Wipe passfile before deletion for better security?

[phpony]

Providing master password to gocryptfs via temporary file may rise some security concerns.

Current workflow is:

1. Create passfile with plain password in it: var temp_file = File.new_tmp (null, out ps);
2. Provide passfile to gocryptfs via -passfile option.
3. Delete passifle: pfile.delete ();

Simple delete () may not be enough in this case, because this temporary file will probably be recoverable for some time (using ext4magic for example). We should either use some kind of "wipe then delete" scenario or implement some kind of virtual passfile.

[moson-mo]

Yeah. Now most distros mount /tmp as tmpfs which should usually only reside in RAM I would assume (unless data being swapped to a disk maybe). That being said, not sure how much of a concern that still is. Dunno if simply overwriting the file content with some random garbage multiple times (before deleting it) would be any beneficial (on the other hand, it doesn't really harm either).

Did you actually try to recover it (just curious 😉)?

[phpony]

Welp I was able to recover it only with specific TMPDIR environment variable pointing to non tmpfs storage. So it looks like you need to intentionally seriously mess your system for someone be able to exploit his. File.new_tmp relies on get_tmp_dir which is /tmp by default which is tmpfs by default so there's no way to recover deleted files from there. So it is safe.

And If someone is able to grab your tmp file in 1 second between it's creation, passing to gocryptfs and deletion - you have way more serious security problems and it's also unsafe for you to type your password directly into gocryptfs cli.