TAO - Tokenized Autonomous Organisation #37
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soc1c
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Aiming to approach UX from a unique stance, utilising d3.js to create an interactive and visual experience to trigger transactions within the cohort and for staking within the initiative to support it's ultimate state of funding, devpost submission to follow and repo. First thing is first though, solidifying the structure. |
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So what would be the differences to a governance ‘framework’ except for beim designed to work only with non-trade able tokens and it seems it is quite similar to you validity project, no? |
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hi Samuel, |
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@step21 this is essentially a new approach to a governance framework, reformatting the DAO to be a non-bias based delegation initiative one that is not skewed by financial entities. Could even be a new form for companies, charities, OSS projects or even a local municipality. @romanoing come find me bro, I'll be jumping in around then, would love to hear what you could contribute and it will be good to catch up. |
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So what are the first steps
Hope to clear this by 02:00 GMT+2 24th of August |
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An actual spinoff of this project is going to be the formation of a new EIP, a governing token non transactional asset that is based on commitment. This is be the core of functional within the initiative. |
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@aquabu Interesting but the only similarity is compounding interest allocation, I do not condone in capital based governance 😘 |
WARNING THIS IDEA WAS FORMED WITHIN THE PAST 24 HOURS, IT NEEDS ALOT OF WORK AND A COALITON OF MINDS TO REACH IT'S OPTIMAL STRUCTURE
SOME ASPECTS MAY BE DRASTICALLY ALTERED OR ENTIRELY REMOVED
TAO - Tokenized Autonomous Organisation
A true form of on-chain open governance, known as a Tokenized Autonomous Organisation (TAO), allowing all who wish to participate towards contributing the direction regarding a subject entity. For its many confrontations and proposals that need to be approached in a distributed manner.
The motivation behind an initiative such as this comes for many reasons but the majority of which resides on the many flaws related to standardised on-chain governing techniques that have seen quite the interest in the past year. In reality, these systems aren’t what they claim to be, with sub-entities dominating the delegated power, which ultimately juxtapositions the use of a distributed organisation.
Given the state of governance in the Ethereum ecosystem, it is clear that it is not viably sustainable, which major highlight to an aspect of voting within MakerDAO. Where internal users feel that their contributions are ultimately insignificant due to the centralisation of voting weight. When we analyse other coalitions like MetaCartelDAO, MolochDAO, dxDAO and finally DAOstack, we can see a correlation between low participation attendance and a use case of delegating grants usually for non-profit motives. After analysing the state of DAO’s, some postulations were formed on some of the flaws regarding long term sustainability.
Rigid focus only on delegated funding
Not a form of open-governance
Centralised delegate power
High financial entry barrier
No form of reputation
No Incentive to vote
Poor attendance
In comparison to standardised DAO’s, there is no locked value to exemplify commitment, instead, users are free to propose their involvement and the organisation as a whole either approves or declines one's involvement in governance.
Architecture
An internal ERC20 standard compliant token, which bears features of burning and minting tokens internally. It is important to highlight that this is not a financial asset and cannot be transferred to external users who do not reside in the cohort. For the TAO to form, it must consist at least with 5 founding members, which could be approached from two waypoints
These individuals are defined within the contract constructor
Multi-sig contract handles the deployment between the 5 founding entities
A fair but reasonable token weight is divided among these founding individuals but no more than 25%-40%. The remaining allocation of this token supply is reserved for delegation rewards that are distributed to proactive individuals but also the onboarding of new individuals to the system, allowing the ability to condone in open-governance.
Acceptance, reformation & rejection
There are only compliant staking options one can choose from. Concluding dominance in one of these options equates to the ultimate faith of the proposal, either the approval, decline or evolution of a proposal as a whole.
Individuality
For any individual to join the TAO, they must be accepted based on an underlying consensus regarding all coalition members, which is officially greater than the 51% majority. Each model can vary quite drastically here, where some can restrict human verification and others allow a variance of the freedom via anonymity par their account address. This is quite fluid and is down to the members how they want to approach this individual onboarding.
Could leverage 3box as a form of identity verification, using their Ethereum based profiling, cohort members then analyse each user and their social track records (Twitter or GitHub) to see if they would be a viable fit for the initiative. This is the ideal approach to for the hackathon at hand.
Unless if a user is proposed for exoneration or decides to leave upon their own accord, allowing a window of opportunity for a new individual to propose their initiation.
Rewards & Penalties
Delegates ultimate commitment and participation affect their stance within the organisation, inactivity can have an ulterior effect on the majority of ownership and in turn affect reputation for delegate within the system. In turn, active commitment to events increases their reputation and their organisation ownership holdings, allowing one to have bigger contributions within the system.
For simplicity with this implementation, the reward constant is static and is distributed to every participant present to allocating consideration for a proposal. Rewards and commitment could be measured through uint mapping of delegates which correlates to the total proposal count when registered to the organisation which updated the key-value when last penalised or rewarded, users have the ability to improve their stance by up keeping with initiative but if continuously engage or disengage may affect their ultimate influence within the infrastructure.
If the user lacking to upkeep within the count, it will result in a penalty on interaction with the organisation. The penalty will affect their token balance by burning an increment of the supply and in turn recontribute to the reward supply for others to claim if the user's commitment count is symbiotic to the current proposal count there are rewarded for their interaction.
Proposals
The essence of a distributed organisation is the ability to participate in open governance, any individual within the system, there are three varying proposal types. Each proposal has an in-depth description of why it may affect the eco-system positively long term.
Funding orientated, an individual proposes a select amount of organisation assets (DAI) to be allocated to a certain resource or entity for the benefit of the organisation as a whole.
Management orientated, an individual proposes that another organisations delegate should be exonerated due to lack of commitment or foul play.
Sentiment orientated, a generic structure for proposals that may be used to dictate the common perspective towards the initiatives movement as a whole, this could be simple tasks such as PR, organisation operatives or more drastic movements like technical propositions.
Funding (needs refinement)
Influence: https://ethresear.ch/t/public-interest-projects-a-fully-onchain-risk-minimized-seed-funding-mechanism/5977
DAI replicates a stable form of value and is the optimal choice for a distributed initiative instead of a volatile asset such as ETH. A form of investment vehicle that only accepts DAI pooled interested creates exponential growth for the initiative through applying compound’s protocol. This could be applied in many different ways
Interest can be used to generate a transferable token that is returned to the pooled investors allowing severability of the deposited assets
Interest is distributed among participants with an allocation used internal funding.
Brainstorming
Should there be two varying token types?
One asset would correlate to governing ownership within the TAO essentially equating to reputation and the other would represent an underlying asset that equates to the monetary value of the organisation, this all depends on how the funding operative is approached.
Should the supply be a static value of 100, that redistributes weight among participants?
It’s hard to say but all in all, it becomes a more comprehensive process to the outside world and dictates the essence of pure ownership, just like our familiar friend, shares.
What are the attack vectors? (needs refinement)
Could a validated cohort member orchestrate a Sybil attack?
Who am I?
My name is Samuel JJ Gosling and I'm an advocate of governance, I have experience with UI/UX engineering/design, mostly working with React.js but more recently focusing on D3.js for creating a unique approach to triggering transactions. I've proactively been engaging with Solidity for the past 2 years know my way around the EVM on a ground level. I'm the founder of a community-driven project called Validity which just launched its MVP that bares the above approach on transactional user experiences. To see some examples of my work in its whole check out my GitHub and visit the Validity website.
https://vldy.org
What do we need?
Conclusion
I hope people can join me refining this idea to leverage an innovation that transcends the hackathon for a future to come. I will be available all day tomorrow if anyone wishes to meet in person and discuss the idea further and perhaps collaborate for the day ahead.
Peace.
Contact
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