-/ TaggedXYZ types.  OtherMsg is identical to TaggedAttribute except that
   the value field is ANY DEFINED BY /-

TaggedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
	iD				INTEGER,				-- Unique 32-bit ID for this attr.
	type			OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
	values			SEQUENCE OF Attribute
	}

TaggedCMS ::= SEQUENCE {
	iD				INTEGER,				-- Unique 32-bit ID for this attr.
	value			CMS
	}

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--																			--
--			Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol / SCVP				--
--																			--
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-/ Another CMP-grade mess full of mandatory fields that are optional,
   optional fields that are mandatory, ambiguous and even undefined fields,
   and infinite SEQUENCE OF { SEQUENCE OF { SEQUENCE OF { CHOICE { CHOICE {
   OPTIONAL, OPTIONAL, OPTIONAL, OPTIONAL, OPTIONAL } } } } } /-

CVRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
	cvRequestVersion		INTEGER DEFAULT 1, -- Possibly encoded even if default
	query					SEQUENCE {
		queriedCerts		CertReferences,
		checks				SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
		wantBack		[1]	SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL, -- Actually mandatory
		validationPolicy	ValidationPolicy,
		responseFlags		... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
		serverContextInfo [2] ... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
		validationTime	[3]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
		intermediateCerts [4] ... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
		revInfos		[5]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
		producedAt		[6]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
		queryExtensions	[7]	... OPTIONAL 	-- Ignored
		},
	requestorRef		[0]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	requestNonce		[1]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	requestorName		[2]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	responderName		[3]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	requestExtensions	[4]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	signatureAlg		[5]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	hashAlg				[6]	OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
	requestorText		[7]	... OPTIONAL 	-- Ignored
	}

CVResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
	cvResponseVersion		INTEGER = 1,
	serverConfigurationID	INTEGER = 1,
	producedAt				GeneralizedTime,
	responseStatus			SEQUENCE {
		statusCode			CVStatusCode DEFAULT okay,
		errorMessage		UTF8String OPTIONAL	-- Ignored
		},
	respValidationPolicy [0] ... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	requestRef			[1]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	requestorRef		[2]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	requestorName		[3]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	replyObjects		[4]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	respNonce			[5]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	serverContextInfo	[6]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	cvResponseExtensions [7] ... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	requestorText		[8]	... OPTIONAL	-- Ignored
	}

ValPolRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
	vpRequestVersion		INTEGER DEFAULT 1, -- Possibly encoded even if default
	requestNonce			OCTET STRING
	}

ValPolResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
	vpResponseVersion               INTEGER = 1,
	maxCVRequestVersion             INTEGER = 1,
	maxVPRequestVersion             INTEGER = 1,
	serverConfigurationID           INTEGER = 1,
	thisUpdate                      GeneralizedTime,
	nextUpdate                      GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, -- Ignored
	supportedChecks                 SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
	supportedWantBacks              SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
	validationPolicies              SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
	validationAlgs                  SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
	authPolicies                    SEQUENCE OF AuthPolicy,
	responseTypes                   ENUMERATED { ... },
	defaultPolicyValues             ValidationPolicy,
	revocationInfoTypes             BIT STRING { ... },
	signatureGeneration             SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier,
	signatureVerification           SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier,
	hashAlgorithms                  SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
	serverPublicKeys                SEQUENCE OF ... OPTIONAL, -- Ignored
	clockSkew                       INTEGER DEFAULT 10, -- Ignored
	requestNonce                    OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
	}

ValidationPolicy ::= SEQUENCE {
	validationPolRef				SEQUENCE {
		valPolId					OBJECT IDENTIFIER scvpDefaultValPolicy,
		valPolParams				ANY DEFINED BY valPolId OPTIONAL
		},
	validationAlg				[0]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	userPolicySet				[1]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	inhibitPolicyMapping		[2]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	requireExplicitPolicy		[3]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	inhibitAnyPolicy			[4]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	trustAnchors				[5]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	keyUsages					[6]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	extendedKeyUsages			[7]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	specifiedKeyUsages			[8]	... OPTIONAL,	-- Ignored
	}

CertReferences ::= CHOICE {
     pkcRefs					[0]	SEQUENCE OF CHOICE {
		cert					[0]	Certificate,
		pkcRef					[1]	SEQUENCE {
			certHash				OCTET STRING,
			issuerSerial			SEQUENCE {
				issuer				SEQUENCE OF GeneralName,	-- Must be cert DN
				serialNumber		INTEGER,
			hashAlgorithm			AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT sha-1
			}
		}
	}

END
>>>>>>> c627b7fdce5a7d3fb5a3cfac7f910c556c3573ae