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remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml
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remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml
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name: Remote Process Instantiation via WMI
id: d25d2c3d-d9d8-40ec-8fdf-e86fe155a3da
version: 8
date: '2024-05-23'
author: Rico Valdez, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the execution of wmic.exe with parameters
to spawn a process on a remote system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection
and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and process telemetry
mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. This activity is significant
as WMI can be abused for lateral movement and remote code execution, often used
by adversaries and Red Teams. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers
to execute arbitrary code on remote systems, facilitating further compromise and
lateral spread within the network.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` (Processes.process="*/node:*"
AND Processes.process="*process*" AND Processes.process="*call*" AND Processes.process="*create*")
by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name
Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_filter`'
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must
be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to
the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint`
data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: The wmic.exe utility is a benign Windows application. It may
be used legitimately by Administrators with these parameters for remote system administration,
but it's relatively uncommon.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/cimwin32prov/create-method-in-class-win32-process
tags:
analytic_story:
- Ransomware
- CISA AA23-347A
- Active Directory Lateral Movement
- Suspicious WMI Use
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 70
impact: 70
message: A wmic.exe process $process$ contain process spawn commandline $process$
in host $dest$
mitre_attack_id:
- T1047
observable:
- name: dest
type: Hostname
role:
- Victim
- name: user
type: User
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- _time
- Processes.dest
- Processes.user
- Processes.parent_process_name
- Processes.parent_process
- Processes.original_file_name
- Processes.process_name
- Processes.process
- Processes.process_id
- Processes.parent_process_path
- Processes.process_path
- Processes.parent_process_id
risk_score: 49
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data:
https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog