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The ElectionGuard SDK Reference Verifier enables the verification of election ballots, tallies, and proofs generated by the ElectionGuard SDK

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Microsoft Defending Democracy Program: ElectionGuard

🗳️ ElectionGuard Verifier

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This repository contains a reference implementation of a verifier for the encrypted record of an election. After an election is completed, the verifier can be run to check that the published tally accords with the tally of all encrypted ballots, yet without the need to decrypt any ballots. It does this by verifying a variety of zero knowledge proofs that establish the integrity of the encrypted election data.

The verifier checks the below properties about the encrypted election record, the totality of which is sufficient to ensure that the record corresponds to a correct representation of the election which generated the published final tally. Properties established via zero-knowledge proof are emphasized.

  • For the entire election, we check:
    • The number of trustees who can together decrypt the election is greater than zero
    • The threshold of trustees necessary to decrypt the election is greater than zero
    • The threshold of trustees necessary to decrypt the election is not greater than the total number of trustees
    • The encryption parameters of the election (prime modulus and group generator) are valid
    • The hash of the election parameters was computed correctly
    • The "extended base hash" was computed correctly
    • The joint public key was computed correctly
  • For the election trustees, we check:
    • The number of trustee public keys is equal to the number of trustees
    • Each trustee public key has the correct number of coefficients necessary to implement the threshold decryption specified in the election parameters
    • Each trustee has possession of a private key corresponding to the public key they published
  • For each cast ballot, we check:
    • The number of contests is equal to the number of contests specified for the election
    • The number of possible selections for each contest is equal to the number of possible selections specified for the election
    • For each contest, the voter selected no more than the total permissible number of selections for that contest
    • For each contest, any given selection corresponds to either one or zero votes (that is, no numerical trickery was used to manufacture a ballot that "counts twice")
  • For each spoiled ballot, we check:
    • The number of contests is equal to the number of contests specified for the election
    • The number of possible selections for each contest is equal to the number of possible selections specified for the election
    • The encrypted ballot decrypts to the cleartext ballot that accompanies it
    • An assortment of other validity and well-formedness checks [TODO: expand on this]
  • For the published final tally, we check:
    • The encrypted sum we calculated from the individual ballots matches the encrypted sum published in the election record
    • The encrypted sum published is an encryption of the published cleartext result of the election

The Role of This Implementation

This implementation is meant to be a reference implementation of the verifier -- it is meant to be simple, comprehensible, and correct. While we would like it to be efficient and scalable, these concerns are secondary to its role as a reference. As a result, places in this codebase which are difficult to understand or under-documented should be considered bugs -- please report them in the issue tracker if you find them.

Building and Running

This project is a Rust project and can be built using the standard Rust toolchain. Because of the high quantity of big-integer arithmetic in critical sections of the code, it's necessary for decent performance to build in release mode:

$ cargo build --release

There are two executables bundled with this crate: verify and encrypt. The former is the tool described above, and can be run like:

$ cargo run --release --bin verify -- -i $PATH_TO_ELECTION_RECORD.json

If not given a path via -i (or equivalently --input) the verifier will expect to read the record from stdin.

The encrypt tool is predominantly useful for testcase generation. It merely reads an unencrypted election record file on stdin and outputs an encrypted election record file on stdout, encrypted using randomly-generated trustee keys. For example:

$ cat $UNENCRYPTED_RECORD.json | cargo run --release --bin encrypt > $ENCRYPTED_RECORD.json

The tests/ directory contains a variety of files generated using this tool. At present, they are:

  • invalid_randomized.json: randomly generated numbers for all data, which should fail every single check
  • invalid_three_different_broken_proofs: a valid election encryption except for three arbitrary proofs which have been altered by a single-digit change
  • valid_encrypted.json: a valid election encryption
  • unencrypted.json: a small sample unencrypted election record demonstrating the schema expected by the encrypt tool and suitable for generating test cases like the above

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The ElectionGuard SDK Reference Verifier enables the verification of election ballots, tallies, and proofs generated by the ElectionGuard SDK

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