path_login.go

package awsec2

import (
	"crypto/subtle"
	"crypto/x509"
	"encoding/base64"
	"encoding/pem"
	"fmt"
	"strings"
	"time"

	"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go/aws"
	"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go/service/ec2"
	"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go/service/iam"
	"github.com/fullsailor/pkcs7"
	"github.com/hashicorp/go-uuid"
	"github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/jsonutil"
	"github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/strutil"
	"github.com/hashicorp/vault/logical"
	"github.com/hashicorp/vault/logical/framework"
)

const (
	reauthenticationDisabledNonce = "reauthentication-disabled-nonce"
)

func pathLogin(b *backend) *framework.Path {
	return &framework.Path{
		Pattern: "login$",
		Fields: map[string]*framework.FieldSchema{
			"role": {
				Type: framework.TypeString,
				Description: `Name of the role against which the login is being attempted.
If 'role' is not specified, then the login endpoint looks for a role
bearing the name of the AMI ID of the EC2 instance that is trying to login.
If a matching role is not found, login fails.`,
			},

			"pkcs7": {
				Type:        framework.TypeString,
				Description: "PKCS7 signature of the identity document.",
			},

			"nonce": {
				Type: framework.TypeString,
				Description: `The nonce to be used for subsequent login requests.
If this parameter is not specified at all and if reauthentication is allowed,
then the backend will generate a random nonce, attaches it to the instance's
identity-whitelist entry and returns the nonce back as part of auth metadata.
This value should be used with further login requests, to establish client
authenticity. Clients can choose to set a custom nonce if preferred, in which
case, it is recommended that clients provide a strong nonce.  If a nonce is
provided but with an empty value, it indicates intent to disable
reauthentication. Note that, when 'disallow_reauthentication' option is enabled
on either the role or the role tag, the 'nonce' holds no significance.`,
			},
			"identity": {
				Type: framework.TypeString,
				Description: `Base64 encoded EC2 instance identity document. This needs to be supplied along
with the 'signature' parameter. If using 'curl' for fetching the identity
document, consider using the option '-w 0' while piping the output to 'base64'
binary.`,
			},
			"signature": {
				Type: framework.TypeString,
				Description: `Base64 encoded SHA256 RSA signature of the instance identity document. This
needs to be supplied along with 'identity' parameter.`,
			},
		},

		Callbacks: map[logical.Operation]framework.OperationFunc{
			logical.UpdateOperation: b.pathLoginUpdate,
		},

		HelpSynopsis:    pathLoginSyn,
		HelpDescription: pathLoginDesc,
	}
}

// instanceIamRoleARN fetches the IAM role ARN associated with the given
// instance profile name
func (b *backend) instanceIamRoleARN(s logical.Storage, instanceProfileName, region, accountID string) (string, error) {
	if instanceProfileName == "" {
		return "", fmt.Errorf("missing instance profile name")
	}

	// Check if an STS configuration exists for the AWS account
	sts, err := b.lockedAwsStsEntry(s, accountID)
	if err != nil {
		return "", fmt.Errorf("error fetching STS config for account ID %q: %q\n", accountID, err)
	}
	// An empty STS role signifies the master account
	stsRole := ""
	if sts != nil {
		stsRole = sts.StsRole
	}

	iamClient, err := b.clientIAM(s, region, stsRole)
	if err != nil {
		return "", err
	}

	profile, err := iamClient.GetInstanceProfile(&iam.GetInstanceProfileInput{
		InstanceProfileName: aws.String(instanceProfileName),
	})
	if err != nil {
		return "", err
	}
	if profile == nil {
		return "", fmt.Errorf("nil output while getting instance profile details")
	}

	if profile.InstanceProfile == nil {
		return "", fmt.Errorf("nil instance profile in the output of instance profile details")
	}

	if profile.InstanceProfile.Roles == nil || len(profile.InstanceProfile.Roles) != 1 {
		return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid roles in the output of instance profile details")
	}

	if profile.InstanceProfile.Roles[0].Arn == nil {
		return "", fmt.Errorf("nil role ARN in the output of instance profile details")
	}

	return *profile.InstanceProfile.Roles[0].Arn, nil
}

// validateInstance queries the status of the EC2 instance using AWS EC2 API
// and checks if the instance is running and is healthy
func (b *backend) validateInstance(s logical.Storage, instanceID, region, accountID string) (*ec2.DescribeInstancesOutput, error) {

	// Check if an STS configuration exists for the AWS account
	sts, err := b.lockedAwsStsEntry(s, accountID)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("error fetching STS config for account ID %q: %q\n", accountID, err)
	}
	// An empty STS role signifies the master account
	stsRole := ""
	if sts != nil {
		stsRole = sts.StsRole
	}

	// Create an EC2 client to pull the instance information
	ec2Client, err := b.clientEC2(s, region, stsRole)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}

	status, err := ec2Client.DescribeInstances(&ec2.DescribeInstancesInput{
		Filters: []*ec2.Filter{
			&ec2.Filter{
				Name: aws.String("instance-id"),
				Values: []*string{
					aws.String(instanceID),
				},
			},
		},
	})
	if err != nil {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("error fetching description for instance ID %q: %q\n", instanceID, err)
	}
	if status == nil {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("nil output from describe instances")
	}
	if len(status.Reservations) == 0 {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("no reservations found in instance description")

	}
	if len(status.Reservations[0].Instances) == 0 {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("no instance details found in reservations")
	}
	if *status.Reservations[0].Instances[0].InstanceId != instanceID {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("expected instance ID not matching the instance ID in the instance description")
	}
	if status.Reservations[0].Instances[0].State == nil {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("instance state in instance description is nil")
	}
	if *status.Reservations[0].Instances[0].State.Name != "running" {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("instance is not in 'running' state")
	}
	return status, nil
}

// validateMetadata matches the given client nonce and pending time with the
// one cached in the identity whitelist during the previous login. But, if
// reauthentication is disabled, login attempt is failed immediately.
func validateMetadata(clientNonce, pendingTime string, storedIdentity *whitelistIdentity, roleEntry *awsRoleEntry) error {
	// For sanity
	if !storedIdentity.DisallowReauthentication && storedIdentity.ClientNonce == "" {
		return fmt.Errorf("client nonce missing in stored identity")
	}

	// If reauthentication is disabled or if the nonce supplied matches a
	// predefied nonce which indicates reauthentication to be disabled,
	// authentication will not succeed.
	if storedIdentity.DisallowReauthentication ||
		subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(reauthenticationDisabledNonce), []byte(clientNonce)) == 1 {
		return fmt.Errorf("reauthentication is disabled")
	}

	givenPendingTime, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, pendingTime)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}

	storedPendingTime, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, storedIdentity.PendingTime)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}

	// When the presented client nonce does not match the cached entry, it
	// is either that a rogue client is trying to login or that a valid
	// client suffered a migration. The migration is detected via
	// pendingTime in the instance metadata, which sadly is only updated
	// when an instance is stopped and started but *not* when the instance
	// is rebooted. If reboot survivability is needed, either
	// instrumentation to delete the instance ID from the whitelist is
	// necessary, or the client must durably store the nonce.
	//
	// If the `allow_instance_migration` property of the registered role is
	// enabled, then the client nonce mismatch is ignored, as long as the
	// pending time in the presented instance identity document is newer
	// than the cached pending time. The new pendingTime is stored and used
	// for future checks.
	//
	// This is a weak criterion and hence the `allow_instance_migration`
	// option should be used with caution.
	if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(clientNonce), []byte(storedIdentity.ClientNonce)) != 1 {
		if !roleEntry.AllowInstanceMigration {
			return fmt.Errorf("client nonce mismatch")
		}
		if roleEntry.AllowInstanceMigration && !givenPendingTime.After(storedPendingTime) {
			return fmt.Errorf("client nonce mismatch and instance meta-data incorrect")
		}
	}

	// Ensure that the 'pendingTime' on the given identity document is not
	// before the 'pendingTime' that was used for previous login. This
	// disallows old metadata documents from being used to perform login.
	if givenPendingTime.Before(storedPendingTime) {
		return fmt.Errorf("instance meta-data is older than the one used for previous login")
	}
	return nil
}

// Verifies the integrity of the instance identity document using its SHA256
// RSA signature. After verification, returns the unmarshaled instance identity
// document.
func (b *backend) verifyInstanceIdentitySignature(s logical.Storage, identityBytes, signatureBytes []byte) (*identityDocument, error) {
	if len(identityBytes) == 0 {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing instance identity document")
	}

	if len(signatureBytes) == 0 {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing SHA256 RSA signature of the instance identity document")
	}

	// Get the public certificates that are used to verify the signature.
	// This returns a slice of certificates containing the default
	// certificate and all the registered certificates via
	// 'config/certificate/<cert_name>' endpoint, for verifying the RSA
	// digest.
	publicCerts, err := b.awsPublicCertificates(s, false)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	if publicCerts == nil || len(publicCerts) == 0 {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("certificates to verify the signature are not found")
	}

	// Check if any of the certs registered at the backend can verify the
	// signature
	for _, cert := range publicCerts {
		err := cert.CheckSignature(x509.SHA256WithRSA, identityBytes, signatureBytes)
		if err == nil {
			var identityDoc identityDocument
			if decErr := jsonutil.DecodeJSON(identityBytes, &identityDoc); decErr != nil {
				return nil, decErr
			}
			return &identityDoc, nil
		}
	}

	return nil, fmt.Errorf("instance identity verification using SHA256 RSA signature is unsuccessful")
}

// Verifies the correctness of the authenticated attributes present in the PKCS#7
// signature. After verification, extracts the instance identity document from the
// signature, parses it and returns it.
func (b *backend) parseIdentityDocument(s logical.Storage, pkcs7B64 string) (*identityDocument, error) {
	// Insert the header and footer for the signature to be able to pem decode it
	pkcs7B64 = fmt.Sprintf("-----BEGIN PKCS7-----\n%s\n-----END PKCS7-----", pkcs7B64)

	// Decode the PEM encoded signature
	pkcs7BER, pkcs7Rest := pem.Decode([]byte(pkcs7B64))
	if len(pkcs7Rest) != 0 {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode the PEM encoded PKCS#7 signature")
	}

	// Parse the signature from asn1 format into a struct
	pkcs7Data, err := pkcs7.Parse(pkcs7BER.Bytes)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse the BER encoded PKCS#7 signature: %v\n", err)
	}

	// Get the public certificates that are used to verify the signature.
	// This returns a slice of certificates containing the default certificate
	// and all the registered certificates via 'config/certificate/<cert_name>' endpoint
	publicCerts, err := b.awsPublicCertificates(s, true)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	if publicCerts == nil || len(publicCerts) == 0 {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("certificates to verify the signature are not found")
	}

	// Before calling Verify() on the PKCS#7 struct, set the certificates to be used
	// to verify the contents in the signer information.
	pkcs7Data.Certificates = publicCerts

	// Verify extracts the authenticated attributes in the PKCS#7 signature, and verifies
	// the authenticity of the content using 'dsa.PublicKey' embedded in the public certificate.
	if pkcs7Data.Verify() != nil {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to verify the signature")
	}

	// Check if the signature has content inside of it
	if len(pkcs7Data.Content) == 0 {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("instance identity document could not be found in the signature")
	}

	var identityDoc identityDocument
	if err := jsonutil.DecodeJSON(pkcs7Data.Content, &identityDoc); err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}

	return &identityDoc, nil
}

// pathLoginUpdate is used to create a Vault token by the EC2 instances
// by providing the pkcs7 signature of the instance identity document
// and a client created nonce. Client nonce is optional if 'disallow_reauthentication'
// option is enabled on the registered role.
func (b *backend) pathLoginUpdate(
	req *logical.Request, data *framework.FieldData) (*logical.Response, error) {
	identityDocB64 := data.Get("identity").(string)
	var identityDocBytes []byte
	var err error
	if identityDocB64 != "" {
		identityDocBytes, err = base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(identityDocB64)
		if err != nil || len(identityDocBytes) == 0 {
			return logical.ErrorResponse("failed to base64 decode the instance identity document"), nil
		}
	}

	signatureB64 := data.Get("signature").(string)
	var signatureBytes []byte
	if signatureB64 != "" {
		signatureBytes, err = base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(signatureB64)
		if err != nil {
			return logical.ErrorResponse("failed to base64 decode the SHA256 RSA signature of the instance identity document"), nil
		}
	}

	pkcs7B64 := data.Get("pkcs7").(string)

	// Either the pkcs7 signature of the instance identity document, or
	// the identity document itself along with its SHA256 RSA signature
	// needs to be provided.
	if pkcs7B64 == "" && (len(identityDocBytes) == 0 && len(signatureBytes) == 0) {
		return logical.ErrorResponse("either pkcs7 or a tuple containing the instance identity document and its SHA256 RSA signature needs to be provided"), nil
	} else if pkcs7B64 != "" && (len(identityDocBytes) != 0 && len(signatureBytes) != 0) {
		return logical.ErrorResponse("both pkcs7 and a tuple containing the instance identity document and its SHA256 RSA signature is supplied; provide only one"), nil
	}

	// Verify the signature of the identity document and unmarshal it
	var identityDocParsed *identityDocument
	if pkcs7B64 != "" {
		identityDocParsed, err = b.parseIdentityDocument(req.Storage, pkcs7B64)
		if err != nil {
			return nil, err
		}
		if identityDocParsed == nil {
			return logical.ErrorResponse("failed to verify the instance identity document using pkcs7"), nil
		}
	} else {
		identityDocParsed, err = b.verifyInstanceIdentitySignature(req.Storage, identityDocBytes, signatureBytes)
		if err != nil {
			return nil, err
		}
		if identityDocParsed == nil {
			return logical.ErrorResponse("failed to verify the instance identity document using the SHA256 RSA digest"), nil
		}
	}

	roleName := data.Get("role").(string)

	// If roleName is not supplied, a role in the name of the instance's AMI ID will be looked for
	if roleName == "" {
		roleName = identityDocParsed.AmiID
	}

	// Validate the instance ID by making a call to AWS EC2 DescribeInstances API
	// and fetching the instance description. Validation succeeds only if the
	// instance is in 'running' state.
	instanceDesc, err := b.validateInstance(req.Storage, identityDocParsed.InstanceID, identityDocParsed.Region, identityDocParsed.AccountID)
	if err != nil {
		return logical.ErrorResponse(fmt.Sprintf("failed to verify instance ID: %v", err)), nil
	}

	// Get the entry for the role used by the instance
	roleEntry, err := b.lockedAWSRole(req.Storage, roleName)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	if roleEntry == nil {
		return logical.ErrorResponse(fmt.Sprintf("entry for role %q not found", roleName)), nil
	}

	// Verify that the AMI ID of the instance trying to login matches the
	// AMI ID specified as a constraint on the role
	if roleEntry.BoundAmiID != "" && identityDocParsed.AmiID != roleEntry.BoundAmiID {
		return logical.ErrorResponse(fmt.Sprintf("AMI ID %q does not belong to role %q", identityDocParsed.AmiID, roleName)), nil
	}

	// Verify that the AccountID of the instance trying to login matches the
	// AccountID specified as a constraint on the role
	if roleEntry.BoundAccountID != "" && identityDocParsed.AccountID != roleEntry.BoundAccountID {
		return logical.ErrorResponse(fmt.Sprintf("Account ID %q does not belong to role %q", identityDocParsed.AccountID, roleName)), nil
	}

	// Check if the IAM instance profile ARN of the instance trying to
	// login, matches the IAM instance profile ARN specified as a constraint
	// on the role.
	if roleEntry.BoundIamInstanceProfileARN != "" {
		if instanceDesc.Reservations[0].Instances[0].IamInstanceProfile == nil {
			return nil, fmt.Errorf("IAM instance profile in the instance description is nil")
		}
		if instanceDesc.Reservations[0].Instances[0].IamInstanceProfile.Arn == nil {
			return nil, fmt.Errorf("IAM instance profile ARN in the instance description is nil")
		}
		iamInstanceProfileARN := *instanceDesc.Reservations[0].Instances[0].IamInstanceProfile.Arn
		if !strings.HasPrefix(iamInstanceProfileARN, roleEntry.BoundIamInstanceProfileARN) {
			return logical.ErrorResponse(fmt.Sprintf("IAM instance profile ARN %q does not satisfy the constraint role %q", iamInstanceProfileARN, roleName)), nil
		}
	}

	// Check if the IAM role ARN of the instance trying to login, matches
	// the IAM role ARN specified as a constraint on the role.
	if roleEntry.BoundIamRoleARN != "" {
		if instanceDesc.Reservations[0].Instances[0].IamInstanceProfile == nil {
			return nil, fmt.Errorf("IAM instance profile in the instance description is nil")
		}
		if instanceDesc.Reservations[0].Instances[0].IamInstanceProfile.Arn == nil {
			return nil, fmt.Errorf("IAM instance profile ARN in the instance description is nil")
		}

		// Fetch the instance profile ARN from the instance description
		iamInstanceProfileARN := *instanceDesc.Reservations[0].Instances[0].IamInstanceProfile.Arn

		if iamInstanceProfileARN == "" {
			return nil, fmt.Errorf("IAM instance profile ARN in the instance description is empty")
		}

		// Extract out the instance profile name from the instance
		// profile ARN
		iamInstanceProfileARNSlice := strings.SplitAfter(iamInstanceProfileARN, ":instance-profile/")
		iamInstanceProfileName := iamInstanceProfileARNSlice[len(iamInstanceProfileARNSlice)-1]

		if iamInstanceProfileName == "" {
			return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to extract out IAM instance profile name from IAM instance profile ARN")
		}

		// Use instance profile ARN to fetch the associated role ARN
		iamRoleARN, err := b.instanceIamRoleARN(req.Storage, iamInstanceProfileName, identityDocParsed.Region, identityDocParsed.AccountID)
		if err != nil {
			return nil, fmt.Errorf("IAM role ARN could not be fetched: %v", err)
		}
		if iamRoleARN == "" {
			return nil, fmt.Errorf("IAM role ARN could not be fetched")
		}

		if !strings.HasPrefix(iamRoleARN, roleEntry.BoundIamRoleARN) {
			return logical.ErrorResponse(fmt.Sprintf("IAM role ARN %q does not satisfy the constraint role %q", iamRoleARN, roleName)), nil
		}
	}

	// Get the entry from the identity whitelist, if there is one
	storedIdentity, err := whitelistIdentityEntry(req.Storage, identityDocParsed.InstanceID)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}

	// disallowReauthentication value that gets cached at the stored
	// identity-whitelist entry is determined not just by the role entry.
	// If client explicitly sets nonce to be empty, it implies intent to
	// disable reauthentication. Also, role tag can override the 'false'
	// value with 'true' (the other way around is not allowed).

	// Read the value from the role entry
	disallowReauthentication := roleEntry.DisallowReauthentication

	clientNonce := ""

	// Check if the nonce is supplied by the client
	clientNonceRaw, clientNonceSupplied := data.GetOk("nonce")
	if clientNonceSupplied {
		clientNonce = clientNonceRaw.(string)

		// Nonce explicitly set to empty implies intent to disable
		// reauthentication by the client. Set a predefined nonce which
		// indicates reauthentication being disabled.
		if clientNonce == "" {
			clientNonce = reauthenticationDisabledNonce

			// Ensure that the intent lands in the whitelist
			disallowReauthentication = true
		}
	}

	// This is NOT a first login attempt from the client
	if storedIdentity != nil {
		// Check if the client nonce match the cached nonce and if the pending time
		// of the identity document is not before the pending time of the document
		// with which previous login was made. If 'allow_instance_migration' is
		// enabled on the registered role, client nonce requirement is relaxed.
		if err = validateMetadata(clientNonce, identityDocParsed.PendingTime, storedIdentity, roleEntry); err != nil {
			return logical.ErrorResponse(err.Error()), nil
		}

		// Don't let subsequent login attempts to bypass in initial
		// intent of disabling reauthentication, despite the properties
		// of role getting updated. For example: Role has the value set
		// to 'false', a role-tag login sets the value to 'true', then
		// role gets updated to not use a role-tag, and a login attempt
		// is made with role's value set to 'false'. Removing the entry
		// from the identity-whitelist should be the only way to be
		// able to login from the instance again.
		disallowReauthentication = disallowReauthentication || storedIdentity.DisallowReauthentication
	}

	// If we reach this point without erroring and if the client nonce was
	// not supplied, a first time login is implied and that the client
	// intends that the nonce be generated by the backend. Create a random
	// nonce to be associated for the instance ID.
	if !clientNonceSupplied {
		if clientNonce, err = uuid.GenerateUUID(); err != nil {
			return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate random nonce")
		}
	}

	// Load the current values for max TTL and policies from the role entry,
	// before checking for overriding max TTL in the role tag.  The shortest
	// max TTL is used to cap the token TTL; the longest max TTL is used to
	// make the whitelist entry as long as possible as it controls for replay
	// attacks.
	shortestMaxTTL := b.System().MaxLeaseTTL()
	longestMaxTTL := b.System().MaxLeaseTTL()
	if roleEntry.MaxTTL > time.Duration(0) && roleEntry.MaxTTL < shortestMaxTTL {
		shortestMaxTTL = roleEntry.MaxTTL
	}
	if roleEntry.MaxTTL > longestMaxTTL {
		longestMaxTTL = roleEntry.MaxTTL
	}

	policies := roleEntry.Policies
	rTagMaxTTL := time.Duration(0)

	if roleEntry.RoleTag != "" {
		//
		// Role tag is enabled on the role.
		//

		// Overwrite the policies with the ones returned from processing the role tag
		resp, err := b.handleRoleTagLogin(req.Storage, identityDocParsed, roleName, roleEntry, instanceDesc)
		if err != nil {
			return nil, err
		}
		if resp == nil {
			return logical.ErrorResponse("failed to fetch and verify the role tag"), nil
		}

		// If there are no policies on the role tag, policies on the role are inherited.
		// If policies on role tag are set, by this point, it is verified that it is a subset of the
		// policies on the role. So, apply only those.
		if len(resp.Policies) != 0 {
			policies = resp.Policies
		}

		// If roleEntry had disallowReauthentication set to 'true', do not reset it
		// to 'false' based on role tag having it not set. But, if role tag had it set,
		// be sure to override the value.
		if !disallowReauthentication {
			disallowReauthentication = resp.DisallowReauthentication
		}

		// Cache the value of role tag's max_ttl value
		rTagMaxTTL = resp.MaxTTL

		// Scope the shortestMaxTTL to the value set on the role tag
		if resp.MaxTTL > time.Duration(0) && resp.MaxTTL < shortestMaxTTL {
			shortestMaxTTL = resp.MaxTTL
		}
		if resp.MaxTTL > longestMaxTTL {
			longestMaxTTL = resp.MaxTTL
		}
	}

	// Save the login attempt in the identity whitelist
	currentTime := time.Now()
	if storedIdentity == nil {
		// Role, ClientNonce and CreationTime of the identity entry,
		// once set, should never change.
		storedIdentity = &whitelistIdentity{
			Role:         roleName,
			ClientNonce:  clientNonce,
			CreationTime: currentTime,
		}
	}

	// DisallowReauthentication, PendingTime, LastUpdatedTime and
	// ExpirationTime may change.
	storedIdentity.LastUpdatedTime = currentTime
	storedIdentity.ExpirationTime = currentTime.Add(longestMaxTTL)
	storedIdentity.PendingTime = identityDocParsed.PendingTime
	storedIdentity.DisallowReauthentication = disallowReauthentication

	// Don't cache the nonce if DisallowReauthentication is set
	if storedIdentity.DisallowReauthentication {
		storedIdentity.ClientNonce = ""
	}

	// Sanitize the nonce to a reasonable length
	if len(clientNonce) > 128 && !storedIdentity.DisallowReauthentication {
		return logical.ErrorResponse("client nonce exceeding the limit of 128 characters"), nil
	}

	if err = setWhitelistIdentityEntry(req.Storage, identityDocParsed.InstanceID, storedIdentity); err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}

	resp := &logical.Response{
		Auth: &logical.Auth{
			Period:   roleEntry.Period,
			Policies: policies,
			Metadata: map[string]string{
				"instance_id":      identityDocParsed.InstanceID,
				"region":           identityDocParsed.Region,
				"account_id":       identityDocParsed.AccountID,
				"role_tag_max_ttl": rTagMaxTTL.String(),
				"role":             roleName,
				"ami_id":           identityDocParsed.AmiID,
			},
			LeaseOptions: logical.LeaseOptions{
				Renewable: true,
				TTL:       roleEntry.TTL,
			},
		},
	}

	// Return the nonce only if reauthentication is allowed
	if !disallowReauthentication {
		// Echo the client nonce back. If nonce param was not supplied
		// to the endpoint at all (setting it to empty string does not
		// qualify here), callers should extract out the nonce from
		// this field for reauthentication requests.
		resp.Auth.Metadata["nonce"] = clientNonce
	}

	if roleEntry.Period > time.Duration(0) {
		resp.Auth.TTL = roleEntry.Period
	} else {
		// Cap the TTL value.
		shortestTTL := b.System().DefaultLeaseTTL()
		if roleEntry.TTL > time.Duration(0) && roleEntry.TTL < shortestTTL {
			shortestTTL = roleEntry.TTL
		}
		if shortestMaxTTL < shortestTTL {
			resp.AddWarning(fmt.Sprintf("Effective ttl of %q exceeded the effective max_ttl of %q; ttl value is capped appropriately", (shortestTTL / time.Second).String(), (shortestMaxTTL / time.Second).String()))
			shortestTTL = shortestMaxTTL
		}
		resp.Auth.TTL = shortestTTL
	}

	return resp, nil

}

// handleRoleTagLogin is used to fetch the role tag of the instance and
// verifies it to be correct.  Then the policies for the login request will be
// set off of the role tag, if certain creteria satisfies.
func (b *backend) handleRoleTagLogin(s logical.Storage, identityDocParsed *identityDocument, roleName string, roleEntry *awsRoleEntry, instanceDesc *ec2.DescribeInstancesOutput) (*roleTagLoginResponse, error) {
	if identityDocParsed == nil {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("nil parsed identity document")
	}
	if roleEntry == nil {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("nil role entry")
	}
	if instanceDesc == nil {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("nil instance description")
	}

	// Input validation on instanceDesc is not performed here considering
	// that it would have been done in validateInstance method.
	tags := instanceDesc.Reservations[0].Instances[0].Tags
	if tags == nil || len(tags) == 0 {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing tag with key %q on the instance", roleEntry.RoleTag)
	}

	// Iterate through the tags attached on the instance and look for
	// a tag with its 'key' matching the expected role tag value.
	rTagValue := ""
	for _, tagItem := range tags {
		if tagItem.Key != nil && *tagItem.Key == roleEntry.RoleTag {
			rTagValue = *tagItem.Value
			break
		}
	}

	// If 'role_tag' is enabled on the role, and if a corresponding tag is not found
	// to be attached to the instance, fail.
	if rTagValue == "" {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing tag with key %q on the instance", roleEntry.RoleTag)
	}

	// Parse the role tag into a struct, extract the plaintext part of it and verify its HMAC
	rTag, err := b.parseAndVerifyRoleTagValue(s, rTagValue)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}

	// Check if the role name with which this login is being made is same
	// as the role name embedded in the tag.
	if rTag.Role != roleName {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("role on the tag is not matching the role supplied")
	}

	// If instance_id was set on the role tag, check if the same instance is attempting to login
	if rTag.InstanceID != "" && rTag.InstanceID != identityDocParsed.InstanceID {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("role tag is being used by an unauthorized instance.")
	}

	// Check if the role tag is blacklisted
	blacklistEntry, err := b.lockedBlacklistRoleTagEntry(s, rTagValue)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	if blacklistEntry != nil {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("role tag is blacklisted")
	}

	// Ensure that the policies on the RoleTag is a subset of policies on the role
	if !strutil.StrListSubset(roleEntry.Policies, rTag.Policies) {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("policies on the role tag must be subset of policies on the role")
	}

	return &roleTagLoginResponse{
		Policies: rTag.Policies,
		MaxTTL:   rTag.MaxTTL,
		DisallowReauthentication: rTag.DisallowReauthentication,
	}, nil
}

// pathLoginRenew is used to renew an authenticated token
func (b *backend) pathLoginRenew(
	req *logical.Request, data *framework.FieldData) (*logical.Response, error) {
	instanceID := req.Auth.Metadata["instance_id"]
	if instanceID == "" {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to fetch instance ID from metadata during renewal")
	}

	region := req.Auth.Metadata["region"]
	if region == "" {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to fetch region from metadata during renewal")
	}

	// Ensure backwards compatibility for older clients without account_id saved in metadata
	accountID, ok := req.Auth.Metadata["account_id"]
	if ok {
		if accountID == "" {
			return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to fetch account_id from metadata during renewal")
		}
	}

	// Cross check that the instance is still in 'running' state
	_, err := b.validateInstance(req.Storage, instanceID, region, accountID)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to verify instance ID %q: %q", instanceID, err)
	}

	storedIdentity, err := whitelistIdentityEntry(req.Storage, instanceID)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	if storedIdentity == nil {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to verify the whitelist identity entry for instance ID: %q", instanceID)
	}

	// Ensure that role entry is not deleted
	roleEntry, err := b.lockedAWSRole(req.Storage, storedIdentity.Role)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	if roleEntry == nil {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("role entry not found")
	}

	// If the login was made using the role tag, then max_ttl from tag
	// is cached in internal data during login and used here to cap the
	// max_ttl of renewal.
	rTagMaxTTL, err := time.ParseDuration(req.Auth.Metadata["role_tag_max_ttl"])
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}

	// Re-evaluate the maxTTL bounds
	shortestMaxTTL := b.System().MaxLeaseTTL()
	longestMaxTTL := b.System().MaxLeaseTTL()
	if roleEntry.MaxTTL > time.Duration(0) && roleEntry.MaxTTL < shortestMaxTTL {
		shortestMaxTTL = roleEntry.MaxTTL
	}
	if roleEntry.MaxTTL > longestMaxTTL {
		longestMaxTTL = roleEntry.MaxTTL
	}
	if rTagMaxTTL > time.Duration(0) && rTagMaxTTL < shortestMaxTTL {
		shortestMaxTTL = rTagMaxTTL
	}
	if rTagMaxTTL > longestMaxTTL {
		longestMaxTTL = rTagMaxTTL
	}

	// Only LastUpdatedTime and ExpirationTime change and all other fields remain the same
	currentTime := time.Now()
	storedIdentity.LastUpdatedTime = currentTime
	storedIdentity.ExpirationTime = currentTime.Add(longestMaxTTL)

	// Updating the expiration time is required for the tidy operation on the
	// whitelist identity storage items
	if err = setWhitelistIdentityEntry(req.Storage, instanceID, storedIdentity); err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}

	// If 'Period' is set on the role, then the token should never expire. Role
	// tag does not have a 'Period' field. So, regarless of whether the token
	// was issued using a role login or a role tag login, the period set on the
	// role should take effect.
	if roleEntry.Period > time.Duration(0) {
		req.Auth.TTL = roleEntry.Period
		return &logical.Response{Auth: req.Auth}, nil
	} else {
		// Cap the TTL value
		shortestTTL := b.System().DefaultLeaseTTL()
		if roleEntry.TTL > time.Duration(0) && roleEntry.TTL < shortestTTL {
			shortestTTL = roleEntry.TTL
		}
		if shortestMaxTTL < shortestTTL {
			shortestTTL = shortestMaxTTL
		}
		return framework.LeaseExtend(shortestTTL, shortestMaxTTL, b.System())(req, data)
	}
}

// identityDocument represents the items of interest from the EC2 instance
// identity document
type identityDocument struct {
	Tags        map[string]interface{} `json:"tags,omitempty" structs:"tags" mapstructure:"tags"`
	InstanceID  string                 `json:"instanceId,omitempty" structs:"instanceId" mapstructure:"instanceId"`
	AmiID       string                 `json:"imageId,omitempty" structs:"imageId" mapstructure:"imageId"`
	AccountID   string                 `json:"accountId,omitempty" structs:"accountId" mapstructure:"accountId"`
	Region      string                 `json:"region,omitempty" structs:"region" mapstructure:"region"`
	PendingTime string                 `json:"pendingTime,omitempty" structs:"pendingTime" mapstructure:"pendingTime"`
}

// roleTagLoginResponse represents the return values required after the process
// of verifying a role tag login
type roleTagLoginResponse struct {
	Policies                 []string      `json:"policies" structs:"policies" mapstructure:"policies"`
	MaxTTL                   time.Duration `json:"max_ttl" structs:"max_ttl" mapstructure:"max_ttl"`
	DisallowReauthentication bool          `json:"disallow_reauthentication" structs:"disallow_reauthentication" mapstructure:"disallow_reauthentication"`
}

const pathLoginSyn = `
Authenticates an EC2 instance with Vault.
`

const pathLoginDesc = `
An EC2 instance is authenticated using the PKCS#7 signature of the instance identity
document and a client created nonce. This nonce should be unique and should be used by
the instance for all future logins, unless 'disallow_reauthenitcation' option on the
registered role is enabled, in which case client nonce is optional.

First login attempt, creates a whitelist entry in Vault associating the instance to the nonce
provided. All future logins will succeed only if the client nonce matches the nonce in the
whitelisted entry.

By default, a cron task will periodically look for expired entries in the whitelist
and deletes them. The duration to periodically run this, is one hour by default.
However, this can be configured using the 'config/tidy/identities' endpoint. This tidy
action can be triggered via the API as well, using the 'tidy/identities' endpoint.
`