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LUNARDAO WHITEPAPER

THIS DOCUMENT IS OF A DYNAMIC NATURE, IT CHANGES ACCORDING TO THE LUNARDAO DEVELOPMENT. FOLLOW THE COMMUNITY CHANNELS AND THE ARCHITECTURE DISCUSSION TO SHARE YOUR FEEDBACK AND PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVEMENT!

Disclaimer

LUNARDAO IS A DECENTRALIZED ORGANIZATION, NOT BASED IN ANY JURISDICTION, NOT REPRESENTED BY ANY LEGAL ENTITY. IT IS A FULLY EXPERIMENTAL PROJECT. EVERYONE SHALL JUDGE BASED ON THEIR OWN RISK ASSESSMENT.

LUNARDAO STEWARDS DO NOT PROMISE TO UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT IN REAL TIME BASED ON SUBSEQUENT CHANGES.

Abstract

LunarDAO is an investment fund based on lunarpunk philosophy. By allocating funds in privacy projects & anonymity tooling we aim to expand freedom and ensure sovereignty. Squad wealth leverages collective strength and capture value in the ecosystem by building a portfolio of privacy assets. Anyone can exit at any time. Members are anonymous hence can participate in building this vision without fear of frozen funds, legal implications or any kind of repression. We aim to move to a full anon setup and develop infrastructure for a parallel economy outside of control and centralization.

LunarDAO's supports research on privacy technologies, listed in the wiki, and education structures such as Adalan Academy, where people can acquire knowledge and master skills in programming and economy while developing a philosophical frame to generate the future path of lunarpunk ecosystem.

Preface

The moon symbolizes many things, among those transformation and life, strength and power. To develop life means continuous transformation. Life that is stagnant will cease to exist. LunarDAO is one part of the expanding forest against surveillance society. It was created out of necessity, but lunarpunks existed long before this DAO. The regulatory changes incentivize us to organize our defenses with more persistence. We constituted LunarDAO, because we believe in community, decentralization, individual responsibility and contribution to a common mission. LunarDAO is a community directed by Lunar Squad. It is a practical application of lunarpunk narrative.

Decades ago, cypherpunks foresaw the rise of censorship and surveillance. They understood that cryptography and economic sovereignty are necessary to ensure freedom. Bitcoin created an economy outside of financial hegemony and made it possible for people to regain agency. Over the years, the voices upholding the cypherpunk mission have become fewer and quieter, drowned out by a flood of easy money. The KYC regulated crypto diverged from that foundation. The advocates of crypto's liberatory mission lack unity as well as strategy.

LunarDAO provides such a strategy.

The more regulation is imposed on people the bigger is the thirst for anonymity and privacy. The development of anonymity and privacy results in stronger regulation. This loop is inevitable. Instead of closing our eyes to this reality, we choose to expand the forest and build a sanctuary where society can redefine itself, self-administrate and regain its economic, political and moral agency.

Read LunarDAO full manifesto.

Mission

LunarDAO mission is the manifestation of lunarpunk vision which enables the forest to expand. In practice LunarDAO:

  • Invest in privacy and anonymity tech and infrastructure.
  • Research and share information on privacy projects.
  • Support education initiatives aligning with LunarDAO aims.

Investment Thesis

LunarDAO is an INVESTMENT FUND INTO PRIVACY PROJECTS & ANONYMITY TOOLING, a squad wealth based DAO spreading Lunarpunk narrative, philosophy and building infrastructure.

Problem

Anonymity and privacy oriented developers will face an increasing difficulty in finding support among traditional VC's and investment funds, because of regulatory measures. This will lead into a dynamic where the developing teams will be forced to sell their work underpriced to counterparties who don't share the same vision. This scenario portrays privacy as a taboo, developers are under stress and value is extracted from the ecosystem.

We don't accept the future to be so grim. The prospect of privacy is ultimately bullish. LunarDAO offers a solution.

Solution

We form a decentralized squad of sovereign individuals and lunarpunks, to allocate resources together and assemble squad wealth. The DAO leverages collective power and becomes an investor. The community discusses which tools are needed to empower the ecosystem, the research committee looks for the solutions, and lists them in the Investment Portal. The Squad members vote on the proposals and invest in the chosen projects.

Gains

  • The privacy projects will get support from a decentralized, anonymous organization, aligned with their mission.
  • The teams will be provided with the needed resources to develop, grow and deliver.
  • LunarDAO Squad is a privacy investor building a treasury (portfolio) of accumulated privacy assets.
  • The value is conserved in the ecosystem, both parties profit from the upcoming lunarpunk cycle.
  • While leveraging collective power, every individual is protected against majority rule and can exit the DAO any time with 100% of their shares (without any fee).

For the current list of primitives and projects discussed as possible investments, visit our Investment portal.

We believe that the loop of tightening regulations and growing demand for privacy and anonymity is inevitable, these events will happen with or without us. We can strenghten the ecosystem, capture the value and grow squad wealth, or be left out in the desert with regressive regFi.

Knowledge as a Value

The privacy investment sphere is LunarDAO's main focus. At the same time we see education as an essential value to fulfill our mission.

The DAO creates possibilities for technical literacy by building research and wiki and supporting educational structures such as the partnering project Adalan Academy, where people can acquire knowledge and master skills in programming and economy while developing a philosophical frame to generate the future path of lunarpunk ecosystem. Such education empowers the community and shape thinkers, who bring value back to the ecosystem. Education is a long-term investment.

Governance

Access to resources is fundamental for everyone. Crypto provides the means for people to have power over their own resources. The concept of a DAO has been battle tested in all kinds of forms. LunarDAO aims to learn from the experiences of those before us. There is no single perfect format and stagnation leads to a dead end. A main limitation when pushing for changes is an inability to imagine the world we want to build. With curiosity, the frame of DAOs offers vast possibilities for progress and expansion. Anyone can join LunarDAO. It is a space where lunarpunks can come together, share ideas and knowledge, initiate and support projects, and build liberating tech in pursuit of autonomy.

Community

A Community member is anyone who sees themselves as a part of the DAO mission; participates on the forum, ircd, telegram and contributes to the development of the DAO through work or by sharing experiences, resources and proposals. No token is required to be a part of the community. Community members have no voting power.

Squad

A LunarDAO Squad member is every community member who owns $VOX (shares). During fundraising event, anyone who buy $VOX can become a squad member. The minimum tribute is 0.1 ETH. $VOX represent the member's share of the treasury as well as voting power. LunarDAO Squad members can exit the DAO with their funds at any time through ragequit.

Voting

LIP (LunarDAO Improvement Proposal) is the basis of governance in LunarDAO. Anyone can share and discuss proposals on the forum. Only Squad members can submit and vote on proposals. In LIP-0001 there is a template and further information on the expected content and process.

The sponsorship threshold is a minimum number of $VOX (10 $VOX which equals 0.1 ETH at launch) which is required to submit a proposal. This deposit is returned when the proposal have been accepted or rejected. Anyone else can submit a proposal by acquiring a sponsorship by offering a fee of 0.2 ETH which is non refundable and will be sent to the DAO treasury.

Proposals should be shared a week before the vote. Voting is open for 72h. The proposal is approved if 50% + 1 $VOX of the voting amount vote for, else it is rejected. It can also be rejected if Sentinels deem the proposal to be malicious. Voting is followed by a Grace period of 72h, during which squad members can ragequit should they disagree with the result of the voting.

Delegation

Delegation is included in Moloch V3. Any Squad member can delegate their voting rights to others, whether they are DAO members or not. By doing this, the member no longer have governance rights, and cannot sponsor proposals. The delegate, if previously not a squad member, will become one and just like before $VOX (shares) will represent a share of the treasury as well as voting power.

Minimum retention

To prevent dilution of assets, minimum retention is 67%. That means that if 33% of shares ragequitted a proposal during the grace period, the proposal will fail automatically as the original circumstances when the proposal was submitted, including access to funds, has changed dramatically. The squad can re-submit the proposal if they want to vote on it with the new circumstance.

RageQuit

Ragequit enables squad members to exit with their funds, without penalty, if they do not agree with the result of a vote, or if they no longer want to be a part of the DAO. The designated time period in which members can ragequit after voting is called Grace period. Ragequit is possible no matter what the squad member voted on the proposal. This is an important function against malicious proposals and also a minority protection. With this function, all members are incentivized to bring forward proposals which are aligned with the community sentiment.

Grace Period

The Grace period, which is 72h, is the time period during which members can Ragequit if they disagree with the result of a vote. At the end of the Grace Period, the proposal which has been voted on is processed by calling the processProposal function. It is the responsibility of Stewards to call this function.

GuildKick

Guildkick allows the squad to remove a malicious member by forcing the them to ragequit. This is done by submitting a proposal which is then voted on. If this proposal is accepted by 50% + 1 $VOX, 100% of the shares owned by the squad member who is guildkicked is converted to loot and the member lose their voting power.

Committees

Committees in LunarDAO are groups within the community that aim to facilitate and coordinate the works of the DAO according to their specific focus. The committees presented below were chosen during the intial development because they are fundamental to the DAO. At any point, after the launch, new committees can be proposed or an existing one can be archived if the community deems it's needed (this operation is also done through LIP and voting).

The committees autonomously decide who can join. In every committee there is one person responsible for communication, who can be contacted if a member wants to get engaged. The committees decide their own work flow and formulate expectations, objectives and key results within the committee.

All committees give information about the ongoing works in the community meetings and are receptive to input and criticisms. Every three months each committee will submit a report to the community about the ongoing works.

Stewards

LunarDAO Stewards (LunarDAO core team) is a committee dedicated to support and guide the essential works of the DAO. Initially, at launch, they include founding members of the DAO. The number of Stewards should not be less than three and no more than ten. The LunarDAO Stewards responsibilities includes, but are not limited to:

  • Operations
  • Administration
  • Community management
  • Information: Making sure all other DAO members are aware of proposals and are notified in time to be able to participate in voting
  • Implementation of community decisions
  • Investment communication & coordination
  • Partnerships & Networking
  • Legal advice coordination
  • Media & Presentation

Stewards have a separated 3/6 multisig for their operation. Fees of 0.25% from tribute and 0.5% per executed investment are sent to this wallet. Any other funding and budget has to be proposed via investment LIP and voted upon as any other proposal. Stewards' wallet: 0xab501a8eb58c9780eb04d683feb504fce391a2dd

How to become a Steward

To become a Steward any member can write an LIP and propose to join. This follows the same governance process as any other LIP, steps are shared in LIP-0001. The proposal can include interests, experiences as well as expected level of commitment within the DAO, ideas and suggestions which can support LunarDAO mission as well as initiatives and activity of the member within the community.

Media

The Media committee is responsible for updating the web page and twitter. The media output is in accordance with LunarDAO mission, decisions and development. The committee can also coordinate and recruit members for media productions based on LunarDAOs mission and goals, participate in interviews or initiate media works that are beneficial to the DAO. Community members can post on the forum if they want to join the Media committee.

Research

The Research committee conveys research about privacy and anonymity projects and tools. This research can serve as a basis for evaluation of investment LIPs for the DAO and as a resource for the community. Community members can post on the forum if they want to join the Research committee.

Education

Education is fundamental in the struggle for free life, autonomy, and community. It is vital to train guides by providing knowledge, skills and build confidence. LunarDAO is in a trust based partnership with Adalan Academy and aim to support their development. The initial focus of this decentralized virtual academy is to offer courses in programming, economics and political philosophy. Some of the outcomes are creation and translation of education material, texts and resources. The long-term objective is being able to educate the new generation of lunarpunks.

An essential part of education, and included in the roadmap, is collecting, researching and sharing tools and resources that are privacy oriented. This includes creating opt out manuals that provide the means to exit surveillance society and develop parallel structures that are decentralized and expands our freedom.

Sentinels

LunarDAO Sentinels is a committee with a role of a treasury veto agent. It is a multi-sig Gnosis Safe with eight members in total. The DAO flow of proposal, vote, and execution is done fully on-chain and without any interaction or approval needed by Sentinels. However, the Sentinels are the last fall back solution as they can reject a malicious proposal even if it has been approved by the community. Five are needed to execute a decision.

A malicious proposal can include:

  • Proposals which are harmful to LunarDAO mission and goals.
  • Proposals which are supporting centralization and hegemony.
  • Proposals which are supporting surveillance projects or measures.
  • Proposals which are supporting regulatory measures.
  • Proposal which are suspected of/or exposed as having malintent ie. a quickly pushed proposals which aims to drain the treasury.

If Sentinels reject a proposal, they are expected to share a report which include the motivation for this decision before the next community meeting after the event. The decision and content of the mentioned report will be included, discussed and evaluated in this meeting.

The suggested time frame to be a multi-sig participant is two years. The transfer will happen when there is someone who can take over when the time is due and is not a rigid measurement. To rotate responsibilities to new Sentinels supports a level of diversity of thought in this important governance responsibility.

As a part of the roadmap the squad will vote if to continue to have a multi-sig based treasury or move to a complete trustless setup after the DAO launches.

Sentinel members

Builders and teams in our ecosystem of privacy oriented projects are often public, using known pseudonyms, and are recognized in crypto communities. In 'Why anon' we explained why anonymity and privacy are not only important for lunarpunk movement, but also the only choice for the Stewards (core team/ founders) of LunarDAO.

To build trust, and decentralize, the DAO is collborating with six Sentinels who are not core-members. The Sentinels are:

  1. Mario Havel; Bordel hackerspace, Paralelní polis.

  2. Mykola Siusko; Web3 privacy now, Pagency framework.

  3. CR1337; Navcoin, Scala.

  4. Auryn Macmillan; Gnosis Guild.

  5. bZ; AssangeDAO.

  6. Yves Edwards; FIAT LUX podcast host.

  7. Steward Anon 1; LunarDAO

  8. Steward Anon 2; LunarDAO

These are guidelines to support Sentinels in their responsibility. It is the responsibility of the whole community to support the governance process, in which the forum discussion is an essential part. This ensures democratic governance and gives opportunities for feedback on proposals before initiating voting. Through the LIP process, if LunarDAO Community and Squad members have expressed criticisms and evaluated a proposal to be non-aligned with community sentiment or otherwise unsupported, the author should consider re-writing the LIP or decide to not proceed with voting.

Governance process

  • LIP (LunarDAO Improvement Proposal): A proposal is created using the template in LIP-0001.
  • Forum discussions: A thread is created on the forum, where the LIP can be discussed. The proposal should be announced at least 7 days before voting.
  • Voting: A proposal is submitted on-chain and the voting is opened for 72h.
  • Grace Period: Follows voting for another 72h. Members can exit the DAO with their funds if they don't want to be affected by the decision.
  • Execution: Proposals are submitted on chain, hence the changes will apply automatically with pushing the execution button. - If unrelated to treasury: Stewards update the documents.

The LunarDAO governance is not limited to LIPs or voting, decisions are also made in the community or committee meetings. Voting in LunarDAO is the practical implementation of the willpower of the community. The decision making process is not something technical and cannot be separated from our communication/interaction on the forum and on ircd. It is important to always seek discussion and encourage diversity in opinions within the community. This will aid our development in building a truly decentralized, anonymous and antifragile organization.

LunarDAO Architecture

LunarDAO architecture is based on Moloch V3 design, deployed by DAOhaus and customized to fit LunarDAO governance.

The design puts an emphasis on anonymity combined with permissionless entry for the initial Squad formation. Both are essential for a privacy oriented investment fund which aims to develop infrastructure for parallel economy.

Contracts

LunarDAO Treasury: 0x59F77dC848C2E45B5954975ee1969e7A22fA25F6
Moloch V3 DAO (LunarDAO Governance): 0x747DA68Facd1459E9D9b8f928418DA30769D3Ba1
Sentinels' Safe (5/8 multi-sig): 0x622066aBA170c185c28cED6E7ccd1cB2047ef6ef
LunarDAO Stewards' Safe (core-team, founders): 0xAb501a8Eb58c9780eb04D683feB504fcE391A2DD
$VOX (voting token/treasury shares): 0x33e6ded5073f512475e17b5f19dda90d9a782478
$VOX-LOOT (non-voting token/shares): 0x94fadf770e44b7bc872fc712e4ba6aaf096fcba7
Genesis Event Onboarder Shaman: 0xFd7f0D849c1820F066aD1DEa8c8B90A59cA51Ef0

On-chain vs Multi-sig

As mentioned in the governance chapter, LunarDAO deployed a Sentinel multi-sig as a veto agent. At the same time the DAO architecture itself is based on Moloch V3 primitive with a full on-chain execution. This contradiction is solved by a design where the main LunarDAO treasury is a Gnosis Safe with two signers of which only one is needed for an execution (1/2). The two signers are:

  1. LunarDAO Squad: a Moloch V3 DAO, 0x747DA68Facd1459E9D9b8f928418DA30769D3Ba1
  2. LunarDAO Sentinels: Gnosis safe (5/8) multi-sig

In this setup all the proposals are submitted, voted upon and (after grace period) executed on-chain without any Sentinels interaction. Only in the case of a malicious proposal, the Sentinels can step in and reject the proposal. Five Sentinel members must sign a veto in their safe in order to make such execution in the LunarDAO treasury.

Moloch v3

Based on the discussions with the allies & the community, the most feasible way for the LunarDAO architecture to meet its aim, was chose MolochDAO V3 primitive, designed by DAOhaus and customized to fit LunarDAO governance architecture. The Moloch V3 contracts have much more optionality on both the initial setup and throughout the DAO life time in comparison to Moloch V2. V3 is also easier to set up and launch upon, using existing UI and implement changes on the fly, in a more democratic manner (based on community discussions and squad vote).

Anatomy of a Moloch V3 DAO in DAOhaus. Courtesy of DAOhaus

Terminology

For full description read Governance above.

  • Community: Anyone engaging on the forum & chats. To be a member of the community does NOT grant voting/governance power.
  • Squad: DAO members holding shares, voting power.
  • Sentinels: Eight guardians (multi-sig) of the DAO treasury.
  • Stewards: Anonymous core-team/founders of the DAO, securing operations (can be exchanged, archived, scaled up).
  • Committees: Working groups with a specific focus (research, media, education).

General

Every point marked with * symbol is to be further evaluated and decided upon by the initial LunarDAO Squad formed by all participants of the first launch, also referred to as a Genesis event.

Setup

  • LunarDAO is setup on top of the Gnosis safe multi-sig. The DAO start with a trusted (and more secure) setup and plan a roadmap milestone to discuss, propose (LIP) and vote on a multi-sig removal in a forseeable future -> full trustless setup. *
  • LunarDAO is launched on existing contracts and customized version of the UI by DAOhaus.
  • Further upgrades and customization will be discussed in the community and voted upon by the Squad.*

Joining the DAO

  • LunarDAO launch is permissionless in the sense that anyone can join/invest.
  • Members can only join during period of the fundraising events.
  • A minimum tribute to join is 0.1 ETH.*
  • The initial fundraising event is the launch of LunarDAO and will be opened for a period of two weeks.

Governance Token

LunarDAO Shares are represented by the symbol $VOX.

  • 1 $VOX is an equivalent to 1 share.
  • $VOX is LunarDAO governance token.
  • Minimum of 1 $VOX grants squad membership and voting power.
  • $VOX is an account bound, non-transferable token.
  • Every 0.1 ETH of tribute to the treasury mints 10 $VOX (-0.25% admin/management fee) to the member (at launch, future entry price may differ based on the previous investments made).
  • When a member ragequits their $VOX is burned.
    • $VOX value in the treasury stays the same for remaining members.
    • Ragequitting member gets 100% of their funds with no extra fee.

LunarDAO Loot

Loot represents members' value of shares in a non-voting form.

  • 1 $VOX-loot monetary value = 1 $VOX (as both are shares of the DAO treasury)
  • Symbol $VOX-loot represents loot.*
  • $VOX-loot does not grant voting power.
  • $LUNAR (community) token is not introduced at launch. It will be designed and introduced as part of the roadmap.*

Token Value

  • $VOX and $VOX-loot monetary value is equal. They both represent 1 share of the DAO treasury.
  • 1 $VOX (or $VOX-loot) = NET TREASURY VALUE / TOTAL AMOUNT OF $VOX (or $VOX-loot)
  • The assets in treasury or existing amount of shares changes according to:
    • Investment proposals voted upon by LunarDAO Squad (the DAO members)
    • Future fundraising events (The initial entry price is 1 ETH = 100 $VOX (shares), the future ones will be decided by LunarDAO Squad)

Fundraising Events

  • A fundraising event is proposed to take place 4x in the first year. (every third month).*
  • An investment deal is expected to happen at least once before between each fundraising event.*
  • If there are still unused ETH (or DAI) from the previous raise, the number of fundraising events or max cap of such event will be adjusted to this reality. *
  • The fundraising is open two weeks the first time, and thereafter a week on each occation.*
  • During this time anyone can become a Squad member by tributing ETH to the treasury.*

LunarDAO Operation Costs

  • LunarDAO has 6 Stewards (core-team members, founders) at the time of launch.
  • Several externals are supporting with design, administration, legal questions, web3 development and translations.
  • A management/admin/dev fee is sent to core-team multi-sig wallet (ETH: 0xAb501a8Eb58c9780eb04D683feB504fcE391A2DD). Management fee calculation:
    a) Entry: 0.25% from the initial tribute of every new member.
    b) Investment: 0.5% of every investment execution (after vote + grace period).
  • To fund further expences and costs an LIP is submitted and voted upon.

Token Value Calculation

LunarDAO Squad (the DAO membership) is defined by holding the governance token $VOX. $VOX represents voting shares and $VOX-LOOT non-voting shares (Loots) of LunarDAO treasury. In other words the value of $VOX and $VOX-LOOT is the same, but only $VOX can be used for voting. In the following definition and calculation we only use the term Shares - in this case shares refers to both $VOX and $VOX-LOOT. The combined value of $VOX and $VOX-LOOT is derived from the net treasury value divided by a total sum of $VOX and $VOX-LOOT.

Terminology & Formulas

TOTAL SHARES: Amount of shares in the treasury.

TOTAL TREASURY: The net asset value in the treasury (in our example ETH).

SHARES PRICE: Amount of shares per ETH or amount of USD per share.

  1. If the treasury is ETH only; Price in shares per ETH.
= TOTAL SHARES / TOTAL TREASURY
  1. If multiple assets in teasury; Price in USD per share.
= TOTAL TREASURY USD NET ASSET VALUE / TOTAL SHARES

ALLOCATED ASSET: # ETH (or any asset) to be allocated to a recipient through minting new shares.

NEW TOTAL SHARES: Amount of shares after minting new ones.

= TOTAL SHARES / 1 - (ALLOCATED ASSET / TOTAL TREASURY)

MINTED SHARES: Amount of shares to be minted to represent the value of ALLOCATED ASSET.

= NEW TOTAL SHARES - TOTAL SHARES
= TOTAL SHARES / 1 - (ALLOCATED ASSET / TOTAL TREASURY) - TOTAL SHARES

EQUITY DILUTION %: Decrease in existing shareholders' ownership percentage of the treasury as a result of minting new shares.

= ALLOCATED ASSET / TOTAL TREASURY * 100

Example

  • Allocated asset = 5 ETH
  • Total Treasury = 100 ETH
  • Total shares = 10 000 $VOX
  • Minted shares = 10 000 / 1 - ( 5 / 100 ) - 10 000 = 526.32
  • New price (shares per ETH) =
    = NEW TOTAL SHARES / TOTAL TREASURY
    = 10 526.32/100 = 105.2632
  • Equity dilution % = 5 / 100 * 100 = 5%

Example Conclusion

  • Total allocated ETH: 5 ETH
  • Total treasury: 100 ETH
  • New total shares: 10526.32 (previously 10 000)
  • New shares: 526.32
  • New price: 105.2632 (# of shares per ETH. Previous price was 100)
  • Equity dilution: 5%

Fund Management

LunarDAO makes investments in privacy projects through the governance process, which includes research, discussion, proposals and voting. The Squad allocates funds to selected teams while building a treasury of its investments. There are several ways how to approach treasury management and govern the funds. For easier understanding we summarized them under two main types: Portfolio (or Investment club) and Syndicate. These two approaches are explained with examples below.

After the genesis event (LunarDAO launch) the default approach to fund management is PORTFOLIO. However the Squad can decide to create separated guilds. To prevent disadvantage of old members' investment dilution, a bonding curve of 10% $VOX price increase is introduced for every new raise event. In the case of a Squad disapproval of opening a new fundraising event (to prevent dilution of past investments) and existing community wish and incentive to join the DAO, a subDAO can be established for the new raise building a separated treasury. In such scenario the different subDAOs manage their own treasuries and their management is based on the SYNDICATE model.

The following table explains these two concepts.

Table 1: Fundamental approaches: Portfolio & Syndicate

FUND MANAGEMENT – Design Essentials Portfolio/ investment club Syndicate
Description: All the assets in the treasury are pooled together as a common portfolio. Each $VOX despite the time of purchase represents the same value (1 $VOX = treasury asset net value / # $VOX ). The Squad members can start different sub-DAOs or specific guilds just like in the “Syndicate” option. Each fundraising cycle (or even each individual deal) is a separated entity in a separated subDAO. The investments or raising cycles can be separated into sub-DAOs or guilds or alternatively tokens representing the past investments are minted based on on-chain snapshot taken at the time of the investment.
Exposure to the past investments: Yes. New members are exposed to the old investments. No, new members aren’t part of the portfolio of the past, only to the future investments.
Aim of LunarDAO launch raise size (minimum, aim): 700 ETH, 7000 ETH As Portfolio
How often LunarDAO runs a raise event: Default: 4x the first year. An investment deal is expected to happen before any next raise. After the initial one, the formed Squad can propose to cap (# ETH) for the next raise or make a sub-DAO and switch into the syndicate option. Every sub-DAO makes autonomus decisions on this question. This case happens if the Squad decides to separate to subDAOs. 4x the first year. Before any next raising event a new separated sub-DAO is opened for the new members who will manage funds separately from the other subDAOs. Every sub-DAO makes autonomus decisions and can futher continue as portfolio style managed DAO.
How often the LunarDAO opens for new Squad members: Every raising event. If the Squad votes against new fundraising events while there is a strong community wish to join the DAO, a new subDAO fundraising can be opened -> switch to syndicate option. As Portfolio
Condition to join LunarDAO Squad at launch: Permissionless with a minimum tribute. LunarDAO launches as Portfolio fund. Conditions to join future subDAOs will be discussed with the community.
Condition to join LunarDAO Squad in the future: Default stays the same (except $VOX price - read below). The initial Squad will has a right to decide whether to keep the permissionless setup, introduce invites, raise the minimum tribute bar, limit the max Squad members or max ETH size etc. New syndicate sub-DAOs are permissionless.
Minimum tribute on launch 0.1 ETH (10 $VOX). Tribute must be a multiplier of 0.1 ETH. LunarDAO launches as portfolio based fund.
On-boarding contract design: Contract is opened for a limited period. $VOX (shares) are minted based on members' tribute. Genesis Event contract. As Portfolio
On-boarding contract expiry period (1st one/ any next one): 2 weeks the first raise/ 1 week any other one. Launch is portfolio type/ the future ones to be decided.
$VOX (shares) price on launch: 1 ETH = 100 $VOX - 0.25% admin/management fee. Each $VOX in the given fundraising period has the same price (every Squad member has an equal entry price). As Portfolio
$VOX value calculation: 1 $VOX = LunarDAO net value / # of $VOX in existence Same formula for each subDAO
$VOX (shares) price bonding curve: + 10% each next funding cycle. The squad can evaluate otherwise. The new members do not have access to the past investments, only the net value of the new treasury. There is no bonding curve. $VOX has the same price like on launch.
$VOX-loot price calculation: Owners $VOX-loot value = owners $VOX (shares) value, without voting power (in the time of GuildKick). Including owners access to the future allocations which are part of the RageQuited treasury. As Portfolio
Squad membership: Everyone owning at least 1 $VOX is a Squad member. Squad members have voting power. Everyone owning at least 1 $VOX is a Squad member, however members can vote on treasury decisions only in the guilds/ sub-DAOs in which their $VOX (shares) are allocated.
Overall governance changes: Discussion -> LIP -> vote -> implementation All the sub-DAOs together and counted as one DAO with vote event. Every 1 $VOX = 1 vote.
Management/admin fee: Entry: 0.25% from each tribute, 0.5% per each investment execution from the treasury. Same like portfolio, but per each subDAO separately as raising events and investment executions happen in different times and sizes.
Further operational expenses: LIP is submitted and voted upon. LIP is submitted and voted upon. Two options: a) Divided budget proposals to each sub-DAO, based on their ETH weight (SUM(proposed ETH * sub_DAO ETH / all sub-DAOS ETH total)). b) One proposal to sub-DAOs combined into one DAO. Vote power is calculated from the proposed asset weight from different subDAOs and their members -> SUM(asset weight * # $VOX). If agreed, the payment is sent proportionally to the token weights of the subDAOs and its members.

Portfolio and Syndicate fund management options are explained below, including examples.

Portfolio/ Investment Club

By default all the assets are pooled in the DAO main treasury. The new members joining are part of the same portfolio and exposed to the past investments. The Squad members can decide to set up any further guilds or sub-DAOs (just like in the syndicate design). Every Squad member can RageQuit at any time and transfer their $VOX (shares) value to $VOX-loot. RageQuited members can re-join during the next raising event.

Genesis Event: DAO launch & the initial raise

  • Price: 100 $VOX (shares) = 1 ETH
  • Minimum tribute: 0.1 ETH
  • Fee: 0.25% from tribute, 0.5% per executed investment deal
  • Permissionless entry
  • Contract has an upper limit & time expiry, mints shares according to investors' tribute size. The price of everyone's shares is the same.

Example

In examples we will use place holders X, Y & Z for supported projects and Tx, Ty & Tz for their tokens. For simplicity, fees are not included in the example calculations.

In a real life scenario the amount of $VOX (shares) will be arbitrary per each member as the tribute sizes will differ. Some members will likely RageQuit with their funds during the DAOs life cycle. This example is simplified to explain the portfolio logic.

  • 100 people join the Squad for 10 ETH each -> 1000 $VOX (shares) each.
  • Treasury net = 1000 ETH; 100 000 $VOX (shares) was minted.
  • The Squad invests 500 ETH to X in exchange for their token Tx. Deal is 1 ETH = 1000 Tx.
  • No-one RageQuits.
  • Treasury net = 500 ETH + 500 000 Tx, represented by 100 000 $VOX (shares).
  • Each member owns 1000 $VOX (shares) representing 5 ETH + 5000 Tx.

Second LunarDAO raising event

Because the new members have access to the deals of the past, the entry price is always 10% higher than the price during the previous event. This premium rewards members who entered past deals and stayed in the DAO exposing their part of portfolio to the new members. Any old member can RageQuit before the event with their assets and re-enter with ETH again.

  • Price: 100 VOX (shares) = 1.1 ETH
  • Conditions and minimum tribute to be decided by the existing Squad.

Example

  • 100 new people join the existing Squad -> Each of the new member paid 11 ETH -> 1000 $VOX (shares) -> 100 000 new $VOX were minted.
  • Treasury has 200 000 $VOX total.
  • Squad = 200 members
  • Treasury net = 500 + 1100 ETH + 500 000 Tx
  • Each $VOX (share) represents:
    • 0.008 ETH
    • 2.5 Tx
  • Every Squad member has the same amount of shares: 1000 $VOX. Their shares representing:
    • 8 ETH (1600/ 200)
    • 25 000 Tx (500 000 / 200)
  • The first 100 members paid 10 ETH each, the new members paid 11 ETH each.
  • The Squad invests 800 ETH to Y in exhange for their token Ty. Deal is 1 ETH = 10 000 Ty.
  • Treasury net = 800 ETH + 500 000 TX + 8 000 000 Ty
  • Each member holding 1000 $VOX (shares) is an owner of:
    • 4 ETH
    • 2500 Tx
    • 40 000 Ty

Summary

  • Portfolio is the default fund management setup.
  • Permissionless but time & max cap limited entry.
  • At any point members can exit with their funds partly or fully.
  • The Squad can decide if, how and when to do next rasing events.
  • A bonding curve adds 10% to the price of $VOX (shares) for every next raising event to balance investment dilution.
  • Every member can add more funds during the next fundraising event.
  • All Squad members share a RageQuitable portfolio together, equal to the size of their tribute.
  • The Squad can decide to open separated guilds.

Syndicate

Each fundraising cycle (possibly each investment) is treated as a separated entity, unique sub-DAO. Members joining in future fundraising events share a new treasury (sub-DAO or a guild) without an access to the investments from the past. All treasury related proposals have impact only on the separated guild/sub-DAO in which the proposing Squad member is at. The management/admin fee (0.25% for new members and 0.5 per investment execution) is applied on each subDAOs.

There are cases in which all the votes across the subDAOs are seen as one DAO and vote on a decision together. In such cases the votes are counted and evaluated like if all the subDAOs were one DAO. Regardless of different investments in the subDAOs, every 1 $VOX = 1 vote. The scenarios include:

a) Overall Governance change proposal which has an impact on everyone (remove multi-sig, change number of Sentinels, change the whitepaper etc)

b) A core-team proposal to cover additional costs: If such proposal passes the payment is taken proportionally to the token weights of the subDAOs (and their members).

If less than 50% + 1 $VOX of total voting weight across the subDAOs is for the proposal, the proposal is rejected.

(Alternatively the assets can be still pooled together but an on-chain Snapshot of $VOX at the time of the investment is taken. The DAO uses proxy tokens to track who had tokens at the time of investment. This greatly simplifies raising, because every new treasury is always ETH.)

Genesis Event: DAO launch & the initial raise

  • Price: 100 $VOX (shares) = 1 ETH
  • Minimum tribute: To be decided as the the DAO launches as portfolio by default.
  • Permissionless entry
  • Contract has upper limit & time expiry. mints shares according to investors' tribute size. The price of everyone's shares is the same.

Example

In examples we will use place holders X, Y & Z for supported project and Tx, Ty & Tz for their tokens

In a real life scenario the amount of shares (the tribute) will be arbitrary per each member and some members will likely RageQuit with their funds. This example is simplified to get the understanding of the syndicate logic.

  • 100 people join the Squad for 10 ETH each -> 1000 $VOX (shares) each.
  • Treasury net = 1000 ETH; 100 000 $VOX (shares) was minted.
  • The Squad invests 500 ETH to X in exchange for their token Tx. Deal is 1 ETH = 1000 Tx.
  • No-one RageQuits.
  • Treasury net = 500 ETH + 500 000 Tx, represented by 100 000 $VOX (shares).
  • Each member owns 1000 $VOX (shares) representing 5 ETH + 5000 Tx.

Second LunarDAO raising event

Because the new members joining another entity, separated from the initial DAO launch treasury, raise looks the same like the Genesis Event. In such scenario each sub-DAO manages their funds on their own in parallel to each other.

Overall Governance Changes

Decisions regarding to the general governance is voted in all the sub-DAOs together and counted as one vote event.

Example

  • Genesis event -> DAO launch -> 1m $VOX across 100 members
  • Squad decided to not allow for future onboarding to the DAO and there is a strong community will to join LunarDAO.
  • New subDAO launches -> 500 000 $VOX across 50 members
  • Proposal to remove multi-sig from the DAO execution -> vote will be in the overall DAO consisting of the sum of all $VOX in all subDAOs.
  • Total $VOX in all subDAOs = 150m.
  • 1/3 of the members vote = 500 000 votes
    • a) 50% + 1 $VOX are for -> multi-sig gets removed
    • b) 50% and less are for -> multisig stays

LunarDAO operation funding proposal

A core-team proposal to cover additional costs for the administration, dev, ops, media, research etcetera. The proposal can be approached in two different ways:

  • a) Divided budget proposals to each sub-DAO
  • b) One proposal to one DAO conposed of all the sub-DAOs

a) The team divides the total sum of proposed budget between the sub-DAOs based on their weight of the given asset (ie ETH) and submits each of them as a separated proposal. The size of these proposals is calculated:

SUM(total funding proposal ETH * sub-DAO ETH weight / sumETH(all sub-DAOs))

Example a)

  • Genesis event -> DAO launches -> 1m $VOX minted between 100 members (10 000 ETH).
  • DAO invests in project X with 5 000 ETH -> Every $VOX (shares) represent 50% ETH and 50% token Tx.
  • Squad decided to not allow for future onboarding to the DAO and there is a strong community will to join LunarDAO.
  • New subDAO launches -> 1m $VOX minted between 1000 members (10 000 ETH).
  • There are 2 subdDAOs now.
  • The core team submits LIP to get 30 ETH funding for the work done. -> the proposal size will be divided between the sub-DAOS and voted upon by each of them separately.
  • The division formula is:
    • Total ETH: SUM(all sub-DAOs ETH) = (sub-DAO1 ETH) + (sub-DAO2 ETH) = 5 000 + 10 000 = 15 000 ETH
    • Funding proposal = 30 ETH
    • Proposal to sub-DAO1 = total funding proposal ETH * sub-DAO1 ETH / total ETH = 30 * 5000 / 15 000 = 10 ETH
    • Proposal to sub-DAO2 = total funding proposal ETH * sub-DAO2 ETH / total ETH = 30 * 10000 / 15 000 = 20 ETH
  • Core team submits 2 LIPs: 10 ETH to subDAO1 and 20 ETH to sub-DAO2
  • Each of them vote separately according to the governance rules.
  • Each sub-DAO and it's member votes as usual: 1 $VOX = 1 vote, the votes only impact the decision in the given sub-DAO.
  • The core team may be supported by all, none or either of the existing sub-DAOs.
  • New proposals can be submitted per governance guidelines.

b) The votes are counted and evaluated like if all the subDAOs were one DAO. Regardless of different investments in the subDAOs. The vote would have to be based on the proposed asset weight per members' $VOX (shares), ie ETH if proposal is for ETH funding:

voting SUM(ETH weight / $VOX * # $VOX)

Example b)

  • Genesis event -> DAO launches -> 1m $VOX minted between 100 members (10 000 ETH).
  • DAO invests in project X with 5 000 ETH -> Every $VOX (shares) represent 50% ETH and 50% token Tx.
  • Squad decided to not allow for future onboarding to the DAO and there is a strong community will to join LunarDAO.
  • New subDAO launches -> 1m $VOX minted between 1000 members (10 000 ETH).
  • There are 2 subdDAOs now.
  • The core team submits LIP to get 30 ETH funding for the work done. -> The proposal will be submitted and voted upon in the parent DAO consisting of the sum of all ETH in all subDAOs.
  • As the impact per member is on their ETH, the voting power is ETH weighted
  • The vote calculation from all voting members: SUM(ETH weight/$VOX * # $VOX)
    • sub-DAO1 member with 1000 $VOX (shares) = 0.5 / 1 * 1000 = 500 votes
    • sub-DAO2 member with 1000 $VOX (shares) = 1 / 1 * 1000 = 1000 votes
  • In this example: Each subDAO2 member has 2x voting power per $VOX than sub-DAO1 member, as they have 2x bigger ETH weight and 2x bigger ETH exposure to than the sub-DAO1 members.
  • The proposal in it's entirety either passes or not.
  • If the vote passes: 30 ETH are sent proportionally to the ETH weights per each LunarDAO member.
    • 10 ETH is sent from SubDAO 1 members in total.
    • 20 ETH is sent from SubDAO 2 members in total.

Summary

  • Every new raise cycle is unrelated to the previous investments.
  • New subDAOs mint $VOX (shares) for the same price like the previous ones, no bonding curve.
  • Old members are inaffected by the new members, no dilution, no more funds in the existing subDAOs.
  • Each member can be part of multiple sub-DAOs.
  • Decisions regarding the general governance is voted in all the sub-DAOs together and counted as one vote event.
  • Core-team additional funding: Possible options to make one all-DAO proposal or divide them per sub-DAOs and their ETH weights.

Investments

See LunarDAO Investment portal for current updates related to investments.

To support privacy projects by investing in them is the main purpose of LunarDAO. Planting seeds for the lunarpunk dark forest of cryptography, autonomy and users' knowledge. To choose meaningful projects and help them grow is vital. A reward for the LunarDAO community is the shared value of these projects in the form of their token and the knowledge and tools they build. It is a mutual harmony in which the growth of one empowers the other and vice versa. This symbiotic relationship slowly but steadily replaces the bare desert of surveillance and hegemony.

Investment Flow

Note: We use place holders X for the supported project and Tx for their token.

Project X is proposed to be financially supported by LunarDAO in exhcange for # of Tx tokens or any other value to the lunarpunk ecosystem. After a community discussion and research an investment LIP is submitted. In this LIP must be clearly defined:

1. Name of the project
2. Date
3. Project X's value to the ecosystem (problem solving, new primitives, tools, knowledge, monetary etc)
4. Requested size of support in USD terms
5. Offered amount of Project X tokens Tx and price per USD (if the project is monetary based)
6. Trigger event: Tokens Tx will be send to LunarDAO treasury/Time period needed for execution or expected time of launch (when Tx becomes liquid)
7. Is the team X supported by private investors or VCs, other DAOs (or plans to) or just LunarDAO?
8. If yes: In which size and what is the price of token Tx to other supporting subjects?
9. If project X is token based: Tx tokenomics/release schedule
10. Project X's wallet address to recieve the support
11. LunarDAO treasury address to recieve token Tx in agreed time, amount and price: 0x59f77dc848c2e45b5954975ee1969e7a22fa25f6

LunarDAO Squad votes on the proposal of investment (see Governance for more details). Project X escrows the promised tokens to LunarDAO treasury as a part of the on-chain proposal, or in case of an illiquid (yet) token Tx, a SAFT NFT (under construction) will be minted by Project X for LunarDAO in exchange for the support sent to the project X's wallet address.

Conclusion

LunarDAO is an anonymity-first organization. However our mission is bigger than that. With the objective to build a strong united Squad accountable to the common mission and shared wealth. Looking into investment DAOs based on Moloch V1 & V2, listening to the allies in chats and multiple meetings with builders, we believe that LunarDAO should not kick-off as an experiment, instead start on well tested mechanisms.

The Portfolio and Syndicate fund management options are perhaps the largest question to be continuosly discussed. We believe that the launch may be easier and more interesting with the Portfolio option as a default, which leaves the door open for anyone to join the Squad and decide in the future how to manage further fundraising events, guilds, sub-DAOs and all the changes.

We would like to remind all the participants to protect themselves and read our docs on anonymizing assets and use Aztec or TornadoCash mixers, ensure network protection and change RPC as a basis to join LunarDAO.

SUPPORT THE DEVELOPMENT OF LUNARDAO ARCHITECTURE!

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