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<h1 class="entry-title"><a rel="bookmark" href="15">Federalist № 15</a></h1>
<h2 class="entry-summary">
The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the
Union
</h2>
<div class="entry-content">
<p id="salutation">To the People of the State of New York.</p>
<p id="p1"><span class="initial">In the</span> course of the
preceding papers, I have endeavored, my fellow-citizens, to place
before you, in a clear and convincing light, the importance of
Union to your political safety and happiness. I have unfolded to
you a complication of dangers to which you would be exposed,
should you permit that sacred knot which binds the people of
America together be severed or dissolved by ambition or by
avarice, by jealousy or by misrepresentation. In the sequel of the
inquiry through which I propose to accompany you, the truths
intended to be inculcated will receive further confirmation from
facts and arguments hitherto unnoticed. If the road over which you
will still have to pass should in some places appear to you
tedious or irksome, you will recollect that you are in quest of
information on a subject the most momentous which can engage the
attention of a free people, that the field through which you have
to travel is in itself spacious, and that the difficulties of the
journey have been unnecessarily increased by the mazes with which
sophistry has beset the way. It will be my aim to remove the
obstacles from your progress in as compendious a manner as it can
be done, without sacrificing utility to despatch. <a
class="permalink" href="#p1">¶</a></p>
<p id="p2">In pursuance of the plan which I have laid down for the
discussion of the subject, the point next in order to be examined
is the <q cite="1#p7">insufficiency of the present Confederation
to the preservation of the Union.</q> It may perhaps be asked what
need there is of reasoning or proof to illustrate a position which
is not either controverted or doubted, to which the understandings
and feelings of all classes of men assent, and which in substance
is admitted by the opponents as well as by the friends of the new
Constitution. It must in truth be acknowledged that, however these
may differ in other respects, they in general appear to harmonize
in this sentiment, at least, that there are material imperfections
in our national system, and that something is necessary to be done
to rescue us from impending anarchy. The facts that support this
opinion are no longer objects of speculation. They have forced
themselves upon the sensibility of the people at large, and have
at length extorted from those, whose mistaken policy has had the
principal share in precipitating the extremity at which we are
arrived, a reluctant confession of the reality of those defects in
the scheme of our federal government, which have been long pointed
out and regretted by the intelligent friends of the Union. <a
class="permalink" href="#p2">¶</a></p>
<p id="p3">We may indeed with propriety be said to have reached
almost the last stage of national humiliation. There is scarcely
anything that can wound the pride or degrade the character of an
independent nation which we do not experience. Are there
engagements to the performance of which we are held by every tie
respectable among men? These are the subjects of constant and
unblushing violation. Do we owe debts to foreigners and to our own
citizens contracted in a time of imminent peril for the
preservation of our political existence? These remain without any
proper or satisfactory provision for their discharge. Have we
valuable territories and important posts in the possession of a
foreign power which, by express stipulations, ought long since to
have been surrendered? These are still retained, to the prejudice
of our interests, not less than of our rights. Are we in a
condition to resent or to repel the aggression? We have neither
troops, nor treasury, nor government.<a class="note"
href="#note1">1</a> Are we even in a condition to remonstrate with
dignity? The just imputations on our own faith, in respect to the
same treaty, ought first to be removed. Are we entitled by nature
and compact to a free participation in the navigation of the
Mississippi? Spain excludes us from it. Is public credit an
indispensable resource in time of public danger? We seem to have
abandoned its cause as desperate and irretrievable. Is commerce of
importance to national wealth? Ours is at the lowest point of
declension. Is respectability in the eyes of foreign powers a
safeguard against foreign encroachments? The imbecility of our
government even forbids them to treat with us. Our ambassadors
abroad are the mere pageants of mimic sovereignty. Is a violent
and unnatural decrease in the value of land a symptom of national
distress? The price of improved land in most parts of the country
is much lower than can be accounted for by the quantity of waste
land at market, and can only be fully explained by that want of
private and public confidence, which are so alarmingly prevalent
among all ranks, and which have a direct tendency to depreciate
property of every kind. Is private credit the friend and patron of
industry? That most useful kind which relates to borrowing and
lending is reduced within the narrowest limits, and this still
more from an opinion of insecurity than from the scarcity of
money. To shorten an enumeration of particulars which can afford
neither pleasure nor instruction, it may in general be demanded,
what indication is there of national disorder, poverty, and
insignificance that could befall a community so peculiarly blessed
with natural advantages as we are, which does not form a part of
the dark catalogue of our public misfortunes? <a class="permalink"
href="#p3">¶</a></p>
<p id="p4">This is the melancholy situation to which we have been
brought by those very maxims and councils which would now deter us
from adopting the proposed Constitution; and which, not content
with having conducted us to the brink of a precipice, seem
resolved to plunge us into the abyss that awaits us below. Here,
my countrymen, impelled by every motive that ought to influence an
enlightened people, let us make a firm stand for our safety, our
tranquillity, our dignity, our reputation. Let us at last break
the fatal charm which has too long seduced us from the paths of
felicity and prosperity. <a class="permalink" href="#p4">¶</a></p>
<p id="p5">It is true, as has been before observed that facts, too
stubborn to be resisted, have produced a species of general assent
to the abstract proposition that there exist material defects in
our national system; but the usefulness of the concession, on the
part of the old adversaries of federal measures, is destroyed by a
strenuous opposition to a remedy, upon the only principles that
can give it a chance of success. While they admit that the
government of the United States is destitute of energy, they
contend against conferring upon it those powers which are
requisite to supply that energy. They seem still to aim at things
repugnant and irreconcilable; at an augmentation of federal
authority, without a diminution of State authority; at sovereignty
in the Union, and complete independence in the members. They
still, in fine, seem to cherish with blind devotion the political
monster of an imperium in imperio. This renders a full display of
the principal defects of the Confederation necessary, in order to
show that the evils we experience do not proceed from minute or
partial imperfections, but from fundamental errors in the
structure of the building, which cannot be amended otherwise than
by an alteration in the first principles and main pillars of the
fabric. <a class="permalink" href="#p5">¶</a></p>
<p id="p6">The great and radical vice in <a href="articles">the
construction of the existing Confederation</a> is in the principle
of <em>legislation</em> for <em>states</em> or
<em>governments</em>, in their <em>corporate</em> or
<em>collective capacities</em>, and as contradistinguished from
the <em>individuals</em> of which they consist. Though this
principle does not run through all the powers delegated to the
Union, yet it pervades and governs those on which the efficacy of
the rest depends. Except as to the rule of appointment, the United
States has an indefinite discretion to make requisitions for men
and money; but they have no authority to raise either, by
regulations extending to the individual citizens of America. The
consequence of this is, that though in theory their resolutions
concerning those objects are laws, constitutionally binding on the
members of the Union, yet in practice they are mere
recommendations which the States observe or disregard at their
option. <a class="permalink" href="#p6">¶</a></p>
<p id="p7">It is a singular instance of the capriciousness of the
human mind, that after all the admonitions we have had from
experience on this head, there should still be found men who
object to the new Constitution, for deviating from a principle
which has been found the bane of the old, and which is in itself
evidently incompatible with the idea of <em>government</em>; a
principle, in short, which, if it is to be executed at all, must
substitute the violent and sanguinary agency of the sword to the
mild influence of the magistracy. <a class="permalink"
href="#p7">¶</a></p>
<p id="p8">There is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea of
a league or alliance between independent nations for certain
defined purposes precisely stated in a treaty regulating all the
details of time, place, circumstance, and quantity; leaving
nothing to future discretion; and depending for its execution on
the good faith of the parties. Compacts of this kind exist among
all civilized nations, subject to the usual vicissitudes of peace
and war, of observance and non-observance, as the interests or
passions of the contracting powers dictate. In the early part of
the present century there was an epidemical rage in Europe for
this species of compacts, from which the politicians of the times
fondly hoped for benefits which were never realized. With a view
to establishing the equilibrium of power and the peace of that
part of the world, all the resources of negotiation were
exhausted, and triple and quadruple alliances were formed; but
they were scarcely formed before they were broken, giving an
instructive but afflicting lesson to mankind, how little
dependence is to be placed on treaties which have no other
sanction than the obligations of good faith, and which oppose
general considerations of peace and justice to the impulse of any
immediate interest or passion. <a class="permalink"
href="#p8">¶</a></p>
<p id="p9">If the particular States in this country are disposed
to stand in a similar relation to each other, and to drop the
project of a general <em>discretionary superintendence</em>, the
scheme would indeed be pernicious, and would entail upon us all
the mischiefs which have been enumerated under the first head; but
it would have the merit of being, at least, consistent and
practicable Abandoning all views towards a confederate government,
this would bring us to a simple alliance offensive and defensive;
and would place us in a situation to be alternate friends and
enemies of each other, as our mutual jealousies and rivalships,
nourished by the intrigues of foreign nations, should prescribe to
us. <a class="permalink" href="#p9">¶</a></p>
<p id="p10">But if we are unwilling to be placed in this perilous
situation; if we still will adhere to the design of a national
government, or, which is the same thing, of a superintending
power, under the direction of a common council, we must resolve to
incorporate into our plan those ingredients which may be
considered as forming the characteristic difference between a
league and a government; we must extend the authority of the Union
to the persons of the citizens, —the only proper objects of
government. <a class="permalink" href="#p10">¶</a></p>
<p id="p11">Government implies the power of making laws. It is
essential to the idea of a law, that it be attended with a
sanction; or, in other words, a penalty or punishment for
disobedience. If there be no penalty annexed to disobedience, the
resolutions or commands which pretend to be laws will, in fact,
amount to nothing more than advice or recommendation. This
penalty, whatever it may be, can only be inflicted in two ways: by
the agency of the courts and ministers of justice, or by military
force; by the <em>coercion</em> of the magistracy, or by the
<em>coercion</em> of arms. The first kind can evidently apply only
to men; the last kind must of necessity, be employed against
bodies politic, or communities, or States. It is evident that
there is no process of a court by which the observance of the laws
can, in the last resort, be enforced. Sentences may be denounced
against them for violations of their duty; but these sentences can
only be carried into execution by the sword. In an association
where the general authority is confined to the collective bodies
of the communities, that compose it, every breach of the laws must
involve a state of war; and military execution must become the
only instrument of civil obedience. Such a state of things can
certainly not deserve the name of government, nor would any
prudent man choose to commit his happiness to it. <a
class="permalink" href="#p11">¶</a></p>
<p id="p12">There was a time when we were told that breaches, by
the States, of the regulations of the federal authority were not
to be expected; that a sense of common interest would preside over
the conduct of the respective members, and would beget a full
compliance with all the constitutional requisitions of the Union.
This language, at the present day, would appear as wild as a great
part of what we now hear from the same quarter will be thought,
when we shall have received further lessons from that best oracle
of wisdom, experience. It at all times betrayed an ignorance of
the true springs by which human conduct is actuated, and belied
the original inducements to the establishment of civil power. Why
has government been instituted at all? Because the passions of men
will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice, without
constraint. Has it been found that bodies of men act with more
rectitude or greater disinterestedness than individuals? The
contrary of this has been inferred by all accurate observers of
the conduct of mankind; and the inference is founded upon obvious
reasons. Regard to reputation has a less active influence, when
the infamy of a bad action is to be divided among a number than
when it is to fall singly upon one. A spirit of faction, which is
apt to mingle its poison in the deliberations of all bodies of
men, will often hurry the persons of whom they are composed into
improprieties and excesses, for which they would blush in a
private capacity. <a class="permalink" href="#p12">¶</a></p>
<p id="p13">In addition to all this, there is, in the nature of
sovereign power, an impatience of control, that disposes those who
are invested with the exercise of it, to look with an evil eye
upon all external attempts to restrain or direct its operations.
From this spirit it happens, that in every political association
which is formed upon the principle of uniting in a common interest
a number of lesser sovereignties, there will be found a kind of
eccentric tendency in the subordinate or inferior orbs, by the
operation of which there will be a perpetual effort in each to fly
off from the common centre. This tendency is not difficult to be
accounted for. It has its origin in the love of power. Power
controlled or abridged is almost always the rival and enemy of
that power by which it is controlled or abridged. This simple
proposition will teach us how little reason there is to expect,
that the persons intrusted with the administration of the affairs
of the particular members of a confederacy will at all times be
ready, with perfect good-humor, and an unbiased regard to the
public weal, to execute the resolutions or decrees of the general
authority. The reverse of this results from the constitution of
human nature. <a class="permalink" href="#p13">¶</a></p>
<p id="p14">If, therefore, the measures of the Confederacy cannot
be executed without the intervention of the particular
administrations, there will be little prospect of their being
executed at all. The rulers of the respective members, whether
they have a constitutional right to do it or not, will undertake
to judge of the propriety of the measures themselves. They will
consider the conformity of the thing proposed or required to their
immediate interests or aims; the momentary conveniences or
inconveniences that would attend its adoption. All this will be
done; and in a spirit of interested and suspicious scrutiny,
without that knowledge of national circumstances and reasons of
state, which is essential to a right judgment, and with that
strong predilection in favor of local objects, which can hardly
fail to mislead the decision. The same process must be repeated in
every member of which the body is constituted; and the execution
of the plans, framed by the councils of the whole, will always
fluctuate on the discretion of the ill-informed and prejudiced
opinion of every part. Those who have been conversant in the
proceedings of popular assemblies; who have seen how difficult it
often is, where there is no exterior pressure of circumstances, to
bring them to harmonious resolutions on important points, will
readily conceive how impossible it must be to induce a number of
such assemblies, deliberating at a distance from each other, at
different times, and under different impressions, long to
co-operate in the same views and pursuits. <a class="permalink"
href="#p14">¶</a></p>
<p id="p15">In our case, the concurrence of thirteen distinct
sovereign wills is requisite, under the Confederation, to the
complete execution of every important measure that proceeds from
the Union. It has happened as was to have been foreseen. The
measures of the Union have not been executed; the delinquencies of
the States have, step by step, matured themselves to an extreme,
which has, at length, arrested all the wheels of the national
government, and brought them to an awful stand. Congress at this
time scarcely possess the means of keeping up the forms of
administration, till the States can have time to agree upon a more
substantial substitute for the present shadow of a federal
government. Things did not come to this desperate extremity at
once. The causes which have been specified produced at first only
unequal and disproportionate degrees of compliance with the
requisitions of the Union. The greater deficiencies of some States
furnished the pretext of example and the temptation of interest to
the complying, or to the least delinquent States. Why should we do
more in proportion than those who are embarked with us in the same
political voyage? Why should we consent to bear more than our
proper share of the common burden? These were suggestions which
human selfishness could not withstand, and which even speculative
men, who looked forward to remote consequences, could not, without
hesitation, combat. Each State, yielding to the persuasive voice
of immediate interest or convenience, has successively withdrawn
its support, till the frail and tottering edifice seems ready to
fall upon our heads, and to crush us beneath its ruins. <a
class="permalink" href="#p15">¶</a></p>
<address class="vcard author">
<span class="nickname">Publius</span>.
[<span class="fn">Alexander Hamilton</span>]
</address>
<ol id="notes">
<li id="note1">"I mean for the Union."</li>
</ol>
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<div class="meta">
<p>
First published in the <abbr class="published updated"
title="1787-12-01">Saturday, December 1, 1787</abbr> issue of the
<span class="publication">Independent Journal</span>.
</p>
<p class="rights">
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</p>
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