Remove anti-NIST "FUD" #102
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I'm no fan of NIST, at least when it comes to the specification of cryptographic standards. They have been the NSA's stooge since the 1987 Computer Security Act theoretically gave them, and not the NSA, control of these standards. They subsequently went on to push the (inferior) Digital Signature Algorithm over RSA signatures, most likely because the NSA was worried about having a standard for public key encryption which they were incapable of breaking. Rinse, repeat with Dual_EC_DRBG, a standard intentionally backdoored by the NSA. This has happened before, and it will all happen again. That said, perhaps this README isn't the best venue for voicing these concerns.
| association, NSA) influence, with the following minor exceptions: | ||
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| * The Poly1305 MAC, used for authenticating integrity of ciphertexts, uses AES | ||
| as a replaceable component |
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Note: this is wrong. NaCl's Poly1305 doesn't use AES
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In the paper which describes NaCl, it references back to Dan's Poly-1305 AES paper. What's your source for it not using AES?
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The NaCl source code
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I'm no fan of NIST, at least when it comes to the specification of cryptographic
standards. They have been the NSA's stooge since the 1987 Computer Security Act
theoretically gave them, and not the NSA, control of these standards. They
subsequently went on to push the (inferior) Digital Signature Algorithm over RSA
signatures, most likely because the NSA was worried about having a standard for
public key encryption which they were incapable of breaking. Rinse, repeat with
Dual_EC_DRBG, a standard intentionally backdoored by the NSA.
This has happened before, and it will all happen again.
That said, perhaps this README isn't the best venue for voicing these concerns.