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powershell_get_localgroup_discovery.yml
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powershell_get_localgroup_discovery.yml
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name: PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery
id: b71adfcc-155b-11ec-9413-acde48001122
version: 2
date: '2024-05-21'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: Hunting
description: The following analytic identifies the use of the `get-localgroup` command
executed via PowerShell or cmd.exe to enumerate local groups on an endpoint. This
detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing
on process names and command-line arguments. Monitoring this activity is significant
as it may indicate an attacker attempting to gather information about local group
memberships, which can be a precursor to privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious,
this activity could allow an attacker to identify and target privileged accounts,
potentially leading to unauthorized access and control over the system.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe
OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe) (Processes.process="*get-localgroup*") by Processes.dest
Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process
Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_filter`'
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must
be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to
the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint`
data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: False positives may be present. Tune as needed.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md
tags:
analytic_story:
- Active Directory Discovery
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 50
impact: 30
message: Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.
mitre_attack_id:
- T1069
- T1069.001
observable:
- name: dest
type: Endpoint
role:
- Victim
- name: user
type: User
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- _time
- Processes.dest
- Processes.user
- Processes.parent_process_name
- Processes.parent_process
- Processes.original_file_name
- Processes.process_name
- Processes.process
- Processes.process_id
- Processes.parent_process_path
- Processes.process_path
- Processes.parent_process_id
risk_score: 15
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data:
https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog