net_localgroup_discovery.yml

name: Net Localgroup Discovery
id: 54f5201e-155b-11ec-a6e2-acde48001122
version: 2
date: '2024-05-21'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: Hunting
description: The following analytic detects the execution of the `net localgroup`
  command, which is used to enumerate local group memberships on a system. It leverages
  data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution
  logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because it
  can indicate an attacker is gathering information about local group memberships,
  potentially to identify privileged accounts. If confirmed malicious, this behavior
  could lead to further privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=net.exe
  OR Processes.process_name=net1.exe (Processes.process="*localgroup*") by Processes.dest
  Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process
  Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id |
  `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
  | `net_localgroup_discovery_filter`'
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
  and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
  telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
  you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
  Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must
  be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to
  the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint`
  data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
  names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: False positives may be present. Tune as needed.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md
- https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/24/2003229517/-1/-1/0/CSA_Living_off_the_Land.PDF
- https://thedfirreport.com/2023/05/22/icedid-macro-ends-in-nokoyawa-ransomware/
tags:
  analytic_story:
  - Prestige Ransomware
  - Volt Typhoon
  - Graceful Wipe Out Attack
  - IcedID
  - Windows Discovery Techniques
  - Windows Post-Exploitation
  - Azorult
  - Active Directory Discovery
  - Rhysida Ransomware
  asset_type: Endpoint
  confidence: 50
  impact: 30
  message: Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.
  mitre_attack_id:
  - T1069
  - T1069.001
  observable:
  - name: dest
    type: Endpoint
    role:
    - Victim
  - name: user
    type: User
    role:
    - Victim
  product:
  - Splunk Enterprise
  - Splunk Enterprise Security
  - Splunk Cloud
  required_fields:
  - _time
  - Processes.dest
  - Processes.user
  - Processes.parent_process_name
  - Processes.parent_process
  - Processes.original_file_name
  - Processes.process_name
  - Processes.process
  - Processes.process_id
  - Processes.parent_process_path
  - Processes.process_path
  - Processes.parent_process_id
  risk_score: 15
  security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
  attack_data:
  - data: 
      https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
    source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
    sourcetype: xmlwineventlog