Update draft-ietf-quic-transport.md

draft-ietf-quic-transport.md

@@ -2699,32 +2699,40 @@ packets with ACK frames.
 
 ## Stream fragmentation and reassembly attacks
 
-An adversarial client may attempt to exhaust server memory resource by performing
+An adversarial client may attempt to 
+exhaust server memory resource by performing
 a stream fragmentation and reassembly attack, similar to the UDP/ICMP
 "Teardrop" fragmentation attacks. The adversarial client would open a stream,
 and send some STREAM DATA packets containing fragments of the stream content.
 The goal of the attack is to induce the receiving implementation to commit
 memory buffers while waiting that the stream data can be reassembled. 
 
 For example, a client
-might send some octets at the beginning of a stream and some octets much further 
+might send some octets at the beginning of a 
+stream and some octets much further 
 away in the stream. A vulnerable server, on receiving the stream data fragments,
 might allocate memory covering the whole space from beginning to end. The client
 would then repeat the process on a large number of streams and a large number
 of connections, inducing the server to commit a large amout of memory.
 
-This attack can be mitigated by not committing memory for stream data reassembly,
+This attack can be mitigated by not 
+committing memory for stream data reassembly,
 and simply keeping the STREAM DATA frames until enough fragments have been 
 received and the data can be delivered to the application in proper sequence. 
-However, this is not a complete mitigation. The adversarial client could still send
-a large number of STREAM DATA packets separated by holes, forcing the server
+However, this is not a complete mitigation. 
+The adversarial client could still send
+a large number of STREAM DATA packets separated by holes, 
+forcing the server
 to commit memory for a large number of data segments.
 
 A possible mitigation is for servers to keep a count of the number of
-"reassembly holes" in data streams received from the client. In normal operation,
-these holes are caused by transmission errors and are promptly filled by the
+"reassembly holes" in data streams received from the client. 
+In normal operation,
+these holes are caused by transmission errors and 
+are promptly filled by the
 recovery processes. An abnormal number of holes is caused by either a 
-very large rate of transmission errors, or by adversarial client behavior. In both 
+very large rate of transmission errors, or by 
+adversarial client behavior. In both 
 cases, it is reasonable for the server to close the connection.
 
 # IANA Considerations