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Breaking Honeypots for Fun and Profit

We will detect, bypass, and abuse honeypot technologies and solutions, turning them against the defender. We will also release a global map of honeypot deployments, honeypot detection vulnerabilities, and supporting code.

Talk notes

DeanSysman, Gadi Evron, Itamar Sher

  • Cyber Deception.
    • Find out what the bad guys are doing by tricking them.
    • Attacks s attackers detection.
    • Attackers have to search the target network for flaws.
    • Observe, orient, decieve, attack (OODA).
    • Considered in planning an intelligence operation.
    • Requires a decoy.
    • The decoy normally is receiving no traffic.
    • If there's traffic, it means it's an attacker.
    • Low interaction honeypots useful for malware and scanning detection.
      • Limited by definition, as it's an emulation of another service to lure the attacker.
    • High interaction honeypots are higly instrumented real services.
  • Fingerprinting.
    • Can be a vulnerability.
  • Low interaction honeypots.
    • Scripting of default protocol behavior.
    • Monitoring built into it.
  • High interaction honeypots.
    • It's the actual network services/machines.
    • Needs to be monitored.
    • Difficult to properly implement.
  • Shodan.
    • "Honeypot or not?" service.
  • "Artillery" project.
    • A combination of a honeypot, monitoring tool, and alerting system.
    • On github.
    • Sends lots of random data to the attacker.
    • No real deception.
    • Detection is trivial.
    • Can be used to block any IP internally in a network by spoofind source IP.
  • "BearTrap" project.
    • Implements some services.
    • Sends a default banner with status code 220.
    • Easily detected.
    • Waits for a user command, then returns status code 530.
    • Can also be tricket into blocking a spoofed source IP.
  • "honeyd" project.
    • Configurable platform for honeypots.
    • Default script detectable; has to be replaced.
      • Spoofs IIS web server by default -- easily fingerprinted.
      • Doesn't implement DELE command for FTP.
      • Some SSH stuff detectable.
  • "Nova"
    • Detectable.
      • Default windows config has no NetBIOS-service.
      • ...
    • Looking at all services can fingerprint the honeypot.
  • "Kippo"
    • Many commands aren't implemented.
    • wget is implemented.
    • Can be used for DDoS, port scan.
    • Can be detected.
      • Detecting can be achieved in the SSH connection.
      • uname is always the same.
        • Searching for the string gives lots of sysadmin questions in forums; "this machine on my network is weird".
  • "Dionaea"
    • Written with the goal to get a copy of the malware used in attacks.
    • Can be detected.
      • Portscan shows MS SQL server with "honeypot" in the name.
      • HTTPS certificate is issued to a dionaea domain.
    • Developers are aware of detection problems, but can't fix all of them with reasonable work.
    • Attackers risk losing resources.
  • "Glstopf"
    • Emulates thousands of known web security holes.
    • Can be detected.
      • Default web site front page needs to be customized.
      • Implements directory traversal security hole. Returns default /etc/shadow.
      • Directory traversal can be used to list /proc/ -- if it's emulated you can see it. If it's a real machine, you can read out memory contents.
  • "KFSensor"
    • Commercial Windows honeypot/IDS.
    • Gives audio feedback for attacks.
      • Default configuration gives lots of feedback for broadcast requests.
    • Can be detected.
      • Hosting a default web page.
      • Limits conncetions to 40 before blacklisting.
  • World honeypot deployment.
    • Using zmap daily scan of port 443.
    • Looking through HTTPS certificate domain results for dinoeae domain name.
      • Taiwan, US, Japan the largest number of servers.
      • Largest hosts are in a Taiwanese ISP, a US university, Taiwanese university.
      • Random organizations around the world also deploys dioneae.
  • Lessons learned.
    • Detection flaws are easy to find.
    • Should deploy the service.
    • Should deploy the whole service.
    • Should make the set of services make sense for the specifik machine.
    • Should make the service exploitable to unknown exploits.
    • ...
    • ...

EOT?