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aes-586.pl
executable file
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aes-586.pl
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#!/usr/bin/env perl
#
# ====================================================================
# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
# ====================================================================
#
# Version 4.3.
#
# You might fail to appreciate this module performance from the first
# try. If compared to "vanilla" linux-ia32-icc target, i.e. considered
# to be *the* best Intel C compiler without -KPIC, performance appears
# to be virtually identical... But try to re-configure with shared
# library support... Aha! Intel compiler "suddenly" lags behind by 30%
# [on P4, more on others]:-) And if compared to position-independent
# code generated by GNU C, this code performs *more* than *twice* as
# fast! Yes, all this buzz about PIC means that unlike other hand-
# coded implementations, this one was explicitly designed to be safe
# to use even in shared library context... This also means that this
# code isn't necessarily absolutely fastest "ever," because in order
# to achieve position independence an extra register has to be
# off-loaded to stack, which affects the benchmark result.
#
# Special note about instruction choice. Do you recall RC4_INT code
# performing poorly on P4? It might be the time to figure out why.
# RC4_INT code implies effective address calculations in base+offset*4
# form. Trouble is that it seems that offset scaling turned to be
# critical path... At least eliminating scaling resulted in 2.8x RC4
# performance improvement [as you might recall]. As AES code is hungry
# for scaling too, I [try to] avoid the latter by favoring off-by-2
# shifts and masking the result with 0xFF<<2 instead of "boring" 0xFF.
#
# As was shown by Dean Gaudet <dean@arctic.org>, the above note turned
# void. Performance improvement with off-by-2 shifts was observed on
# intermediate implementation, which was spilling yet another register
# to stack... Final offset*4 code below runs just a tad faster on P4,
# but exhibits up to 10% improvement on other cores.
#
# Second version is "monolithic" replacement for aes_core.c, which in
# addition to AES_[de|en]crypt implements AES_set_[de|en]cryption_key.
# This made it possible to implement little-endian variant of the
# algorithm without modifying the base C code. Motivating factor for
# the undertaken effort was that it appeared that in tight IA-32
# register window little-endian flavor could achieve slightly higher
# Instruction Level Parallelism, and it indeed resulted in up to 15%
# better performance on most recent µ-archs...
#
# Third version adds AES_cbc_encrypt implementation, which resulted in
# up to 40% performance imrovement of CBC benchmark results. 40% was
# observed on P4 core, where "overall" imrovement coefficient, i.e. if
# compared to PIC generated by GCC and in CBC mode, was observed to be
# as large as 4x:-) CBC performance is virtually identical to ECB now
# and on some platforms even better, e.g. 17.6 "small" cycles/byte on
# Opteron, because certain function prologues and epilogues are
# effectively taken out of the loop...
#
# Version 3.2 implements compressed tables and prefetch of these tables
# in CBC[!] mode. Former means that 3/4 of table references are now
# misaligned, which unfortunately has negative impact on elder IA-32
# implementations, Pentium suffered 30% penalty, PIII - 10%.
#
# Version 3.3 avoids L1 cache aliasing between stack frame and
# S-boxes, and 3.4 - L1 cache aliasing even between key schedule. The
# latter is achieved by copying the key schedule to controlled place in
# stack. This unfortunately has rather strong impact on small block CBC
# performance, ~2x deterioration on 16-byte block if compared to 3.3.
#
# Version 3.5 checks if there is L1 cache aliasing between user-supplied
# key schedule and S-boxes and abstains from copying the former if
# there is no. This allows end-user to consciously retain small block
# performance by aligning key schedule in specific manner.
#
# Version 3.6 compresses Td4 to 256 bytes and prefetches it in ECB.
#
# Current ECB performance numbers for 128-bit key in CPU cycles per
# processed byte [measure commonly used by AES benchmarkers] are:
#
# small footprint fully unrolled
# P4 24 22
# AMD K8 20 19
# PIII 25 23
# Pentium 81 78
#
# Version 3.7 reimplements outer rounds as "compact." Meaning that
# first and last rounds reference compact 256 bytes S-box. This means
# that first round consumes a lot more CPU cycles and that encrypt
# and decrypt performance becomes asymmetric. Encrypt performance
# drops by 10-12%, while decrypt - by 20-25%:-( 256 bytes S-box is
# aggressively pre-fetched.
#
# Version 4.0 effectively rolls back to 3.6 and instead implements
# additional set of functions, _[x86|sse]_AES_[en|de]crypt_compact,
# which use exclusively 256 byte S-box. These functions are to be
# called in modes not concealing plain text, such as ECB, or when
# we're asked to process smaller amount of data [or unconditionally
# on hyper-threading CPU]. Currently it's called unconditionally from
# AES_[en|de]crypt, which affects all modes, but CBC. CBC routine
# still needs to be modified to switch between slower and faster
# mode when appropriate... But in either case benchmark landscape
# changes dramatically and below numbers are CPU cycles per processed
# byte for 128-bit key.
#
# ECB encrypt ECB decrypt CBC large chunk
# P4 52[54] 83[95] 23
# AMD K8 46[41] 66[70] 18
# PIII 41[50] 60[77] 24
# Core 2 31[36] 45[64] 18.5
# Atom 76[100] 96[138] 60
# Pentium 115 150 77
#
# Version 4.1 switches to compact S-box even in key schedule setup.
#
# Version 4.2 prefetches compact S-box in every SSE round or in other
# words every cache-line is *guaranteed* to be accessed within ~50
# cycles window. Why just SSE? Because it's needed on hyper-threading
# CPU! Which is also why it's prefetched with 64 byte stride. Best
# part is that it has no negative effect on performance:-)
#
# Version 4.3 implements switch between compact and non-compact block
# functions in AES_cbc_encrypt depending on how much data was asked
# to be processed in one stroke.
#
######################################################################
# Timing attacks are classified in two classes: synchronous when
# attacker consciously initiates cryptographic operation and collects
# timing data of various character afterwards, and asynchronous when
# malicious code is executed on same CPU simultaneously with AES,
# instruments itself and performs statistical analysis of this data.
#
# As far as synchronous attacks go the root to the AES timing
# vulnerability is twofold. Firstly, of 256 S-box elements at most 160
# are referred to in single 128-bit block operation. Well, in C
# implementation with 4 distinct tables it's actually as little as 40
# references per 256 elements table, but anyway... Secondly, even
# though S-box elements are clustered into smaller amount of cache-
# lines, smaller than 160 and even 40, it turned out that for certain
# plain-text pattern[s] or simply put chosen plain-text and given key
# few cache-lines remain unaccessed during block operation. Now, if
# attacker can figure out this access pattern, he can deduct the key
# [or at least part of it]. The natural way to mitigate this kind of
# attacks is to minimize the amount of cache-lines in S-box and/or
# prefetch them to ensure that every one is accessed for more uniform
# timing. But note that *if* plain-text was concealed in such way that
# input to block function is distributed *uniformly*, then attack
# wouldn't apply. Now note that some encryption modes, most notably
# CBC, do mask the plain-text in this exact way [secure cipher output
# is distributed uniformly]. Yes, one still might find input that
# would reveal the information about given key, but if amount of
# candidate inputs to be tried is larger than amount of possible key
# combinations then attack becomes infeasible. This is why revised
# AES_cbc_encrypt "dares" to switch to larger S-box when larger chunk
# of data is to be processed in one stroke. The current size limit of
# 512 bytes is chosen to provide same [diminishigly low] probability
# for cache-line to remain untouched in large chunk operation with
# large S-box as for single block operation with compact S-box and
# surely needs more careful consideration...
#
# As for asynchronous attacks. There are two flavours: attacker code
# being interleaved with AES on hyper-threading CPU at *instruction*
# level, and two processes time sharing single core. As for latter.
# Two vectors. 1. Given that attacker process has higher priority,
# yield execution to process performing AES just before timer fires
# off the scheduler, immediately regain control of CPU and analyze the
# cache state. For this attack to be efficient attacker would have to
# effectively slow down the operation by several *orders* of magnitute,
# by ratio of time slice to duration of handful of AES rounds, which
# unlikely to remain unnoticed. Not to mention that this also means
# that he would spend correspondigly more time to collect enough
# statistical data to mount the attack. It's probably appropriate to
# say that if adeversary reckons that this attack is beneficial and
# risks to be noticed, you probably have larger problems having him
# mere opportunity. In other words suggested code design expects you
# to preclude/mitigate this attack by overall system security design.
# 2. Attacker manages to make his code interrupt driven. In order for
# this kind of attack to be feasible, interrupt rate has to be high
# enough, again comparable to duration of handful of AES rounds. But
# is there interrupt source of such rate? Hardly, not even 1Gbps NIC
# generates interrupts at such raging rate...
#
# And now back to the former, hyper-threading CPU or more specifically
# Intel P4. Recall that asynchronous attack implies that malicious
# code instruments itself. And naturally instrumentation granularity
# has be noticeably lower than duration of codepath accessing S-box.
# Given that all cache-lines are accessed during that time that is.
# Current implementation accesses *all* cache-lines within ~50 cycles
# window, which is actually *less* than RDTSC latency on Intel P4!
$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
require "x86asm.pl";
$output = pop;
open OUT,">$output";
*STDOUT=*OUT;
&asm_init($ARGV[0],"aes-586.pl",$x86only = $ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386");
&static_label("AES_Te");
&static_label("AES_Td");
$s0="eax";
$s1="ebx";
$s2="ecx";
$s3="edx";
$key="edi";
$acc="esi";
$tbl="ebp";
# stack frame layout in _[x86|sse]_AES_* routines, frame is allocated
# by caller
$__ra=&DWP(0,"esp"); # return address
$__s0=&DWP(4,"esp"); # s0 backing store
$__s1=&DWP(8,"esp"); # s1 backing store
$__s2=&DWP(12,"esp"); # s2 backing store
$__s3=&DWP(16,"esp"); # s3 backing store
$__key=&DWP(20,"esp"); # pointer to key schedule
$__end=&DWP(24,"esp"); # pointer to end of key schedule
$__tbl=&DWP(28,"esp"); # %ebp backing store
# stack frame layout in AES_[en|crypt] routines, which differs from
# above by 4 and overlaps by %ebp backing store
$_tbl=&DWP(24,"esp");
$_esp=&DWP(28,"esp");
sub _data_word() { my $i; while(defined($i=shift)) { &data_word($i,$i); } }
$speed_limit=512; # chunks smaller than $speed_limit are
# processed with compact routine in CBC mode
$small_footprint=1; # $small_footprint=1 code is ~5% slower [on
# recent µ-archs], but ~5 times smaller!
# I favor compact code to minimize cache
# contention and in hope to "collect" 5% back
# in real-life applications...
$vertical_spin=0; # shift "verticaly" defaults to 0, because of
# its proof-of-concept status...
# Note that there is no decvert(), as well as last encryption round is
# performed with "horizontal" shifts. This is because this "vertical"
# implementation [one which groups shifts on a given $s[i] to form a
# "column," unlike "horizontal" one, which groups shifts on different
# $s[i] to form a "row"] is work in progress. It was observed to run
# few percents faster on Intel cores, but not AMD. On AMD K8 core it's
# whole 12% slower:-( So we face a trade-off... Shall it be resolved
# some day? Till then the code is considered experimental and by
# default remains dormant...
sub encvert()
{ my ($te,@s) = @_;
my ($v0,$v1) = ($acc,$key);
&mov ($v0,$s[3]); # copy s3
&mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$s[2]); # save s2
&mov ($v1,$s[0]); # copy s0
&mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),$s[1]); # save s1
&movz ($s[2],&HB($s[0]));
&and ($s[0],0xFF);
&mov ($s[0],&DWP(0,$te,$s[0],8)); # s0>>0
&shr ($v1,16);
&mov ($s[3],&DWP(3,$te,$s[2],8)); # s0>>8
&movz ($s[1],&HB($v1));
&and ($v1,0xFF);
&mov ($s[2],&DWP(2,$te,$v1,8)); # s0>>16
&mov ($v1,$v0);
&mov ($s[1],&DWP(1,$te,$s[1],8)); # s0>>24
&and ($v0,0xFF);
&xor ($s[3],&DWP(0,$te,$v0,8)); # s3>>0
&movz ($v0,&HB($v1));
&shr ($v1,16);
&xor ($s[2],&DWP(3,$te,$v0,8)); # s3>>8
&movz ($v0,&HB($v1));
&and ($v1,0xFF);
&xor ($s[1],&DWP(2,$te,$v1,8)); # s3>>16
&mov ($v1,&DWP(4,"esp")); # restore s2
&xor ($s[0],&DWP(1,$te,$v0,8)); # s3>>24
&mov ($v0,$v1);
&and ($v1,0xFF);
&xor ($s[2],&DWP(0,$te,$v1,8)); # s2>>0
&movz ($v1,&HB($v0));
&shr ($v0,16);
&xor ($s[1],&DWP(3,$te,$v1,8)); # s2>>8
&movz ($v1,&HB($v0));
&and ($v0,0xFF);
&xor ($s[0],&DWP(2,$te,$v0,8)); # s2>>16
&mov ($v0,&DWP(8,"esp")); # restore s1
&xor ($s[3],&DWP(1,$te,$v1,8)); # s2>>24
&mov ($v1,$v0);
&and ($v0,0xFF);
&xor ($s[1],&DWP(0,$te,$v0,8)); # s1>>0
&movz ($v0,&HB($v1));
&shr ($v1,16);
&xor ($s[0],&DWP(3,$te,$v0,8)); # s1>>8
&movz ($v0,&HB($v1));
&and ($v1,0xFF);
&xor ($s[3],&DWP(2,$te,$v1,8)); # s1>>16
&mov ($key,$__key); # reincarnate v1 as key
&xor ($s[2],&DWP(1,$te,$v0,8)); # s1>>24
}
# Another experimental routine, which features "horizontal spin," but
# eliminates one reference to stack. Strangely enough runs slower...
sub enchoriz()
{ my ($v0,$v1) = ($key,$acc);
&movz ($v0,&LB($s0)); # 3, 2, 1, 0*
&rotr ($s2,8); # 8,11,10, 9
&mov ($v1,&DWP(0,$te,$v0,8)); # 0
&movz ($v0,&HB($s1)); # 7, 6, 5*, 4
&rotr ($s3,16); # 13,12,15,14
&xor ($v1,&DWP(3,$te,$v0,8)); # 5
&movz ($v0,&HB($s2)); # 8,11,10*, 9
&rotr ($s0,16); # 1, 0, 3, 2
&xor ($v1,&DWP(2,$te,$v0,8)); # 10
&movz ($v0,&HB($s3)); # 13,12,15*,14
&xor ($v1,&DWP(1,$te,$v0,8)); # 15, t[0] collected
&mov ($__s0,$v1); # t[0] saved
&movz ($v0,&LB($s1)); # 7, 6, 5, 4*
&shr ($s1,16); # -, -, 7, 6
&mov ($v1,&DWP(0,$te,$v0,8)); # 4
&movz ($v0,&LB($s3)); # 13,12,15,14*
&xor ($v1,&DWP(2,$te,$v0,8)); # 14
&movz ($v0,&HB($s0)); # 1, 0, 3*, 2
&and ($s3,0xffff0000); # 13,12, -, -
&xor ($v1,&DWP(1,$te,$v0,8)); # 3
&movz ($v0,&LB($s2)); # 8,11,10, 9*
&or ($s3,$s1); # 13,12, 7, 6
&xor ($v1,&DWP(3,$te,$v0,8)); # 9, t[1] collected
&mov ($s1,$v1); # s[1]=t[1]
&movz ($v0,&LB($s0)); # 1, 0, 3, 2*
&shr ($s2,16); # -, -, 8,11
&mov ($v1,&DWP(2,$te,$v0,8)); # 2
&movz ($v0,&HB($s3)); # 13,12, 7*, 6
&xor ($v1,&DWP(1,$te,$v0,8)); # 7
&movz ($v0,&HB($s2)); # -, -, 8*,11
&xor ($v1,&DWP(0,$te,$v0,8)); # 8
&mov ($v0,$s3);
&shr ($v0,24); # 13
&xor ($v1,&DWP(3,$te,$v0,8)); # 13, t[2] collected
&movz ($v0,&LB($s2)); # -, -, 8,11*
&shr ($s0,24); # 1*
&mov ($s2,&DWP(1,$te,$v0,8)); # 11
&xor ($s2,&DWP(3,$te,$s0,8)); # 1
&mov ($s0,$__s0); # s[0]=t[0]
&movz ($v0,&LB($s3)); # 13,12, 7, 6*
&shr ($s3,16); # , ,13,12
&xor ($s2,&DWP(2,$te,$v0,8)); # 6
&mov ($key,$__key); # reincarnate v0 as key
&and ($s3,0xff); # , ,13,12*
&mov ($s3,&DWP(0,$te,$s3,8)); # 12
&xor ($s3,$s2); # s[2]=t[3] collected
&mov ($s2,$v1); # s[2]=t[2]
}
# More experimental code... SSE one... Even though this one eliminates
# *all* references to stack, it's not faster...
sub sse_encbody()
{
&movz ($acc,&LB("eax")); # 0
&mov ("ecx",&DWP(0,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 0
&pshufw ("mm2","mm0",0x0d); # 7, 6, 3, 2
&movz ("edx",&HB("eax")); # 1
&mov ("edx",&DWP(3,$tbl,"edx",8)); # 1
&shr ("eax",16); # 5, 4
&movz ($acc,&LB("ebx")); # 10
&xor ("ecx",&DWP(2,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 10
&pshufw ("mm6","mm4",0x08); # 13,12, 9, 8
&movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 11
&xor ("edx",&DWP(1,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 11
&shr ("ebx",16); # 15,14
&movz ($acc,&HB("eax")); # 5
&xor ("ecx",&DWP(3,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 5
&movq ("mm3",QWP(16,$key));
&movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 15
&xor ("ecx",&DWP(1,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 15
&movd ("mm0","ecx"); # t[0] collected
&movz ($acc,&LB("eax")); # 4
&mov ("ecx",&DWP(0,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 4
&movd ("eax","mm2"); # 7, 6, 3, 2
&movz ($acc,&LB("ebx")); # 14
&xor ("ecx",&DWP(2,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 14
&movd ("ebx","mm6"); # 13,12, 9, 8
&movz ($acc,&HB("eax")); # 3
&xor ("ecx",&DWP(1,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 3
&movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 9
&xor ("ecx",&DWP(3,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 9
&movd ("mm1","ecx"); # t[1] collected
&movz ($acc,&LB("eax")); # 2
&mov ("ecx",&DWP(2,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 2
&shr ("eax",16); # 7, 6
&punpckldq ("mm0","mm1"); # t[0,1] collected
&movz ($acc,&LB("ebx")); # 8
&xor ("ecx",&DWP(0,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 8
&shr ("ebx",16); # 13,12
&movz ($acc,&HB("eax")); # 7
&xor ("ecx",&DWP(1,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 7
&pxor ("mm0","mm3");
&movz ("eax",&LB("eax")); # 6
&xor ("edx",&DWP(2,$tbl,"eax",8)); # 6
&pshufw ("mm1","mm0",0x08); # 5, 4, 1, 0
&movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 13
&xor ("ecx",&DWP(3,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 13
&xor ("ecx",&DWP(24,$key)); # t[2]
&movd ("mm4","ecx"); # t[2] collected
&movz ("ebx",&LB("ebx")); # 12
&xor ("edx",&DWP(0,$tbl,"ebx",8)); # 12
&shr ("ecx",16);
&movd ("eax","mm1"); # 5, 4, 1, 0
&mov ("ebx",&DWP(28,$key)); # t[3]
&xor ("ebx","edx");
&movd ("mm5","ebx"); # t[3] collected
&and ("ebx",0xffff0000);
&or ("ebx","ecx");
&punpckldq ("mm4","mm5"); # t[2,3] collected
}
######################################################################
# "Compact" block function
######################################################################
sub enccompact()
{ my $Fn = \&mov;
while ($#_>5) { pop(@_); $Fn=sub{}; }
my ($i,$te,@s)=@_;
my $tmp = $key;
my $out = $i==3?$s[0]:$acc;
# $Fn is used in first compact round and its purpose is to
# void restoration of some values from stack, so that after
# 4xenccompact with extra argument $key value is left there...
if ($i==3) { &$Fn ($key,$__key); }##%edx
else { &mov ($out,$s[0]); }
&and ($out,0xFF);
if ($i==1) { &shr ($s[0],16); }#%ebx[1]
if ($i==2) { &shr ($s[0],24); }#%ecx[2]
&movz ($out,&BP(-128,$te,$out,1));
if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[1]; }##%eax
&movz ($tmp,&HB($s[1]));
&movz ($tmp,&BP(-128,$te,$tmp,1));
&shl ($tmp,8);
&xor ($out,$tmp);
if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[2]; &mov ($s[1],$__s0); }##%ebx
else { &mov ($tmp,$s[2]);
&shr ($tmp,16); }
if ($i==2) { &and ($s[1],0xFF); }#%edx[2]
&and ($tmp,0xFF);
&movz ($tmp,&BP(-128,$te,$tmp,1));
&shl ($tmp,16);
&xor ($out,$tmp);
if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[3]; &mov ($s[2],$__s1); }##%ecx
elsif($i==2){ &movz ($tmp,&HB($s[3])); }#%ebx[2]
else { &mov ($tmp,$s[3]);
&shr ($tmp,24); }
&movz ($tmp,&BP(-128,$te,$tmp,1));
&shl ($tmp,24);
&xor ($out,$tmp);
if ($i<2) { &mov (&DWP(4+4*$i,"esp"),$out); }
if ($i==3) { &mov ($s[3],$acc); }
&comment();
}
sub enctransform()
{ my @s = ($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
my $i = shift;
my $tmp = $tbl;
my $r2 = $key ;
&and ($tmp,$s[$i]);
&lea ($r2,&DWP(0,$s[$i],$s[$i]));
&mov ($acc,$tmp);
&shr ($tmp,7);
&and ($r2,0xfefefefe);
&sub ($acc,$tmp);
&mov ($tmp,$s[$i]);
&and ($acc,0x1b1b1b1b);
&rotr ($tmp,16);
&xor ($acc,$r2); # r2
&mov ($r2,$s[$i]);
&xor ($s[$i],$acc); # r0 ^ r2
&rotr ($r2,16+8);
&xor ($acc,$tmp);
&rotl ($s[$i],24);
&xor ($acc,$r2);
&mov ($tmp,0x80808080) if ($i!=1);
&xor ($s[$i],$acc); # ROTATE(r2^r0,24) ^ r2
}
&function_begin_B("_x86_AES_encrypt_compact");
# note that caller is expected to allocate stack frame for me!
&mov ($__key,$key); # save key
&xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); # xor with key
&xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
&xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
&xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
&mov ($acc,&DWP(240,$key)); # load key->rounds
&lea ($acc,&DWP(-2,$acc,$acc));
&lea ($acc,&DWP(0,$key,$acc,8));
&mov ($__end,$acc); # end of key schedule
# prefetch Te4
&mov ($key,&DWP(0-128,$tbl));
&mov ($acc,&DWP(32-128,$tbl));
&mov ($key,&DWP(64-128,$tbl));
&mov ($acc,&DWP(96-128,$tbl));
&mov ($key,&DWP(128-128,$tbl));
&mov ($acc,&DWP(160-128,$tbl));
&mov ($key,&DWP(192-128,$tbl));
&mov ($acc,&DWP(224-128,$tbl));
&set_label("loop",16);
&enccompact(0,$tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3,1);
&enccompact(1,$tbl,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0,1);
&enccompact(2,$tbl,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1,1);
&enccompact(3,$tbl,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2,1);
&mov ($tbl,0x80808080);
&enctransform(2);
&enctransform(3);
&enctransform(0);
&enctransform(1);
&mov ($key,$__key);
&mov ($tbl,$__tbl);
&add ($key,16); # advance rd_key
&xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key));
&xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
&xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
&xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
&cmp ($key,$__end);
&mov ($__key,$key);
&jb (&label("loop"));
&enccompact(0,$tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
&enccompact(1,$tbl,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0);
&enccompact(2,$tbl,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1);
&enccompact(3,$tbl,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2);
&xor ($s0,&DWP(16,$key));
&xor ($s1,&DWP(20,$key));
&xor ($s2,&DWP(24,$key));
&xor ($s3,&DWP(28,$key));
&ret ();
&function_end_B("_x86_AES_encrypt_compact");
######################################################################
# "Compact" SSE block function.
######################################################################
#
# Performance is not actually extraordinary in comparison to pure
# x86 code. In particular encrypt performance is virtually the same.
# Decrypt performance on the other hand is 15-20% better on newer
# µ-archs [but we're thankful for *any* improvement here], and ~50%
# better on PIII:-) And additionally on the pros side this code
# eliminates redundant references to stack and thus relieves/
# minimizes the pressure on the memory bus.
#
# MMX register layout lsb
# +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
# | mm4 | mm0 |
# +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
# | s3 | s2 | s1 | s0 |
# +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
# |15|14|13|12|11|10| 9| 8| 7| 6| 5| 4| 3| 2| 1| 0|
# +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
#
# Indexes translate as s[N/4]>>(8*(N%4)), e.g. 5 means s1>>8.
# In this terms encryption and decryption "compact" permutation
# matrices can be depicted as following:
#
# encryption lsb # decryption lsb
# +----++----+----+----+----+ # +----++----+----+----+----+
# | t0 || 15 | 10 | 5 | 0 | # | t0 || 7 | 10 | 13 | 0 |
# +----++----+----+----+----+ # +----++----+----+----+----+
# | t1 || 3 | 14 | 9 | 4 | # | t1 || 11 | 14 | 1 | 4 |
# +----++----+----+----+----+ # +----++----+----+----+----+
# | t2 || 7 | 2 | 13 | 8 | # | t2 || 15 | 2 | 5 | 8 |
# +----++----+----+----+----+ # +----++----+----+----+----+
# | t3 || 11 | 6 | 1 | 12 | # | t3 || 3 | 6 | 9 | 12 |
# +----++----+----+----+----+ # +----++----+----+----+----+
#
######################################################################
# Why not xmm registers? Short answer. It was actually tested and
# was not any faster, but *contrary*, most notably on Intel CPUs.
# Longer answer. Main advantage of using mm registers is that movd
# latency is lower, especially on Intel P4. While arithmetic
# instructions are twice as many, they can be scheduled every cycle
# and not every second one when they are operating on xmm register,
# so that "arithmetic throughput" remains virtually the same. And
# finally the code can be executed even on elder SSE-only CPUs:-)
sub sse_enccompact()
{
&pshufw ("mm1","mm0",0x08); # 5, 4, 1, 0
&pshufw ("mm5","mm4",0x0d); # 15,14,11,10
&movd ("eax","mm1"); # 5, 4, 1, 0
&movd ("ebx","mm5"); # 15,14,11,10
&mov ($__key,$key);
&movz ($acc,&LB("eax")); # 0
&movz ("edx",&HB("eax")); # 1
&pshufw ("mm2","mm0",0x0d); # 7, 6, 3, 2
&movz ("ecx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 0
&movz ($key,&LB("ebx")); # 10
&movz ("edx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"edx",1)); # 1
&shr ("eax",16); # 5, 4
&shl ("edx",8); # 1
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 10
&movz ($key,&HB("ebx")); # 11
&shl ($acc,16); # 10
&pshufw ("mm6","mm4",0x08); # 13,12, 9, 8
&or ("ecx",$acc); # 10
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 11
&movz ($key,&HB("eax")); # 5
&shl ($acc,24); # 11
&shr ("ebx",16); # 15,14
&or ("edx",$acc); # 11
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 5
&movz ($key,&HB("ebx")); # 15
&shl ($acc,8); # 5
&or ("ecx",$acc); # 5
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 15
&movz ($key,&LB("eax")); # 4
&shl ($acc,24); # 15
&or ("ecx",$acc); # 15
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 4
&movz ($key,&LB("ebx")); # 14
&movd ("eax","mm2"); # 7, 6, 3, 2
&movd ("mm0","ecx"); # t[0] collected
&movz ("ecx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 14
&movz ($key,&HB("eax")); # 3
&shl ("ecx",16); # 14
&movd ("ebx","mm6"); # 13,12, 9, 8
&or ("ecx",$acc); # 14
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 3
&movz ($key,&HB("ebx")); # 9
&shl ($acc,24); # 3
&or ("ecx",$acc); # 3
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 9
&movz ($key,&LB("ebx")); # 8
&shl ($acc,8); # 9
&shr ("ebx",16); # 13,12
&or ("ecx",$acc); # 9
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 8
&movz ($key,&LB("eax")); # 2
&shr ("eax",16); # 7, 6
&movd ("mm1","ecx"); # t[1] collected
&movz ("ecx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 2
&movz ($key,&HB("eax")); # 7
&shl ("ecx",16); # 2
&and ("eax",0xff); # 6
&or ("ecx",$acc); # 2
&punpckldq ("mm0","mm1"); # t[0,1] collected
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 7
&movz ($key,&HB("ebx")); # 13
&shl ($acc,24); # 7
&and ("ebx",0xff); # 12
&movz ("eax",&BP(-128,$tbl,"eax",1)); # 6
&or ("ecx",$acc); # 7
&shl ("eax",16); # 6
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 13
&or ("edx","eax"); # 6
&shl ($acc,8); # 13
&movz ("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"ebx",1)); # 12
&or ("ecx",$acc); # 13
&or ("edx","ebx"); # 12
&mov ($key,$__key);
&movd ("mm4","ecx"); # t[2] collected
&movd ("mm5","edx"); # t[3] collected
&punpckldq ("mm4","mm5"); # t[2,3] collected
}
if (!$x86only) {
&function_begin_B("_sse_AES_encrypt_compact");
&pxor ("mm0",&QWP(0,$key)); # 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0
&pxor ("mm4",&QWP(8,$key)); # 15,14,13,12,11,10, 9, 8
# note that caller is expected to allocate stack frame for me!
&mov ($acc,&DWP(240,$key)); # load key->rounds
&lea ($acc,&DWP(-2,$acc,$acc));
&lea ($acc,&DWP(0,$key,$acc,8));
&mov ($__end,$acc); # end of key schedule
&mov ($s0,0x1b1b1b1b); # magic constant
&mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),$s0);
&mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),$s0);
# prefetch Te4
&mov ($s0,&DWP(0-128,$tbl));
&mov ($s1,&DWP(32-128,$tbl));
&mov ($s2,&DWP(64-128,$tbl));
&mov ($s3,&DWP(96-128,$tbl));
&mov ($s0,&DWP(128-128,$tbl));
&mov ($s1,&DWP(160-128,$tbl));
&mov ($s2,&DWP(192-128,$tbl));
&mov ($s3,&DWP(224-128,$tbl));
&set_label("loop",16);
&sse_enccompact();
&add ($key,16);
&cmp ($key,$__end);
&ja (&label("out"));
&movq ("mm2",&QWP(8,"esp"));
&pxor ("mm3","mm3"); &pxor ("mm7","mm7");
&movq ("mm1","mm0"); &movq ("mm5","mm4"); # r0
&pcmpgtb("mm3","mm0"); &pcmpgtb("mm7","mm4");
&pand ("mm3","mm2"); &pand ("mm7","mm2");
&pshufw ("mm2","mm0",0xb1); &pshufw ("mm6","mm4",0xb1);# ROTATE(r0,16)
&paddb ("mm0","mm0"); &paddb ("mm4","mm4");
&pxor ("mm0","mm3"); &pxor ("mm4","mm7"); # = r2
&pshufw ("mm3","mm2",0xb1); &pshufw ("mm7","mm6",0xb1);# r0
&pxor ("mm1","mm0"); &pxor ("mm5","mm4"); # r0^r2
&pxor ("mm0","mm2"); &pxor ("mm4","mm6"); # ^= ROTATE(r0,16)
&movq ("mm2","mm3"); &movq ("mm6","mm7");
&pslld ("mm3",8); &pslld ("mm7",8);
&psrld ("mm2",24); &psrld ("mm6",24);
&pxor ("mm0","mm3"); &pxor ("mm4","mm7"); # ^= r0<<8
&pxor ("mm0","mm2"); &pxor ("mm4","mm6"); # ^= r0>>24
&movq ("mm3","mm1"); &movq ("mm7","mm5");
&movq ("mm2",&QWP(0,$key)); &movq ("mm6",&QWP(8,$key));
&psrld ("mm1",8); &psrld ("mm5",8);
&mov ($s0,&DWP(0-128,$tbl));
&pslld ("mm3",24); &pslld ("mm7",24);
&mov ($s1,&DWP(64-128,$tbl));
&pxor ("mm0","mm1"); &pxor ("mm4","mm5"); # ^= (r2^r0)<<8
&mov ($s2,&DWP(128-128,$tbl));
&pxor ("mm0","mm3"); &pxor ("mm4","mm7"); # ^= (r2^r0)>>24
&mov ($s3,&DWP(192-128,$tbl));
&pxor ("mm0","mm2"); &pxor ("mm4","mm6");
&jmp (&label("loop"));
&set_label("out",16);
&pxor ("mm0",&QWP(0,$key));
&pxor ("mm4",&QWP(8,$key));
&ret ();
&function_end_B("_sse_AES_encrypt_compact");
}
######################################################################
# Vanilla block function.
######################################################################
sub encstep()
{ my ($i,$te,@s) = @_;
my $tmp = $key;
my $out = $i==3?$s[0]:$acc;
# lines marked with #%e?x[i] denote "reordered" instructions...
if ($i==3) { &mov ($key,$__key); }##%edx
else { &mov ($out,$s[0]);
&and ($out,0xFF); }
if ($i==1) { &shr ($s[0],16); }#%ebx[1]
if ($i==2) { &shr ($s[0],24); }#%ecx[2]
&mov ($out,&DWP(0,$te,$out,8));
if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[1]; }##%eax
&movz ($tmp,&HB($s[1]));
&xor ($out,&DWP(3,$te,$tmp,8));
if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[2]; &mov ($s[1],$__s0); }##%ebx
else { &mov ($tmp,$s[2]);
&shr ($tmp,16); }
if ($i==2) { &and ($s[1],0xFF); }#%edx[2]
&and ($tmp,0xFF);
&xor ($out,&DWP(2,$te,$tmp,8));
if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[3]; &mov ($s[2],$__s1); }##%ecx
elsif($i==2){ &movz ($tmp,&HB($s[3])); }#%ebx[2]
else { &mov ($tmp,$s[3]);
&shr ($tmp,24) }
&xor ($out,&DWP(1,$te,$tmp,8));
if ($i<2) { &mov (&DWP(4+4*$i,"esp"),$out); }
if ($i==3) { &mov ($s[3],$acc); }
&comment();
}
sub enclast()
{ my ($i,$te,@s)=@_;
my $tmp = $key;
my $out = $i==3?$s[0]:$acc;
if ($i==3) { &mov ($key,$__key); }##%edx
else { &mov ($out,$s[0]); }
&and ($out,0xFF);
if ($i==1) { &shr ($s[0],16); }#%ebx[1]
if ($i==2) { &shr ($s[0],24); }#%ecx[2]
&mov ($out,&DWP(2,$te,$out,8));
&and ($out,0x000000ff);
if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[1]; }##%eax
&movz ($tmp,&HB($s[1]));
&mov ($tmp,&DWP(0,$te,$tmp,8));
&and ($tmp,0x0000ff00);
&xor ($out,$tmp);
if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[2]; &mov ($s[1],$__s0); }##%ebx
else { &mov ($tmp,$s[2]);
&shr ($tmp,16); }
if ($i==2) { &and ($s[1],0xFF); }#%edx[2]
&and ($tmp,0xFF);
&mov ($tmp,&DWP(0,$te,$tmp,8));
&and ($tmp,0x00ff0000);
&xor ($out,$tmp);
if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[3]; &mov ($s[2],$__s1); }##%ecx
elsif($i==2){ &movz ($tmp,&HB($s[3])); }#%ebx[2]
else { &mov ($tmp,$s[3]);
&shr ($tmp,24); }
&mov ($tmp,&DWP(2,$te,$tmp,8));
&and ($tmp,0xff000000);
&xor ($out,$tmp);
if ($i<2) { &mov (&DWP(4+4*$i,"esp"),$out); }
if ($i==3) { &mov ($s[3],$acc); }
}
&function_begin_B("_x86_AES_encrypt");
if ($vertical_spin) {
# I need high parts of volatile registers to be accessible...
&exch ($s1="edi",$key="ebx");
&mov ($s2="esi",$acc="ecx");
}
# note that caller is expected to allocate stack frame for me!
&mov ($__key,$key); # save key
&xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); # xor with key
&xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
&xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
&xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
&mov ($acc,&DWP(240,$key)); # load key->rounds
if ($small_footprint) {
&lea ($acc,&DWP(-2,$acc,$acc));
&lea ($acc,&DWP(0,$key,$acc,8));
&mov ($__end,$acc); # end of key schedule
&set_label("loop",16);
if ($vertical_spin) {
&encvert($tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
} else {
&encstep(0,$tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
&encstep(1,$tbl,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0);
&encstep(2,$tbl,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1);
&encstep(3,$tbl,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2);
}
&add ($key,16); # advance rd_key
&xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key));
&xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
&xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
&xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
&cmp ($key,$__end);
&mov ($__key,$key);
&jb (&label("loop"));
}
else {
&cmp ($acc,10);
&jle (&label("10rounds"));
&cmp ($acc,12);
&jle (&label("12rounds"));
&set_label("14rounds",4);
for ($i=1;$i<3;$i++) {
if ($vertical_spin) {
&encvert($tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
} else {
&encstep(0,$tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
&encstep(1,$tbl,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0);
&encstep(2,$tbl,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1);
&encstep(3,$tbl,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2);
}
&xor ($s0,&DWP(16*$i+0,$key));
&xor ($s1,&DWP(16*$i+4,$key));
&xor ($s2,&DWP(16*$i+8,$key));
&xor ($s3,&DWP(16*$i+12,$key));
}
&add ($key,32);
&mov ($__key,$key); # advance rd_key
&set_label("12rounds",4);
for ($i=1;$i<3;$i++) {
if ($vertical_spin) {
&encvert($tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
} else {
&encstep(0,$tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
&encstep(1,$tbl,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0);
&encstep(2,$tbl,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1);
&encstep(3,$tbl,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2);
}
&xor ($s0,&DWP(16*$i+0,$key));
&xor ($s1,&DWP(16*$i+4,$key));
&xor ($s2,&DWP(16*$i+8,$key));
&xor ($s3,&DWP(16*$i+12,$key));
}
&add ($key,32);
&mov ($__key,$key); # advance rd_key
&set_label("10rounds",4);
for ($i=1;$i<10;$i++) {
if ($vertical_spin) {
&encvert($tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
} else {
&encstep(0,$tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
&encstep(1,$tbl,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0);
&encstep(2,$tbl,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1);
&encstep(3,$tbl,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2);
}
&xor ($s0,&DWP(16*$i+0,$key));
&xor ($s1,&DWP(16*$i+4,$key));
&xor ($s2,&DWP(16*$i+8,$key));
&xor ($s3,&DWP(16*$i+12,$key));
}
}
if ($vertical_spin) {
# "reincarnate" some registers for "horizontal" spin...
&mov ($s1="ebx",$key="edi");
&mov ($s2="ecx",$acc="esi");
}
&enclast(0,$tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
&enclast(1,$tbl,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0);
&enclast(2,$tbl,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1);
&enclast(3,$tbl,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2);
&add ($key,$small_footprint?16:160);
&xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key));
&xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
&xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
&xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
&ret ();
&set_label("AES_Te",64); # Yes! I keep it in the code segment!
&_data_word(0xa56363c6, 0x847c7cf8, 0x997777ee, 0x8d7b7bf6);
&_data_word(0x0df2f2ff, 0xbd6b6bd6, 0xb16f6fde, 0x54c5c591);
&_data_word(0x50303060, 0x03010102, 0xa96767ce, 0x7d2b2b56);
&_data_word(0x19fefee7, 0x62d7d7b5, 0xe6abab4d, 0x9a7676ec);
&_data_word(0x45caca8f, 0x9d82821f, 0x40c9c989, 0x877d7dfa);
&_data_word(0x15fafaef, 0xeb5959b2, 0xc947478e, 0x0bf0f0fb);
&_data_word(0xecadad41, 0x67d4d4b3, 0xfda2a25f, 0xeaafaf45);
&_data_word(0xbf9c9c23, 0xf7a4a453, 0x967272e4, 0x5bc0c09b);
&_data_word(0xc2b7b775, 0x1cfdfde1, 0xae93933d, 0x6a26264c);
&_data_word(0x5a36366c, 0x413f3f7e, 0x02f7f7f5, 0x4fcccc83);
&_data_word(0x5c343468, 0xf4a5a551, 0x34e5e5d1, 0x08f1f1f9);
&_data_word(0x937171e2, 0x73d8d8ab, 0x53313162, 0x3f15152a);
&_data_word(0x0c040408, 0x52c7c795, 0x65232346, 0x5ec3c39d);
&_data_word(0x28181830, 0xa1969637, 0x0f05050a, 0xb59a9a2f);
&_data_word(0x0907070e, 0x36121224, 0x9b80801b, 0x3de2e2df);
&_data_word(0x26ebebcd, 0x6927274e, 0xcdb2b27f, 0x9f7575ea);
&_data_word(0x1b090912, 0x9e83831d, 0x742c2c58, 0x2e1a1a34);
&_data_word(0x2d1b1b36, 0xb26e6edc, 0xee5a5ab4, 0xfba0a05b);
&_data_word(0xf65252a4, 0x4d3b3b76, 0x61d6d6b7, 0xceb3b37d);
&_data_word(0x7b292952, 0x3ee3e3dd, 0x712f2f5e, 0x97848413);
&_data_word(0xf55353a6, 0x68d1d1b9, 0x00000000, 0x2cededc1);
&_data_word(0x60202040, 0x1ffcfce3, 0xc8b1b179, 0xed5b5bb6);
&_data_word(0xbe6a6ad4, 0x46cbcb8d, 0xd9bebe67, 0x4b393972);
&_data_word(0xde4a4a94, 0xd44c4c98, 0xe85858b0, 0x4acfcf85);
&_data_word(0x6bd0d0bb, 0x2aefefc5, 0xe5aaaa4f, 0x16fbfbed);
&_data_word(0xc5434386, 0xd74d4d9a, 0x55333366, 0x94858511);
&_data_word(0xcf45458a, 0x10f9f9e9, 0x06020204, 0x817f7ffe);
&_data_word(0xf05050a0, 0x443c3c78, 0xba9f9f25, 0xe3a8a84b);
&_data_word(0xf35151a2, 0xfea3a35d, 0xc0404080, 0x8a8f8f05);
&_data_word(0xad92923f, 0xbc9d9d21, 0x48383870, 0x04f5f5f1);
&_data_word(0xdfbcbc63, 0xc1b6b677, 0x75dadaaf, 0x63212142);
&_data_word(0x30101020, 0x1affffe5, 0x0ef3f3fd, 0x6dd2d2bf);
&_data_word(0x4ccdcd81, 0x140c0c18, 0x35131326, 0x2fececc3);
&_data_word(0xe15f5fbe, 0xa2979735, 0xcc444488, 0x3917172e);
&_data_word(0x57c4c493, 0xf2a7a755, 0x827e7efc, 0x473d3d7a);
&_data_word(0xac6464c8, 0xe75d5dba, 0x2b191932, 0x957373e6);
&_data_word(0xa06060c0, 0x98818119, 0xd14f4f9e, 0x7fdcdca3);