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scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml
100 lines (100 loc) · 3.97 KB
/
scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml
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name: Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD
id: d5af132c-7c17-439c-9d31-13d55340f36c
version: 6
date: '2023-12-27'
author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: This analytic focuses on identifying the creation or deletion of scheduled
tasks using the schtasks.exe utility with the corresponding command-line flags (-create
or -delete). This technique has been notably associated with threat actors like
Dragonfly and the SUNBURST attack against SolarWinds. The purpose of this analytic
is to detect suspicious activity related to scheduled tasks that could indicate
malicious intent or unauthorized system manipulation. By monitoring for these specific
command-line flags, we can enhance our ability to identify potential threats and
prevent attacks similar to the use of scheduled tasks in the BadRabbit Ransomware
incident.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe
(Processes.process=*delete* OR Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name
Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd_filter` '
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must
be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to
the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint`
data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: While it is possible for legitimate scripts or administrators
to trigger this behavior, filtering can be applied based on the parent process and
application to reduce false positives. Analysts should reference the provided references
to understand the context and threat landscape associated with this activity.
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/21/qbot-and-zerologon-lead-to-full-domain-compromise/
- https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/691823/0/html
tags:
analytic_story:
- AsyncRAT
- Winter Vivern
- Windows Persistence Techniques
- Living Off The Land
- Prestige Ransomware
- AgentTesla
- NjRAT
- RedLine Stealer
- Rhysida Ransomware
- Azorult
- DHS Report TA18-074A
- Scheduled Tasks
- Sandworm Tools
- Qakbot
- CISA AA22-257A
- Trickbot
- NOBELIUM Group
- Amadey
- DarkCrystal RAT
- CISA AA23-347A
- Phemedrone Stealer
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 80
impact: 70
message: A schedule task process $process_name$ with create or delete commandline
$process$ in host $dest$
mitre_attack_id:
- T1053.005
- T1053
observable:
- name: dest
type: Hostname
role:
- Victim
- name: user
type: User
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- _time
- Processes.process
- Processes.parent_process
- Processes.process_name
- Processes.user
- Processes.parent_process_name
- Processes.dest
risk_score: 56
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog