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enforce ascending writes in bootloader update #368

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merged 1 commit into from Feb 6, 2020
Merged

enforce ascending writes in bootloader update #368

merged 1 commit into from Feb 6, 2020

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conorpp
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@conorpp conorpp commented Feb 6, 2020

Fix an issue in Solo bootloader where the version check can be bypassed, allowing earlier firmware versions to be programmed on secure models. The fix is to enforce writes on ascending addresses.

@conorpp conorpp closed this Feb 6, 2020
@conorpp conorpp reopened this Feb 6, 2020
@conorpp conorpp merged commit f74dba7 into master Feb 6, 2020
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conorpp commented Feb 6, 2020

Thanks to @fcremo and @ikkisoft of Doyensec for the security audit and catching this!

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fcremo commented Feb 10, 2020

Almost LGTM. With this patch an attacker can't choose freely which bytes get interpreted as the version.
However, I think she can still call BootDone with an uninitialized last_written_app_address, and a valid firmware, maybe allowing to bypass the version check.

To do this, she could flash an older firmware with BootWrite commands, reboot the key, then issue the BootDone command, which would verify the signature correctly and then use an uninitialized pointer to read the firmware version.

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