/
hs.rs
2337 lines (1997 loc) · 88.4 KB
/
hs.rs
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use crate::msgs::enums::{ContentType, HandshakeType, ExtensionType, SignatureScheme};
use crate::msgs::enums::{Compression, ProtocolVersion, AlertDescription, NamedGroup};
use crate::msgs::message::{Message, MessagePayload};
use crate::msgs::base::{Payload, PayloadU8};
use crate::msgs::handshake::{HandshakePayload, HandshakeMessagePayload, ClientHelloPayload};
use crate::msgs::handshake::{SessionID, Random, ServerHelloPayload};
use crate::msgs::handshake::{ClientExtension, HasServerExtensions};
use crate::msgs::handshake::{SupportedSignatureSchemes, SupportedMandatedSignatureSchemes};
use crate::msgs::handshake::DecomposedSignatureScheme;
use crate::msgs::handshake::{NamedGroups, SupportedGroups, KeyShareEntry, EncryptedExtensions};
use crate::msgs::handshake::{ECPointFormatList, SupportedPointFormats};
use crate::msgs::handshake::{ProtocolNameList, ConvertProtocolNameList};
use crate::msgs::handshake::{CertificatePayloadTLS13, CertificateEntry};
use crate::msgs::handshake::ServerKeyExchangePayload;
use crate::msgs::handshake::DigitallySignedStruct;
use crate::msgs::handshake::{PresharedKeyIdentity, PresharedKeyOffer, HelloRetryRequest};
use crate::msgs::handshake::{CertificateStatusRequest, SCTList};
use crate::msgs::enums::{ClientCertificateType, PSKKeyExchangeMode, ECPointFormat};
use crate::msgs::codec::Codec;
use crate::msgs::persist;
use crate::msgs::ccs::ChangeCipherSpecPayload;
use crate::client::ClientSessionImpl;
use crate::session::SessionSecrets;
use crate::key_schedule::{KeySchedule, SecretKind};
use crate::cipher;
use crate::suites;
use crate::hash_hs;
use crate::verify;
use crate::rand;
use crate::ticketer;
use crate::error::TLSError;
use crate::handshake::{check_message, check_handshake_message};
use crate::client::common::{ServerCertDetails, ServerKXDetails, HandshakeDetails};
use crate::client::common::{ClientHelloDetails, ReceivedTicketDetails, ClientAuthDetails};
use std::mem;
use ring::constant_time;
use webpki;
macro_rules! extract_handshake(
( $m:expr, $t:path ) => (
match $m.payload {
MessagePayload::Handshake(ref hsp) => match hsp.payload {
$t(ref hm) => Some(hm),
_ => None
},
_ => None
}
)
);
macro_rules! extract_handshake_mut(
( $m:expr, $t:path ) => (
match $m.payload {
MessagePayload::Handshake(hsp) => match hsp.payload {
$t(hm) => Some(hm),
_ => None
},
_ => None
}
)
);
type CheckResult = Result<(), TLSError>;
type NextState = Box<State + Send + Sync>;
type NextStateOrError = Result<NextState, TLSError>;
pub trait State {
fn check_message(&self, m: &Message) -> CheckResult;
fn handle(self: Box<Self>, sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl, m: Message) -> NextStateOrError;
}
fn illegal_param(sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl, why: &str) -> TLSError {
sess.common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::IllegalParameter);
TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError(why.to_string())
}
fn check_aligned_handshake(sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl) -> Result<(), TLSError> {
if !sess.common.handshake_joiner.is_empty() {
Err(illegal_param(sess, "keys changed with pending hs fragment"))
} else {
Ok(())
}
}
fn find_session(sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl, dns_name: webpki::DNSNameRef)
-> Option<persist::ClientSessionValue> {
let key = persist::ClientSessionKey::session_for_dns_name(dns_name);
let key_buf = key.get_encoding();
let maybe_value = sess.config.session_persistence.get(&key_buf);
if maybe_value.is_none() {
crate::log::debug!("No cached session for {:?}", dns_name);
return None;
}
let value = maybe_value.unwrap();
if let Some(result) = persist::ClientSessionValue::read_bytes(&value) {
if result.has_expired(ticketer::timebase()) {
None
} else {
Some(result)
}
} else {
None
}
}
fn find_kx_hint(sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl, dns_name: webpki::DNSNameRef) -> Option<NamedGroup> {
let key = persist::ClientSessionKey::hint_for_dns_name(dns_name);
let key_buf = key.get_encoding();
let maybe_value = sess.config.session_persistence.get(&key_buf);
maybe_value.and_then(|enc| NamedGroup::read_bytes(&enc))
}
fn save_kx_hint(sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl, dns_name: webpki::DNSNameRef, group: NamedGroup) {
let key = persist::ClientSessionKey::hint_for_dns_name(dns_name);
sess.config.session_persistence.put(key.get_encoding(), group.get_encoding());
}
/// If we have a ticket, we use the sessionid as a signal that we're
/// doing an abbreviated handshake. See section 3.4 in RFC5077.
fn randomise_sessionid_for_ticket(csv: &mut persist::ClientSessionValue) {
if !csv.ticket.0.is_empty() {
let mut random_id = [0u8; 32];
rand::fill_random(&mut random_id);
csv.session_id = SessionID::new(&random_id);
}
}
/// This implements the horrifying TLS1.3 hack where PSK binders have a
/// data dependency on the message they are contained within.
pub fn fill_in_psk_binder(sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl,
handshake: &mut HandshakeDetails,
hmp: &mut HandshakeMessagePayload) {
// We need to know the hash function of the suite we're trying to resume into.
let resuming = handshake.resuming_session.as_ref().unwrap();
let suite_hash = sess.find_cipher_suite(resuming.cipher_suite).unwrap().get_hash();
// The binder is calculated over the clienthello, but doesn't include itself or its
// length, or the length of its container.
let binder_plaintext = hmp.get_encoding_for_binder_signing();
let handshake_hash =
handshake.transcript.get_hash_given(suite_hash, &binder_plaintext);
let mut empty_hash_ctx = hash_hs::HandshakeHash::new();
empty_hash_ctx.start_hash(suite_hash);
let empty_hash = empty_hash_ctx.get_current_hash();
// Run a fake key_schedule to simulate what the server will do if it choses
// to resume.
let mut key_schedule = KeySchedule::new(suite_hash);
key_schedule.input_secret(&resuming.master_secret.0);
let base_key = key_schedule.derive(SecretKind::ResumptionPSKBinderKey, &empty_hash);
let real_binder = key_schedule.sign_verify_data(&base_key, &handshake_hash);
if let HandshakePayload::ClientHello(ref mut ch) = hmp.payload {
ch.set_psk_binder(real_binder);
};
sess.common.set_key_schedule(key_schedule);
}
struct InitialState {
handshake: HandshakeDetails,
}
impl InitialState {
fn new(host_name: webpki::DNSName, extra_exts: Vec<ClientExtension>) -> InitialState {
InitialState {
handshake: HandshakeDetails::new(host_name, extra_exts),
}
}
fn emit_initial_client_hello(mut self, sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl) -> NextState {
if sess.config.client_auth_cert_resolver.has_certs() {
self.handshake.transcript.set_client_auth_enabled();
}
let hello_details = ClientHelloDetails::new();
emit_client_hello_for_retry(sess, self.handshake, hello_details, None)
}
}
pub fn start_handshake(sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl, host_name: webpki::DNSName,
extra_exts: Vec<ClientExtension>) -> NextState {
InitialState::new(host_name, extra_exts)
.emit_initial_client_hello(sess)
}
struct ExpectServerHello {
handshake: HandshakeDetails,
hello: ClientHelloDetails,
server_cert: ServerCertDetails,
may_send_cert_status: bool,
must_issue_new_ticket: bool,
}
struct ExpectServerHelloOrHelloRetryRequest(ExpectServerHello);
fn emit_fake_ccs(hs: &mut HandshakeDetails, sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl) {
if hs.sent_tls13_fake_ccs {
return;
}
let m = Message {
typ: ContentType::ChangeCipherSpec,
version: ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_2,
payload: MessagePayload::ChangeCipherSpec(ChangeCipherSpecPayload {})
};
sess.common.send_msg(m, false);
hs.sent_tls13_fake_ccs = true;
}
fn compatible_suite(sess: &ClientSessionImpl,
resuming_suite: Option<&suites::SupportedCipherSuite>) -> bool {
match resuming_suite {
Some(resuming_suite) => {
if let Some(suite) = sess.common.get_suite() {
suite.can_resume_to(&resuming_suite)
} else {
true
}
}
None => false
}
}
fn emit_client_hello_for_retry(sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl,
mut handshake: HandshakeDetails,
mut hello: ClientHelloDetails,
retryreq: Option<&HelloRetryRequest>) -> NextState {
// Do we have a SessionID or ticket cached for this host?
handshake.resuming_session = find_session(sess, handshake.dns_name.as_ref());
let (session_id, ticket, resume_version) = if handshake.resuming_session.is_some() {
let resuming = handshake.resuming_session.as_mut().unwrap();
if resuming.version == ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_2 {
randomise_sessionid_for_ticket(resuming);
}
crate::log::debug!("Resuming session");
(resuming.session_id, resuming.ticket.0.clone(), resuming.version)
} else {
crate::log::debug!("Not resuming any session");
(SessionID::empty(), Vec::new(), ProtocolVersion::Unknown(0))
};
let support_tls12 = sess.config.supports_version(ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_2);
let support_tls13 = sess.config.supports_version(ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3);
let mut supported_versions = Vec::new();
if support_tls13 {
supported_versions.push(ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3);
}
if support_tls12 {
supported_versions.push(ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_2);
}
let mut key_shares = vec![];
if support_tls13 {
// Choose our groups:
// - if we've been asked via HelloRetryRequest for a specific
// one, do that.
// - if not, we might have a hint of what the server supports
// - if not, send just X25519.
//
let groups = retryreq.and_then(|req| req.get_requested_key_share_group())
.or_else(|| find_kx_hint(sess, handshake.dns_name.as_ref()))
.or_else(|| Some(NamedGroup::X25519))
.map(|grp| vec![ grp ])
.unwrap();
for group in groups {
// in reply to HelloRetryRequest, we must not alter any existing key
// shares
if let Some(already_offered_share) = hello.find_key_share(group) {
key_shares.push(KeyShareEntry::new(group, &already_offered_share.pubkey));
hello.offered_key_shares.push(already_offered_share);
continue;
}
if let Some(key_share) = suites::KeyExchange::start_ecdhe(group) {
key_shares.push(KeyShareEntry::new(group, &key_share.pubkey));
hello.offered_key_shares.push(key_share);
}
}
}
let mut exts = Vec::new();
if !supported_versions.is_empty() {
exts.push(ClientExtension::SupportedVersions(supported_versions));
}
if sess.config.enable_sni {
exts.push(ClientExtension::make_sni(handshake.dns_name.as_ref()));
}
exts.push(ClientExtension::ECPointFormats(ECPointFormatList::supported()));
exts.push(ClientExtension::NamedGroups(NamedGroups::supported()));
exts.push(ClientExtension::SignatureAlgorithms(SupportedSignatureSchemes::supported_verify()));
exts.push(ClientExtension::ExtendedMasterSecretRequest);
exts.push(ClientExtension::CertificateStatusRequest(CertificateStatusRequest::build_ocsp()));
if sess.config.ct_logs.is_some() {
exts.push(ClientExtension::SignedCertificateTimestampRequest);
}
if support_tls13 {
exts.push(ClientExtension::KeyShare(key_shares));
}
if let Some(cookie) = retryreq.and_then(|req| req.get_cookie()) {
exts.push(ClientExtension::Cookie(cookie.clone()));
}
if support_tls13 && sess.config.enable_tickets {
// We could support PSK_KE here too. Such connections don't
// have forward secrecy, and are similar to TLS1.2 resumption.
let psk_modes = vec![ PSKKeyExchangeMode::PSK_DHE_KE ];
exts.push(ClientExtension::PresharedKeyModes(psk_modes));
}
if !sess.config.alpn_protocols.is_empty() {
exts.push(ClientExtension::Protocols(ProtocolNameList::from_strings(&sess.config
.alpn_protocols)));
}
let fill_in_binder = if support_tls13 && sess.config.enable_tickets &&
resume_version == ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3 &&
!ticket.is_empty() {
let resuming_suite = handshake.resuming_session
.as_ref()
.and_then(|resume| sess.find_cipher_suite(resume.cipher_suite));
if compatible_suite(sess, resuming_suite) {
// The EarlyData extension MUST be supplied together with the
// PreSharedKey extension.
let max_early_data_size = handshake
.resuming_session
.as_ref()
.map_or(0, |resume| resume.max_early_data_size);
if sess.config.enable_early_data && max_early_data_size > 0 && retryreq.is_none() {
sess.early_data.enable(max_early_data_size as usize);
exts.push(ClientExtension::EarlyData);
}
// Finally, and only for TLS1.3 with a ticket resumption, include a binder
// for our ticket. This must go last.
//
// Include an empty binder. It gets filled in below because it depends on
// the message it's contained in (!!!).
let (obfuscated_ticket_age, suite) = {
let resuming = handshake.resuming_session
.as_ref()
.unwrap();
(resuming.get_obfuscated_ticket_age(ticketer::timebase()), resuming.cipher_suite)
};
let binder_len = sess.find_cipher_suite(suite).unwrap().get_hash().output_len;
let binder = vec![0u8; binder_len];
let psk_identity = PresharedKeyIdentity::new(ticket, obfuscated_ticket_age);
let psk_ext = PresharedKeyOffer::new(psk_identity, binder);
exts.push(ClientExtension::PresharedKey(psk_ext));
true
} else {
false
}
} else if sess.config.enable_tickets {
// If we have a ticket, include it. Otherwise, request one.
if ticket.is_empty() {
exts.push(ClientExtension::SessionTicketRequest);
} else {
exts.push(ClientExtension::SessionTicketOffer(Payload::new(ticket)));
}
false
} else {
false
};
exts.extend(handshake.extra_exts.iter().cloned());
// Note what extensions we sent.
hello.sent_extensions = exts.iter()
.map(|ext| ext.get_type())
.collect();
let mut chp = HandshakeMessagePayload {
typ: HandshakeType::ClientHello,
payload: HandshakePayload::ClientHello(ClientHelloPayload {
client_version: ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_2,
random: Random::from_slice(&handshake.randoms.client),
session_id,
cipher_suites: sess.get_cipher_suites(),
compression_methods: vec![Compression::Null],
extensions: exts,
}),
};
if fill_in_binder {
fill_in_psk_binder(sess, &mut handshake, &mut chp);
}
let ch = Message {
typ: ContentType::Handshake,
// "This value MUST be set to 0x0303 for all records generated
// by a TLS 1.3 implementation other than an initial ClientHello
// (i.e., one not generated after a HelloRetryRequest)"
version: if retryreq.is_some() {
ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_2
} else {
ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_0
},
payload: MessagePayload::Handshake(chp),
};
if retryreq.is_some() {
// send dummy CCS to fool middleboxes prior
// to second client hello
emit_fake_ccs(&mut handshake, sess);
}
crate::log::trace!("Sending ClientHello {:#?}", ch);
handshake.transcript.add_message(&ch);
sess.common.send_msg(ch, false);
// Calculate the hash of ClientHello and use it to derive EarlyTrafficSecret
if sess.early_data.is_enabled() {
// For middlebox compatility
emit_fake_ccs(&mut handshake, sess);
// It is safe to call unwrap() because fill_in_binder is true.
let resuming_suite = handshake.resuming_session
.as_ref()
.and_then(|resume| sess.find_cipher_suite(resume.cipher_suite)).unwrap();
let client_hello_hash = handshake.transcript.get_hash_given(resuming_suite.get_hash(), &[]);
let client_early_traffic_secret = sess.common
.get_key_schedule()
.derive(SecretKind::ClientEarlyTrafficSecret, &client_hello_hash);
// Set early data encryption key
sess.common
.set_message_encrypter(cipher::new_tls13_write(resuming_suite, &client_early_traffic_secret));
// Now the client can send encrypted early data
sess.common.early_traffic = true;
crate::log::trace!("Starting early data traffic");
sess.common.we_now_encrypting();
}
let next = ExpectServerHello {
handshake, hello,
server_cert: ServerCertDetails::new(),
may_send_cert_status: false,
must_issue_new_ticket: false,
};
if support_tls13 && retryreq.is_none() {
Box::new(ExpectServerHelloOrHelloRetryRequest(next))
} else {
Box::new(next)
}
}
// Extensions we expect in plaintext in the ServerHello.
static ALLOWED_PLAINTEXT_EXTS: &'static [ExtensionType] = &[
ExtensionType::KeyShare,
ExtensionType::PreSharedKey,
ExtensionType::SupportedVersions,
];
// Only the intersection of things we offer, and those disallowed
// in TLS1.3
static DISALLOWED_TLS13_EXTS: &'static [ExtensionType] = &[
ExtensionType::ECPointFormats,
ExtensionType::SessionTicket,
ExtensionType::RenegotiationInfo,
ExtensionType::ExtendedMasterSecret,
];
fn validate_server_hello_tls13(sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl,
server_hello: &ServerHelloPayload)
-> Result<(), TLSError> {
for ext in &server_hello.extensions {
if !ALLOWED_PLAINTEXT_EXTS.contains(&ext.get_type()) {
sess.common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::UnsupportedExtension);
return Err(TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError("server sent unexpected cleartext ext"
.to_string()));
}
}
Ok(())
}
fn process_alpn_protocol(sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl,
proto: Option<&str>)
-> Result<(), TLSError> {
sess.alpn_protocol = proto.map(|s| s.to_owned());
if sess.alpn_protocol.is_some() &&
!sess.config.alpn_protocols.contains(sess.alpn_protocol.as_ref().unwrap()) {
return Err(illegal_param(sess, "server sent non-offered ALPN protocol"));
}
crate::log::debug!("ALPN protocol is {:?}", sess.alpn_protocol);
Ok(())
}
impl ExpectServerHello {
fn start_handshake_traffic(&mut self,
sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl,
server_hello: &ServerHelloPayload)
-> Result<(), TLSError> {
let suite = sess.common.get_suite_assert();
if let Some(selected_psk) = server_hello.get_psk_index() {
if let Some(ref resuming) = self.handshake.resuming_session {
let resume_from_suite = sess.find_cipher_suite(resuming.cipher_suite).unwrap();
if !resume_from_suite.can_resume_to(suite) {
return Err(TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError("server resuming incompatible suite"
.to_string()));
}
if selected_psk != 0 {
return Err(TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError("server selected invalid psk"
.to_string()));
}
crate::log::debug!("Resuming using PSK");
// The key schedule has been initialized and set in fill_in_psk()
// Server must be using the resumption suite, otherwise set_suite()
// in ExpectServerHello::handle() would fail.
// key_schedule.input_secret(&resuming.master_secret.0);
} else {
return Err(TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError("server selected unoffered psk".to_string()));
}
} else {
crate::log::debug!("Not resuming");
// Discard the early data key schedule.
sess.early_data.rejected();
sess.common.early_traffic = false;
let mut key_schedule = KeySchedule::new(suite.get_hash());
key_schedule.input_empty();
sess.common.set_key_schedule(key_schedule);
self.handshake.resuming_session.take();
}
let their_key_share = server_hello.get_key_share()
.ok_or_else(|| {
sess.common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::MissingExtension);
TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError("missing key share".to_string())
})?;
let our_key_share = self.hello.find_key_share_and_discard_others(their_key_share.group)
.ok_or_else(|| illegal_param(sess, "wrong group for key share"))?;
let shared = our_key_share.complete(&their_key_share.payload.0)
.ok_or_else(|| TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError("key exchange failed"
.to_string()))?;
save_kx_hint(sess, self.handshake.dns_name.as_ref(), their_key_share.group);
sess.common.get_mut_key_schedule().input_secret(&shared.premaster_secret);
check_aligned_handshake(sess)?;
self.handshake.hash_at_client_recvd_server_hello =
self.handshake.transcript.get_current_hash();;
if !sess.early_data.is_enabled() {
// Set the client encryption key for handshakes if early data is not used
let write_key = sess.common.get_key_schedule()
.derive(SecretKind::ClientHandshakeTrafficSecret,
&self.handshake.hash_at_client_recvd_server_hello);
sess.common.set_message_encrypter(cipher::new_tls13_write(suite, &write_key));
sess.config.key_log.log("CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET",
&self.handshake.randoms.client,
&write_key);
sess.common.get_mut_key_schedule().current_client_traffic_secret = write_key;
}
let read_key = sess.common.get_key_schedule()
.derive(SecretKind::ServerHandshakeTrafficSecret,
&self.handshake.hash_at_client_recvd_server_hello);
sess.common.set_message_decrypter(cipher::new_tls13_read(suite, &read_key));
sess.config.key_log.log("SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET",
&self.handshake.randoms.client,
&read_key);
sess.common.get_mut_key_schedule().current_server_traffic_secret = read_key;
Ok(())
}
fn into_expect_tls13_encrypted_extensions(self) -> NextState {
Box::new(ExpectTLS13EncryptedExtensions {
handshake: self.handshake,
server_cert: self.server_cert,
hello: self.hello,
})
}
fn into_expect_tls12_new_ticket_resume(self,
certv: verify::ServerCertVerified,
sigv: verify::HandshakeSignatureValid) -> NextState {
Box::new(ExpectTLS12NewTicket {
handshake: self.handshake,
resuming: true,
cert_verified: certv,
sig_verified: sigv,
})
}
fn into_expect_tls12_ccs_resume(self,
certv: verify::ServerCertVerified,
sigv: verify::HandshakeSignatureValid) -> NextState {
Box::new(ExpectTLS12CCS {
handshake: self.handshake,
ticket: ReceivedTicketDetails::new(),
resuming: true,
cert_verified: certv,
sig_verified: sigv,
})
}
fn into_expect_tls12_certificate(self) -> NextState {
Box::new(ExpectTLS12Certificate {
handshake: self.handshake,
server_cert: self.server_cert,
may_send_cert_status: self.may_send_cert_status,
must_issue_new_ticket: self.must_issue_new_ticket,
})
}
}
impl State for ExpectServerHello {
fn check_message(&self, m: &Message) -> CheckResult {
check_handshake_message(m, &[HandshakeType::ServerHello])
}
fn handle(mut self: Box<Self>, sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl, m: Message) -> NextStateOrError {
let server_hello = extract_handshake!(m, HandshakePayload::ServerHello).unwrap();
crate::log::trace!("We got ServerHello {:#?}", server_hello);
use crate::ProtocolVersion::{TLSv1_2, TLSv1_3};
let tls13_supported = sess.config.supports_version(TLSv1_3);
let server_version = if server_hello.legacy_version == TLSv1_2 {
server_hello.get_supported_versions()
.unwrap_or(server_hello.legacy_version)
} else {
server_hello.legacy_version
};
match server_version {
TLSv1_3 if tls13_supported => {
sess.common.negotiated_version = Some(TLSv1_3);
}
TLSv1_2 if sess.config.supports_version(TLSv1_2) => {
if sess.early_data.is_enabled() && sess.common.early_traffic {
// The client must fail with a dedicated error code if the server
// responds with TLS 1.2 when offering 0-RTT.
return Err(TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError("server chose v1.2 when offering 0-rtt"
.to_string()));
}
sess.common.negotiated_version = Some(TLSv1_2);
if server_hello.get_supported_versions().is_some() {
return Err(illegal_param(sess, "server chose v1.2 using v1.3 extension"));
}
}
_ => {
sess.common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::ProtocolVersion);
return Err(TLSError::PeerIncompatibleError("server does not support TLS v1.2/v1.3"
.to_string()));
}
};
if server_hello.compression_method != Compression::Null {
return Err(illegal_param(sess, "server chose non-Null compression"));
}
if server_hello.has_duplicate_extension() {
sess.common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::DecodeError);
return Err(TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError("server sent duplicate extensions".to_string()));
}
let allowed_unsolicited = [ ExtensionType::RenegotiationInfo ];
if self.hello.server_sent_unsolicited_extensions(&server_hello.extensions,
&allowed_unsolicited) {
sess.common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::UnsupportedExtension);
return Err(TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError("server sent unsolicited extension".to_string()));
}
// Extract ALPN protocol
if !sess.common.is_tls13() {
process_alpn_protocol(sess, server_hello.get_alpn_protocol())?;
}
// Reject QUIC if TLS1.2 is in use.
if !sess.common.is_tls13() &&
server_hello.find_extension(ExtensionType::TransportParameters).is_some() {
sess.common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::UnsupportedExtension);
return Err(TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError("server wants to do quic+tls1.2".to_string()));
}
// If ECPointFormats extension is supplied by the server, it must contain
// Uncompressed. But it's allowed to be omitted.
if let Some(point_fmts) = server_hello.get_ecpoints_extension() {
if !point_fmts.contains(&ECPointFormat::Uncompressed) {
sess.common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::HandshakeFailure);
return Err(TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError("server does not support uncompressed points"
.to_string()));
}
}
let scs = sess.find_cipher_suite(server_hello.cipher_suite);
if scs.is_none() {
sess.common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::HandshakeFailure);
return Err(TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError("server chose non-offered ciphersuite"
.to_string()));
}
crate::log::debug!("Using ciphersuite {:?}", server_hello.cipher_suite);
if !sess.common.set_suite(scs.unwrap()) {
return Err(illegal_param(sess, "server varied selected ciphersuite"));
}
let version = sess.common.negotiated_version.unwrap();
if !sess.common.get_suite_assert().usable_for_version(version) {
return Err(illegal_param(sess, "server chose unusable ciphersuite for version"));
}
// Start our handshake hash, and input the server-hello.
self.handshake.transcript.start_hash(sess.common.get_suite_assert().get_hash());
self.handshake.transcript.add_message(&m);
// For TLS1.3, start message encryption using
// handshake_traffic_secret.
if sess.common.is_tls13() {
validate_server_hello_tls13(sess, server_hello)?;
self.start_handshake_traffic(sess, server_hello)?;
emit_fake_ccs(&mut self.handshake, sess);
return Ok(self.into_expect_tls13_encrypted_extensions());
}
// TLS1.2 only from here-on
// Save ServerRandom and SessionID
server_hello.random.write_slice(&mut self.handshake.randoms.server);
self.handshake.session_id = server_hello.session_id;
// Look for TLS1.3 downgrade signal in server random
if tls13_supported && self.handshake.randoms.has_tls12_downgrade_marker() {
return Err(illegal_param(sess, "downgrade to TLS1.2 when TLS1.3 is supported"));
}
// Doing EMS?
if server_hello.ems_support_acked() {
self.handshake.using_ems = true;
}
// Might the server send a ticket?
let with_tickets = if server_hello.find_extension(ExtensionType::SessionTicket).is_some() {
crate::log::debug!("Server supports tickets");
true
} else {
false
};
self.must_issue_new_ticket = with_tickets;
// Might the server send a CertificateStatus between Certificate and
// ServerKeyExchange?
if server_hello.find_extension(ExtensionType::StatusRequest).is_some() {
crate::log::debug!("Server may staple OCSP response");
self.may_send_cert_status = true;
}
// Save any sent SCTs for verification against the certificate.
if let Some(sct_list) = server_hello.get_sct_list() {
crate::log::debug!("Server sent {:?} SCTs", sct_list.len());
if sct_list_is_invalid(sct_list) {
let error_msg = "server sent invalid SCT list".to_string();
return Err(TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError(error_msg));
}
self.server_cert.scts = Some(sct_list.clone());
}
// See if we're successfully resuming.
let mut abbreviated_handshake = false;
if let Some(ref resuming) = self.handshake.resuming_session {
if resuming.session_id == self.handshake.session_id {
crate::log::debug!("Server agreed to resume");
abbreviated_handshake = true;
// Is the server telling lies about the ciphersuite?
if resuming.cipher_suite != scs.unwrap().suite {
let error_msg = "abbreviated handshake offered, but with varied cs".to_string();
return Err(TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError(error_msg));
}
// And about EMS support?
if resuming.extended_ms != self.handshake.using_ems {
let error_msg = "server varied ems support over resume".to_string();
return Err(TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError(error_msg));
}
let secrets = SessionSecrets::new_resume(&self.handshake.randoms,
scs.unwrap().get_hash(),
&resuming.master_secret.0);
sess.config.key_log.log("CLIENT_RANDOM",
&secrets.randoms.client,
&secrets.master_secret);
sess.common.start_encryption_tls12(secrets);
}
}
if abbreviated_handshake {
// Since we're resuming, we verified the certificate and
// proof of possession in the prior session.
let certv = verify::ServerCertVerified::assertion();
let sigv = verify::HandshakeSignatureValid::assertion();
if self.must_issue_new_ticket {
Ok(self.into_expect_tls12_new_ticket_resume(certv, sigv))
} else {
Ok(self.into_expect_tls12_ccs_resume(certv, sigv))
}
} else {
Ok(self.into_expect_tls12_certificate())
}
}
}
impl ExpectServerHelloOrHelloRetryRequest {
fn into_expect_server_hello(self) -> NextState {
Box::new(self.0)
}
fn handle_hello_retry_request(mut self, sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl, m: Message) -> NextStateOrError {
check_handshake_message(&m, &[HandshakeType::HelloRetryRequest])?;
let hrr = extract_handshake!(m, HandshakePayload::HelloRetryRequest).unwrap();
crate::log::trace!("Got HRR {:?}", hrr);
let has_cookie = hrr.get_cookie().is_some();
let req_group = hrr.get_requested_key_share_group();
// A retry request is illegal if it contains no cookie and asks for
// retry of a group we already sent.
if !has_cookie && req_group.map(|g| self.0.hello.has_key_share(g)).unwrap_or(false) {
return Err(illegal_param(sess, "server requested hrr with our group"));
}
// Or asks for us to retry on an unsupported group.
if let Some(group) = req_group {
if !NamedGroups::supported().contains(&group) {
return Err(illegal_param(sess, "server requested hrr with bad group"));
}
}
// Or has an empty cookie.
if has_cookie && hrr.get_cookie().unwrap().0.is_empty() {
return Err(illegal_param(sess, "server requested hrr with empty cookie"));
}
// Or has something unrecognised
if hrr.has_unknown_extension() {
sess.common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::UnsupportedExtension);
return Err(TLSError::PeerIncompatibleError("server sent hrr with unhandled extension"
.to_string()));
}
// Or has the same extensions more than once
if hrr.has_duplicate_extension() {
return Err(illegal_param(sess, "server send duplicate hrr extensions"));
}
// Or asks us to change nothing.
if !has_cookie && req_group.is_none() {
return Err(illegal_param(sess, "server requested hrr with no changes"));
}
// Or asks us to talk a protocol we didn't offer, or doesn't support HRR at all.
match hrr.get_supported_versions() {
Some(ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3) => {
sess.common.negotiated_version = Some(ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3);
}
_ => {
return Err(illegal_param(sess, "server requested unsupported version in hrr"));
}
}
// Or asks us to use a ciphersuite we didn't offer.
let maybe_cs = sess.find_cipher_suite(hrr.cipher_suite);
let cs = match maybe_cs {
Some(cs) => cs,
None => {
return Err(illegal_param(sess, "server requested unsupported cs in hrr"));
}
};
// HRR selects the ciphersuite.
sess.common.set_suite(cs);
// This is the draft19 change where the transcript became a tree
self.0.handshake.transcript.start_hash(cs.get_hash());
self.0.handshake.transcript.rollup_for_hrr();
self.0.handshake.transcript.add_message(&m);
// Early data is not alllowed after HelloRetryrequest
if sess.early_data.is_enabled() {
sess.early_data.rejected();
}
Ok(emit_client_hello_for_retry(sess,
self.0.handshake,
self.0.hello,
Some(hrr)))
}
}
impl State for ExpectServerHelloOrHelloRetryRequest {
fn check_message(&self, m: &Message) -> CheckResult {
check_handshake_message(m,
&[HandshakeType::ServerHello,
HandshakeType::HelloRetryRequest])
}
fn handle(self: Box<Self>, sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl, m: Message) -> NextStateOrError {
if m.is_handshake_type(HandshakeType::ServerHello) {
self.into_expect_server_hello().handle(sess, m)
} else {
self.handle_hello_retry_request(sess, m)
}
}
}
fn validate_encrypted_extensions(sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl,
hello: &ClientHelloDetails,
exts: &EncryptedExtensions) -> Result<(), TLSError> {
if exts.has_duplicate_extension() {
sess.common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::DecodeError);
return Err(TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError("server sent duplicate encrypted extensions"
.to_string()));
}
if hello.server_sent_unsolicited_extensions(exts, &[]) {
sess.common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::UnsupportedExtension);
let msg = "server sent unsolicited encrypted extension".to_string();
return Err(TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError(msg));
}
for ext in exts {
if ALLOWED_PLAINTEXT_EXTS.contains(&ext.get_type()) ||
DISALLOWED_TLS13_EXTS.contains(&ext.get_type()) {
sess.common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::UnsupportedExtension);
let msg = "server sent inappropriate encrypted extension".to_string();
return Err(TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError(msg));
}
}
Ok(())
}
struct ExpectTLS13EncryptedExtensions {
handshake: HandshakeDetails,
server_cert: ServerCertDetails,
hello: ClientHelloDetails,
}
impl ExpectTLS13EncryptedExtensions {
fn into_expect_tls13_finished_resume(self,
certv: verify::ServerCertVerified,
sigv: verify::HandshakeSignatureValid) -> NextState {
Box::new(ExpectTLS13Finished {
handshake: self.handshake,
client_auth: None,
cert_verified: certv,
sig_verified: sigv,
})
}
fn into_expect_tls13_certificate_or_certreq(self) -> NextState {
Box::new(ExpectTLS13CertificateOrCertReq {
handshake: self.handshake,
server_cert: self.server_cert,
})
}
}
impl State for ExpectTLS13EncryptedExtensions {
fn check_message(&self, m: &Message) -> Result<(), TLSError> {
check_handshake_message(m, &[HandshakeType::EncryptedExtensions])
}
fn handle(mut self: Box<Self>, sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl, m: Message) -> NextStateOrError {
let exts = extract_handshake!(m, HandshakePayload::EncryptedExtensions).unwrap();
crate::log::debug!("TLS1.3 encrypted extensions: {:?}", exts);