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Questions about efficiency and fairness of interestGroupBuyers Implementation #981
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It's certainly true that a seller running a Protected Audience auction gets to decide what buyers may submit bids. But that seller needs to exchange money with that buyer; they must have some sort of business relationship for the whole system to work. How could a seller not be responsible for listing the buyers they work with? |
Thank you for your insights on the importance of established business relationships in the selection of While the necessity of business relationships is clear, I'm particularly interested in how we can optimize the matching process to reduce instances where user interest groups don't align with the listed Are there existing strategies or proposals for dynamically adjusting the list of I look forward to further insights and suggestions on this matter. |
I think I still don't understand the essence of your concern. Why would an SSP's |
Thank you for your input. I was reading the following two documents: Protected Audience (formerly known as FLEDGE) Integration and Testing Guide for SSPs Indicate Protected Audience ad renderability From what I understand, the SSP sends a BidRequest with an indication that there might be a relevant interest group from a DSP present in the user's browser, though the SSP itself does not have direct knowledge of this. Here's a breakdown of this process and its implications that I understood. SSP Sends BidRequest with a Signal:When an SSP detects an impression opportunity (e.g., a user visits a webpage with an ad unit), it sends out a BidRequest to potential DSPs. DSP's Decision to Participate:Upon receiving the BidRequest, the DSP must decide whether to participate in the potential browser-held auction. The DSP does not know directly whether its interest groups are present in the user's browser at the time of the auction. This approach does align with privacy-centric advertising models, where user-specific data is not explicitly shared with external entities like DSPs or SSPs. The browser acts as a privacy gatekeeper, holding and managing interest group information, which is the whole purpose of the framework. While this method upholds privacy, it introduces challenges in auction efficiency. Your suggestion to include all DSPs an SSP works with in the |
I forgot to mention about the cost of network traffic usage is substantial, not to mention server instances to keep up with. |
Your perspective has prompted me to reflect on my part, leading me to a self-conclusion I would like to share with you for confirmation. My understanding and conclusionSSP's Discretion in Buyer Selection:SSPs can choose which DSPs to include in the SSP's JavaScript tag and real-time decision-making:The SSP's JavaScript tag embedded on the publisher’s site is crucial in dynamically deciding which DSPs to involve in each ad auction. This decision-making is based on the context of the ad request and potentially the relevance of the DSPs’ ad inventory to the content. Balancing traffic among DSPs:Despite the presence or absence of specific interest groups in a user's browser or whether the auction is PAA eligible, SSPs have always been tasked with balancing ad requests among DSPs. This balancing act has ensured fairness and efficiency in the ad auction process; if they have not, the issue might be attributed to the SSP's optimization strategy or capabilities and not specific to the usage of the My understanding reconciles the operational aspects of SSPs. However, I would appreciate your thoughts or any other thoughts to confirm if my conclusions align with the industry's current practices and trends. I really appreciate your expertise in this area, and I look forward to any further clarification or perspective you can provide. Thank you. |
I understand what you are saying, but...
If an SSP chooses to list a DSP among its It seems to me that this puts on-device auctions in a very different place from RTB auctions, with inevitable server-to-server connections involved in an SSP offering a spot to a DSP. |
Thank you once again for sharing your expertise and perspectives. Impact on DSP strategiesShift from contextual to interest-based targeting:DSPs are likely to redirect their focus and budget from contextual targeting, which relies on the web page's content, to interest-based targeting, which utilizes user interest group data. Adapting to new data sources:DSPs must adapt to using different data sources, like first-party data or aggregated and anonymized data, to inform their interest-based targeting strategies. Challenges for SSPsReduced control in ad selection:SSPs face a reduction in direct control over the ad selection process. In-browser auctions, driven by the user’s browser using locally stored interest group data, diminish the SSP’s ability to influence which ads are shown. Managing a more complex ecosystem:SSPs will need to manage relationships with DSPs and publishers in a more complex ecosystem, where the mechanics of ad delivery are less transparent and more decentralized. Revenue predictability concernsUncertain revenue projections:The predictability of ad revenue becomes more challenging in an environment where ad selection relies heavily on browser algorithms and the variable nature of interest groups. I would appreciate hearing your thoughts regarding this transition. |
Regardless of the on-device auction process, SSPs will still need to send BidRequests for contextual auctions. These requests are essential for DSPs to respond with their bids, even when they are not aware of whether their interest groups are present in the user’s browser. This process incurs network traffic and associated costs for the SSP, even if the on-device auction itself does not. As DSPs increasingly focus on interest group-based targeting, SSPs’ reliance on historical data for predicting which DSPs to send BidRequest might become less effective and achieve the same level of efficiency in the auction process as in the past, when detailed tracking data was available, will become a significant challenge in this new paradigm at least until they find new ways to gather and analyze data that comply with privacy regulations and the constraints of on-device auctions. This might involve focusing more on aggregated data, contextual signals, and permissible first-party data. This inefficiency could lead to a scenario where SSPs must broaden their BidRequest dispatches to include all DSPs they work with, potentially increasing operational costs initially. To maintain efficiency, SSPs could initially include all associated DSPs in |
I am writing to address a critical aspect of interest group-based advertising concerning the
interestGroupBuyers
field in the ad auction process. This issue centers around the matching efficiency between a user's stored interest groups and the DSPs included in theinterestGroupBuyers
list by the seller (typically a publisher or SSP).Core Concerns
Matching Efficiency:
There seems to be a potential inefficiency when there is a mismatch between the user's browser-stored interest groups and the DSPs listed in the
interestGroupBuyers
. This situation is akin to a "high cache miss" scenario where the system fails to find a relevant match, leading to inefficiency in ad auctions.Single Entity Manipulation:
The current framework allows both the seller and buyer sides to manipulate which DSPs are included in the
interestGroupBuyers
list. While this can optimize ad relevance, it raises questions about fairness and the potential for market distortion.Discussion Points
How are Others Addressing This Issue?
Are there existing strategies or solutions that have been effectively addressing the efficiency concern in matching interest groups with
interestGroupBuyers
?What best practices can be adopted to enhance the matching process while maintaining user privacy?
Appropriateness of Single Entity Control:
Is it appropriate for a single entity (seller or buyer) to have significant control over the composition of
interestGroupBuyers
?What are the potential risks of this control in terms of market fairness and competition?
Alternative Models or Suggestions:
Can alternative models or mechanisms balance efficiency, fairness, and privacy more effectively?
Can a more dynamic, real-time system for populating
interestGroupBuyers
be considered?Impact on Smaller Players:
How does this system impact smaller publishers or DSPs in terms of participation and competitiveness in the ad auction ecosystem?
I am seeking the group's insights, experiences, and suggestions on this matter.
Collaborative discussion can lead to a better understanding of these challenges and the exploration of potential solutions. Any shared experiences, data, or innovative approaches to similar issues would be highly valuable.
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