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<h1 class="entry-title"><a rel="bookmark" href="26">Federalist № 26</a></h1>
<h2 class="entry-summary">
The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the
Common Defense Considered
</h2>
<div class="entry-content">
<p id="salutation">To the People of the State of New York:</p>
<p id="p1"><span class="initial">It was</span> a thing hardly to
be expected that in a popular revolution the minds of men should
stop at that happy mean which marks the salutary boundary between
<em>power</em> and <em>privilege</em>, and combines the energy of
government with the security of private rights. A failure in this
delicate and important point is the great source of the
inconveniences we experience, and if we are not cautious to avoid
a repetition of the error, in our future attempts to rectify and
ameliorate our system, we may travel from one chimerical project
to another; we may try change after change; but we shall never be
likely to make any material change for the better. <a
class="permalink" href="#p1">¶</a></p>
<p id="p2">The idea of restraining the legislative authority, in
the means of providing for the national defense, is one of those
refinements which owe their origin to a zeal for liberty more
ardent than enlightened. We have seen, however, that it has not
had thus far an extensive prevalency; that even in this country,
where it made its first appearance, Pennsylvania and North
Carolina are the only two States by which it has been in any
degree patronized; and that all the others have refused to give it
the least countenance; wisely judging that confidence must be
placed somewhere; that the necessity of doing it, is implied in
the very act of delegating power; and that it is better to hazard
the abuse of that confidence than to embarrass the government and
endanger the public safety by impolitic restrictions on the
legislative authority. The opponents of the proposed Constitution
combat, in this respect, the general decision of America; and
instead of being taught by experience the propriety of correcting
any extremes into which we may have heretofore run, they appear
disposed to conduct us into others still more dangerous, and more
extravagant. As if the tone of government had been found too high,
or too rigid, the doctrines they teach are calculated to induce us
to depress or to relax it, by expedients which, upon other
occasions, have been condemned or forborne. It may be affirmed
without the imputation of invective, that if the principles they
inculcate, on various points, could so far obtain as to become the
popular creed, they would utterly unfit the people of this country
for any species of government whatever. But a danger of this kind
is not to be apprehended. The citizens of America have too much
discernment to be argued into anarchy. And I am much mistaken, if
experience has not wrought a deep and solemn conviction in the
public mind, that greater energy of government is essential to the
welfare and prosperity of the community. <a class="permalink"
href="#p2">¶</a></p>
<p id="p3">It may not be amiss in this place concisely to remark
the origin and progress of the idea, which aims at the exclusion
of military establishments in time of peace. Though in speculative
minds it may arise from a contemplation of the nature and tendency
of such institutions, fortified by the events that have happened
in other ages and countries, yet as a national sentiment, it must
be traced to those habits of thinking which we derive from the
nation from whom the inhabitants of these States have in general
sprung. <a class="permalink" href="#p3">¶</a></p>
<p id="p4">In England, for a long time after the Norman Conquest,
the authority of the monarch was almost unlimited. Inroads were
gradually made upon the prerogative, in favor of liberty, first by
the barons, and afterwards by the people, till the greatest part
of its most formidable pretensions became extinct. But it was not
till <a
href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glorious_Revolution">the
revolution in 1688</a>, which elevated the Prince of Orange to the
throne of Great Britain, that English liberty was completely
triumphant. As incident to the undefined power of making war, an
acknowledged prerogative of the crown, Charles II. had, by his own
authority, kept on foot in time of peace a body of 5,000 regular
troops. And this number James II. increased to 30,000; who were
paid out of his civil list. At the revolution, to abolish the
exercise of so dangerous an authority, it became an article of the
<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bill_of_Rights_1689">Bill of
Rights</a> then framed, that <q>the raising or keeping a standing
army within the kingdom in time of peace, <em>unless with the
consent of parliament</em>, was against law.</q> <a
class="permalink" href="#p4">¶</a></p>
<p id="p5">In that kingdom, when the pulse of liberty was at its
highest pitch, no security against the danger of standing armies
was thought requisite, beyond a prohibition of their being raised
or kept up by the mere authority of the executive magistrate. The
patriots, who effected that memorable revolution, were too
temperate, too wellinformed, to think of any restraint on the
legislative discretion. They were aware that a certain number of
troops for guards and garrisons were indispensable; that no
precise bounds could be set to the national exigencies; that a
power equal to every possible contingency must exist somewhere in
the government: and that when they referred the exercise of that
power to the judgment of the legislature, they had arrived at the
ultimate point of precaution which was reconcilable with the
safety of the community. <a class="permalink" href="#p5">¶</a></p>
<p id="p6">From the same source, the people of America may be said
to have derived an hereditary impression of danger to liberty,
from standing armies in time of peace. The circumstances of a
revolution quickened the public sensibility on every point
connected with the security of popular rights, and in some
instances raise the warmth of our zeal beyond the degree which
consisted with the due temperature of the body politic. The
attempts of two of the States to restrict the authority of the
legislature in the article of military establishments, are of the
number of these instances. The principles which had taught us to
be jealous of the power of an hereditary monarch were by an
injudicious excess extended to the representatives of the people
in their popular assemblies. Even in some of the States, where
this error was not adopted, we find unnecessary declarations that
standing armies ought not to be kept up, in time of peace,
<em>without the consent of the legislature</em>. I call them
unnecessary, because the reason which had introduced a similar
provision into the English Bill of Rights is not applicable to any
of the State constitutions. The power of raising armies at all,
under those constitutions, can by no construction be deemed to
reside anywhere else, than in the legislatures themselves; and it
was superfluous, if not absurd, to declare that a matter should
not be done without the consent of a body, which alone had the
power of doing it. Accordingly, in some of these constitutions,
and among others, in that of this State of New York, which has
been justly celebrated, both in Europe and America, as one of the
best of the forms of government established in this country, there
is a total silence upon the subject. <a class="permalink"
href="#p6">¶</a></p>
<p id="p7">It is remarkable, that even in the two States which
seem to have meditated an interdiction of military establishments
in time of peace, the mode of expression made use of is rather
cautionary than prohibitory. It is not said, that standing armies
<em>shall not be</em> kept up, but that they <em>ought not</em> to
be kept up, in time of peace. This ambiguity of terms appears to
have been the result of a conflict between jealousy and
conviction; between the desire of excluding such establishments at
all events, and the persuasion that an absolute exclusion would be
unwise and unsafe. Can it be doubted that such a provision,
whenever the situation of public affairs was understood to require
a departure from it, would be interpreted by the legislature into
a mere admonition, and would be made to yield to the necessities
or supposed necessities of the State? Let <a href="25#p8">the fact
already mentioned</a>, with respect to Pennsylvania, decide. What
then (it may be asked) is the use of such a provision, if it cease
to operate the moment there is an inclination to disregard it? <a
class="permalink" href="#p7">¶</a></p>
<p id="p8">Let us examine whether there be any comparison, in
point of efficacy, between the provision alluded to and that which
is contained in the new Constitution, for <a
href="constitution#a1s8c12">restraining the appropriations of
money for military purposes to the period of two years</a>. The
former, by aiming at too much, is calculated to effect nothing;
the latter, by steering clear of an imprudent extreme, and by
being perfectly compatible with a proper provision for the
exigencies of the nation, will have a salutary and powerful
operation. <a class="permalink" href="#p8">¶</a></p>
<p id="p9">The legislature of the United States will be
<em>obliged</em>, by this provision, once at least in every two
years, to deliberate upon the propriety of keeping a military
force on foot; to come to a new resolution on the point; and to
declare their sense of the matter, by a formal vote in the face of
their constituents. They are not <em>at liberty</em> to vest in
the executive department permanent funds for the support of an
army, if they were even incautious enough to be willing to repose
in it so improper a confidence. As the spirit of party, in
different degrees, must be expected to infect all political
bodies, there will be, no doubt, persons in the national
legislature willing enough to arraign the measures and criminate
the views of the majority. The provision for the support of a
military force will always be a favorable topic for declamation.
As often as the question comes forward, the public attention will
be roused and attracted to the subject, by the party in
opposition; and if the majority should be really disposed to
exceed the proper limits, the community will be warned of the
danger, and will have an opportunity of taking measures to guard
against it. Independent of parties in the national legislature
itself, as often as the period of discussion arrived, the State
legislatures, who will always be not only vigilant but suspicious
and jealous guardians of the rights of the citizens against
encroachments from the federal government, will constantly have
their attention awake to the conduct of the national rulers, and
will be ready enough, if any thing improper appears, to sound the
alarm to the people, and not only to be the <em>voice</em>, but,
if necessary, the <em>arm</em> of their discontent. <a
class="permalink" href="#p9">¶</a></p>
<p id="p10">Schemes to subvert the liberties of a great community
<em>require time</em> to mature them for execution. An army, so
large as seriously to menace those liberties, could only be formed
by progressive augmentations; which would suppose, not merely a
temporary combination between the legislature and executive, but a
continued conspiracy for a series of time. Is it probable that
such a combination would exist at all? Is it probable that it
would be persevered in, and transmitted along through all the
successive variations in a representative body, which biennial
elections would naturally produce in both houses? Is it
presumable, that every man, the instant he took his seat in the
national Senate or House of Representatives, would commence a
traitor to his constituents and to his country? Can it be supposed
that there would not be found one man, discerning enough to detect
so atrocious a conspiracy, or bold or honest enough to apprise his
constituents of their danger? If such presumptions can fairly be
made, there ought at once to be an end of all delegated authority.
The people should resolve to recall all the powers they have
heretofore parted with out of their own hands, and to divide
themselves into as many States as there are counties, in order
that they may be able to manage their own concerns in person. <a
class="permalink" href="#p10">¶</a></p>
<p id="p11">If such suppositions could even be reasonably made,
still the concealment of the design, for any duration, would be
impracticable. It would be announced, by the very circumstance of
augmenting the army to so great an extent in time of profound
peace. What colorable reason could be assigned, in a country so
situated, for such vast augmentations of the military force? It is
impossible that the people could be long deceived; and the
destruction of the project, and of the projectors, would quickly
follow the discovery. <a class="permalink" href="#p11">¶</a></p>
<p id="p12">It has been said that the provision which limits the
appropriation of money for the support of an army to the period of
two years would be unavailing, because the Executive, when once
possessed of a force large enough to awe the people into
submission, would find resources in that very force sufficient to
enable him to dispense with supplies from the acts of the
legislature. But the question again recurs, upon what pretense
could he be put in possession of a force of that magnitude in time
of peace? If we suppose it to have been created in consequence of
some domestic insurrection or foreign war, then it becomes a case
not within the principles of the objection; for this is levelled
against the power of keeping up troops in time of peace. Few
persons will be so visionary as seriously to contend that military
forces ought not to be raised to quell a rebellion or resist an
invasion; and if the defense of the community under such
circumstances should make it necessary to have an army so numerous
as to hazard its liberty, this is one of those calamaties for
which there is neither preventative nor cure. It cannot be
provided against by any possible form of government; it might even
result from a simple league offensive and defensive, if it should
ever be necessary for the confederates or allies to form an army
for common defense. <a class="permalink" href="#p12">¶</a></p>
<p id="p13">But it is an evil infinitely less likely to attend us
in a united than in a disunited state; nay, it may be safely
asserted that it is an evil altogether unlikely to attend us in
the latter situation. It is not easy to conceive a possibility
that dangers so formidable can assail the whole Union, as to
demand a force considerable enough to place our liberties in the
least jeopardy, especially if we take into our view the aid to be
derived from the militia, which ought always to be counted upon as
a valuable and powerful auxiliary. But in a state of disunion (as
has been fully shown in another place), the contrary of this
supposition would become not only probable, but almost
unavoidable. <a class="permalink" href="#p13">¶</a></p>
<address class="vcard author">
<span class="nickname">Publius</span>.
[<span class="fn">Alexander Hamilton</span>]
</address>
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<div class="meta">
<p>
First published in the <abbr class="published updated"
title="1787-12-22">Saturday, December 22, 1787</abbr> issue of the
<span class="publication">Independent Journal</span>.
</p>
<p class="rights">
This work is in <a rel="copyright license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/publicdomain/">the public domain</a>.
</p>
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Read about this
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