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proc_creation_win_mshta_susp_execution.yml
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/
proc_creation_win_mshta_susp_execution.yml
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title: MSHTA Suspicious Execution 01
id: cc7abbd0-762b-41e3-8a26-57ad50d2eea3
status: test
description: Detection for mshta.exe suspicious execution patterns sometimes involving file polyglotism
references:
- http://blog.sevagas.com/?Hacking-around-HTA-files
- https://0x00sec.org/t/clientside-exploitation-in-2018-how-pentesting-has-changed/7356
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/standard/data/xml/xslt-stylesheet-scripting-using-msxsl-script
- https://medium.com/tsscyber/pentesting-and-hta-bypassing-powershell-constrained-language-mode-53a42856c997
- https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/1326228491302563846
author: Diego Perez (@darkquassar), Markus Neis, Swisscom (Improve Rule)
date: 2019/02/22
modified: 2022/11/07
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1140
- attack.t1218.005
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.007
- cve.2020.1599
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '\mshta.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'vbscript'
- '.jpg'
- '.png'
- '.lnk'
# - '.chm' # could be prone to false positives
- '.xls'
- '.doc'
- '.zip'
- '.dll'
# - '.exe'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
level: high