-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 0
/
cod-du87us_jsnvu6-e139452.xml
170 lines (170 loc) · 10.7 KB
/
cod-du87us_jsnvu6-e139452.xml
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-model href="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/lombardpress/lombardpress-schema/1.0.0/src/out/diplomatic.rng" type="application/xml" schematypens="http://relaxng.org/ns/structure/1.0"?><?xml-model href="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/lombardpress/lombardpress-schema/1.0.0/src/out/diplomatic.rng" type="application/xml" schematypens="http://purl.oclc.org/dsdl/schematron"?><TEI xmlns="http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0">
<teiHeader>
<fileDesc>
<titleStmt>
<title>Quaestio 3</title>
<author ref="#Durandus">Durandus</author>
<respStmt>
<name ref="#jeffreycwitt">Jeffrey C. Witt</name>
<resp>Transcription Editor</resp>
<resp>TEI Encoder</resp>
</respStmt>
</titleStmt>
<editionStmt>
<edition n="0.0.0-dev">
<title>Quaestio 3</title>
<date when="2023-08-20">August 20, 2023</date>
</edition>
</editionStmt>
<publicationStmt>
<authority>SCTA</authority>
<availability status="free">
<p>Published under a <ref target="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)</ref>
</p>
</availability>
</publicationStmt>
<sourceDesc>
<listWit>
<witness xml:id="L" n="cod-du87us">Lyon 1563</witness>
</listWit>
</sourceDesc>
</fileDesc>
<encodingDesc>
<schemaRef n="lbp-diplomatic-1.0.0" url="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/lombardpress/lombardpress-schema/1.0.0/src/out/diplomatic.rng"/>
<editorialDecl>
<p>Encoding of this text has followed the recommendations of the LombardPress 1.0.0
guidelines for a diplomatic edition.</p>
</editorialDecl>
</encodingDesc>
<revisionDesc status="draft">
<listChange>
<change when="2023-08-20" status="draft" n="0.0.0">
<p>Created file for the first time.</p>
</change>
</listChange>
</revisionDesc>
</teiHeader>
<text xml:lang="la">
<front>
<div xml:id="starts-on">
<pb ed="#L" n="169-r"/>
<cb ed="#L" n="a"/>
</div>
</front>
<body>
<div xml:id="jsnvu6-e139452"><!-- l2d39q3 -->
<head xml:id="jsnvu6-e139452-Hd1e101">Quaestio 3</head>
<head xml:id="jsnvu6-e139452-Hd1e103" type="question-title">Utrum voluntas naturaliter velit bonum</head>
<p xml:id="jsnvu6-e139452-d1e106">
<lb ed="#L" n="45"/>QUAESTIO TERTIA.
<lb ed="#L" n="46"/>Vtrum voluntas naturaliter velit bonum.
<lb ed="#L" n="47"/>Thom. 1. 2. q. 8. ar. 1. Gand quodl. 1. 9. 17.
</p>
<p xml:id="jsnvu6-e139452-d1e115">
<lb ed="#L" n="48"/>DEINDE quaeritur, vtrum voluntas
natura<lb ed="#L" n="49" break="no"/>liter velit bonum. Et videtur quod non. Nullum
<lb ed="#L" n="50"/>enim voluntarium est naturale, diuiditur enim
<lb ed="#L" n="51"/>agens naturale contra voluntarium in principio
<lb ed="#L" n="52"/>secundi Physicorum, sed omne velle est
volun<lb ed="#L" n="53" break="no"/>tarium, ergo nullum est naturale.
</p>
<p xml:id="jsnvu6-e139452-d1e131">
<lb ed="#L" n="54"/>Item natura non assuescit in contrarium, vt dicitur a. Ethic.
<lb ed="#L" n="55"/>sed homo per assuefactionem efficitur habilior ad malum
vo<lb ed="#L" n="56" break="no"/>lendum, ergo non vult naturaliter bonum.
</p>
<p xml:id="jsnvu6-e139452-d1e141">
<lb ed="#L" n="57"/>IN CONTRARIVM est quod dicit
Am<lb ed="#L" n="58" break="no"/>brosius super illud ad Romanos I. Non quod volo borum illud
<lb ed="#L" n="59"/>facio: dicit enim quod homo subditus peccato, facit quod non
<lb ed="#L" n="60"/>vult, quia naturaliter vult bonum. Et arguitur per rationem,
<lb ed="#L" n="61"/>quia peccata & defectus sunt praeter naturam, vt dicitur 2. Physi.
<lb ed="#L" n="62"/>sed velle malum est defectus quidam, & peccatum, vt
appa<lb ed="#L" n="63" break="no"/>ret ex praecedente quaestione, ergo velle malum est praeter
na<lb ed="#L" n="64" break="no"/>turam voluntatis: id autem non esset nisi velle bonum inesset
<lb ed="#L" n="65"/>ei naturaliter, ergo: &c.
</p>
<p xml:id="jsnvu6-e139452-d1e163">
<lb ed="#L" n="66"/>RESPONSIO. Dicendum que quaestio potest intelligi
<lb ed="#L" n="67"/>dupliciter. Vno modo, vtrum velle bonum insit naturaliter vo
<lb ed="#L" n="68"/>luntati, hoc est secundum conuenientiam naturae. Alio modo,
<lb ed="#L" n="69"/>vtrum velle bonum conueniat voluntati naturaliter, hoc est
mo<lb ed="#L" n="70" break="no"/>do naturali, sicut igni conuenit ferri sursum naturaliter. Primo
<lb ed="#L" n="71"/>modo intelligendo quaestionem, dicendum quod voluntas vult bo
<lb ed="#L" n="72"/>num naturaliter, hoc est, secundum conuenientiam naturae, quia
<lb ed="#L" n="73"/>illud per quod natura perficitur inest naturaliter, id est, secundum
<lb ed="#L" n="74"/>conuenientiam naturae, sed natura voluntatis perficitur in volen
<lb ed="#L" n="75"/>do bonum, & intellectus in intelligendo verum, vt patet ex
praece<lb ed="#L" n="76" break="no"/>dente quaest. ergo, &c. Et econtrario error in intellectu, & velle
<lb ed="#L" n="77"/>malum est praeter naturam, imo contra naturam, id est, contra
<lb ed="#L" n="78"/>conuenientiam naturae intellectus & voluntatis.
</p>
<p xml:id="jsnvu6-e139452-d1e194">
<lb ed="#L" n="79"/>
<!--5.--> Si autem quaestio intelligatur secundo modo, scilicet an vo¬
<!--00405.xml-->
<cb ed="#L" n="b"/>
<lb ed="#L" n="80"/>luntas velit bonum naturaliter, id est, modo naturali. Sic
vi<lb ed="#L" n="81" break="no"/>dendum est quae sint conditiones agentis vel actionis naturalis,
<lb ed="#L" n="82"/>quae videntur esse duae, vna est, quia actio naturalis non tendit
<lb ed="#L" n="83"/>in praecognitum. Alia est, quod ipsa est determinata ad vnum &
<lb ed="#L" n="84"/>vno modo. Quantum ad primam conditionem patet quod vo
<lb ed="#L" n="85"/>luntas non vult naturaliter bonum, quia non tendit per actum
<lb ed="#L" n="86"/>volendi, nisi in cognitum. Quantum autem ad secundam
con<lb ed="#L" n="87" break="no"/>ditionem considerandum eit, quod bonum (sub cuius ratione
<lb ed="#L" n="88"/>est volitum quicquid est volitum) considerari potest
secun<lb ed="#L" n="89" break="no"/>dum communem rationem boni, vel secundum eius aliquam
<lb ed="#L" n="90"/>rationem specialem. Primo modo voluntas vult naturaliter
<lb ed="#L" n="91"/>bonum. Quod patet, quia nullum peccatum potest esse in
vo<lb ed="#L" n="92" break="no"/>luntate, nin praecedente aliquo defectu in ratione, vt
proba<lb ed="#L" n="93" break="no"/>tum fuit supra, sed proposito bono secundum communem
ratio<lb ed="#L" n="94" break="no"/>nem boni intellectui practico nullus defectus potest esse in
ra<lb ed="#L" n="95" break="no"/>tione, quia sicut intellectus speculatiuus necessario assentit pri
<lb ed="#L" n="96"/>mis principiis formatis in communibus terminis entis, nec circa
<lb ed="#L" n="97"/>ea potest decipi, vt dicitur 4. Metaphys. sic intellectus practicus
<lb ed="#L" n="98"/>primis principiis formatis in communibus terminis
boninecessa<lb ed="#L" n="99" break="no"/>rio assentit in operabilibus, nec circa ea decipitur. Et ita bono
<lb ed="#L" n="100"/>proposito secundum communem rationem boni, intellectui
pra<lb ed="#L" n="101" break="no"/>ctico, nullus defectus potest esse in ratione practica, nec
defe<lb ed="#L" n="102" break="no"/>ctus inconsiderationis, nec erroris, aut ignorantiae: ergo nullum
<lb ed="#L" n="103"/>peccatum omnino potest esse in voluntate, posset autem in ipsa
<lb ed="#L" n="104"/>esse peccatum, si ea non necessario & determinate ferretur in
<lb ed="#L" n="105"/>bonum sic propositum, sed libere posset refutare bonum sic
obla<lb ed="#L" n="106" break="no"/>tum, ergo voluntas necessario, & determinate & vniformiter
<lb ed="#L" n="107"/>fertur in bonum secundum communem rationem boni.
Respe<lb ed="#L" n="108" break="no"/>ctu autem boni accepti in particulari non sic est, quia
intelle<lb ed="#L" n="109" break="no"/>ctus practicus non necessario assentit tali bono, sed deliberat
<lb ed="#L" n="110"/>an sit bonum, sicut deliberat medicus an pharmaca expediant
<lb ed="#L" n="111"/>tali infirmo: potest etiam circa hoc decipi iudicando bonum
<lb ed="#L" n="112"/>quod est malum, vel econtrario, secundum diuersas circunstar
<lb ed="#L" n="113"/>tias. Et ideo voluntas non necessario & determinate fertur in
<lb ed="#L" n="114"/>tale bonum, sed potest libere refutare ipsum.
</p>
<p xml:id="jsnvu6-e139452-d1e281">
<lb ed="#L" n="115"/>
<!--6--> Ad primum argumentum dicendum qued voluntarium
diui<lb ed="#L" n="116" break="no"/>ditur contra naturale, quoad illa, respectu quorum habet
volun<lb ed="#L" n="117" break="no"/>tas dominium sui actus, & sic diuidit Philosoph. 2. Physi. agen
<lb ed="#L" n="118"/>per artem contra agens naturale: ars enim est de factibilibus,
<lb ed="#L" n="119"/>respectu quorum voluntas est libere mouens sic vel aliter, sed
<lb ed="#L" n="120"/>respectu eorum in quae necessario fertur voluntas voluntarium
<lb ed="#L" n="121"/>coincidit cum naturali quoad vltimam conditionem.
</p>
<p xml:id="jsnvu6-e139452-d1e301">
<lb ed="#L" n="122"/>
<!--7--> Per idem patet ad secundum, quia per assuefactionem homo
<lb ed="#L" n="123"/>non habilitatur ad volendum malum sub ratione mali, quia
bi<lb ed="#L" n="124" break="no"/>num secundum rationem communem boni propositum necessario
<lb ed="#L" n="125"/>est volitum, sed habilitatur ad volendum hoc, vel illud malum
<lb ed="#L" n="126"/>sub aliqua particulari ratione boni, circa quam ratio decipitur.
</p>
<p xml:id="jsnvu6-e139452-d1e317">
<lb ed="#L" n="127"/>
<!--8--> AVCTORITAS Ambrosij, & ratio adducta post
<lb ed="#L" n="128"/>oppositum probant quod bonum est volitum naturaliter, id est
<lb ed="#L" n="129"/>secundum conuenientiam naturae.
</p>
</div>
</body>
</text>
</TEI>