HonorLt - Spam proposals

[sherlock-admin2]

HonorLt

medium

Spam proposals

Summary

An infinite number of active proposals can be initiated by any counselor making it more difficult to challenge them.

Vulnerability Detail

Members can submit proposals to execute transactions in TelcoinDistributor:

    function proposeTransaction(
        uint256 totalWithdrawl,
        address[] memory destinations,
        uint256[] memory amounts
    ) external onlyCouncilMember whenNotPaused {
        // Pushing the proposed transaction to the array
        proposedTransactions.push(
            ProposedTransaction({
                totalWithdrawl: totalWithdrawl,
                destinations: destinations,
                amounts: amounts,
                timestamp: uint64(block.timestamp),
                challenged: false,
                executed: false
            })
        );

        // Emitting an event after proposing a transaction
        emit TransactionProposed(proposedTransactions.length - 1, _msgSender());
    }

If one of the members disagrees with the transaction that member can challenge the distribution, this way rejecting it.
However, no limits exist on how many active proposals can be submitted. A malicious actor can submit thousands of copy-paste proposals, especially on chains like Polygon where gas cost is meager. Legit members will have a hard time filtering and challenging all these proposals.

Impact

If evil counselors want to execute some action, they can instantly spam proposals, before their role is revoked. Then white-hat counselors will need to challenge all these proposals fighting a gas war.

Code Snippet

https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2024-01-telcoin/blob/main/telcoin-audit/contracts/protocol/core/TelcoinDistributor.sol#L78-L106

Tool used

Manual Review

Recommendation

Consider introducing global / per-account limits on proposals. Another useful layer of protection would be to check if the original proposer still has a council member role when executing the transaction.

[nevillehuang]

Invalid, a malicious council member will simply waste gas to perform this, given challenging proposal will not be affected since it is indexed O(1) from proposalTransactions mapping . Additionally, admin can simply increase challenge period, which applies its effects immediately.