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handshake_client_gm.go
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handshake_client_gm.go
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// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package tls
import (
"bytes"
"crypto"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/subtle"
"errors"
"fmt"
"github.com/Lcfling/cryptogm/sm2"
"github.com/Lcfling/cryptogm/x509"
"hash"
"io"
"sync/atomic"
)
type clientHandshakeStateGM struct {
c *Conn
serverHello *serverHelloMsg
hello *clientHelloMsg
suite *cipherSuite
finishedHash finishedHash
masterSecret []byte
session *ClientSessionState
}
func (c *Conn) makeClientHelloGM() (*clientHelloMsg, error) {
config := c.config
if len(config.ServerName) == 0 && !config.InsecureSkipVerify {
return nil, errors.New("tls: either ServerName or InsecureSkipVerify must be specified in the tls.Config")
}
hello := &clientHelloMsg{
vers: config.GMSupport.GetVersion(),
compressionMethods: []uint8{compressionNone},
random: make([]byte, 32),
}
if c.handshakes > 0 {
hello.secureRenegotiation = c.clientFinished[:]
}
possibleCipherSuites := config.cipherSuites()
hello.cipherSuites = make([]uint16, 0, len(possibleCipherSuites))
for _, suiteId := range possibleCipherSuites {
for _, suite := range config.GMSupport.cipherSuites() {
if suite.id != suiteId {
continue
}
hello.cipherSuites = append(hello.cipherSuites, suiteId)
break
}
}
_, err := io.ReadFull(config.rand(), hello.random)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.New("tls: short read from Rand: " + err.Error())
}
// A random session ID is used to detect when the server accepted a ticket
// and is resuming a session (see RFC 5077). In TLS 1.3, it's always set as
// a compatibility measure (see RFC 8446, Section 4.1.2).
if _, err := io.ReadFull(config.rand(), hello.sessionId); err != nil {
return nil, errors.New("tls: short read from Rand: " + err.Error())
}
return hello, nil
}
// Does the handshake, either a full one or resumes old session. Requires hs.c,
// hs.hello, hs.serverHello, and, optionally, hs.session to be set.
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateGM) handshake() error {
c := hs.c
isResume, err := hs.processServerHello()
if err != nil {
return err
}
hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHashGM(hs.suite)
// No signatures of the handshake are needed in a resumption.
// Otherwise, in a full handshake, if we don't have any certificates
// configured then we will never send a CertificateVerify message and
// thus no signatures are needed in that case either.
if isResume || (len(c.config.Certificates) == 0 && c.config.GetClientCertificate == nil) {
hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal())
c.buffering = true
c.didResume = isResume
if isResume {
if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.readSessionTicket(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.readFinished(c.serverFinished[:]); err != nil {
return err
}
c.clientFinishedIsFirst = false
// Make sure the connection is still being verified whether or not this
// is a resumption. Resumptions currently don't reverify certificates so
// they don't call verifyServerCertificate. See Issue 31641.
if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil {
if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
return err
}
}
if err := hs.sendFinished(c.clientFinished[:]); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
return err
}
} else {
if err := hs.doFullHandshake(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.sendFinished(c.clientFinished[:]); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
return err
}
c.clientFinishedIsFirst = true
if err := hs.readSessionTicket(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.readFinished(c.serverFinished[:]); err != nil {
return err
}
}
c.ekm = ekmFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.hello.random, hs.serverHello.random)
atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1)
return nil
}
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateGM) pickCipherSuite() error {
if hs.suite = mutualCipherSuite(hs.hello.cipherSuites, hs.serverHello.cipherSuite); hs.suite == nil {
hs.c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return errors.New("tls: server chose an unconfigured cipher suite")
}
hs.c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
return nil
}
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateGM) doFullHandshake() error {
c := hs.c
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsg)
if !ok || len(certMsg.certificates) == 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg)
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
cs, ok := msg.(*certificateStatusMsg)
if ok {
// RFC4366 on Certificate Status Request:
// The server MAY return a "certificate_status" message.
if !hs.serverHello.ocspStapling {
// If a server returns a "CertificateStatus" message, then the
// server MUST have included an extension of type "status_request"
// with empty "extension_data" in the extended server hello.
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return errors.New("tls: received unexpected CertificateStatus message")
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(cs.marshal())
c.ocspResponse = cs.response
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
if c.handshakes == 0 {
// If this is the first handshake on a connection, process and
// (optionally) verify the server's certificates.
if err := c.verifyServerCertificateGM(certMsg.certificates); err != nil {
return err
}
} else {
// This is a renegotiation handshake. We require that the
// server's identity (i.e. leaf certificate) is unchanged and
// thus any previous trust decision is still valid.
//
// See https://mitls.org/pages/attacks/3SHAKE for the
// motivation behind this requirement.
if !bytes.Equal(c.peerCertificates[0].Raw, certMsg.certificates[0]) {
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
return errors.New("tls: server's identity changed during renegotiation")
}
}
keyAgreement := hs.suite.ka(c.vers)
if ka, ok := keyAgreement.(*eccKeyAgreementGM); ok {
// mod by syl only one cert
//ka.encipherCert = c.peerCertificates[1]
ka.encipherCert = c.peerCertificates[0]
}
skx, ok := msg.(*serverKeyExchangeMsg)
if ok {
hs.finishedHash.Write(skx.marshal())
err = keyAgreement.processServerKeyExchange(c.config, hs.hello, hs.serverHello, c.peerCertificates[0], skx)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return err
}
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
var chainToSend *Certificate
var certRequested bool
certReq, ok := msg.(*certificateRequestMsgGM)
if ok {
certRequested = true
hs.finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal())
cri := certificateRequestInfoFromMsgGM(c.vers, certReq)
if chainToSend, err = c.getClientCertificateGM(cri); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
shd, ok := msg.(*serverHelloDoneMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(shd, msg)
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(shd.marshal())
// If the server requested a certificate then we have to send a
// Certificate message, even if it's empty because we don't have a
// certificate to send.
if certRequested {
certMsg = new(certificateMsg)
certMsg.certificates = chainToSend.Certificate
hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
return err
}
}
preMasterSecret, ckx, err := keyAgreement.generateClientKeyExchange(c.config, hs.hello, c.peerCertificates[0])
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
if ckx != nil {
hs.finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, ckx.marshal()); err != nil {
return err
}
}
if chainToSend != nil && len(chainToSend.Certificate) > 0 {
certVerify := &certificateVerifyMsg{}
key, ok := chainToSend.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return fmt.Errorf("tls: client certificate private key of type %T does not implement crypto.Signer", chainToSend.PrivateKey)
}
digest := hs.finishedHash.client.Sum(nil)
certVerify.signature, err = key.Sign(c.config.rand(), digest, nil)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certVerify.marshal()); err != nil {
return err
}
}
hs.masterSecret = masterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, preMasterSecret, hs.hello.random, hs.serverHello.random)
if err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelTLS12, hs.hello.random, hs.masterSecret); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return errors.New("tls: failed to write to key log: " + err.Error())
}
hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
return nil
}
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateGM) establishKeys() error {
c := hs.c
clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV :=
keysFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.hello.random, hs.serverHello.random, hs.suite.macLen, hs.suite.keyLen, hs.suite.ivLen)
var clientCipher, serverCipher interface{}
var clientHash, serverHash macFunction
if hs.suite.cipher != nil {
clientCipher = hs.suite.cipher(clientKey, clientIV, false /* not for reading */)
clientHash = hs.suite.mac(clientMAC)
serverCipher = hs.suite.cipher(serverKey, serverIV, true /* for reading */)
serverHash = hs.suite.mac(serverMAC)
} else {
clientCipher = hs.suite.aead(clientKey, clientIV)
serverCipher = hs.suite.aead(serverKey, serverIV)
}
c.in.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, serverCipher, serverHash)
c.out.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, clientCipher, clientHash)
return nil
}
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateGM) serverResumedSession() bool {
// If the server responded with the same sessionId then it means the
// sessionTicket is being used to resume a TLS session.
return hs.session != nil && hs.hello.sessionId != nil &&
bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.sessionId, hs.hello.sessionId)
}
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateGM) processServerHello() (bool, error) {
c := hs.c
if err := hs.pickCipherSuite(); err != nil {
return false, err
}
if hs.serverHello.compressionMethod != compressionNone {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return false, errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported compression format")
}
if c.handshakes == 0 && hs.serverHello.secureRenegotiationSupported {
c.secureRenegotiation = true
if len(hs.serverHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return false, errors.New("tls: initial handshake had non-empty renegotiation extension")
}
}
if c.handshakes > 0 && c.secureRenegotiation {
var expectedSecureRenegotiation [24]byte
copy(expectedSecureRenegotiation[:], c.clientFinished[:])
copy(expectedSecureRenegotiation[12:], c.serverFinished[:])
if !bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.secureRenegotiation, expectedSecureRenegotiation[:]) {
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return false, errors.New("tls: incorrect renegotiation extension contents")
}
}
if hs.serverHello.alpnProtocol != "" {
if len(hs.hello.alpnProtocols) == 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
return false, errors.New("tls: server advertised unrequested ALPN extension")
}
if mutualProtocol([]string{hs.serverHello.alpnProtocol}, hs.hello.alpnProtocols) == "" {
c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
return false, errors.New("tls: server selected unadvertised ALPN protocol")
}
c.clientProtocol = hs.serverHello.alpnProtocol
}
c.scts = hs.serverHello.scts
if !hs.serverResumedSession() {
return false, nil
}
if hs.session.vers != c.vers {
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return false, errors.New("tls: server resumed a session with a different version")
}
if hs.session.cipherSuite != hs.suite.id {
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return false, errors.New("tls: server resumed a session with a different cipher suite")
}
// Restore masterSecret, peerCerts, and ocspResponse from previous state
hs.masterSecret = hs.session.masterSecret
c.peerCertificates = hs.session.serverCertificates
c.verifiedChains = hs.session.verifiedChains
c.ocspResponse = hs.session.ocspResponse
// Let the ServerHello SCTs override the session SCTs from the original
// connection, if any are provided
if len(c.scts) == 0 && len(hs.session.scts) != 0 {
c.scts = hs.session.scts
}
return true, nil
}
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateGM) readFinished(out []byte) error {
c := hs.c
if err := c.readChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
return err
}
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
serverFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(serverFinished, msg)
}
verify := hs.finishedHash.serverSum(hs.masterSecret)
if len(verify) != len(serverFinished.verifyData) ||
subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, serverFinished.verifyData) != 1 {
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return errors.New("tls: server's Finished message was incorrect")
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(serverFinished.marshal())
copy(out, verify)
return nil
}
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateGM) readSessionTicket() error {
if !hs.serverHello.ticketSupported {
return nil
}
c := hs.c
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
sessionTicketMsg, ok := msg.(*newSessionTicketMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(sessionTicketMsg, msg)
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(sessionTicketMsg.marshal())
hs.session = &ClientSessionState{
sessionTicket: sessionTicketMsg.ticket,
vers: c.vers,
cipherSuite: hs.suite.id,
masterSecret: hs.masterSecret,
serverCertificates: c.peerCertificates,
verifiedChains: c.verifiedChains,
receivedAt: c.config.time(),
ocspResponse: c.ocspResponse,
scts: c.scts,
}
return nil
}
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateGM) sendFinished(out []byte) error {
c := hs.c
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1}); err != nil {
return err
}
finished := new(finishedMsg)
finished.verifyData = hs.finishedHash.clientSum(hs.masterSecret)
hs.finishedHash.Write(finished.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()); err != nil {
return err
}
copy(out, finished.verifyData)
return nil
}
// verifyServerCertificate parses and verifies the provided chain, setting
// c.verifiedChains and c.peerCertificates or sending the appropriate alert.
func (c *Conn) verifyServerCertificateGM(certificates [][]byte) error {
certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certificates))
for i, asn1Data := range certificates {
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
return errors.New("tls: failed to parse certificate from server: " + err.Error())
}
certs[i] = cert
}
if !c.config.InsecureSkipVerify {
opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
Roots: c.config.RootCAs,
CurrentTime: c.config.time(),
DNSName: c.config.ServerName,
Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(),
}
if opts.Roots == nil {
opts.Roots = x509.NewCertPool()
}
for _, rootca := range getCAs() {
opts.Roots.AddCert(rootca)
}
for _, cert := range certs[2:] {
opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert)
}
var err error
c.verifiedChains, err = certs[0].Verify(opts)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
return err
}
}
switch certs[0].PublicKey.(type) {
case *sm2.PublicKey, *ecdsa.PublicKey, *rsa.PublicKey:
break
default:
c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate)
return fmt.Errorf("tls: server's certificate contains an unsupported type of public key: %T", certs[0].PublicKey)
}
c.peerCertificates = certs
if c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate != nil {
if err := c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate(certificates, c.verifiedChains); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
return err
}
}
if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil {
if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
return err
}
}
return nil
}
// certificateRequestInfoFromMsg generates a CertificateRequestInfo from a TLS
// <= 1.2 CertificateRequest, making an effort to fill in missing information.
func certificateRequestInfoFromMsgGM(vers uint16, certReq *certificateRequestMsgGM) *CertificateRequestInfo {
var signatureSchemes []SignatureScheme
cri := &CertificateRequestInfo{
AcceptableCAs: certReq.certificateAuthorities,
Version: vers,
}
cri.SignatureSchemes = signatureSchemes
// Filter the signature schemes based on the certificate types.
// See RFC 5246, Section 7.4.4 (where it calls this "somewhat complicated").
return cri
}
func (c *Conn) getClientCertificateGM(cri *CertificateRequestInfo) (*Certificate, error) {
if c.config.GetClientCertificate != nil {
return c.config.GetClientCertificate(cri)
}
for _, chain := range c.config.Certificates {
if err := cri.SupportsCertificateGM(&chain); err != nil {
continue
}
return &chain, nil
}
// No acceptable certificate found. Don't send a certificate.
return new(Certificate), nil
}