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<h1 class="entry-title"><a rel="bookmark" href="77">Federalist № 77</a></h1>
<h2 class="entry-summary">
The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive
Considered
</h2>
<div class="entry-content">
<p id="salutation">To the People of the State of New York:</p>
<p id="p1"><span class="initial">It has</span> been mentioned as
one of the advantages to be expected from the co-operation of the
Senate, in the business of appointments, that it would contribute
to the stability of the administration. The consent of that body
would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint. A change of
the Chief Magistrate, therefore, would not occasion so violent or
so general a revolution in the officers of the government as might
be expected, if he were the sole disposer of offices. Where a man
in any station had given satisfactory evidence of his fitness for
it, a new President would be restrained from attempting a change
in favor of a person more agreeable to him, by the apprehension
that a discountenance of the Senate might frustrate the attempt,
and bring some degree of discredit upon himself. Those who can
best estimate the value of a steady administration, will be most
disposed to prize a provision which connects the official
existence of public men with the approbation or disapprobation of
that body which, from the greater permanency of its own
composition, will in all probability be less subject to
inconstancy than any other member of the government. <a
class="permalink" href="#p1">¶</a></p>
<p id="p2">To this union of the Senate with the President, in the
article of appointments, it has in some cases been suggested that
it would serve to give the President an undue influence over the
Senate, and in others that it would have an opposite tendency, a
strong proof that neither suggestion is true. <a class="permalink"
href="#p2">¶</a></p>
<p id="p3">To state the first in its proper form, is to refute it.
It amounts to this: the President would have an improper
<em>influence over</em> the Senate, because the Senate would have
the power of <em>restraining</em> him. This is an absurdity in
terms. It cannot admit of a doubt that the entire power of
appointment would enable him much more effectually to establish a
dangerous empire over that body, than a mere power of nomination
subject to their control. <a class="permalink"
href="#p3">¶</a></p>
<p id="p4">Let us take a view of the converse of the proposition:
<q>the Senate would influence the Executive.</q> As I have had
occasion to remark in several other instances, the indistinctness
of the objection forbids a precise answer. In what manner is this
influence to be exerted? In relation to what objects? The power of
influencing a person, in the sense in which it is here used, must
imply a power of conferring a benefit upon him. How could the
Senate confer a benefit upon the President by the manner of
employing their right of negative upon his nominations? If it be
said they might sometimes gratify him by an acquiescence in a
favorite choice, when public motives might dictate a different
conduct, I answer, that the instances in which the President could
be personally interested in the result, would be too few to admit
of his being materially affected by the compliances of the Senate.
The <em>power</em> which can <em>originate</em> the disposition of
honors and emoluments, is more likely to attract than to be
attracted by the <em>power</em> which can merely obstruct their
course. If by influencing the President be meant
<em>restraining</em> him, this is precisely what must have been
intended. And it has been shown that the restraint would be
salutary, at the same time that it would not be such as to destroy
a single advantage to be looked for from the uncontrolled agency
of that Magistrate. The right of nomination would produce all the
good of that of appointment, and would in a great measure avoid
its evils. Upon a comparison of the plan for the appointment of
the officers of the proposed government with that which is
established by the constitution of this State, a decided
preference must be given to the former. In that plan the power of
nomination is unequivocally vested in the Executive. And as there
would be a necessity for submitting each nomination to the
judgment of an entire branch of the legislature, the circumstances
attending an appointment, from the mode of conducting it, would
naturally become matters of notoriety; and the public would be at
no loss to determine what part had been performed by the different
actors. The blame of a bad nomination would fall upon the
President singly and absolutely. The censure of rejecting a good
one would lie entirely at the door of the Senate; aggravated by
the consideration of their having counteracted the good intentions
of the Executive. If an ill appointment should be made, the
Executive for nominating, and the Senate for approving, would
participate, though in different degrees, in the opprobrium and
disgrace. <a class="permalink" href="#p4">¶</a></p>
<p id="p5">The reverse of all this characterizes the manner of
appointment in this State. The council of appointment consists of
from three to five persons, of whom the governor is always one.
This small body, shut up in a private apartment, impenetrable to
the public eye, proceed to the execution of the trust committed to
them. It is known that the governor claims the right of
nomination, upon the strength of some ambiguous expressions in the
constitution; but it is not known to what extent, or in what
manner he exercises it; nor upon what occasions he is contradicted
or opposed. The censure of a bad appointment, on account of the
uncertainty of its author, and for want of a determinate object,
has neither poignancy nor duration. And while an unbounded field
for cabal and intrigue lies open, all idea of responsibility is
lost. The most that the public can know, is that the governor
claims the right of nomination; that <em>two</em> out of the
inconsiderable number of <em>four</em> men can too often be
managed without much difficulty; that if some of the members of a
particular council should happen to be of an uncomplying
character, it is frequently not impossible to get rid of their
opposition by regulating the times of meeting in such a manner as
to render their attendance inconvenient; and that from whatever
cause it may proceed, a great number of very improper appointments
are from time to time made. Whether a governor of this State
avails himself of the ascendant he must necessarily have, in this
delicate and important part of the administration, to prefer to
offices men who are best qualified for them, or whether he
prostitutes that advantage to the advancement of persons whose
chief merit is their implicit devotion to his will, and to the
support of a despicable and dangerous system of personal
influence, are questions which, unfortunately for the community,
can only be the subjects of speculation and conjecture. <a
class="permalink" href="#p5">¶</a></p>
<p id="p6">Every mere council of appointment, however constituted,
will be a conclave, in which cabal and intrigue will have their
full scope. Their number, without an unwarrantable increase of
expense, cannot be large enough to preclude a facility of
combination. And as each member will have his friends and
connections to provide for, the desire of mutual gratification
will beget a scandalous bartering of votes and bargaining for
places. The private attachments of one man might easily be
satisfied; but to satisfy the private attachments of a dozen, or
of twenty men, would occasion a monopoly of all the principal
employments of the government in a few families, and would lead
more directly to an aristocracy or an oligarchy than any measure
that could be contrived. If, to avoid an accumulation of offices,
there was to be a frequent change in the persons who were to
compose the council, this would involve the mischiefs of a mutable
administration in their full extent. Such a council would also be
more liable to executive influence than the Senate, because they
would be fewer in number, and would act less immediately under the
public inspection. Such a council, in fine, as a substitute for
the plan of the convention, would be productive of an increase of
expense, a multiplication of the evils which spring from
favoritism and intrigue in the distribution of public honors, a
decrease of stability in the administration of the government, and
a diminution of the security against an undue influence of the
Executive. And yet such a council has been warmly contended for as
an essential amendment in the proposed Constitution. <a
class="permalink" href="#p6">¶</a></p>
<p id="p7">I could not with propriety conclude my observations on
the subject of appointments without taking notice of a scheme for
which there have appeared some, though but few advocates; I mean
that of uniting the House of Representatives in the power of
making them. I shall, however, do little more than mention it, as
I cannot imagine that it is likely to gain the countenance of any
considerable part of the community. A body so fluctuating and at
the same time so numerous, can never be deemed proper for the
exercise of that power. Its unfitness will appear manifest to all,
when it is recollected that in half a century it may consist of
three or four hundred persons. All the advantages of the
stability, both of the Executive and of the Senate, would be
defeated by this union, and infinite delays and embarrassments
would be occasioned. The example of most of the States in their
local constitutions encourages us to reprobate the idea. <a
class="permalink" href="#p7">¶</a></p>
<p id="p8">The only <a href="constitution#a2s3">remaining powers
of the Executive</a> are comprehended in giving information to
Congress of the state of the Union; in recommending to their
consideration such measures as he shall judge expedient; in
convening them, or either branch, upon extraordinary occasions; in
adjourning them when they cannot themselves agree upon the time of
adjournment; in receiving ambassadors and other public ministers;
in faithfully executing the laws; and in commissioning all the
officers of the United States. <a class="permalink"
href="#p8">¶</a></p>
<p id="p9">Except some cavils about the power of convening
<em>either</em> house of the legislature, and that of receiving
ambassadors, no objection has been made to this class of
authorities; nor could they possibly admit of any. It required,
indeed, an insatiable avidity for censure to invent exceptions to
the parts which have been excepted to. In regard to the power of
convening either house of the legislature, I shall barely remark,
that in respect to the Senate at least, we can readily discover a
good reason for it. <em>As</em> this body has a concurrent power
with the Executive in the article of treaties, it might often be
necessary to call it together with a view to this object, when it
would be unnecessary and improper to convene the House of
Representatives. As to the reception of ambassadors, what I have
said in a former paper will furnish a sufficient answer. <a
class="permalink" href="#p9">¶</a></p>
<p id="p10">We have now completed a survey of the structure and
powers of the executive department, which, I have endeavored to
show, combines, as far as republican principles will admit, all
the requisites to energy. The remaining inquiry is: Does it also
combine the requisites to safety, in a republican sense, a due
dependence on the people, a due responsibility? The answer to this
question has been anticipated in the investigation of its other
characteristics, and is satisfactorily deducible from these
circumstances; from the election of the President once in four
years by persons immediately chosen by the people for that
purpose; and from his being at all times liable to impeachment,
trial, dismission from office, incapacity to serve in any other,
and to forfeiture of life and estate by subsequent prosecution in
the common course of law. But these precautions, great as they
are, are not the only ones which the plan of the convention has
provided in favor of the public security. In the only instances in
which the abuse of the executive authority was materially to be
feared, the Chief Magistrate of the United States would, by that
plan, be subjected to the control of a branch of the legislative
body. What more could be desired by an enlightened and reasonable
people? <a class="permalink" href="#p10">¶</a></p>
<address class="vcard author">
<span class="nickname">Publius</span>.
[<span class="fn">Alexander Hamilton</span>]
</address>
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<div class="meta">
<p>
First published in the <abbr class="published updated"
title="1788-04-04">Friday, April 4, 1788</abbr> issue of the <span
class="publication">Independent Journal</span>.
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