A contract that collects user rewards and exchanges it for 1inch tokens through an auction. The auction has parameters maxValue and minValue, which indicate the maximum and minimum values of the number of 1inch tokens that the contract agrees to receive in exchange for the entire number of certain tokens.
The scope of the audit includes the following smart contracts at:
https://github.com/1inch/fee-collector/blob/3c2626763fd829500496f15476d5e98fbdf4f574/contracts/FeeCollector.sol
https://github.com/1inch/fee-collector/blob/3c2626763fd829500496f15476d5e98fbdf4f574/contracts/utils/BalanceAccounting.sol
https://github.com/1inch/fee-collector/blob/3c2626763fd829500496f15476d5e98fbdf4f574/contracts/interfaces/IFeeCollector.sol
https://github.com/1inch/fee-collector/blob/3c2626763fd829500496f15476d5e98fbdf4f574/contracts/interfaces/InteractiveMaker.sol
The audited commit identifier is 3c2626763fd829500496f15476d5e98fbdf4f574, 62107c397b8e922afb63dc4c49595fb56db015e8
- CRITICAL: Bugs leading to assets theft, fund access locking, or any other loss funds to be transferred to any party.
- MAJOR: Bugs that can trigger a contract failure. Further recovery is possible only by manual modification of the contract state or replacement.
- WARNINGS: Bugs that can break the intended contract logic or expose it to DoS attacks.
- COMMENTS: Other issues and recommendations reported to/ acknowledged by the team.
Based on the feedback received from the Customer's team regarding the list of findings discovered by the Contractor, they are assigned the following statuses:
- FIXED: Recommended fixes have been made to the project code and no longer affect its security.
- ACKNOWLEDGED: The project team is aware of this finding. Recommendations for this finding are planned to be resolved in the future. This finding does not affect the overall safety of the project.
- NO ISSUE: Finding does not affect the overall safety of the project and does not violate the logic of its work
- NEW: Waiting for project team's feedback on the finding discovered
A group of auditors independently verified the code.
Stages of the audit were as follows:
- Project architecture review
- Checking the code against the checklist of known vulnerabilities
- Checking the code for compliance with the desired security model
- Consolidation of interim auditor reports into general one
- Bug fixing & re-check
- Preparation of the final audit report
The code in this line contains an error in calculation in line: https://github.com/1inch/fee-collector/blob/3c2626763fd829500496f15476d5e98fbdf4f574/contracts/FeeCollector.sol#L360
uint256 returnAmount = amount * tokenBalance / value(erc20);
According to the formula, it is fixed price for the rest of tokenBalance or whole amount, not the price for unit.
*Example:
Someone(something) makes updateReward for 10 WETH - user1 Let's assume now we have minimal price after a long period of time
Current price is 100 Inch for 10 WETH user2 and user3 are atackers
User4 wants to make a full trade. He wants to buy 10 WETH for 100 1Inch. He wants make a transaction
attacker puts the next transaction before User4 User2 updateReward with ~101010 WETH the price is changed User3 trades after User2 ~101010.mul(price) User2 executes trade attacker has a profit equal ~1.4 WETH
User4 got ~8.6 WETH. 1.4 WETH less that expected*
*Example 2
Let's assume, now we have minimal price after a long period of time Someone(something) makes updateReward for 10 WETH - user1 Current price is 100 Inch for 10 WETH
User2 and User3 want to make partial trade. They want to buy 5 WETH for 50 1Inch. They make a transaction at approximately the same time
User2 trades first and gets 5 WETH and spends ~50 1Inch. OK User3 trades after User 2.5WETH and spends ~50 Inch. Not correct
User1 never gets his 1Inch because User3 or nobody wants to make this incorrect transaction
In case User3 makes transaction for 5 WETH and ~spends 100 1Inch, User1 will receive ~2 times more 1Inch than excpected*
Implement correct returnAmount calculation
Fixed at https://github.com/1inch/fee-collector/commit/62107c397b8e922afb63dc4c49595fb56db015e8
Not found
When the price is continuously changing it is not possible to set exact amount of token for buying the whole amount because the price is always decreasing and transation will be always reverted because we will have not enough rewarder tokens. In case you set perspective price, you will have the same situation described in №1 critical case.
We recommend to add functionality which allows us to set exact returnAmount for rewarded token and set restriction for input tokens amount.
Acknowledged
It is possible via external contract that will call FeeCollector.value(erc20) beforehand.
Solidity contracts can use a special form of comments to provide rich documentation for functions, return variables and more. This special form is named the Ethereum Natural Language Specification Format (NatSpec).
It is recommended to include natspec documentation and follow the doxygen style including @author, @title, @notice, @dev, @param, @return and make it easier to review and understand your smart contract.
No issue
In the trade() function the state of smart contract is changed, but events are not emitted:
https://github.com/1inch/fee-collector/blob/3c2626763fd829500496f15476d5e98fbdf4f574/contracts/FeeCollector.sol#L344
We recommend to add emitting events for this function.
Fixed at https://github.com/1inch/fee-collector/commit/62107c397b8e922afb63dc4c49595fb56db015e8
At the lines: https://github.com/1inch/fee-collector/blob/3c2626763fd829500496f15476d5e98fbdf4f574/contracts/FeeCollector.sol#L339-L342
the state changes inside _updateReward which happens AFTER:
erc20.safeTransferFrom()It makes the method potentially weak for re-entry attack.
We recommend to add ReentrancyGuard modifier. or It is recommended to change the order of calls in a common-way, change-state first, then external-call.
Fixed at https://github.com/1inch/fee-collector/commit/62107c397b8e922afb63dc4c49595fb56db015e8
| Level | Amount |
|---|---|
| CRITICAL | 1 |
| MAJOR | - |
| WARNING | 1 |
| COMMENT | 3 |
The audited scope implements Fee Collector smart contracts that handles governance and referral fees from Liquidity Protocol and Aggregation Protocol.
Smart contract has been audited and several suspicious places were found. During audit one critical issue was identified. Several issues were marked as warnings and comments. After working on audit report all issues were fixed or acknowledged by the client. Thus, contract is assumed as secure to use according to our security criteria.
Final commit identifier with all fixes: 62107c397b8e922afb63dc4c49595fb56db015e8