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OpenSSL Security Advisory [16 November 2010] TLS extension parsing race condition. (UPDATED) CVE-2010-3864 http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20101116-2.txt Bug: 3201137 Change-Id: Ie3e38b9e02ac35eb8c782e0bcd19ce29ac457f29
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| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
|---|---|---|
| @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ | ||
| --- openssl-1.0.0.orig/ssl/t1_lib.c 15 Jun 2010 17:25:15 -0000 1.64.2.14 | ||
| +++ openssl-1.0.0/ssl/t1_lib.c 15 Nov 2010 15:26:19 -0000 | ||
| @@ -714,14 +714,23 @@ | ||
| switch (servname_type) | ||
| { | ||
| case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: | ||
| - if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) | ||
| + if (!s->hit) | ||
| { | ||
| - if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name || | ||
| - ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)) | ||
| + if(s->session->tlsext_hostname) | ||
| + { | ||
| + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | ||
| + return 0; | ||
| + } | ||
| + if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) | ||
| { | ||
| *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | ||
| return 0; | ||
| } | ||
| + if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL) | ||
| + { | ||
| + *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | ||
| + return 0; | ||
| + } | ||
| memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len); | ||
| s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0'; | ||
| if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) { | ||
| @@ -734,7 +743,8 @@ | ||
|
|
||
| } | ||
| else | ||
| - s->servername_done = strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len | ||
| + s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname | ||
| + && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len | ||
| && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0; | ||
|
|
||
| break; | ||
| @@ -765,15 +775,22 @@ | ||
| *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | ||
| return 0; | ||
| } | ||
| - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; | ||
| - if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); | ||
| - if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) | ||
| + if (!s->hit) | ||
| { | ||
| - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | ||
| - return 0; | ||
| + if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) | ||
| + { | ||
| + *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | ||
| + return 0; | ||
| + } | ||
| + s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; | ||
| + if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) | ||
| + { | ||
| + *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | ||
| + return 0; | ||
| + } | ||
| + s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; | ||
| + memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); | ||
| } | ||
| - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; | ||
| - memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); | ||
| #if 0 | ||
| fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); | ||
| sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; | ||
| @@ -794,15 +811,22 @@ | ||
| *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | ||
| return 0; | ||
| } | ||
| - s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; | ||
| - if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); | ||
| - if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) | ||
| + if (!s->hit) | ||
| { | ||
| - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | ||
| - return 0; | ||
| + if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) | ||
| + { | ||
| + *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | ||
| + return 0; | ||
| + } | ||
| + s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; | ||
| + if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) | ||
| + { | ||
| + *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | ||
| + return 0; | ||
| + } | ||
| + s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length; | ||
| + memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length); | ||
| } | ||
| - s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length; | ||
| - memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length); | ||
| #if 0 | ||
| fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); | ||
| sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; |
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