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<h1 class="entry-title"><a rel="bookmark" href="24">Federalist № 24</a></h1>
<h2 class="entry-summary">
The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
</h2>
<div class="entry-content">
<p id="salutation">To the People of the State of New York:</p>
<p id="p1">To <span class="initial">the</span> powers proposed to
be conferred upon the federal government, in respect to the
creation and direction of the national forces, I have met with but
one specific objection, which, if I understand it right, is this,
that proper provision has not been made against the existence of
standing armies in time of peace; an objection which, I shall now
endeavor to show, rests on weak and unsubstantial foundations. <a
class="permalink" href="#p1">¶</a></p>
<p id="p2">It has indeed been brought forward in the most vague
and general form, supported only by bold assertions, without the
appearance of argument; without even the sanction of theoretical
opinions; in contradiction to the practice of other free nations,
and to the general sense of America, as expressed in most of the
existing constitutions. The proprietory of this remark will
appear, the moment it is recollected that the objection under
consideration turns upon a supposed necessity of restraining the
<em>legislative</em> authority of the nation, in the article of
military establishments; a principle unheard of, except in one or
two of our State constitutions, and rejected in all the rest. <a
class="permalink" href="#p2">¶</a></p>
<p id="p3">A stranger to our politics, who was to read our
newspapers at the present juncture, without having previously
inspected the plan reported by the convention, would be naturally
led to one of two conclusions: either that it contained a positive
injunction, that standing armies should be kept up in time of
peace; or that it vested in the <em>executive</em> the whole power
of levying troops, without subjecting his discretion, in any
shape, to the control of the legislature. <a class="permalink"
href="#p3">¶</a></p>
<p id="p4">If he came afterwards to peruse the plan itself, he
would be surprised to discover, that neither the one nor the other
was the case; that the whole power of raising armies was lodged in
the <em>legislature</em>, not in the <em>executive</em>; that this
legislature was to be a popular body, consisting of the
representatives of the people periodically elected; and that
instead of the provision he had supposed in favor of standing
armies, there was to be found, in respect to this object, an
important qualification even of the legislative discretion, in <a
href="constitution#a1s8c12">that clause</a> which forbids the
appropriation of money for the support of an army for any longer
period than two years a precaution which, upon a nearer view of
it, will appear to be a great and real security against the
keeping up of troops without evident necessity. <a
class="permalink" href="#p4">¶</a></p>
<p id="p5">Disappointed in his first surmise, the person I have
supposed would be apt to pursue his conjectures a little further.
He would naturally say to himself, it is impossible that all this
vehement and pathetic declamation can be without some colorable
pretext. It must needs be that this people, so jealous of their
liberties, have, in all the preceding models of the constitutions
which they have established, inserted the most precise and rigid
precautions on this point, the omission of which, in the new plan,
has given birth to all this apprehension and clamor. <a
class="permalink" href="#p5">¶</a></p>
<p id="p6">If, under this impression, he proceeded to pass in
review the several State constitutions, how great would be his
disappointment to find that <em>two only</em> of them<a
class="note" href="#note1">1</a> contained an interdiction of
standing armies in time of peace; that the other eleven had either
observed a profound silence on the subject, or had in express
terms admitted the right of the Legislature to authorize their
existence. <a class="permalink" href="#p6">¶</a></p>
<p id="p7">Still, however he would be persuaded that there must be
some plausible foundation for the cry raised on this head. He
would never be able to imagine, while any source of information
remained unexplored, that it was nothing more than an experiment
upon the public credulity, dictated either by a deliberate
intention to deceive, or by the overflowings of a zeal too
intemperate to be ingenuous. It would probably occur to him, that
he would be likely to find the precautions he was in search of in
the primitive compact between the States. Here, at length, he
would expect to meet with a solution of the enigma. No doubt, he
would observe to himself, the existing Confederation must contain
the most explicit provisions against military establishments in
time of peace; and a departure from this model, in a favorite
point, has occasioned the discontent which appears to influence
these political champions. <a class="permalink"
href="#p7">¶</a></p>
<p id="p8">If he should now apply himself to a careful and
critical survey of the articles of Confederation, his astonishment
would not only be increased, but would acquire a mixture of
indignation, at the unexpected discovery, that these articles,
instead of containing the prohibition he looked for, and though
they had, with jealous circumspection, restricted the authority of
the State legislatures in this particular, had not imposed a
single restraint on that of the United States. If he happened to
be a man of quick sensibility, or ardent temper, he could now no
longer refrain from regarding these clamors as the dishonest
artifices of a sinister and unprincipled opposition to a plan
which ought at least to receive a fair and candid examination from
all sincere lovers of their country! How else, he would say, could
the authors of them have been tempted to vent such loud censures
upon that plan, about a point in which it seems to have conformed
itself to the general sense of America as declared in its
different forms of government, and in which it has even superadded
a new and powerful guard unknown to any of them? If, on the
contrary, he happened to be a man of calm and dispassionate
feelings, he would indulge a sigh for the frailty of human nature,
and would lament, that in a matter so interesting to the happiness
of millions, the true merits of the question should be perplexed
and entangled by expedients so unfriendly to an impartial and
right determination. Even such a man could hardly forbear
remarking, that a conduct of this kind has too much the appearance
of an intention to mislead the people by alarming their passions,
rather than to convince them by arguments addressed to their
understandings. <a class="permalink" href="#p8">¶</a></p>
<p id="p9">But however little this objection may be countenanced,
even by precedents among ourselves, it may be satisfactory to take
a nearer view of its intrinsic merits. From a close examination it
will appear that restraints upon the discretion of the legislature
in respect to military establishments in time of peace, would be
improper to be imposed, and if imposed, from the necessities of
society, would be unlikely to be observed. <a class="permalink"
href="#p9">¶</a></p>
<p id="p10">Though a wide ocean separates the United States from
Europe, yet there are various considerations that warn us against
an excess of confidence or security. On one side of us, and
stretching far into our rear, are growing settlements subject to
the dominion of Britain. On the other side, and extending to meet
the British settlements, are colonies and establishments subject
to the dominion of Spain. This situation and the vicinity of the
West India Islands, belonging to these two powers create between
them, in respect to their American possessions and in relation to
us, a common interest. The savage tribes on our Western frontier
ought to be regarded as our natural enemies, their natural allies,
because they have most to fear from us, and most to hope from
them. The improvements in the art of navigation have, as to the
facility of communication, rendered distant nations, in a great
measure, neighbors. Britain and Spain are among the principal
maritime powers of Europe. A future concert of views between these
nations ought not to be regarded as improbable. The increasing
remoteness of consanguinity is every day diminishing the force of
<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Bourbon">the family
compact between France and Spain</a>. And politicians have ever
with great reason considered the ties of blood as feeble and
precarious links of political connection. These circumstances
combined, admonish us not to be too sanguine in considering
ourselves as entirely out of the reach of danger. <a
class="permalink" href="#p10">¶</a></p>
<p id="p11">Previous to the Revolution, and ever since the peace,
there has been a constant necessity for keeping small garrisons on
our Western frontier. No person can doubt that these will continue
to be indispensable, if it should only be against the ravages and
depredations of the Indians. These garrisons must either be
furnished by occasional detachments from the militia, or by
permanent corps in the pay of the government. The first is
impracticable; and if practicable, would be pernicious. The
militia would not long, if at all, submit to be dragged from their
occupations and families to perform that most disagreeable duty in
times of profound peace. And if they could be prevailed upon or
compelled to do it, the increased expense of a frequent rotation
of service, and the loss of labor and disconcertion of the
industrious pursuits of individuals, would form conclusive
objections to the scheme. It would be as burdensome and injurious
to the public as ruinous to private citizens. The latter resource
of permanent corps in the pay of the government amounts to a
standing army in time of peace; a small one, indeed, but not the
less real for being small. Here is a simple view of the subject,
that shows us at once the impropriety of a constitutional
interdiction of such establishments, and the necessity of leaving
the matter to the discretion and prudence of the legislature. <a
class="permalink" href="#p11">¶</a></p>
<p id="p12">In proportion to our increase in strength, it is
probable, nay, it may be said certain, that Britain and Spain
would augment their military establishments in our neighborhood.
If we should not be willing to be exposed, in a naked and
defenseless condition, to their insults and encroachments, we
should find it expedient to increase our frontier garrisons in
some ratio to the force by which our Western settlements might be
annoyed. There are, and will be, particular posts, the possession
of which will include the command of large districts of territory,
and facilitate future invasions of the remainder. It may be added
that some of those posts will be keys to the trade with the Indian
nations. Can any man think it would be wise to leave such posts in
a situation to be at any instant seized by one or the other of two
neighboring and formidable powers? To act this part would be to
desert all the usual maxims of prudence and policy. <a
class="permalink" href="#p12">¶</a></p>
<p id="p13">If we mean to be a commercial people, or even to be
secure on our Atlantic side, we must endeavor, as soon as
possible, to have a navy. To this purpose there must be dock-yards
and arsenals; and for the defense of these, fortifications, and
probably garrisons. When a nation has become so powerful by sea
that it can protect its dock-yards by its fleets, this supersedes
the necessity of garrisons for that purpose; but where naval
establishments are in their infancy, moderate garrisons will, in
all likelihood, be found an indispensable security against
descents for the destruction of the arsenals and dock-yards, and
sometimes of the fleet itself. <a class="permalink"
href="#p13">¶</a></p>
<address class="vcard author">
<span class="nickname">Publius</span>.
[<span class="fn">Alexander Hamilton</span>]
</address>
<ol id="notes">
<li id="note1">
This statement of the matter is taken from the printed
collection of State constitutions. Pennsylvania and North
Carolina are the two which contain the interdiction in these
words: <q>As standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to
liberty, <em>they ought not</em> to be kept up.</q> This is,
in truth, rather a <em>caution</em> than a
<em>prohibition</em>. New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Delaware,
and Maryland have, in each of their bils of rights, a clause
to this effect: <q>Standing armies are dangerous to liberty,
and ought not to be raised or kept up <em>without the consent
of the legislature</em></q>; which is a formal admission of
the authority of the Legislature. New York has no bills of
rights, and her constitution says not a word about the matter.
No bills of rights appear annexed to the constitutions of the
other States, except the foregoing, and their constitutions
are equally silent. I am told, however that one or two States
have bills of rights which do not appear in this collection;
but that those also recognize the right of the legislative
authority in this respect.
</li>
</ol>
</div>
<div class="meta">
<p>
First published in the <abbr class="published updated"
title="1787-12-19">Wednesday, December 19, 1787</abbr> issue of
the <span class="publication">Independent Journal</span>.
</p>
<p class="rights">
This work is in <a rel="copyright license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/publicdomain/">the public domain</a>.
</p>
<p>
Read about this
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