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mspimplvalidate.go
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mspimplvalidate.go
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/*
Copyright IBM Corp. All Rights Reserved.
SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*/
/*
Notice: This file has been modified for Hyperledger Fabric SDK Go usage.
Please review third_party pinning scripts and patches for more details.
*/
package msp
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/x509"
"crypto/x509/pkix"
"encoding/asn1"
"math/big"
"reflect"
"time"
"github.com/pkg/errors"
)
func (msp *bccspmsp) validateIdentity(id *identity) error {
id.validationMutex.Lock()
defer id.validationMutex.Unlock()
// return cached validation value if already validated
if id.validated {
return id.validationErr
}
id.validated = true
validationChain, err := msp.getCertificationChainForBCCSPIdentity(id)
if err != nil {
id.validationErr = errors.WithMessage(err, "could not obtain certification chain")
return id.validationErr
}
err = msp.validateIdentityAgainstChain(id, validationChain)
if err != nil {
id.validationErr = errors.WithMessage(err, "could not validate identity against certification chain")
return id.validationErr
}
err = msp.internalValidateIdentityOusFunc(id)
if err != nil {
id.validationErr = errors.WithMessage(err, "could not validate identity's OUs")
return id.validationErr
}
return nil
}
func (msp *bccspmsp) validateCAIdentity(id *identity) error {
if !id.cert.IsCA {
return errors.New("Only CA identities can be validated")
}
validationChain, err := msp.getUniqueValidationChain(id.cert, msp.getValidityOptsForCert(id.cert))
if err != nil {
return errors.WithMessage(err, "could not obtain certification chain")
}
if len(validationChain) == 1 {
// validationChain[0] is the root CA certificate
return nil
}
return msp.validateIdentityAgainstChain(id, validationChain)
}
func (msp *bccspmsp) validateTLSCAIdentity(cert *x509.Certificate, opts *x509.VerifyOptions) error {
if !cert.IsCA {
return errors.New("Only CA identities can be validated")
}
validationChain, err := msp.getUniqueValidationChain(cert, *opts)
if err != nil {
return errors.WithMessage(err, "could not obtain certification chain")
}
if len(validationChain) == 1 {
// validationChain[0] is the root CA certificate
return nil
}
return msp.validateCertAgainstChain(cert, validationChain)
}
func (msp *bccspmsp) validateIdentityAgainstChain(id *identity, validationChain []*x509.Certificate) error {
return msp.validateCertAgainstChain(id.cert, validationChain)
}
func (msp *bccspmsp) validateCertAgainstChain(cert *x509.Certificate, validationChain []*x509.Certificate) error {
// here we know that the identity is valid; now we have to check whether it has been revoked
// identify the SKI of the CA that signed this cert
SKI, err := getSubjectKeyIdentifierFromCert(validationChain[1])
if err != nil {
return errors.WithMessage(err, "could not obtain Subject Key Identifier for signer cert")
}
// check whether one of the CRLs we have has this cert's
// SKI as its AuthorityKeyIdentifier
for _, crl := range msp.CRL {
aki, err := getAuthorityKeyIdentifierFromCrl(crl)
if err != nil {
return errors.WithMessage(err, "could not obtain Authority Key Identifier for crl")
}
// check if the SKI of the cert that signed us matches the AKI of any of the CRLs
if bytes.Equal(aki, SKI) {
// we have a CRL, check whether the serial number is revoked
for _, rc := range crl.TBSCertList.RevokedCertificates {
if rc.SerialNumber.Cmp(cert.SerialNumber) == 0 {
// We have found a CRL whose AKI matches the SKI of
// the CA (root or intermediate) that signed the
// certificate that is under validation. As a
// precaution, we verify that said CA is also the
// signer of this CRL.
err = validationChain[1].CheckCRLSignature(crl)
if err != nil {
// the CA cert that signed the certificate
// that is under validation did not sign the
// candidate CRL - skip
mspLogger.Warningf("Invalid signature over the identified CRL, error %+v", err)
continue
}
// A CRL also includes a time of revocation so that
// the CA can say "this cert is to be revoked starting
// from this time"; however here we just assume that
// revocation applies instantaneously from the time
// the MSP config is committed and used so we will not
// make use of that field
return errors.New("The certificate has been revoked")
}
}
}
}
return nil
}
func (msp *bccspmsp) validateIdentityOUsV1(id *identity) error {
// Check that the identity's OUs are compatible with those recognized by this MSP,
// meaning that the intersection is not empty.
if len(msp.ouIdentifiers) > 0 {
found := false
for _, OU := range id.GetOrganizationalUnits() {
certificationIDs, exists := msp.ouIdentifiers[OU.OrganizationalUnitIdentifier]
if exists {
for _, certificationID := range certificationIDs {
if bytes.Equal(certificationID, OU.CertifiersIdentifier) {
found = true
break
}
}
}
}
if !found {
if len(id.GetOrganizationalUnits()) == 0 {
return errors.New("the identity certificate does not contain an Organizational Unit (OU)")
}
return errors.Errorf("none of the identity's organizational units %s are in MSP %s", OUIDs(id.GetOrganizationalUnits()), msp.name)
}
}
return nil
}
func (msp *bccspmsp) validateIdentityOUsV11(id *identity) error {
// Run the same checks as per V1
err := msp.validateIdentityOUsV1(id)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Perform V1_1 additional checks:
//
// -- Check for OU enforcement
if !msp.ouEnforcement {
// No enforcement required
return nil
}
// Make sure that the identity has only one of the special OUs
// used to tell apart clients or peers.
counter := 0
for _, OU := range id.GetOrganizationalUnits() {
// Is OU.OrganizationalUnitIdentifier one of the special OUs?
var nodeOU *OUIdentifier
switch OU.OrganizationalUnitIdentifier {
case msp.clientOU.OrganizationalUnitIdentifier:
nodeOU = msp.clientOU
case msp.peerOU.OrganizationalUnitIdentifier:
nodeOU = msp.peerOU
default:
continue
}
// Yes. Then, enforce the certifiers identifier is this is specified.
// It is not specified, it means that any certification path is fine.
if len(nodeOU.CertifiersIdentifier) != 0 && !bytes.Equal(nodeOU.CertifiersIdentifier, OU.CertifiersIdentifier) {
return errors.Errorf("certifiersIdentifier does not match: %v, MSP: [%s]", OUIDs(id.GetOrganizationalUnits()), msp.name)
}
counter++
if counter > 1 {
break
}
}
if counter != 1 {
return errors.Errorf("the identity must be a client or a peer identity to be valid, not a combination of them. OUs: %s, MSP: [%s]", OUIDs(id.GetOrganizationalUnits()), msp.name)
}
return nil
}
func (msp *bccspmsp) validateIdentityOUsV142(id *identity) error {
// Run the same checks as per V1
err := msp.validateIdentityOUsV1(id)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// -- Check for OU enforcement
if !msp.ouEnforcement {
// No enforcement required
return nil
}
// Make sure that the identity has only one of the special OUs
// used to tell apart clients, peers and admins.
counter := 0
validOUs := make(map[string]*OUIdentifier)
if msp.clientOU != nil {
validOUs[msp.clientOU.OrganizationalUnitIdentifier] = msp.clientOU
}
if msp.peerOU != nil {
validOUs[msp.peerOU.OrganizationalUnitIdentifier] = msp.peerOU
}
if msp.adminOU != nil {
validOUs[msp.adminOU.OrganizationalUnitIdentifier] = msp.adminOU
}
if msp.ordererOU != nil {
validOUs[msp.ordererOU.OrganizationalUnitIdentifier] = msp.ordererOU
}
for _, OU := range id.GetOrganizationalUnits() {
// Is OU.OrganizationalUnitIdentifier one of the special OUs?
nodeOU := validOUs[OU.OrganizationalUnitIdentifier]
if nodeOU == nil {
continue
}
// Yes. Then, enforce the certifiers identifier in this is specified.
// If is not specified, it means that any certification path is fine.
if len(nodeOU.CertifiersIdentifier) != 0 && !bytes.Equal(nodeOU.CertifiersIdentifier, OU.CertifiersIdentifier) {
return errors.Errorf("certifiersIdentifier does not match: %s, MSP: [%s]", OUIDs(id.GetOrganizationalUnits()), msp.name)
}
counter++
if counter > 1 {
break
}
}
if counter != 1 {
return errors.Errorf("the identity must be a client, a peer, an orderer or an admin identity to be valid, not a combination of them. OUs: %s, MSP: [%s]", OUIDs(id.GetOrganizationalUnits()), msp.name)
}
return nil
}
func (msp *bccspmsp) getValidityOptsForCert(cert *x509.Certificate) x509.VerifyOptions {
// First copy the opts to override the CurrentTime field
// in order to make the certificate passing the expiration test
// independently from the real local current time.
// This is a temporary workaround for FAB-3678
var tempOpts x509.VerifyOptions
tempOpts.Roots = msp.opts.Roots
tempOpts.DNSName = msp.opts.DNSName
tempOpts.Intermediates = msp.opts.Intermediates
tempOpts.KeyUsages = msp.opts.KeyUsages
tempOpts.CurrentTime = cert.NotBefore.Add(time.Second)
return tempOpts
}
/*
This is the definition of the ASN.1 marshalling of AuthorityKeyIdentifier
from https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt
AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
keyIdentifier [0] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
authorityCertIssuer [1] GeneralNames OPTIONAL,
authorityCertSerialNumber [2] CertificateSerialNumber OPTIONAL }
KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING
CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER
*/
type authorityKeyIdentifier struct {
KeyIdentifier []byte `asn1:"optional,tag:0"`
AuthorityCertIssuer []byte `asn1:"optional,tag:1"`
AuthorityCertSerialNumber big.Int `asn1:"optional,tag:2"`
}
// getAuthorityKeyIdentifierFromCrl returns the Authority Key Identifier
// for the supplied CRL. The authority key identifier can be used to identify
// the public key corresponding to the private key which was used to sign the CRL.
func getAuthorityKeyIdentifierFromCrl(crl *pkix.CertificateList) ([]byte, error) {
aki := authorityKeyIdentifier{}
for _, ext := range crl.TBSCertList.Extensions {
// Authority Key Identifier is identified by the following ASN.1 tag
// authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35) (see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3280.html)
if reflect.DeepEqual(ext.Id, asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 5, 29, 35}) {
_, err := asn1.Unmarshal(ext.Value, &aki)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "failed to unmarshal AKI")
}
return aki.KeyIdentifier, nil
}
}
return nil, errors.New("authorityKeyIdentifier not found in certificate")
}
// getSubjectKeyIdentifierFromCert returns the Subject Key Identifier for the supplied certificate
// Subject Key Identifier is an identifier of the public key of this certificate
func getSubjectKeyIdentifierFromCert(cert *x509.Certificate) ([]byte, error) {
var SKI []byte
for _, ext := range cert.Extensions {
// Subject Key Identifier is identified by the following ASN.1 tag
// subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14) (see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3280.html)
if reflect.DeepEqual(ext.Id, asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 5, 29, 14}) {
_, err := asn1.Unmarshal(ext.Value, &SKI)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "failed to unmarshal Subject Key Identifier")
}
return SKI, nil
}
}
return nil, errors.New("subjectKeyIdentifier not found in certificate")
}