-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 340
/
domain_group_discovery_with_net.yml
79 lines (79 loc) · 3.39 KB
/
domain_group_discovery_with_net.yml
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
name: Domain Group Discovery With Net
id: f2f14ac7-fa81-471a-80d5-7eb65c3c7349
version: 2
date: '2024-05-28'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: Hunting
description: The following analytic identifies the execution of `net.exe` with command-line
arguments used to query domain groups, specifically `group /domain`. It leverages
data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names
and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it indicates potential
reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to enumerate domain groups, which is a common
step in Active Directory Discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could
allow attackers to gain insights into the domain structure, aiding in further attacks
such as privilege escalation or lateral movement.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="net.exe"
OR Processes.process_name="net1.exe") (Processes.process=*group* AND Processes.process=*/do*)
by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_net_filter`'
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must
be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to
the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint`
data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/
tags:
analytic_story:
- Windows Post-Exploitation
- Active Directory Discovery
- Prestige Ransomware
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
- Rhysida Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 50
impact: 30
message: Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$
mitre_attack_id:
- T1069
- T1069.002
observable:
- name: dest
type: Endpoint
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- Processes.dest
- Processes.user
- Processes.parent_process_name
- Processes.parent_process
- Processes.original_file_name
- Processes.process_name
- Processes.process
- Processes.process_id
- Processes.parent_process_path
- Processes.process_path
- Processes.parent_process_id
risk_score: 15
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data:
https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog