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authorize.go
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authorize.go
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package authority
import (
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/pkg/errors"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/authority/admin"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/authority/provisioner"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/errs"
"go.step.sm/crypto/jose"
"go.step.sm/linkedca"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
)
// Claims extends jose.Claims with step attributes.
type Claims struct {
jose.Claims
SANs []string `json:"sans,omitempty"`
Email string `json:"email,omitempty"`
Nonce string `json:"nonce,omitempty"`
}
type skipTokenReuseKey struct{}
// NewContextWithSkipTokenReuse creates a new context from ctx and attaches a
// value to skip the token reuse.
func NewContextWithSkipTokenReuse(ctx context.Context) context.Context {
return context.WithValue(ctx, skipTokenReuseKey{}, true)
}
// SkipTokenReuseFromContext returns if the token reuse needs to be ignored.
func SkipTokenReuseFromContext(ctx context.Context) bool {
m, _ := ctx.Value(skipTokenReuseKey{}).(bool)
return m
}
// getProvisionerFromToken extracts a provisioner from the given token without
// doing any token validation.
func (a *Authority) getProvisionerFromToken(token string) (provisioner.Interface, *Claims, error) {
tok, err := jose.ParseSigned(token)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("error parsing token: %w", err)
}
// Get claims w/out verification. We need to look up the provisioner
// key in order to verify the claims and we need the issuer from the claims
// before we can look up the provisioner.
var claims Claims
if err := tok.UnsafeClaimsWithoutVerification(&claims); err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("error unmarshaling token: %w", err)
}
// This method will also validate the audiences for JWK provisioners.
p, ok := a.provisioners.LoadByToken(tok, &claims.Claims)
if !ok {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("provisioner not found or invalid audience (%s)", strings.Join(claims.Audience, ", "))
}
return p, &claims, nil
}
// authorizeToken parses the token and returns the provisioner used to generate
// the token. This method enforces the One-Time use policy (tokens can only be
// used once).
func (a *Authority) authorizeToken(ctx context.Context, token string) (provisioner.Interface, error) {
p, claims, err := a.getProvisionerFromToken(token)
if err != nil {
return nil, errs.UnauthorizedErr(err)
}
// TODO: use new persistence layer abstraction.
// Do not accept tokens issued before the start of the ca.
// This check is meant as a stopgap solution to the current lack of a persistence layer.
if a.config.AuthorityConfig != nil && !a.config.AuthorityConfig.DisableIssuedAtCheck {
if claims.IssuedAt != nil && claims.IssuedAt.Time().Before(a.startTime) {
return nil, errs.Unauthorized("token issued before the bootstrap of certificate authority")
}
}
// Store the token to protect against reuse unless it's skipped.
// If we cannot get a token id from the provisioner, just hash the token.
if !SkipTokenReuseFromContext(ctx) {
if err := a.UseToken(token, p); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
return p, nil
}
// AuthorizeAdminToken authorize an Admin token.
func (a *Authority) AuthorizeAdminToken(r *http.Request, token string) (*linkedca.Admin, error) {
jwt, err := jose.ParseSigned(token)
if err != nil {
return nil, admin.WrapError(admin.ErrorUnauthorizedType, err, "adminHandler.authorizeToken; error parsing x5c token")
}
verifiedChains, err := jwt.Headers[0].Certificates(x509.VerifyOptions{
Roots: a.rootX509CertPool,
KeyUsages: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth},
})
if err != nil {
return nil, admin.WrapError(admin.ErrorUnauthorizedType, err,
"adminHandler.authorizeToken; error verifying x5c certificate chain in token")
}
leaf := verifiedChains[0][0]
if leaf.KeyUsage&x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature == 0 {
return nil, admin.NewError(admin.ErrorUnauthorizedType, "adminHandler.authorizeToken; certificate used to sign x5c token cannot be used for digital signature")
}
// Using the leaf certificates key to validate the claims accomplishes two
// things:
// 1. Asserts that the private key used to sign the token corresponds
// to the public certificate in the `x5c` header of the token.
// 2. Asserts that the claims are valid - have not been tampered with.
var claims jose.Claims
if err := jwt.Claims(leaf.PublicKey, &claims); err != nil {
return nil, admin.WrapError(admin.ErrorUnauthorizedType, err, "adminHandler.authorizeToken; error parsing x5c claims")
}
prov, err := a.LoadProvisionerByCertificate(leaf)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Check that the token has not been used.
if err := a.UseToken(token, prov); err != nil {
return nil, admin.WrapError(admin.ErrorUnauthorizedType, err, "adminHandler.authorizeToken; error with reuse token")
}
// According to "rfc7519 JSON Web Token" acceptable skew should be no
// more than a few minutes.
if err := claims.ValidateWithLeeway(jose.Expected{
Time: time.Now().UTC(),
}, time.Minute); err != nil {
return nil, admin.WrapError(admin.ErrorUnauthorizedType, err, "x5c.authorizeToken; invalid x5c claims")
}
// validate audience: path matches the current path
if !matchesAudience(claims.Audience, a.config.Audience(r.URL.Path)) {
return nil, admin.NewError(admin.ErrorUnauthorizedType, "x5c.authorizeToken; x5c token has invalid audience claim (aud)")
}
// validate issuer: old versions used the provisioner name, new version uses
// 'step-admin-client/1.0'
if claims.Issuer != "step-admin-client/1.0" && claims.Issuer != prov.GetName() {
return nil, admin.NewError(admin.ErrorUnauthorizedType, "x5c.authorizeToken; x5c token has invalid issuer claim (iss)")
}
if claims.Subject == "" {
return nil, admin.NewError(admin.ErrorUnauthorizedType, "x5c.authorizeToken; x5c token subject cannot be empty")
}
var (
ok bool
adm *linkedca.Admin
)
adminFound := false
adminSANs := append([]string{leaf.Subject.CommonName}, leaf.DNSNames...)
adminSANs = append(adminSANs, leaf.EmailAddresses...)
for _, san := range adminSANs {
if adm, ok = a.LoadAdminBySubProv(san, prov.GetName()); ok {
adminFound = true
break
}
}
if !adminFound {
return nil, admin.NewError(admin.ErrorUnauthorizedType,
"adminHandler.authorizeToken; unable to load admin with subject(s) %s and provisioner '%s'",
adminSANs, prov.GetName())
}
if strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/admin/admins") && (r.Method != "GET") && adm.Type != linkedca.Admin_SUPER_ADMIN {
return nil, admin.NewError(admin.ErrorUnauthorizedType, "must have super admin access to make this request")
}
return adm, nil
}
// UseToken stores the token to protect against reuse.
//
// This method currently ignores any error coming from the GetTokenID, but it
// should specifically ignore the error provisioner.ErrAllowTokenReuse.
func (a *Authority) UseToken(token string, prov provisioner.Interface) error {
if reuseKey, err := prov.GetTokenID(token); err == nil {
if reuseKey == "" {
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
reuseKey = strings.ToLower(hex.EncodeToString(sum[:]))
}
ok, err := a.db.UseToken(reuseKey, token)
if err != nil {
return errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "failed when attempting to store token")
}
if !ok {
return errs.Unauthorized("token already used")
}
}
return nil
}
// Authorize grabs the method from the context and authorizes the request by
// validating the one-time-token.
func (a *Authority) Authorize(ctx context.Context, token string) ([]provisioner.SignOption, error) {
var opts = []interface{}{errs.WithKeyVal("token", token)}
switch m := provisioner.MethodFromContext(ctx); m {
case provisioner.SignMethod, provisioner.SignIdentityMethod:
signOpts, err := a.authorizeSign(ctx, token)
return signOpts, errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "authority.Authorize", opts...)
case provisioner.RevokeMethod:
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, a.authorizeRevoke(ctx, token), "authority.Authorize", opts...)
case provisioner.SSHSignMethod:
if a.sshCAHostCertSignKey == nil && a.sshCAUserCertSignKey == nil {
return nil, errs.NotImplemented("authority.Authorize; ssh certificate flows are not enabled", opts...)
}
signOpts, err := a.authorizeSSHSign(ctx, token)
return signOpts, errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "authority.Authorize", opts...)
case provisioner.SSHRenewMethod:
if a.sshCAHostCertSignKey == nil && a.sshCAUserCertSignKey == nil {
return nil, errs.NotImplemented("authority.Authorize; ssh certificate flows are not enabled", opts...)
}
_, err := a.authorizeSSHRenew(ctx, token)
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "authority.Authorize", opts...)
case provisioner.SSHRevokeMethod:
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, a.authorizeSSHRevoke(ctx, token), "authority.Authorize", opts...)
case provisioner.SSHRekeyMethod:
if a.sshCAHostCertSignKey == nil && a.sshCAUserCertSignKey == nil {
return nil, errs.NotImplemented("authority.Authorize; ssh certificate flows are not enabled", opts...)
}
_, signOpts, err := a.authorizeSSHRekey(ctx, token)
return signOpts, errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "authority.Authorize", opts...)
default:
return nil, errs.InternalServer("authority.Authorize; method %d is not supported", append([]interface{}{m}, opts...)...)
}
}
// authorizeSign loads the provisioner from the token and calls the provisioner
// AuthorizeSign method. Returns a list of methods to apply to the signing flow.
func (a *Authority) authorizeSign(ctx context.Context, token string) ([]provisioner.SignOption, error) {
p, err := a.authorizeToken(ctx, token)
if err != nil {
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "authority.authorizeSign")
}
signOpts, err := p.AuthorizeSign(ctx, token)
if err != nil {
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "authority.authorizeSign")
}
return signOpts, nil
}
// AuthorizeSign authorizes a signature request by validating and authenticating
// a token that must be sent w/ the request.
//
// Deprecated: Use Authorize(context.Context, string) ([]provisioner.SignOption, error).
func (a *Authority) AuthorizeSign(token string) ([]provisioner.SignOption, error) {
ctx := NewContext(context.Background(), a)
ctx = provisioner.NewContextWithMethod(ctx, provisioner.SignMethod)
return a.Authorize(ctx, token)
}
// authorizeRevoke locates the provisioner used to generate the authenticating
// token and then performs the token validation flow.
func (a *Authority) authorizeRevoke(ctx context.Context, token string) error {
p, err := a.authorizeToken(ctx, token)
if err != nil {
return errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "authority.authorizeRevoke")
}
if err := p.AuthorizeRevoke(ctx, token); err != nil {
return errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "authority.authorizeRevoke")
}
return nil
}
// authorizeRenew locates the provisioner (using the provisioner extension in the cert), and checks
// if for the configured provisioner, the renewal is enabled or not. If the
// extra extension cannot be found, authorize the renewal by default.
//
// TODO(mariano): should we authorize by default?
func (a *Authority) authorizeRenew(ctx context.Context, cert *x509.Certificate) (provisioner.Interface, error) {
serial := cert.SerialNumber.String()
var opts = []interface{}{errs.WithKeyVal("serialNumber", serial)}
isRevoked, err := a.IsRevoked(serial)
if err != nil {
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "authority.authorizeRenew", opts...)
}
if isRevoked {
return nil, errs.Unauthorized("authority.authorizeRenew: certificate has been revoked", opts...)
}
p, err := a.LoadProvisionerByCertificate(cert)
if err != nil {
var ok bool
// For backward compatibility this method will also succeed if the
// certificate does not have a provisioner extension. LoadByCertificate
// returns the noop provisioner if this happens, and it allows
// certificate renewals.
if p, ok = a.provisioners.LoadByCertificate(cert); !ok {
return nil, errs.Unauthorized("authority.authorizeRenew: provisioner not found", opts...)
}
}
if err := p.AuthorizeRenew(ctx, cert); err != nil {
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "authority.authorizeRenew", opts...)
}
return p, nil
}
// authorizeSSHCertificate returns an error if the given certificate is revoked.
func (a *Authority) authorizeSSHCertificate(_ context.Context, cert *ssh.Certificate) error {
var err error
var isRevoked bool
serial := strconv.FormatUint(cert.Serial, 10)
if lca, ok := a.adminDB.(interface {
IsSSHRevoked(string) (bool, error)
}); ok {
isRevoked, err = lca.IsSSHRevoked(serial)
} else {
isRevoked, err = a.db.IsSSHRevoked(serial)
}
if err != nil {
return errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "authority.authorizeSSHCertificate", errs.WithKeyVal("serialNumber", serial))
}
if isRevoked {
return errs.Unauthorized("authority.authorizeSSHCertificate: certificate has been revoked", errs.WithKeyVal("serialNumber", serial))
}
return nil
}
// authorizeSSHSign loads the provisioner from the token, checks that it has not
// been used again and calls the provisioner AuthorizeSSHSign method. Returns a
// list of methods to apply to the signing flow.
func (a *Authority) authorizeSSHSign(ctx context.Context, token string) ([]provisioner.SignOption, error) {
p, err := a.authorizeToken(ctx, token)
if err != nil {
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusUnauthorized, err, "authority.authorizeSSHSign")
}
signOpts, err := p.AuthorizeSSHSign(ctx, token)
if err != nil {
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusUnauthorized, err, "authority.authorizeSSHSign")
}
return signOpts, nil
}
// authorizeSSHRenew authorizes an SSH certificate renewal request, by
// validating the contents of an SSHPOP token.
func (a *Authority) authorizeSSHRenew(ctx context.Context, token string) (*ssh.Certificate, error) {
p, err := a.authorizeToken(ctx, token)
if err != nil {
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "authority.authorizeSSHRenew")
}
cert, err := p.AuthorizeSSHRenew(ctx, token)
if err != nil {
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "authority.authorizeSSHRenew")
}
return cert, nil
}
// authorizeSSHRekey authorizes an SSH certificate rekey request, by
// validating the contents of an SSHPOP token.
func (a *Authority) authorizeSSHRekey(ctx context.Context, token string) (*ssh.Certificate, []provisioner.SignOption, error) {
p, err := a.authorizeToken(ctx, token)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "authority.authorizeSSHRekey")
}
cert, signOpts, err := p.AuthorizeSSHRekey(ctx, token)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "authority.authorizeSSHRekey")
}
return cert, signOpts, nil
}
// authorizeSSHRevoke authorizes an SSH certificate revoke request, by
// validating the contents of an SSHPOP token.
func (a *Authority) authorizeSSHRevoke(ctx context.Context, token string) error {
p, err := a.authorizeToken(ctx, token)
if err != nil {
return errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "authority.authorizeSSHRevoke")
}
if err = p.AuthorizeSSHRevoke(ctx, token); err != nil {
return errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "authority.authorizeSSHRevoke")
}
return nil
}
// AuthorizeRenewToken validates the renew token and returns the leaf
// certificate in the x5cInsecure header.
func (a *Authority) AuthorizeRenewToken(_ context.Context, ott string) (*x509.Certificate, error) {
var claims jose.Claims
jwt, chain, err := jose.ParseX5cInsecure(ott, a.rootX509Certs)
if err != nil {
return nil, errs.UnauthorizedErr(err, errs.WithMessage("error validating renew token"))
}
leaf := chain[0][0]
if err := jwt.Claims(leaf.PublicKey, &claims); err != nil {
return nil, errs.InternalServerErr(err, errs.WithMessage("error validating renew token"))
}
p, err := a.LoadProvisionerByCertificate(leaf)
if err != nil {
return nil, errs.Unauthorized("error validating renew token: cannot get provisioner from certificate")
}
if err := a.UseToken(ott, p); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := claims.ValidateWithLeeway(jose.Expected{
Subject: leaf.Subject.CommonName,
Time: time.Now().UTC(),
}, time.Minute); err != nil {
switch {
case errors.Is(err, jose.ErrInvalidIssuer):
return nil, errs.UnauthorizedErr(err, errs.WithMessage("error validating renew token: invalid issuer claim (iss)"))
case errors.Is(err, jose.ErrInvalidSubject):
return nil, errs.UnauthorizedErr(err, errs.WithMessage("error validating renew token: invalid subject claim (sub)"))
case errors.Is(err, jose.ErrNotValidYet):
return nil, errs.UnauthorizedErr(err, errs.WithMessage("error validating renew token: token not valid yet (nbf)"))
case errors.Is(err, jose.ErrExpired):
return nil, errs.UnauthorizedErr(err, errs.WithMessage("error validating renew token: token is expired (exp)"))
case errors.Is(err, jose.ErrIssuedInTheFuture):
return nil, errs.UnauthorizedErr(err, errs.WithMessage("error validating renew token: token issued in the future (iat)"))
default:
return nil, errs.UnauthorizedErr(err, errs.WithMessage("error validating renew token"))
}
}
audiences := a.config.GetAudiences().Renew
if !matchesAudience(claims.Audience, audiences) && !isRAProvisioner(p) {
return nil, errs.InternalServerErr(jose.ErrInvalidAudience, errs.WithMessage("error validating renew token: invalid audience claim (aud)"))
}
// validate issuer: old versions used the provisioner name, new version uses
// 'step-ca-client/1.0'
if claims.Issuer != "step-ca-client/1.0" && claims.Issuer != p.GetName() {
return nil, admin.NewError(admin.ErrorUnauthorizedType, "error validating renew token: invalid issuer claim (iss)")
}
return leaf, nil
}
// matchesAudience returns true if A and B share at least one element.
func matchesAudience(as, bs []string) bool {
if len(bs) == 0 || len(as) == 0 {
return false
}
for _, b := range bs {
for _, a := range as {
if b == a || stripPort(a) == stripPort(b) {
return true
}
}
}
return false
}
// stripPort attempts to strip the port from the given url. If parsing the url
// produces errors it will just return the passed argument.
func stripPort(rawurl string) string {
u, err := url.Parse(rawurl)
if err != nil {
return rawurl
}
u.Host = u.Hostname()
return u.String()
}