Update draft-ietf-quic-transport.md

draft-ietf-quic-transport.md

@@ -2707,23 +2707,27 @@ attack is in some ways similar to SYN flooding attack in TCP, in which the
 attackers try to exhaust a server memory by creating a large number of half 
 open TCP connections. It is less potent than the SYN flooding attack, since
 stream creation is much lighter weight than the creation of TCP-IP connections,
-and stream control data presumably requires less memory resource than a TCP protocol
+and stream control data presumably requires less 
+memory resource than a TCP protocol
 control block. However, the attack can be amplified if the adversarial
 client can open multiple streams with a single message.
 
-Normally, clients will open streams sequentially, as explained in {{stream-identifiers}}. 
+Normally, clients will open streams sequentially, 
+as explained in {{stream-identifiers}}. 
 However, when several streams are initiated at short intervals,
 transmission error may cause STREAM DATA frames opening streams to be
 received out of sequence. Some implementations will have provisions to 
 open all intermediate streams in case of out-of-sequence arrival. For example,
 a server that receive STREAM DATA for streams 3 and then 9 may decide to
-open stream 5 and 7 immediately. An adversarial client would for example exploit that
+open stream 5 and 7 immediately. An adversarial client 
+would for example exploit that
 design by sending STREAM DATA for streams 3 and the 2,000,001, causing the 
 server to open 1 million connections, and contributing to server resource
 exhaustion.
 
 The number of active streams is limited by the concurrent stream limit transport 
-parameter, as explained in {{stream-concurrency}}. If chosen judisciously, this limit 
+parameter, as explained in {{stream-concurrency}}. 
+If chosen judisciously, this limit 
 mitigates the effect of the stream commitment attack. However, setting the limit
 too low could affect performance when applications expect to open large number
 of streams.