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plugin_server_nodeattestor_gcp_iit.md

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Server plugin: NodeAttestor "gcp_iit"

Must be used in conjunction with the agent-side gcp_iit plugin

The gcp_iit plugin automatically attests instances using the GCP Instance Identity Token. It also allows an operator to use GCP Instance IDs when defining SPIFFE ID attestation policies. Agents attested by the gcp_iit attestor will be issued a SPIFFE ID like spiffe://TRUST_DOMAIN/spire/agent/gcp_iit/PROJECT_ID/INSTANCE_ID This plugin requires an allow list of ProjectID from which nodes can be attested. This also means that you shouldn't run multiple trust domains from the same GCP project.

Configuration

Configuration Description Default
projectid_allow_list List of ProjectIDs from which nodes can be attested.
use_instance_metadata If true, instance metadata is fetched from the Google Compute Engine API and used to augment the node selectors produced by the plugin. false
service_account_file Path to the service account file used to authenticate with the Google Compute Engine API
allowed_label_keys Instance label keys considered for selectors
allowed_metadata_keys Instance metadata keys considered for selectors
max_metadata_value_size Sets the maximum metadata value size considered by the plugin for selectors 128

A sample configuration:

    NodeAttestor "gcp_iit" {
        plugin_data {
            projectid_allow_list = ["project-123"]
        }
    }

Selectors

This plugin generates the following selectors based on information contained in the Instance Identity Token:

Selector Example Description
gcp_iit:project-id gcp_iit:project-id:big-kahuna-123456 ID of the project containing the instance
gcp_iit:zone gcp_iit:zone:us-west1-b Zone containing the instance
gcp_iit:instance-name gcp_iit:instance-name:blog-server Name of the instance

If use_instance_metadata is true, then the Google Compute Engine API is queried for instance metadata which is used to populate these additional selectors:

Selector Example Description
gcp_iit:tag gcp_iit:tag:blog-server Instance tag (one selector per)
gcp_iit:sa gcp_iit:sa:123456789-compute@developer.gserviceaccount.com Service account (one selector per)
gcp_iit:label gcp_iit:label:key:value Instance label
gcp_iit:metadata gcp_iit:metadata:key:value Instance metadata (see caveat below)

Not all instance label and metadata values are useful for node selection. To prevent the creation of large amounts of useless selectors, labels and metadata are not used by default. To opt-in to use a specific label or metadata value, specify the key in the allowed_label_keys or allowed_metadata_keys configurable.

Instance metadata can hold large values up to 256KiB. To prevent pushing large amounts of data into the datastore, a maximum metadata value size limit is enforced. If an allowed (i.e. key specified in allowed_metadata_keys) metadata value is encountered that exceeds the limit then attestation will fail.

Metadata and label values are optional. If the value isn't present, the corresponding selector will still have a trailing colon (i.e. gcp_iit:label:<key>:, gcp_iit:metadata:<key>:)

Authenticating with the Google Compute Engine API

The plugin uses the Application Default Credentials to authenticate with the Google Compute Engine API, as documented by Setting Up Authentication For Server to Server. When SPIRE Server is running inside GCP, it will use the default service account credentials available to the instance it is running under. When running outside GCP, or if non-default credentials are needed, the path to the service account file containing the credentials may be specified using the GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS environment variable or the service_account_file configurable (see Configuration).

The service account must have IAM permissions and Authorization Scopes granting access to the following APIs:

Security Considerations

The Instance Identity Token, which this attestor leverages to prove node identity, is available to any process running on the node by default. As a result, it is possible for non-agent code running on a node to attest to the SPIRE Server, allowing it to obtain any workload identity that the node is authorized to run.

While many operators choose to configure their systems to block access to the Instance Identity Token, the SPIRE project cannot guarantee this posture. To mitigate the associated risk, the gcp_iit node attestor implements Trust On First Use (or TOFU) semantics. For any given node, attestation may occur only once. Subsequent attestation attempts will be rejected.

It is still possible for non-agent code to complete node attestation before SPIRE Agent can, however this condition is easily and quickly detectable as SPIRE Agent will fail to start, and both SPIRE Agent and SPIRE Server will log the occurrence. Such cases should be investigated as possible security incidents.