Don't check self-signed signature in X509_verify_cert(), the check just

wastes processing time and doesn't add any security.

CHANGES

@@ -4,6 +4,11 @@
 
  Changes between 0.9.8k and 0.9.8l  [xx XXX xxxx]
 
+  *) Don't check self signed certificate signatures in X509_verify_cert():
+     it just wastes time without adding any security. As a useful side effect
+     self signed root CAs with non-FIPS digests are now usable in FIPS mode.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
   *) In dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message() the check if the current message
      is already buffered was missing. For every new message was memory
      allocated, allowing an attacker to perform an denial of service attack

crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c

@@ -986,7 +986,11 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 	while (n >= 0)
 		{
 		ctx->error_depth=n;
-		if (!xs->valid)
+
+		/* Skip signature check for self signed certificates. It
+		 * doesn't add any security and just wastes time.
+		 */
+		if (!xs->valid && xs != xi)
 			{
 			if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
 				{
@@ -996,13 +1000,6 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 				if (!ok) goto end;
 				}
 			else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
-				/* XXX  For the final trusted self-signed cert,
-				 * this is a waste of time.  That check should
-				 * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be
-				 * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but
-				 * we don't verify again and again in SSL
-				 * handshakes and the like once the cert has
-				 * been declared trusted. */
 				{
 				ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
 				ctx->current_cert=xs;