CVSS Score 3.1 AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N, Low
Envoy does not restrict the set of certificates it accepts from the peer, either as a TLS client or a TLS server, to only those certificates that contain the necessary extendedKeyUsage (id-kp-serverAuth and id-kp-clientAuth, respectively)
This means that a peer may present an e-mail certificate (e.g. id-kp-emailProtection), either as a leaf certificate or as a CA in the chain, and it will be accepted for TLS. This is particularly bad when combined with #630 , in that it allows a Web PKI CA that is intended only for use with S/MIME, and thus exempted from audit or supervision, to issue TLS certificates that will be accepted by Envoy.
Impact
Envoy will trust upstream certificates that should not be trusted.
Patches
Workarounds
None.
References
https://blog.envoyproxy.io
https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/releases
For more information
Open an issue in Envoy repo
Email us at envoy-security
CVSS Score 3.1 AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N, Low
Envoy does not restrict the set of certificates it accepts from the peer, either as a TLS client or a TLS server, to only those certificates that contain the necessary extendedKeyUsage (id-kp-serverAuth and id-kp-clientAuth, respectively)
This means that a peer may present an e-mail certificate (e.g. id-kp-emailProtection), either as a leaf certificate or as a CA in the chain, and it will be accepted for TLS. This is particularly bad when combined with #630 , in that it allows a Web PKI CA that is intended only for use with S/MIME, and thus exempted from audit or supervision, to issue TLS certificates that will be accepted by Envoy.
Impact
Envoy will trust upstream certificates that should not be trusted.
Patches
Workarounds
None.
References
https://blog.envoyproxy.io
https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/releases
For more information
Open an issue in Envoy repo
Email us at envoy-security