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Merge pull request #556 from ReFirmLabs/unpriv_user_exec
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Symlink directory traversal security fix
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eacmen committed Sep 10, 2021
2 parents 0499019 + 8f3dd37 commit fa0c0bd
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7 changes: 7 additions & 0 deletions README.md
Expand Up @@ -7,10 +7,17 @@

Binwalk is a fast, easy to use tool for analyzing, reverse engineering, and extracting firmware images.


### *** Extraction Security Notice ***

Prior to Binwalk v2.3.3, extracted archives could create symlinks which point anywhere on the file system, potentially resulting in a directory traversal attack if subsequent extraction utilties blindly follow these symlinks. More generically, Binwalk makes use of many third-party extraction utilties which may have unpatched security issues; Binwalk v2.3.3 and later allows external extraction tools to be run as an unprivileged user using the `run-as` command line option (this requires Binwalk itself to be run with root privileges). Additionally, Binwalk v2.3.3 and later will refuse to perform extraction as root unless `--run-as=root` is specified.


### *** Python 2.7 Deprecation Notice ***

Even though many major Linux distros are still shipping Python 2.7 as the default interpreter in their currently stable release, we are making the difficult decision to move binwalk support exclusively to Python 3. This is likely to make many upset and others rejoice. If you need to install binwalk into a Python 2.7 environment we will be creating a tag `python27` that will be a snapshot of `master` before all of these major changes are made. Thank you for being patient with us through this transition process.


### Installation and Usage

* [Installation](./INSTALL.md)
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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion setup.py
Expand Up @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
from distutils.dir_util import remove_tree

MODULE_NAME = "binwalk"
MODULE_VERSION = "2.3.2"
MODULE_VERSION = "2.3.3"
SCRIPT_NAME = MODULE_NAME
MODULE_DIRECTORY = os.path.dirname(os.path.realpath(__file__))

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168 changes: 132 additions & 36 deletions src/binwalk/modules/extractor.py
Expand Up @@ -4,12 +4,14 @@

import os
import re
import pwd
import stat
import shlex
import tempfile
import subprocess
import binwalk.core.common
from binwalk.core.compat import *
from binwalk.core.exceptions import ModuleException
from binwalk.core.module import Module, Option, Kwarg
from binwalk.core.common import file_size, file_md5, unique_file_name, BlockFile

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -87,11 +89,20 @@ class Extractor(Module):
type=int,
kwargs={'max_count': 0},
description='Limit the number of extracted files'),
Option(short='0',
long='run-as',
type=str,
kwargs={'runas_user': 0},
description="Execute external extraction utilities with the specified user's privileges"),
#Option(short='u',
# long='limit',
# type=int,
# kwargs={'recursive_max_size': 0},
# description="Limit the total size of all extracted files"),
Option(short='1',
long='preserve-symlinks',
kwargs={'do_not_sanitize_symlinks': True},
description="Do not sanitize extracted symlinks that point outside the extraction directory (dangerous)"),
Option(short='r',
long='rm',
kwargs={'remove_after_execute': True},
Expand All @@ -111,16 +122,43 @@ class Extractor(Module):
Kwarg(name='recursive_max_size', default=None),
Kwarg(name='max_count', default=None),
Kwarg(name='base_directory', default=None),
Kwarg(name='do_not_sanitize_symlinks', default=False),
Kwarg(name='remove_after_execute', default=False),
Kwarg(name='load_default_rules', default=False),
Kwarg(name='run_extractors', default=True),
Kwarg(name='extract_into_subdirs', default=False),
Kwarg(name='manual_rules', default=[]),
Kwarg(name='matryoshka', default=0),
Kwarg(name='enabled', default=False),
Kwarg(name='runas_user', default=None),
]

def load(self):
self.runas_uid = None
self.runas_gid = None

if self.enabled is True:
if self.runas_user is None:
# Get some info about the current user we're running under
user_info = pwd.getpwuid(os.getuid())

# Don't run as root, unless explicitly instructed to
if user_info.pw_uid == 0:
raise ModuleException("Binwalk extraction uses many third party utilities, which may not be secure. If you wish to have extraction utilities executed as the current user, use '--run-as=%s' (binwalk itself must be run as root)." % user_info.pw_name)

# Run external applications as the current user
self.runas_uid = user_info.pw_uid
self.runas_gid = user_info.pw_gid
else:
# Run external applications as the specified user
user_info = pwd.getpwnam(self.runas_user)
self.runas_uid = user_info.pw_uid
self.runas_gid = user_info.pw_gid

# Make sure we'll have permissions to switch to the different user
if self.runas_uid != os.getuid() and os.getuid() != 0:
raise ModuleException("In order to execute third party applications as %s, binwalk must be run with root privileges." % self.runas_user)

# Holds a list of extraction rules loaded either from a file or when
# manually specified.
self.extract_rules = []
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -148,8 +186,8 @@ def load(self):
self.config.verbose = True

def add_pending(self, f):
# Ignore symlinks
if os.path.islink(f):
# Ignore symlinks, don't add new files unless recursion was requested
if os.path.islink(f) or not self.matryoshka:
return

# Get the file mode to check and see if it's a block/char device
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -260,30 +298,34 @@ def callback(self, r):

# If recursion was specified, and the file is not the same
# one we just dd'd
if (self.matryoshka and
file_path != dd_file_path and
scan_extracted_files and
self.directory in real_file_path):
# If the recursion level of this file is less than or
# equal to our desired recursion level
if len(real_file_path.split(self.directory)[1].split(os.path.sep)) <= self.matryoshka:
# If this is a directory and we are supposed to process directories for this extractor,
# then add all files under that directory to the
# list of pending files.
if os.path.isdir(file_path):
for root, dirs, files in os.walk(file_path):
for f in files:
full_path = os.path.join(root, f)
self.add_pending(full_path)
# If it's just a file, it to the list of pending
# files
else:
self.add_pending(file_path)
if file_path != dd_file_path:
# Symlinks can cause security issues if they point outside the extraction directory.
self.symlink_sanitizer(file_path, extraction_directory)

# If this is a directory and we are supposed to process directories for this extractor,
# then add all files under that directory to the
# list of pending files.
if os.path.isdir(file_path):
for root, dirs, files in os.walk(file_path):
# Symlinks can cause security issues if they point outside the extraction directory.
self.symlink_sanitizer([os.path.join(root, x) for x in dirs+files], extraction_directory)

for f in files:
full_path = os.path.join(root, f)

# If the recursion level of this file is less than or equal to our desired recursion level
if len(real_file_path.split(self.directory)[1].split(os.path.sep)) <= self.matryoshka:
if scan_extracted_files and self.directory in real_file_path:
self.add_pending(full_path)

# If it's just a file, it to the list of pending
# files
elif scan_extracted_files and self.directory in real_file_path:
self.add_pending(file_path)

# Update the last directory listing for the next time we
# extract a file to this same output directory
self.last_directory_listing[
extraction_directory] = directory_listing
self.last_directory_listing[extraction_directory] = directory_listing

def append_rule(self, r):
self.extract_rules.append(r.copy())
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -534,6 +576,9 @@ def build_output_directory(self, path):
else:
output_directory = self.extraction_directories[path]

# Make sure run-as user can access this directory
os.chown(output_directory, self.runas_uid, self.runas_gid)

return output_directory

def cleanup_extracted_files(self, tf=None):
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -826,6 +871,9 @@ def _dd(self, file_name, offset, size, extension, output_file_name=None):
# Cleanup
fdout.close()
fdin.close()

# Make sure run-as user can access this file
os.chown(fname, self.runas_uid, self.runas_gid)
except KeyboardInterrupt as e:
raise e
except Exception as e:
Expand All @@ -846,7 +894,6 @@ def execute(self, cmd, fname, codes=[0, None]):
Returns True on success, False on failure, or None if the external extraction utility could not be found.
'''
tmp = None
rval = 0
retval = True
command_list = []
Expand All @@ -865,16 +912,10 @@ def execute(self, cmd, fname, codes=[0, None]):
retval = False
binwalk.core.common.warning("Internal extractor '%s' failed with exception: '%s'" % (str(cmd), str(e)))
elif cmd:
# If not in debug mode, create a temporary file to redirect
# stdout and stderr to
if not binwalk.core.common.DEBUG:
tmp = tempfile.TemporaryFile()

# Generate unique file paths for all paths in the current
# command that are surrounded by UNIQUE_PATH_DELIMITER
while self.UNIQUE_PATH_DELIMITER in cmd:
need_unique_path = cmd.split(self.UNIQUE_PATH_DELIMITER)[
1].split(self.UNIQUE_PATH_DELIMITER)[0]
need_unique_path = cmd.split(self.UNIQUE_PATH_DELIMITER)[1].split(self.UNIQUE_PATH_DELIMITER)[0]
unique_path = binwalk.core.common.unique_file_name(need_unique_path)
cmd = cmd.replace(self.UNIQUE_PATH_DELIMITER + need_unique_path + self.UNIQUE_PATH_DELIMITER, unique_path)

Expand All @@ -885,9 +926,10 @@ def execute(self, cmd, fname, codes=[0, None]):
# command with fname
command = command.strip().replace(self.FILE_NAME_PLACEHOLDER, fname)

binwalk.core.common.debug("subprocess.call(%s, stdout=%s, stderr=%s)" % (command, str(tmp), str(tmp)))
rval = subprocess.call(shlex.split(command), stdout=tmp, stderr=tmp)
# Execute external extractor
rval = self.shell_call(command)

# Check the return value to see if extraction was successful or not
if rval in codes:
retval = True
else:
Expand All @@ -909,7 +951,61 @@ def execute(self, cmd, fname, codes=[0, None]):
binwalk.core.common.warning("Extractor.execute failed to run external extractor '%s': %s, '%s' might not be installed correctly" % (str(cmd), str(e), str(cmd)))
retval = None

if tmp is not None:
tmp.close()

return (retval, '&&'.join(command_list))

def shell_call(self, command):
# If not in debug mode, redirect output to /dev/null
if not binwalk.core.common.DEBUG:
tmp = subprocess.DEVNULL
else:
tmp = None

# If a run-as user is not the current user, we'll need to switch privileges to that user account
if self.runas_uid != os.getuid():
binwalk.core.common.debug("Switching privileges to %s (%d:%d)" % (self.runas_user, self.runas_uid, self.runas_gid))

# Fork a child process
child_pid = os.fork()
if child_pid is 0:
# Switch to the run-as user privileges, if one has been set
if self.runas_uid is not None and self.runas_gid is not None:
os.setgid(self.runas_uid)
os.setuid(self.runas_gid)
else:
# child_pid of None indicates that no os.fork() occured
child_pid = None

# If we're the child, or there was no os.fork(), execute the command
if child_pid in [0, None]:
binwalk.core.common.debug("subprocess.call(%s, stdout=%s, stderr=%s)" % (command, str(tmp), str(tmp)))
rval = subprocess.call(shlex.split(command), stdout=tmp, stderr=tmp)

# A true child process should exit with the subprocess exit value
if child_pid is 0:
sys.exit(rval)
# If no os.fork() happened, just return the subprocess exit value
elif child_pid is None:
return rval
# Else, os.fork() happened and we're the parent. Wait and return the child's exit value.
else:
return os.wait()[1]

def symlink_sanitizer(self, file_list, extraction_directory):
# User can disable this if desired
if self.do_not_sanitize_symlinks is True:
return

# Allows either a single file path, or a list of file paths to be passed in for sanitization.
if type(file_list) is not list:
file_list = [file_list]

# Sanitize any files in the list that are symlinks outside of the specified extraction directory.
for file_name in file_list:
if os.path.islink(file_name):
linktarget = os.path.realpath(file_name)
binwalk.core.common.debug("Analysing symlink: %s -> %s" % (file_name, linktarget))

if not linktarget.startswith(extraction_directory) and linktarget != os.devnull:
binwalk.core.common.warning("Symlink points outside of the extraction directory: %s -> %s; changing link target to %s for security purposes." % (file_name, linktarget, os.devnull))
os.remove(file_name)
os.symlink(os.devnull, file_name)
Binary file added testing/tests/input-vectors/dirtraversal.tar
Binary file not shown.
33 changes: 33 additions & 0 deletions testing/tests/test_dirtraversal.py
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
import os
import binwalk
from nose.tools import eq_, ok_, assert_equal, assert_not_equal

def test_dirtraversal():
'''
Test: Open dirtraversal.tar, scan for signatures.
Verify that dangerous symlinks have been sanitized.
'''
bad_symlink_file_list = ['foo', 'bar', 'subdir/foo2', 'subdir/bar2']
good_symlink_file_list = ['subdir/README_link', 'README2_link']

input_vector_file = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__),
"input-vectors",
"dirtraversal.tar")

output_directory = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__),
"input-vectors",
"_dirtraversal.tar.extracted")

scan_result = binwalk.scan(input_vector_file,
signature=True,
extract=True,
quiet=True)[0]

# Make sure the bad symlinks have been sanitized and the
# good symlinks have not been sanitized.
for symlink in bad_symlink_file_list:
linktarget = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(output_directory, symlink))
assert_equal(linktarget, os.devnull)
for symlink in good_symlink_file_list:
linktarget = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(output_directory, symlink))
assert_not_equal(linktarget, os.devnull)
2 changes: 0 additions & 2 deletions testing/tests/test_firmware_zip.py
Expand Up @@ -10,8 +10,6 @@ def test_firmware_zip():
'''
expected_results = [
[0, 'Zip archive data, at least v1.0 to extract, name: dir655_revB_FW_203NA/'],
[51, 'Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract, compressed size: 6395868, uncompressed size: 6422554, name: dir655_revB_FW_203NA/DIR655B1_FW203NAB02.bin'],
[6395993, 'Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract, compressed size: 14243, uncompressed size: 61440, name: dir655_revB_FW_203NA/dir655_revB_release_notes_203NA.doc'],
[6410581, 'End of Zip archive, footer length: 22'],

]
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