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idp_oidc.go
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idp_oidc.go
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package main
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/aes"
"crypto/cipher"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"log"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"regexp"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/Cloud-Foundations/keymaster/lib/authutil"
"github.com/Cloud-Foundations/keymaster/lib/instrumentedwriter"
"github.com/mendsley/gojwk"
"gopkg.in/square/go-jose.v2"
"gopkg.in/square/go-jose.v2/jwt"
)
//For minimal openid connect interaface and easy config we need 5 enpoints
// 1. Discovery Document -> so that consumers need only 3 conf values
// 2. jwks_uri -> where the keys to decrypt document can be found
// 3. authorization_endpoint - > OAUth2 authorization endpoint
// 4. token_endpoint
// 5. userinfo endpoint.
const idpOpenIDCConfigurationDocumentPath = "/.well-known/openid-configuration"
const idpOpenIDCJWKSPath = "/idp/oauth2/jwks"
const idpOpenIDCAuthorizationPath = "/idp/oauth2/authorize"
const idpOpenIDCTokenPath = "/idp/oauth2/token"
const idpOpenIDCUserinfoPath = "/idp/oauth2/userinfo"
// From: https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html
// We only put required OR implemented fields here
type openIDProviderMetadata struct {
Issuer string `json:"issuer"`
AuthorizationEndpoint string `json:"authorization_endpoint"`
TokenEndoint string `json:"token_endpoint"`
UserInfoEndpoint string `json:"userinfo_endpoint"`
JWKSURI string `json:"jwks_uri"`
ResponseTypesSupported []string `json:"response_types_supported"`
SubjectTypesSupported []string `json:"subject_types_supported"`
IDTokenSigningAlgValue []string `json:"id_token_signing_alg_values_supported"`
}
func (state *RuntimeState) idpOpenIDCDiscoveryHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
issuer := state.idpGetIssuer()
metadata := openIDProviderMetadata{
Issuer: issuer,
AuthorizationEndpoint: issuer + idpOpenIDCAuthorizationPath,
TokenEndoint: issuer + idpOpenIDCTokenPath,
UserInfoEndpoint: issuer + idpOpenIDCUserinfoPath,
JWKSURI: issuer + idpOpenIDCJWKSPath,
ResponseTypesSupported: []string{"code"}, // We only support authorization code flow
SubjectTypesSupported: []string{"pairwise", "public"}, // WHAT is THIS?
IDTokenSigningAlgValue: []string{"RS256"}}
// need to agree on what scopes we will support
b, err := json.Marshal(metadata)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("Error marshalling in idpOpenIDCDiscoveryHandler: %s", err)
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal Error")
return
}
var out bytes.Buffer
json.Indent(&out, b, "", "\t")
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*")
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
out.WriteTo(w)
}
type jwsKeyList struct {
Keys []*gojwk.Key `json:"keys"`
}
// Need to improve this to account for adding the other signers here.
func (state *RuntimeState) idpOpenIDCJWKSHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if state.sendFailureToClientIfLocked(w, r) {
return
}
var currentKeys jwsKeyList
for _, key := range state.KeymasterPublicKeys {
jwkKey, err := gojwk.PublicKey(key)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("error getting key idpOpenIDCJWKSHandler: %s", err)
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal Error")
return
}
jwkKey.Kid, err = getKeyFingerprint(key)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("error computing key fingerprint in idpOpenIDCJWKSHandler: %s", err)
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal Error")
return
}
currentKeys.Keys = append(currentKeys.Keys, jwkKey)
}
b, err := json.Marshal(currentKeys)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("idpOpenIDCJWKSHandler marshaling error: %s", err)
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal Error")
return
}
var out bytes.Buffer
json.Indent(&out, b, "", "\t")
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*")
out.WriteTo(w)
}
type keymasterdIDPCodeProtectedData struct {
CodeChallenge string `json:"code_challenge,omitempty"`
CodeChallengeMethod string `json:"code_challenge_method,omitempty"`
}
type keymasterdCodeToken struct {
Issuer string `json:"iss"` //keymasterd
Subject string `json:"sub"` //clientID
IssuedAt int64 `json:"iat"`
Expiration int64 `json:"exp"`
Audience []string `json:"aud"`
Username string `json:"username"`
AuthLevel int64 `json:"auth_level"`
AuthExpiration int64 `json:"auth_exp"`
Nonce string `json:"nonce,omitEmpty"`
RedirectURI string `json:"redirect_uri"`
AccessAudience []string `json:"access_audience,omitempty"`
Scope string `json:"scope"`
Type string `json:"type"`
JWTId string `json:"jti,omitEmpty"`
ProtectedDataKey string `json:"protected_data_key,omitempty"`
ProtectedData string `json:"protected_data,omitempty"`
}
var ErrorIDPClientNotFound = errors.New("Client id not found")
func (state *RuntimeState) idpOpenIDCGetClientConfig(client_id string) (*OpenIDConnectClientConfig, error) {
for _, client := range state.Config.OpenIDConnectIDP.Client {
if client.ClientID == client_id {
return &client, nil
}
}
return nil, ErrorIDPClientNotFound
}
// https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-10.html states
// that redirects MUST be exact matches.
// We allow our users to be less strict (for facilitation of internal deployments).
// however we make 3 things mandatory:
// 1. redirect_urls scheme MUST be https (to prevent code snooping).
// 2. redirect_urls MUST not include a query (to prevent stealing of code with faulty clients (open redirect))
// 3. redirect_url path MUST NOT contain ".." to prevent path traversal attacks
func (client *OpenIDConnectClientConfig) CanRedirectToURL(redirectUrl string) (bool, *url.URL, error) {
if len(client.AllowedRedirectDomains) < 1 && len(client.AllowedRedirectURLRE) < 1 {
return false, nil, nil
}
matchedRE := false
for _, re := range client.AllowedRedirectURLRE {
matched, err := regexp.MatchString(re, redirectUrl)
if err != nil {
return false, nil, err
}
if matched {
matchedRE = true
break
}
}
parsedURL, err := url.Parse(redirectUrl)
if err != nil {
logger.Debugf(1, "user passed unparsable url as string err = %s", err)
return false, nil, nil
}
if parsedURL.Scheme != "https" {
return false, nil, nil
}
if len(parsedURL.RawQuery) > 0 {
return false, nil, nil
}
if strings.Contains(parsedURL.Path, "..") {
return false, nil, nil
}
// if no domains, the matchedRE answer is authoritative
if len(client.AllowedRedirectDomains) < 1 {
return matchedRE, parsedURL, nil
}
if len(client.AllowedRedirectURLRE) < 1 {
matchedRE = true
}
matchedDomain := false
for _, domain := range client.AllowedRedirectDomains {
matched := strings.HasSuffix(parsedURL.Hostname(), domain)
if matched {
matchedDomain = true
break
}
}
return matchedDomain && matchedRE, parsedURL, nil
}
func (client *OpenIDConnectClientConfig) CorsOriginAllowed(origin string) (bool, error) {
parsedURL, err := url.Parse(origin)
if err != nil {
logger.Debugf(1, "user passed unparsable url as string err = %s", err)
return false, nil
}
if parsedURL.Scheme != "https" {
return false, nil
}
for _, domain := range client.AllowedRedirectDomains {
matched := strings.HasSuffix(parsedURL.Hostname(), domain)
if matched {
return true, nil
}
}
return false, nil
}
//
func (client *OpenIDConnectClientConfig) RequestedAudienceIsAllowed(audience string) bool {
return client.AllowClientChosenAudiences
}
// This is weak we should be doing hashes
func (client *OpenIDConnectClientConfig) ValidClientSecret(clientSecret string) bool {
return clientSecret == client.ClientSecret
}
func (client *OpenIDConnectClientConfig) ClientCanDoPKCEAuth() (bool, error) {
return client.ClientSecret == "", nil
}
func (state *RuntimeState) idpOpenIDCGenericIsCorsOriginAllowed(origin string) (bool, error) {
parsedURL, err := url.Parse(origin)
if err != nil {
logger.Debugf(1, "user passed unparsable url as string err = %s", err)
return false, nil
}
if parsedURL.Scheme != "https" {
return false, nil
}
for _, client := range state.Config.OpenIDConnectIDP.Client {
for _, domain := range client.AllowedRedirectDomains {
matched := strings.HasSuffix(parsedURL.Hostname(), domain)
if matched {
return true, nil
}
}
}
return false, nil
}
func genRandomBytes() ([]byte, error) {
size := randomStringEntropyBytes
rb := make([]byte, size)
_, err := rand.Read(rb)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return rb, nil
}
type EncryptedKeySet struct {
RsaOaep [][]byte `json:"rsa_oaep"`
}
func (state *RuntimeState) deserializeKeysetIntoPlaintextKey(serializedKeySet []byte) ([]byte, error) {
var encodedKeySet EncryptedKeySet
var err error
err = json.Unmarshal(serializedKeySet, &encodedKeySet)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return state.decryptWithPublicKeys(encodedKeySet.RsaOaep)
}
func (state *RuntimeState) encryptKeyAndSerialize(key []byte) ([]byte, error) {
var encodedKeySet EncryptedKeySet
var err error
encodedKeySet.RsaOaep, err = state.encryptWithPublicKeys(key)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return json.Marshal(encodedKeySet)
}
func sealEncodeData(plaintext, nonce, key []byte) (string, error) {
block, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
aesgcm, err := cipher.NewGCM(block)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
trimmedNonce := nonce[:aesgcm.NonceSize()]
ciphertext := aesgcm.Seal(nil, trimmedNonce, plaintext, nil)
return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(ciphertext), nil
}
func decodeOpenData(cipherText string, nonce, key []byte) ([]byte, error) {
var err error
decodedCipherText, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(cipherText)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
block, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
aesgcm, err := cipher.NewGCM(block)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
trimmedNonce := nonce[:aesgcm.NonceSize()]
return aesgcm.Open(nil, trimmedNonce, decodedCipherText, nil)
}
const idpOpenIDCMaxAuthProcessMaxDurationSeconds = 300
func (state *RuntimeState) idpOpenIDCAuthorizationHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if state.sendFailureToClientIfLocked(w, r) {
return
}
// We are now at exploration stage... and will require pre-authed clients.
authData, err := state.checkAuth(w, r, state.getRequiredWebUIAuthLevel())
if err != nil {
logger.Debugf(1, "%v", err)
return
}
logger.Debugf(1, "AuthUser of idc auth: %s", authData.Username)
w.(*instrumentedwriter.LoggingWriter).SetUsername(authData.Username)
// requst MUST be a GET or POST
if !(r.Method == "GET" || r.Method == "POST") {
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid Method for Auth Handler")
return
}
err = r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
if err.Error() == "invalid semicolon separator in query" {
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid URL, contains semicolons")
return
}
if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "invalid") {
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid URL")
return
}
logger.Printf("idpOpenIDCAuthorizationHandler Error parsing From err: %s", err)
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, "")
return
}
logger.Debugf(2, "Auth request =%+v", r)
//logger.Printf("IDC auth from=%v", r.Form)
if r.Form.Get("response_type") != "code" {
logger.Debugf(1, "Invalid response_type")
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "Unsupported or Missing response_type for Auth Handler")
return
}
clientID := r.Form.Get("client_id")
if clientID == "" {
logger.Debugf(1, "empty client_id aborting")
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "Empty cleint_id for Auth Handler")
return
}
scope := r.Form.Get("scope")
validScope := false
for _, requestedScope := range strings.Split(scope, " ") {
if requestedScope == "openid" {
validScope = true
}
}
if !validScope {
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid scope value for Auth Handler")
return
}
oidcClient, err := state.idpOpenIDCGetClientConfig(clientID)
if err != nil {
if err == ErrorIDPClientNotFound {
logger.Debugf(1, "Client Not Found clientID=%s", clientID)
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "ClientID uknown")
return
}
logger.Printf("%v", err)
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, "")
return
}
requestRedirectURLString := r.Form.Get("redirect_uri")
ok, parsedRedirectURL, err := oidcClient.CanRedirectToURL(requestRedirectURLString)
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("%v", err)
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, "")
return
}
if !ok {
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "redirect string not valid")
return
}
jwtId, err := genRandomString()
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("Error getting random string %v", err)
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, "")
return
}
var protectedData keymasterdIDPCodeProtectedData
protectedData.CodeChallenge = r.Form.Get("code_challenge")
protectedData.CodeChallengeMethod = r.Form.Get("code_challenge_method")
var protectedCipherText string
var protectedCipherTextKeys string
if len(protectedData.CodeChallenge) > 0 {
if len(protectedData.CodeChallengeMethod) > 0 && protectedData.CodeChallengeMethod != "S256" {
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "Requested Code Challenge, but challenge method is invalid")
return
}
jsonEncodedData, err := json.Marshal(protectedData)
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("Error json encoding data %v", err)
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, "")
return
}
key, err := genRandomBytes()
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("Error generating PKCE encryption key %v", err)
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, "")
return
}
serializedKeySet, err := state.encryptKeyAndSerialize(key) //json.Marshal(encodedKeySet)
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("Error encrpyting PKCE encryption key %v", err)
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, "")
return
}
protectedCipherTextKeys = string(serializedKeySet)
protectedCipherText, err = sealEncodeData([]byte(jsonEncodedData), []byte(jwtId), key)
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("Error getting random string %v", err)
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, "")
return
}
}
//For the initial version we will only allow a single extra audience
var accessAudience []string
requestedAudience := r.Form.Get("audience")
if requestedAudience != "" {
if !oidcClient.RequestedAudienceIsAllowed(requestedAudience) {
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid audience")
return
}
validAudience, err := oidcClient.CorsOriginAllowed(requestedAudience)
if err != nil {
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, "")
return
}
if !validAudience {
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid audience")
return
}
accessAudience = append(accessAudience, requestedAudience)
}
//Dont check for now
signerOptions := (&jose.SignerOptions{}).WithType("JWT")
//signerOptions.EmbedJWK = true
signer, err := jose.NewSigner(jose.SigningKey{Algorithm: jose.RS256, Key: state.Signer}, signerOptions)
if err != nil {
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, "")
return
}
codeToken := keymasterdCodeToken{Issuer: state.idpGetIssuer(), Subject: clientID, IssuedAt: time.Now().Unix()}
codeToken.JWTId = jwtId
codeToken.Scope = scope
codeToken.AuthExpiration = time.Now().Unix() + maxAgeSecondsAuthCookie
codeToken.Expiration = time.Now().Unix() + idpOpenIDCMaxAuthProcessMaxDurationSeconds
codeToken.Username = authData.Username
codeToken.RedirectURI = requestRedirectURLString
codeToken.Type = "token_endpoint"
codeToken.ProtectedData = protectedCipherText
codeToken.ProtectedDataKey = protectedCipherTextKeys
codeToken.AccessAudience = accessAudience
codeToken.Nonce = r.Form.Get("nonce")
// Do nonce complexity check
if len(codeToken.Nonce) < 6 && len(codeToken.Nonce) != 0 {
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "bad Nonce value...not enough entropy")
return
}
logger.Debugf(3, "auth request is valid, now proceeding to generate redirect")
raw, err := jwt.Signed(signer).Claims(codeToken).CompactSerialize()
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
redirectPath := fmt.Sprintf("%s?code=%s&state=%s", requestRedirectURLString, raw, url.QueryEscape(r.Form.Get("state")))
logger.Debugf(3, "auth request is valid, redirect path=%s", redirectPath)
logger.Debugf(0, "IDP: Successful oauth2 authorization: user=%s redirect url=%s", authData.Username, parsedRedirectURL.Redacted())
eventNotifier.PublishServiceProviderLoginEvent(requestRedirectURLString, authData.Username)
http.Redirect(w, r, redirectPath, 302)
//logger.Printf("raw jwt =%v", raw)
}
type openIDConnectIDToken struct {
Issuer string `json:"iss"`
Subject string `json:"sub"`
Audience []string `json:"aud"`
Expiration int64 `json:"exp"`
IssuedAt int64 `json:"iat"`
AuthTime int64 `json:"auth_time,omitempty"` //Time of Auth
Nonce string `json:"nonce,omitempty"`
}
type tokenResponse struct {
AccessToken string `json:"access_token"`
TokenType string `json:"token_type"`
ExpiresIn int `json:"expires_in"`
IDToken string `json:"id_token"`
}
type bearerAccessToken struct {
Issuer string `json:"iss"`
Audience []string `json:"aud,omitempty"`
Username string `json:"username"`
Scope string `json:"scope"`
Expiration int64 `json:"exp"`
IssuedAt int64 `json:"iat"`
Type string `json:"type"`
}
func (state *RuntimeState) idpOpenIDCValidCodeVerifier(clientId string, codeVerifier string, codeToken keymasterdCodeToken) bool {
key, err := state.deserializeKeysetIntoPlaintextKey([]byte(codeToken.ProtectedDataKey))
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("idpOpenIDCValidCodeVerifier: Error getting encryption keys %v", err)
return false
}
plainTextJson, err := decodeOpenData(codeToken.ProtectedData, []byte(codeToken.JWTId), key)
if err != nil {
return false
}
var protectedData keymasterdIDPCodeProtectedData
err = json.Unmarshal([]byte(plainTextJson), &protectedData)
if err != nil {
return false
}
state.logger.Debugf(1, "Protected Data Found=%+v", protectedData)
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7636 section 4.6
switch protectedData.CodeChallengeMethod {
case "", "plain":
return codeVerifier == protectedData.CodeChallenge
case "S256":
// BASE64URL-ENCODE(SHA256(ASCII(code_verifier))) == code_challenge
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(codeVerifier))
return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(sum[:]) == protectedData.CodeChallenge
default:
return false
}
}
func (state *RuntimeState) idpOpenIDCTokenHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// MUST be POST https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html 3.1.3.1
if !(r.Method == "POST") {
logger.Printf("invalid method")
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid Method for Auth Handler")
return
}
err := r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("error parsing form")
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, "")
return
}
if r.Form.Get("grant_type") != "authorization_code" {
logger.Printf("invalid grant type='%s'", r.Form.Get("grant_type"))
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid grant type")
return
}
requestRedirectURLString := r.Form.Get("redirect_uri")
if requestRedirectURLString == "" {
logger.Printf("redirect_uri is empty")
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid redirect uri")
return
}
logger.Debugf(1, "token request =%+v", r)
codeString := r.Form.Get("code")
if codeString == "" {
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "nil code")
return
}
tok, err := jwt.ParseSigned(codeString)
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("err=%s", err)
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "bad code")
return
}
logger.Debugf(2, "token request tok=%+v", tok)
//out := jwt.Claims{}
keymasterToken := keymasterdCodeToken{}
//if err := tok.Claims(state.Signer.Public(), &keymasterToken); err != nil {
if err := state.JWTClaims(tok, &keymasterToken); err != nil {
logger.Printf("err=%s", err)
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "bad code")
return
}
logger.Debugf(3, "idc token handler out=%+v", keymasterToken)
//now is time to extract the values..
//formClientID := r.Form.Get("clientID")
logger.Debugf(2, "%+v", r)
codeVerifier := r.Form.Get("code_verifier")
unescapeAuthCredentials := true
clientID, pass, ok := r.BasicAuth()
if !ok {
logger.Debugf(1, "warn: basic auth Missing")
clientID = r.Form.Get("client_id")
pass = r.Form.Get("client_secret")
if len(pass) < 1 && len(codeVerifier) < 1 {
logger.Printf("Cannot get auth credentials in auth request")
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, "")
return
}
if len(clientID) < 1 {
// This section is kind of unclear. The original rfc6749 spec
// Did not have this as mandatory, however given the need for password
// based auth it was prety much mandatory.
// However... with PKCE the issue is murkier:
// not mandatory: login.gov (https://developers.login.gov/oidc/)
// on-docs: auth0, okta,
// mandatory: onlogin.com
// In our implementation we ARE explicitly making it mandatory for
// the PKCE flow.
// Thus for clarity we are also explicily sending the error cause to
// help developers debug and be able to potentially enumerate interoperativity
// issues
logger.Printf("Missing client_id in auth request")
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, "Missing client_id")
return
}
unescapeAuthCredentials = false
}
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-2.3.1 says the client id and password
// are actually url-encoded
if unescapeAuthCredentials {
unescapedClientID, err := url.QueryUnescape(clientID)
if err == nil {
clientID = unescapedClientID
}
unescapedPass, err := url.QueryUnescape(pass)
if err == nil {
pass = unescapedPass
}
}
oidcClient, err := state.idpOpenIDCGetClientConfig(clientID)
if err != nil {
if err == ErrorIDPClientNotFound {
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "ClientID uknown")
return
}
logger.Printf("%v", err)
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, "")
return
}
valid := false
if len(codeVerifier) > 0 {
canUserCodeVerifier, err := oidcClient.ClientCanDoPKCEAuth()
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("Error checking if client can do PKCE auth")
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, "")
return
}
if !canUserCodeVerifier {
logger.Printf("Missing client_id in auth request")
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, "Client Cannot use PKCE authentication")
return
}
valid = state.idpOpenIDCValidCodeVerifier(clientID, codeVerifier, keymasterToken)
}
if !valid && len(pass) > 0 {
valid = oidcClient.ValidClientSecret(pass)
}
if !valid {
logger.Debugf(0, "Error invalid client secret or code verifier")
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, "")
return
}
// if we have an origin it should be whitelisted
originIsValid, err := oidcClient.CorsOriginAllowed(r.Header.Get("Origin"))
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("Error checking Origin")
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, "")
return
}
// 1. Ensure authoriation client was issued to the authenticated client
if clientID != keymasterToken.Subject {
logger.Debugf(0, "Unmatching token Value")
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, "")
return
}
// 2. verify authorization code is valid
// 2.a -> expiration
if keymasterToken.Expiration < time.Now().Unix() {
logger.Debugf(0, "Expired Token")
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, "")
return
}
// verify redirect uri matches the one setup in the original request:
if keymasterToken.RedirectURI != requestRedirectURLString {
logger.Debugf(0, "Invalid Redirect Target")
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, "")
return
}
// Verify that the Authorization Code used was issued in response to an OpenID Connect Authentication Request
if keymasterToken.Type != "token_endpoint" {
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, "")
return
}
signerOptions := (&jose.SignerOptions{}).WithType("JWT")
kid, err := getKeyFingerprint(state.Signer.Public())
if err != nil {
log.Printf("error getting key fingerprint in idpOpenIDCTokenHandler: %s", err)
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal Error")
return
}
signerOptions = signerOptions.WithHeader("kid", kid)
signer, err := jose.NewSigner(jose.SigningKey{Algorithm: jose.RS256, Key: state.Signer}, signerOptions)
if err != nil {
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, "")
return
}
idToken := openIDConnectIDToken{Issuer: state.idpGetIssuer(), Subject: keymasterToken.Username, Audience: []string{clientID}}
idToken.Nonce = keymasterToken.Nonce
idToken.Expiration = keymasterToken.AuthExpiration
idToken.IssuedAt = time.Now().Unix()
signedIdToken, err := jwt.Signed(signer).Claims(idToken).CompactSerialize()
if err != nil {
log.Printf("error signing idToken in idpOpenIDCTokenHandler,: %s", err)
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal Error")
return
}
logger.Debugf(2, "raw=%s", signedIdToken)
accessToken := bearerAccessToken{Issuer: state.idpGetIssuer(),
Username: keymasterToken.Username, Scope: keymasterToken.Scope}
accessToken.Expiration = idToken.Expiration
accessToken.Type = "bearer"
accessToken.IssuedAt = time.Now().Unix()
if len(keymasterToken.AccessAudience) > 0 {
accessToken.Audience = append(keymasterToken.AccessAudience, state.idpGetIssuer()+idpOpenIDCUserinfoPath)
}
signedAccessToken, err := jwt.Signed(signer).Claims(accessToken).CompactSerialize()
if err != nil {
log.Printf("error signing accessToken in idpOpenIDCTokenHandler: %s", err)
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal Error")
return
}
// The access token will be yet another jwt.
outToken := tokenResponse{
AccessToken: signedAccessToken,
TokenType: "Bearer",
ExpiresIn: int(idToken.Expiration - idToken.IssuedAt),
IDToken: signedIdToken}
// and write the json output
b, err := json.Marshal(outToken)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("error marshaling in idpOpenIDCTokenHandler: %s", err)
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal Error")
return
}
var out bytes.Buffer
json.Indent(&out, b, "", "\t")
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
w.Header().Set("Pragma", "no-cache")
if originIsValid {
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", r.Header.Get("Origin"))
w.Header().Set("Vary", "Origin")
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Max-Age", "7200")
}
out.WriteTo(w)
}
func (state *RuntimeState) getGitDbUserAttributes(username string,
attributes []string) (bool, map[string][]string, error) {
if state.gitDB == nil {
return false, nil, nil
}
groups, err := state.gitDB.GetUserGroups(username)
if err != nil {
return true, nil, err
}
return true, map[string][]string{"groups": prependGroups(
groups, state.Config.UserInfo.GitDB.GroupPrepend)},
nil
}
func (state *RuntimeState) getLdapUserAttributes(username string,
attributes []string) (bool, map[string][]string, error) {
ldapConfig := state.Config.UserInfo.Ldap
if ldapConfig.LDAPTargetURLs == "" {
return false, nil, nil
}
var timeoutSecs uint
timeoutSecs = 2
for _, ldapUrl := range strings.Split(ldapConfig.LDAPTargetURLs, ",") {
if len(ldapUrl) < 1 {
continue
}
u, err := authutil.ParseLDAPURL(ldapUrl)
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("Failed to parse ldapurl '%s'", ldapUrl)
continue
}
attributeMap, err := authutil.GetLDAPUserAttributes(*u,
ldapConfig.BindUsername, ldapConfig.BindPassword,
timeoutSecs, nil, username,
ldapConfig.UserSearchBaseDNs, ldapConfig.UserSearchFilter,
attributes)
if err != nil {
continue
}
userGroups, err := authutil.GetLDAPUserGroups(*u,
ldapConfig.BindUsername, ldapConfig.BindPassword,
timeoutSecs, nil, username,
ldapConfig.UserSearchBaseDNs, ldapConfig.UserSearchFilter,
ldapConfig.GroupSearchBaseDNs, ldapConfig.GroupSearchFilter)
if err != nil {
// TODO: We actually need to check the error, right now we are
// assuming the user does not exists and go with that.
logger.Printf("Failed get userGroups for user '%s'", username)
} else {
logger.Debugf(1, "Got groups for username %s: %s",
username, userGroups)
attributeMap["groups"] = userGroups
}
return true, attributeMap, nil
}
return true, nil, errors.New("error getting the groups")
}
func (state *RuntimeState) getUserAttributes(username string,
attributes []string) (map[string][]string, error) {
ok, attrs, err := state.getLdapUserAttributes(username, attributes)
if ok {
return attrs, err
}
ok, attrs, err = state.getGitDbUserAttributes(username, attributes)
if ok {
return attrs, err
}
return nil, nil
}
type openidConnectUserInfo struct {
Subject string `json:"sub"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Login string `json:"login,omitempty"`
Username string `json:"username,omitempty"`
PreferredUsername string `json:"preferred_username,omitempty"`
Email string `json:"email,omitempty"`
Groups []string `json:"groups,omitempty"`
}
func (state *RuntimeState) idpOpenIDCUserinfoHandler(w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request) {
if !(r.Method == "GET" || r.Method == "POST" || r.Method == "OPTIONS") {
logger.Printf("Invalid Method for Userinfo Handler")
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest,
"Invalid Method for Userinfo Handler")
return
}
logger.Debugf(2, "userinfo request=%+v", r)
origin := r.Header.Get("Origin")
if r.Method == "OPTIONS" {
if origin == "" {
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "Options MUST contain origin")
return
}
originIsValid, err := state.idpOpenIDCGenericIsCorsOriginAllowed(origin)
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("Error checking Origin")
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, "")
return
}
if originIsValid {
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", origin)
w.Header().Set("Vary", "Origin")
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Max-Age", "7200")
}
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", "Accept, Authorization")
return
}
var accessToken string
authHeader := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
if authHeader != "" {
logger.Debugf(2, "AuthHeader= %s", authHeader)
splitHeader := strings.Split(authHeader, " ")
if len(splitHeader) == 2 {
if splitHeader[0] == "Bearer" {
accessToken = splitHeader[1]
}
}
}
if accessToken == "" {
err := r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, "")
return
}
accessToken = r.Form.Get("access_token")
}
logger.Debugf(1, "access_token='%s'", accessToken)
if accessToken == "" {
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest,
"Missing access token")
return
}
tok, err := jwt.ParseSigned(accessToken)
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("err=%s", err)
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest,
"bad access token")
return
}
logger.Debugf(1, "tok=%+v", tok)
parsedAccessToken := bearerAccessToken{}
if err := state.JWTClaims(tok, &parsedAccessToken); err != nil {
logger.Printf("err=%s", err)
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "bad code")
return
}
logger.Debugf(1, "out=%+v", parsedAccessToken)
// Now we check for validity.
if parsedAccessToken.Expiration < time.Now().Unix() {
logger.Printf("expired token attempted to be used for bearer")
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, "Expired Token")
return
}
if parsedAccessToken.Type != "bearer" {
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, "Wrong Token Type")
return
}
if parsedAccessToken.Issuer != state.idpGetIssuer() {
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, "Invalid Token Issuer")
return
}
if len(parsedAccessToken.Audience) > 0 {
hasUserinfoAudience := false
userInfoURL := state.idpGetIssuer() + idpOpenIDCUserinfoPath
for _, audience := range parsedAccessToken.Audience {
if audience == userInfoURL {
hasUserinfoAudience = true
break
}
}
if !hasUserinfoAudience {
state.writeFailureResponse(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, "Invalid Audience in token")
return
}
}
// Get email from LDAP if available.
defaultEmailDomain := state.HostIdentity
if len(state.Config.OpenIDConnectIDP.DefaultEmailDomain) > 3 {
defaultEmailDomain = state.Config.OpenIDConnectIDP.DefaultEmailDomain
}
email := fmt.Sprintf("%s@%s", parsedAccessToken.Username,
defaultEmailDomain)
userAttributeMap, err := state.getUserAttributes(parsedAccessToken.Username,
[]string{"mail"})
if err != nil {
logger.Printf("warn: failed to get user attributes for %s, %s",
parsedAccessToken.Username, err)
}
var userGroups []string
if userAttributeMap != nil {
logger.Debugf(2, "useMa=%+v", userAttributeMap)
mailList, ok := userAttributeMap["mail"]
if ok {
email = mailList[0]
}