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<h1 class="entry-title"><a rel="bookmark" href="17">Federalist № 17</a></h1>
<h2 class="entry-summary">The Same Subject Continued</h2>
<h3 class="entry-summary">
The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the
Union
</h3>
<div class="entry-content">
<p id="salutation">To the People of the State of New York:</p>
<p id="p1"><span class="initial">An objection</span>, of a nature
different from that which has been stated and answered, in <a
href="16">my last address</a>, may perhaps be likewise urged
against the principle of legislation for the individual citizens
of America. It may be said that it would tend to render the
government of the Union too powerful, and to enable it to absorb
those residuary authorities, which it might be judged proper to
leave with the States for local purposes. Allowing the utmost
latitude to the love of power which any reasonable man can
require, I confess I am at a loss to discover what temptation the
persons intrusted with the administration of the general
government could ever feel to divest the States of the authorities
of that description. The regulation of the mere domestic police of
a State appears to me to hold out slender allurements to ambition.
Commerce, finance, negotiation, and war seem to comprehend all the
objects which have charms for minds governed by that passion; and
all the powers necessary to those objects ought, in the first
instance, to be lodged in the national depository. The
administration of private justice between the citizens of the same
State, the supervision of agriculture and of other concerns of a
similar nature, all those things, in short, which are proper to be
provided for by local legislation, can never be desirable cares of
a general jurisdiction. It is therefore improbable that there
should exist a disposition in the federal councils to usurp the
powers with which they are connected; because the attempt to
exercise those powers would be as troublesome as it would be
nugatory; and the possession of them, for that reason, would
contribute nothing to the dignity, to the importance, or to the
splendor of the national government. <a class="permalink"
href="#p1">¶</a></p>
<p id="p2">But let it be admitted, for argument's sake, that mere
wantonness and lust of domination would be sufficient to beget
that disposition; still it may be safely affirmed, that the sense
of the constituent body of the national representatives, or, in
other words, the people of the several States, would control the
indulgence of so extravagant an appetite. It will always be far
more easy for the State governments to encroach upon the national
authorities than for the national government to encroach upon the
State authorities. The proof of this proposition turns upon the
greater degree of influence which the State governments if they
administer their affairs with uprightness and prudence, will
generally possess over the people; a circumstance which at the
same time teaches us that there is an inherent and intrinsic
weakness in all federal constitutions; and that too much pains
cannot be taken in their organization, to give them all the force
which is compatible with the principles of liberty. <a
class="permalink" href="#p2">¶</a></p>
<p id="p3">The superiority of influence in favor of the particular
governments would result partly from the diffusive construction of
the national government, but chiefly from the nature of the
objects to which the attention of the State administrations would
be directed. <a class="permalink" href="#p3">¶</a></p>
<p id="p4">It is a known fact in human nature, that its affections
are commonly weak in proportion to the distance or diffusiveness
of the object. Upon the same principle that a man is more attached
to his family than to his neighborhood, to his neighborhood than
to the community at large, the people of each State would be apt
to feel a stronger bias towards their local governments than
towards the government of the Union; unless the force of that
principle should be destroyed by a much better administration of
the latter. <a class="permalink" href="#p4">¶</a></p>
<p id="p5">This strong propensity of the human heart would find
powerful auxiliaries in the objects of State regulation. <a
class="permalink" href="#p5">¶</a></p>
<p id="p6">The variety of more minute interests, which will
necessarily fall under the superintendence of the local
administrations, and which will form so many rivulets of
influence, running through every part of the society, cannot be
particularized, without involving a detail too tedious and
uninteresting to compensate for the instruction it might afford.
<a class="permalink" href="#p6">¶</a></p>
<p id="p7">There is one transcendant advantage belonging to the
province of the State governments, which alone suffices to place
the matter in a clear and satisfactory light,—I mean the
ordinary administration of criminal and civil justice. This, of
all others, is the most powerful, most universal, and most
attractive source of popular obedience and attachment. It is that
which, being the immediate and visible guardian of life and
property, having its benefits and its terrors in constant activity
before the public eye, regulating all those personal interests and
familiar concerns to which the sensibility of individuals is more
immediately awake, contributes, more than any other circumstance,
to impressing upon the minds of the people, affection, esteem, and
reverence towards the government. This great cement of society,
which will diffuse itself almost wholly through the channels of
the particular governments, independent of all other causes of
influence, would insure them so decided an empire over their
respective citizens as to render them at all times a complete
counterpoise, and, not unfrequently, dangerous rivals to the power
of the Union. <a class="permalink" href="#p7">¶</a></p>
<p id="p8">The operations of the national government, on the other
hand, falling less immediately under the observation of the mass
of the citizens, the benefits derived from it will chiefly be
perceived and attended to by speculative men. Relating to more
general interests, they will be less apt to come home to the
feelings of the people; and, in proportion, less likely to inspire
an habitual sense of obligation, and an active sentiment of
attachment. <a class="permalink" href="#p8">¶</a></p>
<p id="p9">The reasoning on this head has been abundantly
exemplified by the experience of all federal constitutions with
which we are acquainted, and of all others which have borne the
least analogy to them. <a class="permalink" href="#p9">¶</a></p>
<p id="p10">Though the ancient feudal systems were not, strictly
speaking, confederacies, yet they partook of the nature of that
species of association. There was a common head, chieftain, or
sovereign, whose authority extended over the whole nation; and a
number of subordinate vassals, or feudatories, who had large
portions of land allotted to them, and numerous trains of
<em>inferior</em> vassals or retainers, who occupied and
cultivated that land upon the tenure of fealty or obedience, to
the persons of whom they held it. Each principal vassal was a kind
of sovereign, within his particular demesnes. The consequences of
this situation were a continual opposition to authority of the
sovereign, and frequent wars between the great barons or chief
feudatories themselves. The power of the head of the nation was
commonly too weak, either to preserve the public peace, or to
protect the people against the oppressions of their immediate
lords. This period of European affairs is emphatically styled by
historians, the times of feudal anarchy. <a class="permalink"
href="#p10">¶</a></p>
<p id="p11">When the sovereign happened to be a man of vigorous
and warlike temper and of superior abilities, he would acquire a
personal weight and influence, which answered, for the time, the
purpose of a more regular authority. But in general, the power of
the barons triumphed over that of the prince; and in many
instances his dominion was entirely thrown off, and the great
fiefs were erected into independent principalities or States. In
those instances in which the monarch finally prevailed over his
vassals, his success was chiefly owing to the tyranny of those
vassals over their dependents. The barons, or nobles, equally the
enemies of the sovereign and the oppressors of the common people,
were dreaded and detested by both; till mutual danger and mutual
interest effected a union between them fatal to the power of the
aristocracy. Had the nobles, by a conduct of clemency and justice,
preserved the fidelity and devotion of their retainers and
followers, the contests between them and the prince must almost
always have ended in their favor, and in the abridgment or
subversion of the royal authority. <a class="permalink"
href="#p11">¶</a></p>
<p id="p12">This is not an assertion founded merely in speculation
or conjecture. Among other illustrations of its truth which might
be cited, Scotland will furnish a cogent example. The spirit of
clanship which was, at an early day, introduced into that kingdom,
uniting the nobles and their dependants by ties equivalent to
those of kindred, rendered the aristocracy a constant overmatch
for the power of the monarch, till the incorporation with England
subdued its fierce and ungovernable spirit, and reduced it within
those rules of subordination which a more rational and more
energetic system of civil polity had previously established in the
latter kingdom. <a class="permalink" href="#p12">¶</a></p>
<p id="p13">The separate governments in a confederacy may aptly be
compared with the feudal baronies; with this advantage in their
favor, that from the reasons already explained, they will
generally possess the confidence and good-will of the people, and
with so important a support, will be able effectually to oppose
all encroachments of the national government. It will be well if
they are not able to counteract its legitimate and necessary
authority. The points of similitude consist in the rivalship of
power, applicable to both, and in the <em>concentration</em> of
large portions of the strength of the community into particular
<em>deposits</em>, in one case at the disposal of individuals, in
the other case at the disposal of political bodies. <a
class="permalink" href="#p13">¶</a></p>
<p id="p14">A concise review of the events that have attended
confederate governments will further illustrate this important
doctrine; an inattention to which has been the great source of our
political mistakes, and has given our jealousy a direction to the
wrong side. This review shall form the subject of some ensuing
papers. <a class="permalink" href="#p14">¶</a></p>
<address class="vcard author">
<span class="nickname">Publius</span>.
[<span class="fn">Alexander Hamilton</span>]
</address>
</div>
<div class="meta">
<p>
First published in the <abbr class="published updated"
title="1787-12-05">Wednesday, December 5, 1787</abbr> issue of the
<span class="publication">Independent Journal</span>.
</p>
<p class="rights">
This work is in <a rel="copyright license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/publicdomain/">the public domain</a>.
</p>
<p>
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