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mok.c
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mok.c
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
/*
* mok.c - MoK variable processing
* Copyright 2017 Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
*/
#include "shim.h"
/*
* Check if a variable exists
*/
static BOOLEAN check_var(CHAR16 *varname)
{
EFI_STATUS efi_status;
UINTN size = sizeof(UINT32);
UINT32 MokVar;
UINT32 attributes;
efi_status = RT->GetVariable(varname, &SHIM_LOCK_GUID, &attributes,
&size, (void *)&MokVar);
if (!EFI_ERROR(efi_status) || efi_status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)
return TRUE;
return FALSE;
}
#define SetVariable(name, guid, attrs, varsz, var) \
({ \
EFI_STATUS efi_status_; \
efi_status_ = RT->SetVariable(name, guid, attrs, varsz, var); \
dprint_(L"%a:%d:%a() SetVariable(\"%s\", ... varsz=0x%llx) = %r\n", \
__FILE__, __LINE__ - 5, __func__, name, varsz, \
efi_status_); \
efi_status_; \
})
/*
* If the OS has set any of these variables we need to drop into MOK and
* handle them appropriately
*/
static EFI_STATUS check_mok_request(EFI_HANDLE image_handle)
{
EFI_STATUS efi_status;
if (check_var(L"MokNew") || check_var(L"MokSB") ||
check_var(L"MokPW") || check_var(L"MokAuth") ||
check_var(L"MokDel") || check_var(L"MokDB") ||
check_var(L"MokXNew") || check_var(L"MokXDel") ||
check_var(L"MokXAuth") || check_var(L"MokListTrustedNew")) {
efi_status = start_image(image_handle, MOK_MANAGER);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
perror(L"Failed to start MokManager: %r\n", efi_status);
return efi_status;
}
}
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
static vendor_addend_category_t
categorize_authorized(struct mok_state_variable *v)
{
if (!(v->addend && v->addend_size &&
*v->addend && *v->addend_size)) {
return VENDOR_ADDEND_NONE;
}
return vendor_authorized_category;
}
static vendor_addend_category_t
categorize_deauthorized(struct mok_state_variable *v)
{
if (!(v->addend && v->addend_size &&
*v->addend && *v->addend_size)) {
return VENDOR_ADDEND_NONE;
}
return VENDOR_ADDEND_DB;
}
#define MOK_MIRROR_KEYDB 0x01
#define MOK_MIRROR_DELETE_FIRST 0x02
#define MOK_VARIABLE_MEASURE 0x04
#define MOK_VARIABLE_LOG 0x08
#define MOK_VARIABLE_INVERSE 0x10
struct mok_state_variable mok_state_variable_data[] = {
{.name = L"MokList",
.name8 = "MokList",
.rtname = L"MokListRT",
.rtname8 = "MokListRT",
.guid = &SHIM_LOCK_GUID,
.yes_attr = EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE,
.no_attr = EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,
.categorize_addend = categorize_authorized,
.addend = &vendor_authorized,
.addend_size = &vendor_authorized_size,
.user_cert = &user_cert,
.user_cert_size = &user_cert_size,
#if defined(ENABLE_SHIM_CERT)
.build_cert = &build_cert,
.build_cert_size = &build_cert_size,
#endif /* defined(ENABLE_SHIM_CERT) */
.flags = MOK_MIRROR_KEYDB |
MOK_MIRROR_DELETE_FIRST |
MOK_VARIABLE_LOG,
.pcr = 14,
},
{.name = L"MokListX",
.name8 = "MokListX",
.rtname = L"MokListXRT",
.rtname8 = "MokListXRT",
.guid = &SHIM_LOCK_GUID,
.yes_attr = EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE,
.no_attr = EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,
.categorize_addend = categorize_deauthorized,
.addend = &vendor_deauthorized,
.addend_size = &vendor_deauthorized_size,
.flags = MOK_MIRROR_KEYDB |
MOK_MIRROR_DELETE_FIRST |
MOK_VARIABLE_LOG,
.pcr = 14,
},
{.name = L"MokSBState",
.name8 = "MokSBState",
.rtname = L"MokSBStateRT",
.rtname8 = "MokSBStateRT",
.guid = &SHIM_LOCK_GUID,
.yes_attr = EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE,
.no_attr = EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,
.flags = MOK_MIRROR_DELETE_FIRST |
MOK_VARIABLE_MEASURE |
MOK_VARIABLE_LOG,
.pcr = 14,
.state = &user_insecure_mode,
},
{.name = L"MokDBState",
.name8 = "MokDBState",
.rtname = L"MokIgnoreDB",
.rtname8 = "MokIgnoreDB",
.guid = &SHIM_LOCK_GUID,
.yes_attr = EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE,
.no_attr = EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,
.state = &ignore_db,
},
{.name = SBAT_VAR_NAME,
.name8 = SBAT_VAR_NAME8,
.rtname = SBAT_RT_VAR_NAME,
.rtname8 = SBAT_RT_VAR_NAME8,
.guid = &SHIM_LOCK_GUID,
.yes_attr = EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE,
/*
* we're enforcing that SBAT can't have an RT flag here because
* there's no way to tell whether it's an authenticated variable.
*/
#if !defined(ENABLE_SHIM_DEVEL)
.no_attr = EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,
#else
.no_attr = 0,
#endif
.flags = MOK_MIRROR_DELETE_FIRST |
MOK_VARIABLE_MEASURE,
.pcr = 7,
},
{.name = L"MokListTrusted",
.name8 = "MokListTrusted",
.rtname = L"MokListTrustedRT",
.rtname8 = "MokListTrustedRT",
.guid = &SHIM_LOCK_GUID,
.yes_attr = EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE,
.no_attr = EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,
.flags = MOK_MIRROR_DELETE_FIRST |
MOK_VARIABLE_MEASURE |
MOK_VARIABLE_INVERSE |
MOK_VARIABLE_LOG,
.pcr = 14,
.state = &trust_mok_list,
},
{.name = L"MokPolicy",
.name8 = "MokPolicy",
.rtname = L"MokPolicyRT",
.rtname8 = "MokPolicyRT",
.guid = &SHIM_LOCK_GUID,
.yes_attr = EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE,
.no_attr = EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,
.flags = MOK_MIRROR_DELETE_FIRST |
MOK_VARIABLE_LOG,
.pcr = 14,
.state = &mok_policy,
},
{ NULL, }
};
size_t n_mok_state_variables = sizeof(mok_state_variable_data) / sizeof(mok_state_variable_data[0]);
struct mok_state_variable *mok_state_variables = &mok_state_variable_data[0];
#define should_mirror_addend(v) (((v)->categorize_addend) && ((v)->categorize_addend(v) != VENDOR_ADDEND_NONE))
static inline BOOLEAN NONNULL(1)
should_mirror_build_cert(struct mok_state_variable *v)
{
return (v->build_cert && v->build_cert_size &&
*v->build_cert && *v->build_cert_size) ? TRUE : FALSE;
}
static const uint8_t null_sha256[32] = { 0, };
typedef UINTN SIZE_T;
#define EFI_MAJOR_VERSION(tablep) ((UINT16)((((tablep)->Hdr.Revision) >> 16) & 0xfffful))
#define EFI_MINOR_VERSION(tablep) ((UINT16)(((tablep)->Hdr.Revision) & 0xfffful))
static EFI_STATUS
get_max_var_sz(UINT32 attrs, SIZE_T *max_var_szp)
{
EFI_STATUS efi_status;
uint64_t max_storage_sz = 0;
uint64_t remaining_sz = 0;
uint64_t max_var_sz = 0;
*max_var_szp = 0;
if (EFI_MAJOR_VERSION(RT) < 2) {
dprint(L"EFI %d.%d; no RT->QueryVariableInfo(). Using 1024!\n",
EFI_MAJOR_VERSION(RT), EFI_MINOR_VERSION(RT));
max_var_sz = remaining_sz = max_storage_sz = 1024;
efi_status = EFI_SUCCESS;
} else {
dprint(L"calling RT->QueryVariableInfo() at 0x%lx\n",
RT->QueryVariableInfo);
efi_status = RT->QueryVariableInfo(attrs, &max_storage_sz,
&remaining_sz, &max_var_sz);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
perror(L"Could not get variable storage info: %r\n",
efi_status);
return efi_status;
}
}
/*
* I just don't trust implementations to not be showing static data
* for max_var_sz
*/
*max_var_szp = (max_var_sz < remaining_sz) ? max_var_sz : remaining_sz;
dprint("max_var_sz:%lx remaining_sz:%lx max_storage_sz:%lx\n",
max_var_sz, remaining_sz, max_storage_sz);
return efi_status;
}
/*
* If any entries fit in < maxsz, and nothing goes wrong, create a variable
* of the given name and guid with as many esd entries as possible in it,
* and updates *esdp with what would be the next entry (even if makes *esdp
* > esl+esl->SignatureListSize), and returns whatever SetVariable()
* returns
*
* If no entries fit (i.e. sizeof(esl) + esl->SignatureSize > maxsz),
* returns EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
*/
static EFI_STATUS
mirror_one_esl(CHAR16 *name, EFI_GUID *guid, UINT32 attrs,
EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *esl, EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *esd,
SIZE_T howmany)
{
EFI_STATUS efi_status;
SIZE_T varsz = 0;
UINT8 *var;
/*
* We always assume esl->SignatureHeaderSize is 0 (and so far,
* that's true as per UEFI 2.8)
*/
dprint(L"Trying to add %lx signatures to \"%s\" of size %lx\n",
howmany, name, esl->SignatureSize);
/*
* Because of the semantics of variable_create_esl(), the first
* owner guid from the data is not part of esdsz, or the data.
*
* Compensate here.
*/
efi_status = variable_create_esl(esd, howmany,
&esl->SignatureType,
esl->SignatureSize,
&var, &varsz);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status) || !var || !varsz) {
LogError(L"Couldn't allocate %lu bytes for mok variable \"%s\": %r\n",
varsz, var, efi_status);
return efi_status;
}
dprint(L"new esl:\n");
dhexdumpat(var, varsz, 0);
efi_status = SetVariable(name, guid, attrs, varsz, var);
FreePool(var);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
LogError(L"Couldn't create mok variable \"%s\": %r\n",
varsz, var, efi_status);
return efi_status;
}
return efi_status;
}
static EFI_STATUS
mirror_mok_db(CHAR16 *name, CHAR8 *name8, EFI_GUID *guid, UINT32 attrs,
UINT8 *FullData, SIZE_T FullDataSize, BOOLEAN only_first)
{
EFI_STATUS efi_status = EFI_SUCCESS;
SIZE_T max_var_sz;
efi_status = get_max_var_sz(attrs, &max_var_sz);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status) && efi_status != EFI_UNSUPPORTED) {
LogError(L"Could not get maximum variable size: %r",
efi_status);
return efi_status;
}
/* Some UEFI environment such as u-boot doesn't implement
* QueryVariableInfo() and we will only get EFI_UNSUPPORTED when
* querying the available space. In this case, we just mirror
* the variable directly. */
if (FullDataSize <= max_var_sz || efi_status == EFI_UNSUPPORTED) {
efi_status = EFI_SUCCESS;
if (only_first)
efi_status = SetVariable(name, guid, attrs,
FullDataSize, FullData);
return efi_status;
}
CHAR16 *namen;
CHAR8 *namen8;
UINTN namelen, namesz;
namelen = StrLen(name);
namesz = namelen * 2;
if (only_first) {
namen = name;
namen8 = name8;
} else {
namelen += 18;
namesz += 34;
namen = AllocateZeroPool(namesz);
if (!namen) {
LogError(L"Could not allocate %lu bytes", namesz);
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
}
namen8 = AllocateZeroPool(namelen);
if (!namen8) {
FreePool(namen);
LogError(L"Could not allocate %lu bytes", namelen);
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
}
}
UINTN pos, i;
const SIZE_T minsz = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)
+ sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA)
+ SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
BOOLEAN did_one = FALSE;
/*
* Create any entries that can fit.
*/
if (!only_first) {
dprint(L"full data for \"%s\":\n", name);
dhexdumpat(FullData, FullDataSize, 0);
}
EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *esl = NULL;
UINTN esl_end_pos = 0;
for (i = 0, pos = 0; FullDataSize - pos >= minsz && FullData; ) {
EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *esd = NULL;
dprint(L"pos:0x%llx FullDataSize:0x%llx\n", pos, FullDataSize);
if (esl == NULL || pos >= esl_end_pos) {
UINT8 *nesl = FullData + pos;
dprint(L"esl:0x%llx->0x%llx\n", esl, nesl);
esl = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)nesl;
esl_end_pos = pos + esl->SignatureListSize;
dprint(L"pos:0x%llx->0x%llx\n", pos, pos + sizeof(*esl));
pos += sizeof(*esl);
}
esd = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *)(FullData + pos);
if (pos >= FullDataSize)
break;
if (esl->SignatureListSize == 0 || esl->SignatureSize == 0)
break;
dprint(L"esl[%lu] 0x%llx = {sls=0x%lx, ss=0x%lx} esd:0x%llx\n",
i, esl, esl->SignatureListSize, esl->SignatureSize, esd);
if (!only_first) {
SPrint(namen, namelen, L"%s%lu", name, i);
namen[namelen-1] = 0;
/* uggggh */
UINTN j;
for (j = 0; j < namelen; j++)
namen8[j] = (CHAR8)(namen[j] & 0xff);
namen8[namelen - 1] = 0;
}
/*
* In case max_var_sz is computed dynamically, refresh the
* value here.
*/
efi_status = get_max_var_sz(attrs, &max_var_sz);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
LogError(L"Could not get maximum variable size: %r",
efi_status);
if (!only_first) {
FreePool(namen);
FreePool(namen8);
}
return efi_status;
}
/* The name counts towards the size of the variable */
max_var_sz -= (StrLen(namen) + 1) * 2;
dprint(L"max_var_sz - name: %lx\n", max_var_sz);
SIZE_T howmany;
howmany = MIN((max_var_sz - sizeof(*esl)) / esl->SignatureSize,
(esl_end_pos - pos) / esl->SignatureSize);
if (howmany == 0) {
/* No signatures from this ESL can be mirrored in to a
* single variable, so skip it.
*/
dprint(L"skipping esl, pos:0x%llx->0x%llx\n", pos, esl_end_pos);
pos = esl_end_pos;
continue;
}
UINTN adj = howmany * esl->SignatureSize;
if (!only_first && i == 0) {
dprint(L"pos:0x%llx->0x%llx\n", pos, pos + adj);
pos += adj;
i++;
continue;
}
efi_status = mirror_one_esl(namen, guid, attrs,
esl, esd, howmany);
dprint(L"esd:0x%llx adj:0x%llx\n", esd, adj);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
LogError(L"Could not mirror mok variable \"%s\": %r\n",
namen, efi_status);
break;
}
dprint(L"pos:0x%llx->0x%llx\n", pos, pos + adj);
pos += adj;
did_one = TRUE;
if (only_first)
break;
i++;
}
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
perror(L"Failed to set %s: %r\n", name, efi_status);
} else if (only_first && !did_one) {
/*
* In this case we're going to try to create a
* dummy variable so that there's one there. It
* may or may not work, because on some firmware
* builds when the SetVariable call above fails it
* does actually set the variable(!), so aside from
* not using the allocation if it doesn't work, we
* don't care about failures here.
*/
UINT8 *var;
UINTN varsz;
efi_status = variable_create_esl_with_one_signature(
null_sha256, sizeof(null_sha256),
&EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, &SHIM_LOCK_GUID,
&var, &varsz);
/*
* from here we don't really care if it works or
* doesn't.
*/
if (!EFI_ERROR(efi_status) && var && varsz) {
efi_status = SetVariable(name, guid,
EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
| EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,
varsz, var);
FreePool(var);
}
}
return efi_status;
}
static EFI_STATUS NONNULL(1)
mirror_one_mok_variable(struct mok_state_variable *v,
BOOLEAN only_first)
{
EFI_STATUS efi_status = EFI_SUCCESS;
uint8_t *FullData = NULL;
size_t FullDataSize = 0;
vendor_addend_category_t addend_category = VENDOR_ADDEND_NONE;
uint8_t *p = NULL;
uint32_t attrs = EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS;
BOOLEAN measure = v->flags & MOK_VARIABLE_MEASURE;
BOOLEAN log = v->flags & MOK_VARIABLE_LOG;
size_t build_cert_esl_sz = 0, addend_esl_sz = 0;
bool reuse = FALSE;
if (v->categorize_addend)
addend_category = v->categorize_addend(v);
/*
* if it is, there's more data
*/
if (v->flags & MOK_MIRROR_KEYDB) {
/*
* We're mirroring (into) an efi security database, aka an
* array of EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST. Its layout goes like:
*
* existing_variable_data
* existing_variable_data_size
* if flags & MOK_MIRROR_KEYDB
* if build_cert
* build_cert_esl
* build_cert_header (always sz=0)
* build_cert_esd[0] { owner, data }
* if addend==vendor_db
* for n=[1..N]
* vendor_db_esl_n
* vendor_db_header_n (always sz=0)
* vendor_db_esd_n[m] {{ owner, data }, ... }
* elif addend==vendor_cert
* vendor_cert_esl
* vendor_cert_header (always sz=0)
* vendor_cert_esd[1] { owner, data }
*
* first we determine the size of the variable, then alloc
* and add the data.
*/
/*
* *first* vendor_db or vendor_cert
*/
switch (addend_category) {
case VENDOR_ADDEND_DB:
/*
* if it's an ESL already, we use it wholesale
*/
FullDataSize += *v->addend_size;
dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%llx\n",
FullDataSize, FullData);
break;
case VENDOR_ADDEND_X509:
efi_status = fill_esl_with_one_signature(*v->addend,
*v->addend_size,
&EFI_CERT_TYPE_X509_GUID,
&SHIM_LOCK_GUID,
NULL,
&addend_esl_sz);
if (efi_status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
perror(L"Could not add built-in cert to %s: %r\n",
v->name, efi_status);
return efi_status;
}
FullDataSize += addend_esl_sz;
dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%llx\n",
FullDataSize, FullData);
break;
default:
case VENDOR_ADDEND_NONE:
dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%llx\n",
FullDataSize, FullData);
break;
}
/*
* then the build cert if it's there
*/
if (should_mirror_build_cert(v)) {
efi_status = fill_esl_with_one_signature(*v->build_cert,
*v->build_cert_size,
&EFI_CERT_TYPE_X509_GUID,
&SHIM_LOCK_GUID,
NULL, &build_cert_esl_sz);
if (efi_status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
perror(L"Could not add built-in cert to %s: %r\n",
v->name, efi_status);
return efi_status;
}
FullDataSize += build_cert_esl_sz;
dprint(L"FullDataSize:0x%lx FullData:0x%llx\n",
FullDataSize, FullData);
}
if (v->user_cert_size)
FullDataSize += *v->user_cert_size;
}
/*
* we're always mirroring the original data, whether this is an efi
* security database or not
*/
dprint(L"v->name:\"%s\" v->rtname:\"%s\"\n", v->name, v->rtname);
dprint(L"v->data_size:%lu v->data:0x%llx\n", v->data_size, v->data);
dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%llx\n", FullDataSize, FullData);
if (v->data_size) {
FullDataSize += v->data_size;
dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%llx\n",
FullDataSize, FullData);
}
if (v->data_size == FullDataSize)
reuse = TRUE;
/*
* Now we have the full size
*/
if (FullDataSize) {
/*
* allocate the buffer, or use the old one if it's just the
* existing data.
*/
if (FullDataSize == v->data_size) {
FullData = v->data;
FullDataSize = v->data_size;
p = FullData + FullDataSize;
dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%llx p:0x%llx pos:%lld\n",
FullDataSize, FullData, p, p-(uintptr_t)FullData);
v->data = NULL;
v->data_size = 0;
} else {
dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%llx allocating FullData\n",
FullDataSize, FullData);
/*
* make sure we've got some zeroes at the end, just
* in case.
*/
UINTN new, allocsz;
allocsz = FullDataSize + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST);
new = ALIGN_VALUE(allocsz, 4096);
allocsz = new == allocsz ? new + 4096 : new;
FullData = AllocateZeroPool(allocsz);
if (!FullData) {
perror(L"Failed to allocate %lu bytes for %s\n",
FullDataSize, v->name);
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
}
p = FullData;
}
}
dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%llx p:0x%llx pos:%lld\n",
FullDataSize, FullData, p, p-(uintptr_t)FullData);
/*
* Now fill it.
*/
if (v->flags & MOK_MIRROR_KEYDB) {
/*
* first vendor_cert or vendor_db
*/
switch (addend_category) {
case VENDOR_ADDEND_DB:
CopyMem(p, *v->addend, *v->addend_size);
p += *v->addend_size;
dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%llx p:0x%llx pos:%lld\n",
FullDataSize, FullData, p, p-(uintptr_t)FullData);
break;
case VENDOR_ADDEND_X509:
efi_status = fill_esl_with_one_signature(*v->addend,
*v->addend_size,
&EFI_CERT_TYPE_X509_GUID,
&SHIM_LOCK_GUID,
p, &addend_esl_sz);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
perror(L"Could not add built-in cert to %s: %r\n",
v->name, efi_status);
return efi_status;
}
p += addend_esl_sz;
dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%llx p:0x%llx pos:%lld\n",
FullDataSize, FullData, p, p-(uintptr_t)FullData);
break;
default:
case VENDOR_ADDEND_NONE:
dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%llx p:0x%llx pos:%lld\n",
FullDataSize, FullData, p, p-(uintptr_t)FullData);
break;
}
/*
* then is the build cert
*/
dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%llx p:0x%llx pos:%lld\n",
FullDataSize, FullData, p, p-(uintptr_t)FullData);
if (should_mirror_build_cert(v)) {
efi_status = fill_esl_with_one_signature(*v->build_cert,
*v->build_cert_size,
&EFI_CERT_TYPE_X509_GUID,
&SHIM_LOCK_GUID,
p, &build_cert_esl_sz);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
perror(L"Could not add built-in cert to %s: %r\n",
v->name, efi_status);
return efi_status;
}
p += build_cert_esl_sz;
dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%llx p:0x%llx pos:%lld\n",
FullDataSize, FullData, p, p-(uintptr_t)FullData);
}
if (v->user_cert_size) {
CopyMem(p, *v->user_cert, *v->user_cert_size);
p += *v->user_cert_size;
}
}
/*
* last bit is existing data, unless it's the only thing,
* in which case it's already there.
*/
if (!reuse) {
dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%llx p:0x%llx pos:%lld\n",
FullDataSize, FullData, p, p-(uintptr_t)FullData);
if (v->data && v->data_size) {
CopyMem(p, v->data, v->data_size);
p += v->data_size;
}
dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%llx p:0x%llx pos:%lld\n",
FullDataSize, FullData, p, p-(uintptr_t)FullData);
}
/*
* We always want to create our key databases, so in this case we
* need a dummy entry
*/
if ((v->flags & MOK_MIRROR_KEYDB) && FullDataSize == 0) {
efi_status = variable_create_esl_with_one_signature(
null_sha256, sizeof(null_sha256),
&EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, &SHIM_LOCK_GUID,
&FullData, &FullDataSize);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
perror(L"Failed to allocate %lu bytes for %s\n",
FullDataSize, v->name);
return efi_status;
}
p = FullData + FullDataSize;
dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%llx p:0x%llx pos:%lld\n",
FullDataSize, FullData, p, p-(uintptr_t)FullData);
}
dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%llx p:0x%llx pos:%lld\n",
FullDataSize, FullData, p, p-(uintptr_t)FullData);
if (FullDataSize && v->flags & MOK_MIRROR_KEYDB) {
dprint(L"calling mirror_mok_db(\"%s\", datasz=%lu)\n",
v->rtname, FullDataSize);
efi_status = mirror_mok_db(v->rtname, (CHAR8 *)v->rtname8, v->guid,
attrs, FullData, FullDataSize,
only_first);
dprint(L"mirror_mok_db(\"%s\", datasz=%lu) returned %r\n",
v->rtname, FullDataSize, efi_status);
} else if (FullDataSize && only_first) {
efi_status = SetVariable(v->rtname, v->guid, attrs,
FullDataSize, FullData);
}
if (FullDataSize && only_first) {
if (measure) {
/*
* Measure this into PCR 7 in the Microsoft format
*/
efi_status = tpm_measure_variable(v->name, *v->guid,
FullDataSize, FullData);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
dprint(L"tpm_measure_variable(\"%s\",%lu,0x%llx)->%r\n",
v->name, FullDataSize, FullData, efi_status);
return efi_status;
}
}
if (log) {
/*
* Log this variable into whichever PCR the table
* says.
*/
EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS datap =
(EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)FullData,
efi_status = tpm_log_event(datap, FullDataSize,
v->pcr, (CHAR8 *)v->name8);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
dprint(L"tpm_log_event(0x%llx, %lu, %lu, \"%s\")->%r\n",
FullData, FullDataSize, v->pcr, v->name,
efi_status);
return efi_status;
}
}
}
if (v->data && v->data_size && v->data != FullData) {
FreePool(v->data);
v->data = NULL;
v->data_size = 0;
}
v->data = FullData;
v->data_size = FullDataSize;
dprint(L"returning %r\n", efi_status);
return efi_status;
}
/*
* Mirror a variable if it has an rtname, and preserve any
* EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION status at the same time.
*/
static EFI_STATUS NONNULL(1)
maybe_mirror_one_mok_variable(struct mok_state_variable *v,
EFI_STATUS ret, BOOLEAN only_first)
{
EFI_STATUS efi_status;
BOOLEAN present = FALSE;
if (v->rtname) {
if (only_first && (v->flags & MOK_MIRROR_DELETE_FIRST)) {
dprint(L"deleting \"%s\"\n", v->rtname);
efi_status = LibDeleteVariable(v->rtname, v->guid);
dprint(L"LibDeleteVariable(\"%s\",...) => %r\n", v->rtname, efi_status);
}
efi_status = mirror_one_mok_variable(v, only_first);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
if (ret != EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION)
ret = efi_status;
perror(L"Could not create %s: %r\n", v->rtname,
efi_status);
}
}
present = (v->data && v->data_size) ? TRUE : FALSE;
if (!present)
return ret;
if (v->data_size == sizeof(UINT8) && v->state) {
*v->state = v->data[0];
}
return ret;
}
EFI_STATUS import_one_mok_state(struct mok_state_variable *v,
BOOLEAN only_first)
{
EFI_STATUS ret = EFI_SUCCESS;
EFI_STATUS efi_status;
UINT32 attrs = 0;
BOOLEAN delete = FALSE;
dprint(L"importing mok state for \"%s\"\n", v->name);
if (!v->data && !v->data_size) {
efi_status = get_variable_attr(v->name,
&v->data, &v->data_size,
*v->guid, &attrs);
if (efi_status == EFI_NOT_FOUND &&
v->flags & MOK_VARIABLE_INVERSE) {
v->data = AllocateZeroPool(4);
if (!v->data) {
perror(L"Out of memory\n");
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
}
v->data[0] = 0x01;
v->data_size = 1;
} else if (efi_status == EFI_NOT_FOUND) {
v->data = NULL;
v->data_size = 0;
} else if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
perror(L"Could not verify %s: %r\n", v->name,
efi_status);
delete = TRUE;
} else {
if (!(attrs & v->yes_attr)) {
perror(L"Variable %s is missing attributes:\n",
v->name);
perror(L" 0x%08x should have 0x%08x set.\n",
attrs, v->yes_attr);
delete = TRUE;
}
if (attrs & v->no_attr) {
perror(L"Variable %s has incorrect attribute:\n",
v->name);
perror(L" 0x%08x should not have 0x%08x set.\n",
attrs, v->no_attr);
delete = TRUE;
}
if (v->flags & MOK_VARIABLE_INVERSE) {
FreePool(v->data);
v->data = NULL;
v->data_size = 0;
}
}
}
if (delete == TRUE) {
perror(L"Deleting bad variable %s\n", v->name);
efi_status = LibDeleteVariable(v->name, v->guid);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
perror(L"Failed to erase %s\n", v->name);
ret = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
}
FreePool(v->data);
v->data = NULL;
v->data_size = 0;
}
dprint(L"maybe mirroring \"%s\". original data:\n", v->name);
if (v->data && v->data_size) {
dhexdumpat(v->data, v->data_size, 0);
}
ret = maybe_mirror_one_mok_variable(v, ret, only_first);
dprint(L"returning %r\n", ret);
return ret;
}
/*
* Verify our non-volatile MoK state. This checks the variables above
* accessable and have valid attributes. If they don't, it removes
* them. If any of them can't be removed, our ability to do this is
* comprimized, so return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.
*
* Any variable that isn't deleted and has ->measure == TRUE is then
* measured into the tpm.
*
* Any variable with a ->rtname element is then mirrored to a
* runtime-accessable version. The new ones won't be marked NV, so the OS
* can't modify them.
*/
EFI_STATUS import_mok_state(EFI_HANDLE image_handle)
{
UINTN i;
EFI_STATUS ret = EFI_SUCCESS;
EFI_STATUS efi_status;
user_insecure_mode = 0;
ignore_db = 0;
trust_mok_list = 0;
UINT64 config_sz = 0;
UINT8 *config_table = NULL;
size_t npages = 0;
struct mok_variable_config_entry config_template;
dprint(L"importing minimal mok state variables\n");
for (i = 0; mok_state_variables[i].name != NULL; i++) {
struct mok_state_variable *v = &mok_state_variables[i];
efi_status = import_one_mok_state(v, TRUE);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
dprint(L"import_one_mok_state(ih, \"%s\", TRUE): %r\n",
v->rtname);
/*
* don't clobber EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION from some
* other variable in the list.
*/
if (ret != EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION)
ret = efi_status;
}
if (v->data && v->data_size) {
config_sz += v->data_size;
config_sz += sizeof(config_template);
}
}
/*
* Alright, so we're going to copy these to a config table. The
* table is a packed array of N+1 struct mok_variable_config_entry
* items, with the last item having all zero's in name and
* data_size.
*/
if (config_sz) {
config_sz += sizeof(config_template);
npages = ALIGN_VALUE(config_sz, PAGE_SIZE) >> EFI_PAGE_SHIFT;
config_table = NULL;
efi_status = BS->AllocatePages(
AllocateAnyPages, EfiRuntimeServicesData, npages,
(EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS *)&config_table);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status) || !config_table) {
console_print(L"Allocating %lu pages for mok config table failed: %r\n",
npages, efi_status);
config_table = NULL;
} else {
ZeroMem(config_table, npages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT);
}