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[GHSA-mh63-6h87-95cp] jwt-go allows excessive memory allocation during header parsing #5427
[GHSA-mh63-6h87-95cp] jwt-go allows excessive memory allocation during header parsing #5427
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Hi there @oxisto! A community member has suggested an improvement to your security advisory. If approved, this change will affect the global advisory listed at github.com/advisories. It will not affect the version listed in your project repository. This change will be reviewed by our Security Curation Team. If you have thoughts or feedback, please share them in a comment here! If this PR has already been closed, you can start a new community contribution for this advisory |
👋 Hi @peterbourgon, I can understand how @oxisto and the other maintainers of jwt-go came to the conclusion that If @oxisto agrees and wants to change the CVSS, that's fine, but for now, |
Whatever you prefer! Thanks for taking a look. |
I see @peterbourgon’s point. We could also go for low or medium. Unfortunately CVSS are never really a good way to describe a scenario like this. |
@oxisto @peterbourgon If there's no proof of GHSA-mh63-6h87-95cp/CVE-2025-30204 having proof of concept code exploited in the wild, one way to get the score down would be to use CVSS 4.0. CVSS 4.0 has a metric called exploit maturity that takes into account how feasible it is to exploit a vulnerability in the wild. Per the specification documentation, exploit maturity has three levels: GHSA-mh63-6h87-95cp/CVE-2025-30204 doesn't have a public PoC that I can find and I haven't seen reports of attempts to exploit it in the wild, so setting |
And just to be clear: my feedback isn't really related to likelihood of exploitation, it's about the (worst possible) impact. |
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Hi @peterbourgon! Thank you so much for contributing to the GitHub Advisory Database. This database is free, open, and accessible to all, and it's people like you who make it great. Thanks for choosing to help others. We hope you send in more contributions in the future! |
@peterbourgon @oxisto My apologies for this PR suddenly getting merged. I intended to merge #5447 but accidentally caught this PR at the same time. 🤦♀️ I'm still OK with changing the CVSS 4.0 score in the advisory to https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/v4-0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U while keeping the CVSS 3.1 score chosen by @oxisto (and with only the CVSS 3.1 score chosen by @oxisto being in the CVE record) if that's something of interest to both of you. |
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HTTP headers are not of arbitrary or unbounded size, they have a maximum practical length of around 10KiB. A 10KiB HTTP header consisting of nothing but
.
characters, when passed to strings.Split, would certainly do more work than is necessary, but would allocate at most around 200KiB, which in the context of typical JWT processing within an HTTP request is not enormous. Furthermore, those bytes would almost certainly not escape to the heap, so the impact on e.g. GC would be minimal to zero. In general, the impact of this issue to any user, even when subject to the most malicious possible input, is limited/bounded, not disproportionate to any existing load, and unlikely to have any meaningful impact on the service. I'm therefore suggesting to reduce the impact to availability from "high" to "low". But, do with this feedback what you will.