/
brke.go
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/
brke.go
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// (c) 2018 EPFL
// This code is licensed under MIT license (see LICENSE.txt for details)
// Package pr implements the bidirectionally ratcheted key exchange (BRKE)
// protocol specified by Bertram Poettering and Paul Roesler in their paper
// Asynchronous Ratcheted Key Exchange (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/296)
// first published at CRYPTO-2018. The scheme relies on a novel HIBE-based
// key-updatable KEM described in the same paper.
package pr
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/sha512"
"strconv"
"github.com/pkg/errors"
"github.com/qantik/ratcheted/primitives"
"github.com/qantik/ratcheted/primitives/hibe"
"github.com/qantik/ratcheted/primitives/signature"
)
const (
seedSize = 16
chainingKeySize = 16
sessionKeySize = 16
)
// BRKE designates the PT18 protocol object defined by a ku-KEM scheme and a
// one-time signature algorithm.
type BRKE struct {
kuKEM *kuKEM
signature signature.Signature
}
// User designates a participant in the protocol that can both send and receive
// messages. It has to be passed as an argument to both the send and receive routines.
type User struct {
// A user state is comprised of two sub-states (r,s) that are continuously updated upon
// sending or receving messages. The r and s sub-states are derived from the SRKE
// receiver and sender states but due to the interleaving of the SRKE parts in the
// BRKE algorithm both states are needed to send and receive messages.
r *r
s *s
// User identifier string.
name string
}
// r comprises the first sub-state of a user.
type r struct {
SK map[int][]byte // SK are the established ku-KEM secret keys for different epochs.
E0 int // E0 is the oldest active epoch.
E1 int // E1 is the newest active epoch.
r int // r is the number of received messages.
L map[int][]byte // L stores the created ciphertexts for different epochs.
sgk []byte // sgk is the signature scheme signing key.
K []byte // K is one of the two created chaining keys.
// t is the accumulated transcript of the current communication.
t []byte
}
// s comprises the second sub-state of a user.
type s struct {
PK map[int][]byte // PK are the established ku-KEM public keys for different epochs.
E0 int // EO is the oldest active epoch.
E1 int // E1 is the newest active epoch.
s int // s is the number of sent messages.
L map[int][]byte // L stores the created ciphertexts for different epochs.
vfk []byte // vfk is the signature scheme verifying key.
K []byte // K is one of the two crated chaining keys.
// t is the accumulated transcript of the current communication.
t []byte
}
// NewBRKE creates a fresh BRKE protocol instance.
func NewBRKE(hibe hibe.HIBE, signature signature.Signature) *BRKE {
return &BRKE{kuKEM: &kuKEM{hibe: hibe}, signature: signature}
}
// Init creates two fresh users objects that can communicate with each other.
func (b BRKE) Init() (*User, *User, error) {
// Generate two sets of signature key pairs.
vfka, sgka, err := b.signature.Generate()
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, errors.Wrap(err, "unable to poll prng")
}
vfkb, sgkb, err := b.signature.Generate()
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, errors.Wrap(err, "unable to poll prng")
}
// Generate two sets of key-updatable KEM key pairs.
var seed [seedSize]byte
if _, err := rand.Read(seed[:]); err != nil {
return nil, nil, errors.Wrap(err, "unable to poll prng")
}
pka, ska, err := b.kuKEM.generate(seed[:])
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, errors.Wrap(err, "error while generating kem keys")
}
if _, err := rand.Read(seed[:]); err != nil {
return nil, nil, errors.Wrap(err, "unable to poll prng")
}
pkb, skb, err := b.kuKEM.generate(seed[:])
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, errors.Wrap(err, "error while generating kem keys")
}
// Generate two chaining keys. Both users receive both of them.
var Ka [chainingKeySize]byte
var Kb [chainingKeySize]byte
if _, err := rand.Read(Ka[:]); err != nil {
return nil, nil, errors.Wrap(err, "unable to poll prng")
}
if _, err := rand.Read(Kb[:]); err != nil {
return nil, nil, errors.Wrap(err, "unable to poll prng")
}
// Create sub-states for user a.
sa := &s{
PK: map[int][]byte{0: pkb},
E0: 0, E1: 0, s: 0,
L: map[int][]byte{0: []byte{}},
vfk: vfkb, K: Kb[:],
t: []byte{},
}
ra := &r{
SK: map[int][]byte{0: ska},
E0: 0, E1: 0, r: 0,
L: map[int][]byte{},
sgk: sgka, K: Ka[:],
t: []byte{},
}
ua := &User{r: ra, s: sa, name: "alice"}
// Create sub-states for user b.
sb := &s{
PK: map[int][]byte{0: pka},
E0: 0, E1: 0, s: 0,
L: map[int][]byte{0: []byte{}},
vfk: vfka, K: Ka[:],
t: []byte{},
}
rb := &r{
SK: map[int][]byte{0: skb},
E0: 0, E1: 0, r: 0,
L: map[int][]byte{},
sgk: sgkb, K: Kb[:],
t: []byte{},
}
ub := &User{r: rb, s: sb, name: "bob"}
return ua, ub, nil
}
// oracle implements the random oracle specified in the paper by spliting a SHA512 digest.
func oracle(Ks, ks, ts []byte) ([]byte, []byte, []byte) {
sum := primitives.Digest(sha512.New(), Ks, ks, ts)
// TODO: Make this more elegant.
ko := sum[:sessionKeySize]
Ks = sum[sessionKeySize : sessionKeySize+chainingKeySize]
coins := sum[sessionKeySize+chainingKeySize : sessionKeySize+chainingKeySize+seedSize]
return ko, Ks, coins
}
// Send creates a new session key and a corresponding ciphertext that has to be passed
// to the other user in order to notify him of the update.
func (b BRKE) Send(user *User, ad []byte) ([]byte, [][]byte, error) {
// Generate new signature and ku-KEM key pairs. Store the signing key and append
// the two public keys to the ciphertext.
vfks, sgks, err := b.signature.Generate()
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, errors.Wrap(err, "unable to poll prng")
}
var seed [seedSize]byte
if _, err := rand.Read(seed[:]); err != nil {
return nil, nil, errors.Wrap(err, "unable to poll prng")
}
pks, sks, err := b.kuKEM.generate(seed[:])
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, errors.Wrap(err, "error while generating kem keys")
}
user.r.E1 += 1
user.r.SK[user.r.E1] = sks
C := [][]byte{[]byte(strconv.Itoa(user.r.r)), pks, vfks, []byte(strconv.Itoa(user.s.E1))}
// Encapsulate new intermediate hashing keys for each active s-epoch. Append
// the generated ciphers to the above ciphertext.
ks := []byte{}
for i := user.s.E0; i <= user.s.E1; i++ {
c1, c2, err := b.kuKEM.encrypt(user.s.PK[i])
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, errors.Wrap(err, "error while encapsulating key")
}
ks, C = append(ks, c1...), append(C, c2)
}
// Sign ciphertext and append it to the history.
sig, err := b.signature.Sign(user.r.sgk, append(ad, bytes.Join(C, nil)...))
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, errors.Wrap(err, "error while signing message")
}
C = append(C, sig)
user.r.L[user.r.E1] = append(ad, bytes.Join(C, nil)...)
user.r.sgk = sgks
// Poll oracle to establish the session key, chaining key and a new ku-KEM public key
// for the latest epoch. This erases all previously created ku-KEM public keys since
// there can only be a single active s-epoch after a sending operation.
user.s.t = append(user.s.t, append(ad, bytes.Join(C, nil)...)...)
ko, Ks, coins := oracle(user.s.K, ks, user.s.t)
pk, _, err := b.kuKEM.generate(coins)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, errors.Wrap(err, "error while generating kem keys")
}
for i := 0; i < user.s.E1; i++ {
user.s.PK[i] = nil
}
user.s.PK[user.s.E1] = pk
user.s.E0 = user.s.E1
user.s.s += 1
user.s.K = Ks
user.s.L[user.s.s] = append(ad, bytes.Join(C, nil)...)
return ko, C, nil
}
// Receive receives a newly established session key created by the opposing user.
func (b BRKE) Receive(user *User, ad []byte, C [][]byte) ([]byte, error) {
// Update s-transcript.
ts := append(ad, bytes.Join(C, nil)...)
user.s.t = append(user.s.t, ts...)
sig := C[len(C)-1]
C = C[:len(C)-1]
if err := b.signature.Verify(user.s.vfk, append(ad, bytes.Join(C, nil)...), sig); err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "unable to verify signature")
}
// Unwind ciphertext and delete old ciphertext for out-dated r-epochs.
r, pks, vfk := C[0], C[1], C[2]
C = C[3:]
rr, err := strconv.Atoi(string(r))
if err != nil || user.s.L[rr] == nil {
return nil, errors.New("users are out-of-sync")
}
for i := 0; i < rr; i++ {
user.s.L[i] = nil
}
user.s.L[rr] = []byte{}
for i := rr + 1; i <= user.s.s; i++ {
pks, err = b.kuKEM.updatePublicKey(pks, user.s.L[i])
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "error while updating kem public key")
}
}
user.s.E1 += 1
user.s.PK[user.s.E1] = pks
user.s.vfk = vfk
// Check that received epoch is still active and delete old ciphertexts.
e, _ := strconv.Atoi(string(C[0]))
C = C[1:]
if e < user.r.E0 || e > user.r.E1 {
return nil, errors.New("users are out-of-sync")
}
for i := user.r.E0 + 1; i <= e; i++ {
user.r.t = append(user.r.t, user.r.L[i]...)
}
for i := 0; i <= e; i++ {
user.r.L[i] = nil
}
// Recreate hashing key and poll oracle to establish the same session key, chaining key
// and ku-KEM secret key as the initiating party.
ks := []byte{}
for i := user.r.E0; i <= e; i++ {
c := C[0]
C = C[1:]
k, err := b.kuKEM.decrypt(user.r.SK[i], c)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "error while decapsulating key")
}
ks = append(ks, k...)
}
user.r.t = append(user.r.t, ts...)
ko, Kr, coins := oracle(user.r.K, ks, user.r.t)
_, sk, err := b.kuKEM.generate(coins)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "error while genereting kem keys")
}
// Delete old ku-KEM secret keys and update those which are still active.
for i := 0; i <= e-1; i++ {
user.r.SK[i] = nil
}
user.r.SK[e] = sk
for i := e + 1; i <= user.r.E1; i++ {
s, err := b.kuKEM.updateSecretKey(user.r.SK[i], ts)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "error while updating kem secret key")
}
user.r.SK[i] = s
}
user.r.E0 = e
user.r.r += 1
user.r.K = Kr
return ko, nil
}
// Size returns the size (in bytes) of the user state.
func (u User) Size() int {
size := 0
for _, a := range []map[int][]byte{u.r.SK, u.r.L, u.s.PK, u.s.L} {
for _, b := range a {
size += len(b)
}
}
return size + len(u.r.sgk) + len(u.r.K) + len(u.r.t) + len(u.s.vfk) + len(u.s.K) + len(u.s.t)
}