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This proposal is no substitute for services providing encryption and proper access controls. This proposal does not protect adequately against true cross-protocol attacks that use either unencrypted HTTP or attacker-controlled components of TLS handshakes to attack poorly-protected servers from the vantage point of a client (we have a port number blocklist that is designed to help, but we know that too is not perfect).
This is largely true. Cross-protocol attacks would get harder because the request initiator would be constrained by the format of CORS preflight requests, but this is not intended to provide a robust protection in this case, nor would it. TLS handshakes are entirely unaffected.
We should call this out more clearly in the spec.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered:
@martinthomson has a point in w3ctag/design-reviews#572 (comment):
This is largely true. Cross-protocol attacks would get harder because the request initiator would be constrained by the format of CORS preflight requests, but this is not intended to provide a robust protection in this case, nor would it. TLS handshakes are entirely unaffected.
We should call this out more clearly in the spec.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: