Enhance postUpgradeTasks with self hosted renovate #27563
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As far as I can tell, the attack vector here is that your own developers wish to exploit you, the operator of your company's Renovate instance. For most companies this is an edge case, because malicious developers within a company can likely do far worse than compromise a Renovate instance. Do you have a different viewpoint on that? On the technical matter, Renovate supports binarySource=docker, which runs such child processes in its own sidecar image. |
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Yes, I'm specifically referring to a Kubernetes (k8s) environment. It's important to note that access to tools like GitLab isn't exclusive to developers; in some organizations, various team members can create repositories. And some times there are CVE's. While the potential risks associated with CI jobs are well recognized, the dangers posed by Additionally, Renovate is frequently set up to automatically detect new repositories. An attacker could create a malicious repository and, once Renovate automatically initiates its tasks (including postUpgradeTasks), subsequently delete the repository, leaving behind little to no trace of the attack. However, CI runners are typically safeguarded through multiple layers of security, a precaution that doesn't seem as evident for Firstly, a malicious user could exploit this to gain access to sensitive environment variables, such as Furthermore, within a k8s environment, the Renovate pod is not typically perceived as a significant threat, which means it may not be as securely configured as it should be. This oversight could inadvertently allow for broader access to the entire cluster. Perhaps this issue could be mitigated with better documentation, emphasizing the potential security risks and recommending best practices for securing postUpgradeTasks in a Kubernetes environment. |
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I'm unsure where to place these documents, but here is my suggestion for improving them. Security Advisory for Self-Hosted Renovate InstancesOverviewWhen using self-hosted versions of Renovate for dependency management, it is imperative to understand the security implications associated with monitoring and updating repositories. The process that Renovate uses to update dependencies runs under the same user context as the Renovate process itself. This means it has the same level of access to information and resources. Trusting Repository DevelopersKey Point: All self-hosted Renovate instances must operate under a trust relationship with the developers of the monitored repositories.
Centralized Logging and Sensitive Information ManagementWhile centralized logging plays a pivotal role in monitoring and troubleshooting within self-hosted Renovate environments, it inadvertently bears the risk of capturing and exposing sensitive information. Operations that involve Recommendations
ConclusionThe flexibility and power of Renovate come with the responsibility to manage security proactively. By understanding the risks associated with repository management and taking steps to mitigate those risks, organizations can maintain a secure and efficient development workflow. |
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When using self-hosted Renovate with
postUpgradeTasks
configured, there is a significant trust requirement in the projects being checked. This configuration allows for the execution of arbitrary commands post-upgrade, which can potentially be exploited for malicious purposes. Even when you use allowedPostUpgradeCommands in your configuration.Example Configuration:
The flexibility of
postUpgradeTasks
to execute any script or command introduces a risk, especially in a scenario where a project's build script (./gradlew in this example) could be maliciously modified. For instance, an altered gradlew script could include harmful commands like ps -ef >> gradle.lockfile, or other shell commands that could compromise security, extract sensitive information, or execute unauthorized actions.To mitigate this risk, could a sidecar container approach be considered? The idea is to isolate the execution environment of the tools called by postUpgradeTasks. By utilizing a sidecar container equipped with a pre-approved suite of tools, Renovate can operate in a secure, controlled environment, eliminating the dependency on repository-provided tools and enhancing overall security. This method would significantly reduce the risk of executing potentially malicious code and improve security by:
Looking forward to your thoughts and any further suggestions.
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