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DCP: 0003
Title: Relative Lock Time Support
Author: Dave Collins <davec@decred.org>
Status: Active
Created: 2017-09-11
License: CC0-1.0
License-Code: ISC

Table of Contents

Abstract

This repurposes the sequence field of transaction inputs to provide consensus-enforced relative lock-time semantics, specifies a new opcode (CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY) for the Decred script system that provides the ability to conditionally enforce relative time-based restrictions, and changes the semantics for transaction time locks to use the median time of the previous 11 blocks instead of the timestamp of the block itself in order to ensure the lock times increase monotonically with each block.

Motivation

There are a large number of use cases that either rely on, or can benefit from, the ability to prevent spending outputs until they have reached a certain relative age, especially when that ability can be conditionally enforced via the script system. A few examples of these use cases are provided in this proposal, but it is important to note that they are merely a small sampling of the possible applications.

Currently, the ability to lock outputs until a certain absolute age exists via the locktime field of transactions and the CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY opcode. In other words, that opcode makes it possible to conditionally enforce that an output can't be spent until a specific time and date, or a specific absolute block height.

In comparison, this proposal aims to additionally provide consensus-enforced relative time locks. In other words, the ability to allow a transaction input to remain invalid until a certain number of blocks or time has passed from the point the referenced output is actually mined.

The sequence field of transaction inputs was inherited from Bitcoin where its original intent seemed to be to support replacing unmined transactions by increasing the sequence number. Unfortunately, that approach would not work well because it relies on miners benevolently choosing the higher value even when it would go against their best interests such as preferring a lower sequence number that paid a higher fee and therefore it has never been used.

Consequently, this proposal repurposes the sequence field to provide the highly desirable relative lock-time properties in a backwards-compatible way while still providing some additional bits for future enhancements.

Hash Time-Locked Contracts with Relative Timeouts

The basic premise of Hash Time-Locked Contracts (HTLCs) are described in DCP0002, which also provides an example HTLC that relies on absolute lock times by making use of the CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY opcode. With the new CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY opcode in this proposal, it is possible to modify the example contract slightly such that the timeout is relative to the time the contract is actually mined into the chain as follows:

    OP_IF
      OP_SHA256 <hash of secret> OP_EQUALVERIFY           // Require disclosure of secret to redeem
      OP_DUP OP_HASH160 <counterparty2 public key hash>   // Require signature from counterparty 2
    OP_ELSE
      <locktime> OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY OP_DROP           // Prevent redemption until specified relative timeout after funding
      OP_DUP OP_HASH160 <counterparty1 public key hash>   // Require signature from counterparty 1
    OP_ENDIF
    OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG                            // Ensure signature is valid

This is useful because it allows these contracts to be negotiated off-chain without imposing an absolute deadline by which they have to be recreated with a timeout further in the future. This is the case because, due to the relative timeout, the clock does not start ticking until the transaction is actually mined into the chain.

Bidirectional Payment Channels

A fundamental requirement of the Lightning Network (LN) is what is known as a bidirectional payment channel. In essence, a bidirectional payment channel is a series of off-chain transactions that are constructed in a way that allows them to take advantage of the security of normal on-chain transactions while simultaneously providing several additional benefits.

At a high level, this is accomplished by creating an on-chain anchor transaction that requires signatures from both counterparties to redeem and a series of time-locked revocable commitment transactions that spend from that anchor transaction. Each party initially creates a commitment transaction that refunds their respective individual amounts they used to fund the contract, however, they do not broadcast them to the network. Instead, as they conduct business, they create new commitment transactions which alter how the funds are split between them. Since the anchor transaction can only be spent once, and due to the restrictions enforced by the underlying smart contract, only the most recent commitment transaction is valid. Consequently, the payment channel can be trustlessly closed at any time by either party by simply broadcasting the most recent commitment transaction to the network for inclusion in the blockchain.

Since the commitment transactions are time locked, using absolute times would effectively place a lifetime on the channel. This is the case because it would be necessary to close and reopen the channel any time the absolute timeout was approaching in order to prevent the counterparty from being able to steal funds. This also implies that it would be necessary to use fairly long timeouts with absolute time locks in order to limit the frequency of closing and reopening channels. Long timeouts are not desirable because it increases the time it takes to recover funds from the channel in the event of an uncooperative counterparty.

These problems can all be avoided by using relative time locks.

Lightning Network

The Lightning Network further builds on the concept of bidirectional payment channels to create a network of them over which payments can be trustlessly routed by finding a path similar to the way packets are routed through the internet. In order to do this, it essentially makes use of HTLCs with decrementing time locks.

Off-chain Atomic Swaps

Combining the concepts of bidirectional payment channels, routing over multiple hops, and techniques to perform cross-chain atomic swaps, such as those described in DCP0002, it is possible to instantly and trustlessly exchange funds between chains with heterogeneous consensus rules so long as both chains support a shared cryptographic hash function, such as SHA-256.

In short, off-chain atomic swaps provide the opportunity to create instant, trustless, decentralized cryptocurrency exchanges.

Escrow with Timeout

A common technique when making payments for products or services via an escrow is to create a 2-of-3 multisig transaction between the buyer, seller, and a third-party escrow agent. In this type of setup, the escrow agent acts as an arbiter in the event the transaction does not go smoothly, but is not able to unilaterally steal the funds.

The addition of the proposed CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY opcode allows an additional relative time constraint to be added such that the original funding party can redeem the funds after a timeout without needing to get the escrow agent or seller involved. The timeout does not start ticking until the contract is actually funded.

An example contract which accomplishes this follows:

    OP_IF
      OP_2                                        // Require 2 signatures...
      <buyer public key>
      <seller public key>
      <escrow public key>
      OP_3                                        // ...from the 3 pubkeys
      OP_CHECKMULTISIG                            // Ensure required number of signatures are valid
    OP_ELSE
      <locktime> OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY OP_DROP   // Prevent redemption until specified relative timeout after funding
      <buyer public key> OP_CHECKSIG              // Require signature from buyer
    OP_ENDIF

Specification

Transaction Lock Times Based On Past Median Time

All calculations involving transaction lock times MUST be compared against the timestamp of the median time of the previous 11 blocks. This value is also often called the past median time and is already used in various places in the consensus code.

This requirement includes changing the semantics of the existing lock time field and also applies to the newly repurposed relative lock-time sequence numbers described in this proposal.

Relative Lock-time Sequence Numbers

Transactions with a version greater than or equal to 2, except for coinbase and stakebase transactions, are required to interpret the sequence number of their inputs per the following diagram and detailed specification:

Bits Description
0-15 Relative lock time. This value is interpreted differently depending on the type flag. A mask of 0x0000ffff MUST be applied to the sequence number to extract this value.
16-21 Reserved for potential future use
22 Relative lock type. When set, the value portion MUST be interpreted as the relative number of blocks required. When not set, the value portion MUST be interpreted as the number of 512-second intervals required.
23-30 Reserved for potential future use
31 Disable flag. When set, the sequence number MUST not have any new consensus-enforced meaning, as described in this proposal, applied to it.

Time-based constraints MUST be encoded with a granularity of 512. Since 512 is 2^9, this implies converting the number of seconds to and from the value portion of a sequence number can be accomplished by shifting the value right or left 9 bits, respectively.

Relative locks MUST provide a minimum constraint on the age of the input relative to the referenced output. The constraint is either a block-time constraint in terms of seconds or a block-height constraint in terms of number of blocks depending on the type of the relative lock as determined by bit 22 of the sequence number. Since the sequence number is a 32-bit value, this implies a mask of 0x00400000 may be be used in conjunction with the binary AND and binary OR operations to determine or set the relative lock type, respectively.

The age of an input MUST be calculated relative to the output that is being spent. For time-based relative locks, the age is relative to the past median time of the block prior to the one that contains the output, while, for block-based relative locks, the age is relative to the height of the block that contains the output.

The previous two rules imply that a relative lock time of 0 (in terms of both seconds and number of blocks) indicates an input can be included in any block and any other values prevent an input from being included before the required age has been reached.

It should also be noted that bit 22, the relative lock type flag, is the high order bit in a 3-byte signed integer as encoded when pushed as data in the Decred scripting language for use with the proposed CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY opcode.

CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY Opcode Value

The new opcode CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY redefines the existing opcode NOP3, which has a value of 0xb2 (178 decimal).

CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY Opcode Semantics

When executed, the script execution MUST terminate with an error under the following conditions:

  • The stack is empty; or
  • The top stack item is encoded with more than 5 bytes; or
  • The top stack item is less than 0; or
  • The top stack item does not have the disable flag set; and
    • The transaction version is less than 2; or
    • The transaction sequence number has the disable flag set; or
    • The transaction sequence number and top stack item relative lock-time types are not the same; or
    • The top stack item is greater than the converted transaction sequence number
Otherwise, the opcode MUST be treated as a NOP.

The following diagram illustrates these semantics:

This opcode, in conjunction with the newly introduced requirements imposed on sequence numbers in the relative lock-time sequence numbers section, provides a mechanism to conditionally ensure that a minimum age has been reached before a transaction can be included in a block.

Rationale

The format of the sequence numbers and semantics of the opcode were chosen because they mirror those used in other prominent chains and therefore provide a much easier path to allowing interoperability with other chains.

This is especially pertinent since the ability to trustlessly interoperate helps pave the way for techniques such as off-chain atomic swaps and a whole host of other use cases which can make use of these primitives.

Deployment

Voting Agenda Parameters

This proposal will be deployed to mainnet using the standard Decred on-chain voting infrastructure as follows:

Name Setting
Deployment Version 5
Agenda ID lnfeatures
Agenda Description Enable features defined in DCP0002 and DCP0003 necessary to support Lightning Network (LN)
Start Time 1505260800 (Sep 13th, 2017 00:00:00 +0000 UTC)
Expire Time 1536796800 (Sep 13th, 2018 00:00:00 +0000 UTC)
Mask 0x06 (Bits 1 and 2)
Choices
Choice English Description Bits
abstain abstain voting for change 0x00
no keep the existing consensus rules 0x02 (Bit 1)
yes change to the new consensus rules 0x04 (Bit 2)

Voting Results

This proposal was approved by the stakeholder voting process and is now active.

Implementations MAY optimize their enforcement activation logic to apply the new rules specified by this proposal to the Active block and all of its descendants as opposed to tallying historical votes.

Status Block Hash Block Height
Voting Started 0000000000000032798428af98f60111c12d0c4ffdedbce72b8143a0b4444a56 173440
Locked In 000000000000006df125ef4afe8aaf87414cd40aff321f7a075a8c8aadb60b36 181504
Active 000000000000006ffe775adf77b96f18c51fc6ca6f40d982abd4239be1922a0f 189568

Compatibility

This is a soft-forking change to the Decred consensus, so old nodes that have not been upgraded will continue to follow the chain with the most proof-of-work.

However, it is highly recommended that all nodes upgrade before the activation time so they also fully validate and enforce the new rules versus relying on upgraded nodes to do so for them.

The only use of sequence numbers currently is to disable checking the lock time constraints and that behavior is not changed by this proposal.

Other software that performs full validation will need to upgrade their script system and consensus enforcement rules according to the specification herein.

Reference Implementation

Sequence Lock Consensus Enforcement

const (
	// SequenceLockTimeDisabled is a flag that if set on a transaction
	// input's sequence number, the sequence number will not be interpreted
	// as a relative locktime.
	SequenceLockTimeDisabled = 1 << 31

	// SequenceLockTimeIsSeconds is a flag that if set on a transaction
	// input's sequence number, the relative locktime has units of 512
	// seconds.
	SequenceLockTimeIsSeconds = 1 << 22

	// SequenceLockTimeMask is a mask that extracts the relative locktime
	// when masked against the transaction input sequence number.
	SequenceLockTimeMask = 0x0000ffff

	// SequenceLockTimeGranularity is the defined time based granularity
	// for seconds-based relative time locks.  When converting from seconds
	// to a sequence number, the value is right shifted by this amount,
	// therefore the granularity of relative time locks in 512 or 2^9
	// seconds.  Enforced relative lock times are multiples of 512 seconds.
	SequenceLockTimeGranularity = 9
)


// SequenceLock represents the minimum timestamp and minimum block height after
// which a transaction can be included into a block while satisfying the
// relative lock times of all of its input sequence numbers.  It is calculated
// via the CalcSequenceLock function.  Each field may be -1 if none of the input
// sequence numbers require a specific relative lock time for the respective
// type.  Since all valid heights and times are larger than -1, this implies
// that it will not prevent a transaction from being included due to the
// sequence lock, which is the desired behavior.
type SequenceLock struct {
	MinHeight int64
	MinTime   int64
}

// calcSequenceLock computes the relative lock times for the passed transaction
// from the point of view of the block node passed in as the first argument.
//
// See the CalcSequenceLock comments for more details.
//
// This function MUST be called with the chain state lock held (for writes).
func (b *BlockChain) calcSequenceLock(node *blockNode, tx *dcrutil.Tx, view *UtxoViewpoint, isActive bool) (*SequenceLock, error) {
	// A value of -1 for each lock type allows a transaction to be included
	// in a block at any given height or time.
	sequenceLock := &SequenceLock{MinHeight: -1, MinTime: -1}

	// Sequence locks do not apply if they are not yet active, the tx
	// version is less than 2, or the tx is a coinbase or stakebase, so
	// return now with a sequence lock that indicates the tx can possibly be
	// included in a block at any given height or time.
	msgTx := tx.MsgTx()
	enforce := isActive && msgTx.Version >= 2
	if !enforce || IsCoinBaseTx(msgTx) || isStakeBaseTx(msgTx) {
		return sequenceLock, nil

	}

	for txInIndex, txIn := range msgTx.TxIn {
		// Nothing to calculate for this input when relative time locks
		// are disabled for it.
		sequenceNum := txIn.Sequence
		if sequenceNum&SequenceLockTimeDisabled != 0 {
			continue
		}

		utxo := view.LookupEntry(&txIn.PreviousOutPoint.Hash)
		if utxo == nil {
			str := fmt.Sprintf("unable to find unspent output "+
				"%v referenced from transaction %s:%d",
				txIn.PreviousOutPoint, tx.Hash(), txInIndex)
			return sequenceLock, ruleError(ErrMissingTx, str)
		}

		// Calculate the sequence locks from the point of view of the
		// next block for inputs that are in the mempool.
		inputHeight := utxo.BlockHeight()
		if inputHeight == 0x7fffffff {
			inputHeight = node.height + 1
		}

		// Mask off the value portion of the sequence number to obtain
		// the time lock delta required before this this input can be
		// spent.  The relative lock can be time based or block based.
		relativeLock := int64(sequenceNum & SequenceLockTimeMask)

		if sequenceNum&SequenceLockTimeIsSeconds != 0 {
			// This input requires a time based relative lock
			// expressed in seconds before it can be spent and time
			// based locks are calculated relative to the earliest
			// possible time the block that contains the referenced
			// output could have been.  That time is the past
			// median time of the block before it (technically one
			// second after that, but that complexity is ignored for
			// time based locks which already have a granularity
			// associated with them anyways).  Therefore, the block
			// prior to the one in which the referenced output was
			// included is needed to compute its past median time.
			prevInputHeight := inputHeight - 1
			if prevInputHeight < 0 {
				prevInputHeight = 0
			}
			blockNode, err := b.ancestorNode(node, prevInputHeight)
			if err != nil {
				return sequenceLock, err
			}

			// Calculate the past median time of the block prior to
			// the one which included the output being spent.
			medianTime, err := b.calcPastMedianTime(blockNode)
			if err != nil {
				return sequenceLock, err
			}

			// Calculate the minimum required timestamp based on the
			// sum of the aforementioned past median time and
			// required relative number of seconds.  Since time
			// based relative locks have a granularity associated
			// with them, shift left accordingly in order to convert
			// to the proper number of relative seconds.  Also,
			// subtract one from the relative lock to maintain the
			// original lock time semantics.
			relativeSecs := relativeLock << SequenceLockTimeGranularity
			minTime := medianTime.Unix() + relativeSecs - 1
			if minTime > sequenceLock.MinTime {
				sequenceLock.MinTime = minTime
			}
		} else {
			// This input requires a relative lock expressed in
			// blocks before it can be spent.  Therefore, calculate
			// the minimum required height based on the sum of the
			// input height and required relative number of blocks.
			// Also, subtract one from the relative lock in order to
			// maintain the original lock time semantics.
			minHeight := inputHeight + int64(relativeLock) - 1
			if minHeight > sequenceLock.MinHeight {
				sequenceLock.MinHeight = minHeight
			}
		}
	}

	return sequenceLock, nil
}

Sequence Number Conversion

// LockTimeToSequence converts the passed relative lock time to a sequence
// number in accordance with DCP0003.
//
// A sequence number is defined as follows:
//
//   - bit 31 is the disable bit
//   - the next 8 bits are reserved
//   - bit 22 is the relative lock type (unset = block height, set = seconds)
//   - the next 6 bites are reserved
//   - the least significant 16 bits represent the value
//     - value has a granularity of 512 when interpreted as seconds (bit 22 set)
//
//   ---------------------------------------------------
//   | Disable | Reserved |  Type | Reserved |  Value  |
//   ---------------------------------------------------
//   |  1 bit  |  8 bits  | 1 bit |  6 bits  | 16 bits |
//   ---------------------------------------------------
//   |   [31]  |  [30-23] |  [22] |  [21-16] | [15-0]  |
//   ---------------------------------------------------
//
// The above implies that the maximum relative block height that can be encoded
// is 65535 and the maximum relative number of seconds that can be encoded is
// 65535*512 = 33,553,920 seconds (~1.06 years).  It also means that seconds are
// truncated to the nearest granularity towards 0 (e.g. 536 seconds will end up
// round tripping as 512 seconds and 1500 seconds will end up round tripping as
// 1024 seconds).
//
// An error will be returned for values that are larger than can be represented.
func LockTimeToSequence(isSeconds bool, lockTime uint32) (uint32, error) {
	// The corresponding sequence number is simply the desired input age
	// when expressing the relative lock time in blocks.
	if !isSeconds {
		if lockTime > SequenceLockTimeMask {
			return 0, fmt.Errorf("max relative block height a "+
				"sequence number can represent is %d",
				SequenceLockTimeMask)
		}
		return lockTime, nil
	}

	maxSeconds := uint32(SequenceLockTimeMask << SequenceLockTimeGranularity)
	if lockTime > maxSeconds {
		return 0, fmt.Errorf("max relative seconds a sequence number "+
			"can represent is %d", maxSeconds)
	}

	// Set bit 22 which indicates the lock time is in seconds, then shift the
	// lock time over by 9 since the time granularity is in 512-second
	// intervals (2^9).  This results in a max lock time of 33,553,920 seconds
	// (~1.06 years).
	return SequenceLockTimeIsSeconds |
	    lockTime>>SequenceLockTimeGranularity, nil
}

Opcode Execution

// verifyLockTime is a helper function used to validate locktimes.
func verifyLockTime(txLockTime, threshold, lockTime int64) error {
	// The lockTimes in both the script and transaction must be of the same
	// type.
	if !((txLockTime < threshold && lockTime < threshold) ||
		(txLockTime >= threshold && lockTime >= threshold)) {

		return fmt.Errorf("mismatched locktime types -- tx locktime %d, stack "+
			"locktime %d", txLockTime, lockTime)
	}

	if lockTime > txLockTime {
		str := "locktime requirement not satisfied -- locktime is greater " +
			"than the transaction locktime: %d > %d"
		return fmt.Errorf(str, lockTime, txLockTime)
	}

	return nil
}

// opcodeCheckSequenceVerify compares the top item on the data stack to the
// Sequence field of the transaction containing the script signature
// validating if the transaction outputs are spendable yet.
func opcodeCheckSequenceVerify(op *parsedOpcode, vm *Engine) error {
	// Treat the opcode as OP_NOP3 if the flag to interpret it as the
	// CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY opcode is not set.
	if !vm.hasFlag(ScriptVerifyCheckSequenceVerify) {
		if vm.hasFlag(ScriptDiscourageUpgradableNops) {
			return errors.New("OP_NOP3 reserved for soft-fork upgrades")
		}
		return nil
	}

	// The current transaction sequence is a uint32 resulting in a maximum
	// sequence of 2^32-1.  However, scriptNums are signed and therefore a
	// standard 4-byte scriptNum would only support up to a maximum of
	// 2^31-1.  Thus, a 5-byte scriptNum is used here since it will support
	// up to 2^39-1 which allows sequences beyond the current sequence
	// limit.
	//
	// PeekByteArray is used here instead of PeekInt because we do not want
	// to be limited to a 4-byte integer for reasons specified above.
	so, err := vm.dstack.PeekByteArray(0)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	stackSequence, err := makeScriptNum(so, vm.dstack.verifyMinimalData, 5)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}

	// In the rare event that the argument needs to be < 0 due to some
	// arithmetic being done first, you can always use
	// 0 OP_MAX OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY.
	if stackSequence < 0 {
		return fmt.Errorf("negative sequence: %d", stackSequence)
	}

	sequence := int64(stackSequence)

	// To provide for future soft-fork extensibility, if the
	// operand has the disabled lock-time flag set,
	// CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY behaves as a NOP.
	if sequence&int64(SequenceLockTimeDisabled) != 0 {
		return nil
	}

	// Transaction version numbers not high enough to trigger CSV rules must
	// fail.
	if vm.tx.Version < 2 {
		return fmt.Errorf("invalid transaction version: %d",
			vm.tx.Version)
	}

	// Sequence numbers with their most significant bit set are not
	// consensus constrained. Testing that the transaction's sequence
	// number does not have this bit set prevents using this property
	// to get around a CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY check.
	txSequence := int64(vm.tx.TxIn[vm.txIdx].Sequence)
	if txSequence&int64(SequenceLockTimeDisabled) != 0 {
		return fmt.Errorf("transaction sequence has sequence "+
			"locktime disabled bit set: 0x%x", txSequence)
	}

	// Mask off non-consensus bits before doing comparisons.
	lockTimeMask := int64(SequenceLockTimeIsSeconds | SequenceLockTimeMask)
	err = verifyLockTime(txSequence&lockTimeMask, SequenceLockTimeIsSeconds,
		sequence&lockTimeMask)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}

	return nil
}

Pull Requests

Relative Lock-time Sequence Number Enforcement

A reference implementation of the required consensus changes to enforce the sequence field abides by the relative lock-time semantics and the required script engine changes is provided by pull request #864.

Deployment

A reference implementation of the required agenda definition is implemented by pull request #848.

A reference implementation of enforcing the new opcode and semantics in accordance with the results of the agenda vote is implemented by pull request #855.

Test Vectors

The following test vectors are provided in order to facilitate testing across implementations. These are the expected values for all networks.

Sequence Number Conversion

Validity Input Value Height or Seconds Expected Sequence Number Description
valid 0 height 0 relative block height 0
valid 65535 height 65535 max relative block height
invalid 65536 height invalid max relative block height + 1
valid 0 seconds 4194304 relative seconds 0
valid 511 seconds 4194304 relative seconds granularity - 1
valid 512 seconds 4194305 relative seconds exact granularity
valid 513 seconds 4194305 relative seconds granularity + 1
valid 33553919 seconds 4259838 relative seconds max - 1
valid 33553920 seconds 4259839 relative seconds max
invalid 33553921 seconds invalid relative seconds max + 1

Sequence Lock Calculation

NOTE: The tests in this section all assume the block the referenced inputs are contained in has a median time of 1401292367 and a height of 16.

Tx Version Input Sequence Numbers Expected Min Height Expected Min Time Description
1 3 -1 -1 Sequence locks do not apply to version 1 transactions
2 4294967295 -1 -1 Max sequence number has disabled bit set
2 4194304 -1 1401292366 Single input that requires seconds below granularity
2 4194306 -1 1401293390 Single input that requires 1024 seconds
2 4194309, 4, 2147483653 19 1401294926 Multiple inputs with one disabled
2 3 18 -1 Single input that requires 3 blocks
2 4194314, 4194309 -1 1401297486 Two inputs that both require seconds
2 1, 11 26 -1 Two inputs that both require blocks
2 4194309, 4194317, 3, 9 24 1401299022 Four inputs with two that require seconds and two that require blocks

Script Evaluation

Validity Tx Version Sequence Number Signature Script Public Key Script Description
valid 2 0 empty 00b251 By-height lock with equal argument and sequence (argument == 0)
valid 2 65535 empty 03ffff00b251 By-height lock with equal argument and sequence (argument == 65535)
valid 2 2143289343 empty 03ffff00b251 By-height lock with equal argument and masked max sequence (argument == 65535)
valid 2 2143289343 empty 00b251 By-height lock with argument < masked max sequence (argument == 0)
valid 2 4194304 empty 03000040b251 By-time lock with equal argument and sequence (argument == 4194304)
valid 2 4259839 empty 03ffff40b251 By-time lock with equal argument and sequence (argument == 4259839)
valid 2 2147483647 empty 03ffff40b251 By-time lock with min argument < sequence (argument == 4259839)
valid 2 2147483647 empty 03000040b251 By-time lock with max argument < sequence (argument == 4194304)
valid 2 2147483648 empty 050000008000b251 Disabled by-height lock with equal argument and sequence (argument == 2147483648)
valid 2 2147483648 empty 05ffffffff00b251 Disabled mismatched lock types with by-time argument and by-height sequence (argument == 4294967295)
valid 2 4294967294 empty 050000008000b251 Disabled mismatched lock types with by-height argument and by-time sequence < max (argument == 2147483648)
valid 2 4294967294 empty 05ffffffff00b251 Disabled by-time lock with argument > sequence (argument == 4294967295)
valid 2 4294967295 empty 050000008000b251 Disabled mismatched lock types with by-height argument and by-time sequence (argument == 2147483648)
valid 2 4294967295 empty 05ffffffff00b251 Disabled by-time lock with equal argument and sequence (argument == 4294967295)
valid 2 2143289343 empty 050000008000b251 Disabled by-height argument for enabled by-height sequence with argument > sequence (argument == 2147483648)
valid 2 2147483647 empty 050000008000b251 Disabled by-height argument for enabled by-time sequence with argument > sequence (argument == 2147483648)
valid 2 4294967295 empty 050000008000b251 Disabled by-height argument for disabled by-time sequence with argument < sequence (argument == 2147483648)
valid 2 2143289343 empty 05ffffffff00b251 Disabled by-time argument for enabled by-height sequence with argument > sequence (argument == 4294967295)
valid 2 2147483647 empty 05ffffffff00b251 Disabled by-time argument for enabled by-time sequence with argument > sequence (argument == 4294967295)
valid 2 4294967295 empty 05ffffffff00b251 Disabled by-time argument for disabled by-time sequence with equal argument and sequence (argument == 4294967295)
valid 2 2143289343 empty 050000008001b251 Disabled >32-bit argument for enabled by-height sequence (argument == 6442450944)
valid 2 2147483647 empty 050000008001b251 Disabled >32-bit argument for enabled by-time sequence (argument == 6442450944)
valid 2 4294967295 empty 050000008001b251 Disabled >32-bit argument for disabled sequence (argument == 6442450944)
valid 2 0 empty 050000000000b251 5-byte non-minimally-encoded operands are valid (argument == non-minimally-encoded 0)
valid 2 4194304 empty 03ffff3f8bb251 By-time lock with calculated argument equal to sequence (argument == 4194303 + 1)
valid 2 65535 empty 030000408cb251 By-height lock with masked calculated argument equal to sequence (argument == 4194304 - 1)
valid 2 0 empty 04ffffff7f0300000193b251 By-height lock with 5-byte calculated argument that sets disable bit (argument == 2147483647 + 65536)
valid 2 4194304 empty 04ffffff7f0300004193b251 By-time lock with 5-byte calculated argument that sets disable bit (argument == 2147483647 + 4259840)
valid 2 1 51b2 51 Valid in signature script (argument == 1)
invalid 2 0 empty 51b251 By-height lock with argument > min sequence (argument == 1)
invalid 2 65534 empty 03ffff00b251 By-time lock with argument > max sequence - 1 (argument == 65535)
invalid 2 4194304 empty 03010040b251 By-time lock with argument > min sequence (argument == 4194305)
invalid 2 4259838 empty 03ffff40b251 By-time lock with argument > max sequence - 1 (argument == 4259839)
invalid 2 0 empty b251 Missing argument
invalid 2 0 empty 4fb251 By-height sequence with negative argument (argument == -1)
invalid 2 4194304 empty 4fb251 By-time sequence with negative argument (argument == -1)
invalid 2 4194304 empty 00b251 Mismatched lock types with min by-height argument and by-time sequence (argument == 0)
invalid 2 4194304 empty 03ffff00b251 Mismatched lock types with max by-height argument and by-time sequence (argument == 65535)
invalid 2 0 empty 03000040b251 Mismatched lock types with min by-time argument and by-height sequence (argument == 4194304)
invalid 2 0 empty 03ffff40b251 Mismatched lock types with max by-time argument and by-height sequence (argument == 4259839)
invalid 2 65535 empty 06000000000000b251 6-byte non-minimally-encoded argument (argument == non-minimally-encoded 0)
invalid 2 0 51b2 51 Failure in signature script (argument == 1)
invalid 1 0 empty 00b251 Valid by-height lock, but version 1 transaction (argument == 0)
invalid 1 4194304 empty 03000040b251 Valid by-time lock, but version 1 transaction (argument == 4194304)

Acknowledgements

Source BIPs

This proposal is based on BIP68, BIP112, and BIP113. A special thanks goes to their authors (alphabetical order):

  • BtcDrak
  • Eric Lombrozo
  • Kinoshitajona
  • Mark Friedenbach
  • Nicolas Dorier
  • Thomas Kerin

Collaborators

Thanks to the following individuals who provided valuable feedback during the review process of this proposal (alphabetical order):

Additional References

Copyright

This document is licensed under the CC0-1.0: Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal license.

The code is licensed under the ISC License.